From 86bf04ca9be15a2ed9cad7f3918c90de6ebd6f14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Haris Okanovic Date: Fri, 15 May 2015 16:57:11 -0500 Subject: glibc: CVE-2015-1781: resolv/nss_dns/dns-host.c buffer overflow Backport Arjun Shankar's patch for CVE-2015-1781: A buffer overflow flaw was found in the way glibc's gethostbyname_r() and other related functions computed the size of a buffer when passed a misaligned buffer as input. An attacker able to make an application call any of these functions with a misaligned buffer could use this flaw to crash the application or, potentially, execute arbitrary code with the permissions of the user running the application. https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=18287 (From OE-Core rev: c0f0b6e6ef1edc0a9f9e1ceffb1cdbbef2e409c6) (From OE-Core rev: 54f5e2001249c117cdfc1c26631ba50bc7a155dd) Signed-off-by: Haris Okanovic Reviewed-by: Ben Shelton Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie --- ...81-resolv-nss_dns-dns-host.c-buffer-overf.patch | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2015-1781-resolv-nss_dns-dns-host.c-buffer-overf.patch (limited to 'meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2015-1781-resolv-nss_dns-dns-host.c-buffer-overf.patch') diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2015-1781-resolv-nss_dns-dns-host.c-buffer-overf.patch b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2015-1781-resolv-nss_dns-dns-host.c-buffer-overf.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c02fa127cd --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2015-1781-resolv-nss_dns-dns-host.c-buffer-overf.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 2959eda9272a033863c271aff62095abd01bd4e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Arjun Shankar +Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2015 14:06:31 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2015-1781: resolv/nss_dns/dns-host.c buffer overflow + [BZ#18287] + +Upstream-Status: Backport +https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=18287 +--- + resolv/nss_dns/dns-host.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/resolv/nss_dns/dns-host.c b/resolv/nss_dns/dns-host.c +index b16b0ddf110907a0086b86612e544d3dc75182b8..d8c55791591750567f00e616e5d7b378dec934a0 100644 +--- a/resolv/nss_dns/dns-host.c ++++ b/resolv/nss_dns/dns-host.c +@@ -608,21 +608,22 @@ getanswer_r (const querybuf *answer, int anslen, const char *qname, int qtype, + int n, ancount, qdcount; + int haveanswer, had_error; + char *bp, **ap, **hap; + char tbuf[MAXDNAME]; + const char *tname; + int (*name_ok) (const char *); + u_char packtmp[NS_MAXCDNAME]; + int have_to_map = 0; + uintptr_t pad = -(uintptr_t) buffer % __alignof__ (struct host_data); + buffer += pad; +- if (__glibc_unlikely (buflen < sizeof (struct host_data) + pad)) ++ buflen = buflen > pad ? buflen - pad : 0; ++ if (__glibc_unlikely (buflen < sizeof (struct host_data))) + { + /* The buffer is too small. */ + too_small: + *errnop = ERANGE; + *h_errnop = NETDB_INTERNAL; + return NSS_STATUS_TRYAGAIN; + } + host_data = (struct host_data *) buffer; + linebuflen = buflen - sizeof (struct host_data); + if (buflen - sizeof (struct host_data) != linebuflen) +-- +2.2.2 + -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf