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-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch77
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch53
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch70
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch56
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch54
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch36
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb6
7 files changed, 352 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a2bafc8c46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
1Upstream-Status: Backport
2
3Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
4
5From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
6From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
7Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300
8Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit
9 and Confirm
10
11The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
12checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
13overflow when processing an invalid message.
14
15Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
16processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
17make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
18message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
19
20Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
21reporting this issue.
22
23Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
24---
25 src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
26 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
27
28diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
29index f2b0926..a629437 100644
30--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
31+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
32@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
33 BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
34 u16 offset;
35 u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
36+ size_t prime_len, order_len;
37+
38+ if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) {
39+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
40+ goto fin;
41+ }
42+
43+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
44+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
45+
46+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
47+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
48+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
49+ (unsigned int) payload_len,
50+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
51+ goto fin;
52+ }
53
54 if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
55 ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
56@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
57 u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
58 int offset;
59
60+ if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
61+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
62+ goto fin;
63+ }
64+
65+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
66+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
67+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
68+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
69+ goto fin;
70+ }
71+
72 /*
73 * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
74 * prf
75--
761.9.1
77
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2568ea1124
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
1Upstream-Status: Backport
2
3Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
4
5From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
6From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
7Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300
8Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser
9
10strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
11resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
12result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
13argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
14
15This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
16has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
17would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
18upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
19(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
20
21Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
22rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
23larger than the maximum configured body length.
24
25Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
26reporting this issue.
27
28Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
29---
30 src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++
31 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
32
33diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c
34index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644
35--- a/src/wps/httpread.c
36+++ b/src/wps/httpread.c
37@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
38 if (!isxdigit(*cbp))
39 goto bad;
40 h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16);
41+ if (h->chunk_size < 0 ||
42+ h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) {
43+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
44+ "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d",
45+ h->chunk_size);
46+ goto bad;
47+ }
48 /* throw away chunk header
49 * so we have only real data
50 */
51--
521.9.1
53
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c477c2f93c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
1Upstream-Status: Backport
2
3Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
4
5From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
6From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
7Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300
8Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit
9 and Confirm
10
11The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
12checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
13overflow when processing an invalid message.
14
15Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
16processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
17make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
18message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
19
20Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
21reporting this issue.
22
23Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
24---
25 src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
26 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
27
28diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
29index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644
30--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
31+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
32@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
33 BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
34 EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
35 int res = 0;
36+ size_t prime_len, order_len;
37
38 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
39
40+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
41+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
42+
43+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
44+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
45+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
46+ (unsigned int) payload_len,
47+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
48+ goto fin;
49+ }
50+
51 if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
52 ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
53 ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
54@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
55 u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
56 int offset;
57
58+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
59+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
60+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
61+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
62+ goto fin;
63+ }
64+
65 /* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
66 grp = htons(data->group_num);
67 ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
68--
691.9.1
70
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e46ce436e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
1Upstream-Status: Backport
2
3Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
4
5From 477c74395acd0123340457ba6f15ab345d42016e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
6From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
7Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:23:04 +0300
8Subject: [PATCH 3/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
9 reassembly
10
11The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
12Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
13prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
14have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
15as a huge positive integer.
16
17In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
18before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
19potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
20
21Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
22---
23 src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 12 ++++++++++++
24 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
25
26diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
27index a629437..1d2079b 100644
28--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
29+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
30@@ -866,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
31 * if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field
32 */
33 if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
34+ if (len < 2) {
35+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
36+ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
37+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
38+ return NULL;
39+ }
40 tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
41 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose "
42 "total length = %d", tot_len);
43 if (tot_len > 15000)
44 return NULL;
45+ if (data->inbuf) {
46+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
47+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
48+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
49+ return NULL;
50+ }
51 data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
52 if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
53 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer "
54--
551.9.1
56
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a4c02b4745
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
1Upstream-Status: Backport
2
3Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
4
5From 3035cc2894e08319b905bd6561e8bddc8c2db9fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
6From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
7Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:06 +0300
8Subject: [PATCH 4/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
9 reassembly
10
11The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
12Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
13prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
14have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
15as a huge positive integer.
16
17In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
18before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
19potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
20
21Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
22---
23 src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 10 ++++++++++
24 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
25
26diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
27index 3189105..2bfc3c2 100644
28--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
29+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
30@@ -942,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
31 * the first fragment has a total length
32 */
33 if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
34+ if (len < 2) {
35+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
36+ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
37+ return;
38+ }
39 tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
40 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total "
41 "length = %d", tot_len);
42 if (tot_len > 15000)
43 return;
44+ if (data->inbuf) {
45+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
46+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
47+ return;
48+ }
49 data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
50 if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
51 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to "
52--
531.9.1
54
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4073600732
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
1Upstream-Status: Backport
2
3Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
4
5From 28a069a545b06b99eb55ad53f63f2c99e65a98f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
6From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
7Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:28 +0300
8Subject: [PATCH 5/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior
9
10The L (Length) and M (More) flags needs to be cleared before deciding
11whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This
12fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid
13for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in
14triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process
15due to invalid buffer allocation.
16
17Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
18---
19 src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 1 +
20 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
21
22diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
23index 1d2079b..e58b13a 100644
24--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
25+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
26@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
27 /*
28 * we have output! Do we need to fragment it?
29 */
30+ lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch);
31 len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf);
32 if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) {
33 resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu,
34--
351.9.1
36
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb
index ebae23922e..0186c2be3d 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb
@@ -25,6 +25,12 @@ SRC_URI = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \
25 file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \ 25 file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \
26 file://99_wpa_supplicant \ 26 file://99_wpa_supplicant \
27 file://0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch \ 27 file://0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch \
28 file://0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch \
29 file://0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch \
30 file://0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch \
31 file://0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch \
32 file://0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch \
33 file://0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch \
28 " 34 "
29SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f0037dbe03897dcaf2ad2722e659095d" 35SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f0037dbe03897dcaf2ad2722e659095d"
30SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "058dc832c096139a059e6df814080f50251a8d313c21b13364c54a1e70109122" 36SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "058dc832c096139a059e6df814080f50251a8d313c21b13364c54a1e70109122"
generated by cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf (git 2.39.0) at 2024-11-11 18:44:02 +0000