From e93f9a838260100ece7cac36f01e42e321e6414b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Saul Wold Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2014 14:16:23 -0700 Subject: openssl: Upgrade to 1.0.1j This address the latest set of CVE issues (From OE-Core rev: 461e598815f8749bb26e97369e3b877f7ce749cf) Signed-off-by: Saul Wold Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie --- .../openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch | 103 --------------------- 1 file changed, 103 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch') diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0ed1d12551..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,103 +0,0 @@ -Fix for CVE-2014-0224 - -Only accept change cipher spec when it is expected instead of at any -time. This prevents premature setting of session keys before the master -secret is determined which an attacker could use as a MITM attack. - -Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for reporting this issue -and providing the initial fix this patch is based on. - - -Patch borrowed from Fedora -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton - - -diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h ---- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.keying-mitm 2014-06-02 19:48:04.518100562 +0200 -+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h 2014-06-02 19:48:04.642103429 +0200 -@@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st - #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG 0x0008 - #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY 0x0010 - #define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE 0x0020 -+#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK 0x0080 - - /* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we - * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us -diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c ---- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.keying-mitm 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2014-06-02 19:49:57.042701985 +0200 -@@ -559,6 +559,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) - case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: - -+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; -@@ -916,6 +917,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); - goto f_err; - } -+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - s->hit=1; - } - else /* a miss or crap from the other end */ -diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c ---- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c.keying-mitm 2014-06-02 19:48:04.640103383 +0200 -+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2014-06-02 19:48:04.643103452 +0200 -@@ -1298,6 +1298,15 @@ start: - goto f_err; - } - -+ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) -+ { -+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); -+ goto f_err; -+ } -+ -+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; -+ - rr->length=0; - - if (s->msg_callback) -@@ -1432,7 +1441,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) - - if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) - { -- if (s->session == NULL) -+ if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) - { - /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); -diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c ---- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.keying-mitm 2014-06-02 19:48:04.630103151 +0200 -+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2014-06-02 19:48:04.643103452 +0200 -@@ -673,6 +673,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: - -+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - /* we should decide if we expected this one */ - ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; -@@ -700,6 +701,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) - - case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: -+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, - SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; -@@ -770,7 +772,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; - #else - if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) -+ { -+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; -+ } - else - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; - #endif -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf