190 files changed, 11315 insertions, 574 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/0001-Fix-error-handling-in-gdbm.patch b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/0001-Fix-error-handling-in-gdbm.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 57e7453312..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/0001-Fix-error-handling-in-gdbm.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-From 6b638fa9afbeb54dfa19378e391465a5284ce1ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
-Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2018 17:16:36 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix error handling in gdbm
-
-Only check for gdbm_errno if the return value of the called gdbm_*
-function says so. This fixes apr-util with gdbm 1.14, which does not
-seem to always reset gdbm_errno.
-
-Also make the gdbm driver return error codes starting with
-APR_OS_START_USEERR instead of always returning APR_EGENERAL. This is
-what the berkleydb driver already does.
-
-Also ensure that dsize is 0 if dptr == NULL.
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport[https://svn.apache.org/viewvc?
-view=revision&amp;revision=1825311]
-
-Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
----
- dbm/apr_dbm_gdbm.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/dbm/apr_dbm_gdbm.c b/dbm/apr_dbm_gdbm.c
-index 749447a..1c86327 100644
---- a/dbm/apr_dbm_gdbm.c
-+++ b/dbm/apr_dbm_gdbm.c
-@@ -36,13 +36,25 @@
- static apr_status_t g2s(int gerr)
- {
-     if (gerr == -1) {
--        /* ### need to fix this */
--        return APR_EGENERAL;
-+        if (gdbm_errno == GDBM_NO_ERROR)
-+           return APR_SUCCESS;
-+        return APR_OS_START_USEERR + gdbm_errno;
-     }
- 
-     return APR_SUCCESS;
- }
- 
-+static apr_status_t gdat2s(datum d)
-+{
-+    if (d.dptr == NULL) {
-+        if (gdbm_errno == GDBM_NO_ERROR || gdbm_errno == GDBM_ITEM_NOT_FOUND)
-+           return APR_SUCCESS;
-+        return APR_OS_START_USEERR + gdbm_errno;
-+   }
-+
-+    return APR_SUCCESS;
-+}
-+
- static apr_status_t datum_cleanup(void *dptr)
- {
-     if (dptr)
-@@ -53,22 +65,15 @@ static apr_status_t datum_cleanup(void *dptr)
- 
- static apr_status_t set_error(apr_dbm_t *dbm, apr_status_t dbm_said)
- {
--    apr_status_t rv = APR_SUCCESS;
- 
--    /* ### ignore whatever the DBM said (dbm_said); ask it explicitly */
-+    dbm->errcode = dbm_said;  
- 
--    if ((dbm->errcode = gdbm_errno) == GDBM_NO_ERROR) {
-+    if (dbm_said == APR_SUCCESS)
-         dbm->errmsg = NULL;
--    }
--    else {
--        dbm->errmsg = gdbm_strerror(gdbm_errno);
--        rv = APR_EGENERAL;        /* ### need something better */
--    }
--
--    /* captured it. clear it now. */
--    gdbm_errno = GDBM_NO_ERROR;
-+    else
-+        dbm->errmsg = gdbm_strerror(dbm_said - APR_OS_START_USEERR);
- 
--    return rv;
-+    return dbm_said;
- }
- 
- /* --------------------------------------------------------------------------
-@@ -107,7 +112,7 @@ static apr_status_t vt_gdbm_open(apr_dbm_t **pdb, const char *pathname,
-                      NULL);
- 
-     if (file == NULL)
--        return APR_EGENERAL;      /* ### need a better error */
-+        return APR_OS_START_USEERR + gdbm_errno;   /* ### need a better error */
- 
-     /* we have an open database... return it */
-     *pdb = apr_pcalloc(pool, sizeof(**pdb));
-@@ -141,10 +146,12 @@ static apr_status_t vt_gdbm_fetch(apr_dbm_t *dbm, apr_datum_t key,
-     if (pvalue->dptr)
-         apr_pool_cleanup_register(dbm->pool, pvalue->dptr, datum_cleanup,
-                                   apr_pool_cleanup_null);
-+    else
-+       pvalue->dsize = 0;
- 
-     /* store the error info into DBM, and return a status code. Also, note
-        that *pvalue should have been cleared on error. */
--    return set_error(dbm, APR_SUCCESS);
-+    return set_error(dbm, gdat2s(rd));
- }
- 
- static apr_status_t vt_gdbm_store(apr_dbm_t *dbm, apr_datum_t key,
-@@ -201,9 +208,11 @@ static apr_status_t vt_gdbm_firstkey(apr_dbm_t *dbm, apr_datum_t *pkey)
-     if (pkey->dptr)
-         apr_pool_cleanup_register(dbm->pool, pkey->dptr, datum_cleanup,
-                                   apr_pool_cleanup_null);
-+    else
-+        pkey->dsize = 0;
- 
-     /* store any error info into DBM, and return a status code. */
--    return set_error(dbm, APR_SUCCESS);
-+    return set_error(dbm, gdat2s(rd));
- }
- 
- static apr_status_t vt_gdbm_nextkey(apr_dbm_t *dbm, apr_datum_t *pkey)
-@@ -221,9 +230,11 @@ static apr_status_t vt_gdbm_nextkey(apr_dbm_t *dbm, apr_datum_t *pkey)
-     if (pkey->dptr)
-         apr_pool_cleanup_register(dbm->pool, pkey->dptr, datum_cleanup,
-                                   apr_pool_cleanup_null);
-+    else
-+       pkey->dsize = 0;
- 
-     /* store any error info into DBM, and return a status code. */
--    return set_error(dbm, APR_SUCCESS);
-+    return set_error(dbm, gdat2s(rd));
- }
- 
- static void vt_gdbm_freedatum(apr_dbm_t *dbm, apr_datum_t data)
--- 
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb
index f7d827a1d8..3d9d619c7b 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb
@@ -13,11 +13,9 @@ SRC_URI = "${APACHE_MIRROR}/apr/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://configfix.patch \
            file://configure_fixes.patch \
            file://run-ptest \
-           file://0001-Fix-error-handling-in-gdbm.patch \
-"
+           "
 
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "bd502b9a8670a8012c4d90c31a84955f"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b65e40713da57d004123b6319828be7f1273fbc6490e145874ee1177e112c459"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2b74d8932703826862ca305b094eef2983c27b39d5c9414442e9976a9acf1983"
 
 EXTRA_OECONF = "--with-apr=${STAGING_BINDIR_CROSS}/apr-1-config \
                 --without-odbc \
@@ -35,6 +33,7 @@ OE_BINCONFIG_EXTRA_MANGLE = " -e 's:location=source:location=installed:'"
 do_configure_append() {
         if [ "${CLASSOVERRIDE}" = "class-target" ]; then
                 cp ${STAGING_DATADIR}/apr/apr_rules.mk ${B}/build/rules.mk
+                sed -i -e 's#^CFLAGS=.*#CFLAGS=${TARGET_CFLAGS}#g' ${B}/build/rules.mk
         fi
 }
 do_configure_prepend_class-native() {
@@ -49,6 +48,7 @@ do_configure_append_class-native() {
 
 do_configure_prepend_class-nativesdk() {
         cp ${STAGING_DATADIR}/apr/apr_rules.mk ${S}/build/rules.mk
+        sed -i -e 's#^CFLAGS=.*#CFLAGS=${TARGET_CFLAGS}#g' ${S}/build/rules.mk
 }
 
 do_configure_append_class-nativesdk() {
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0001-Add-option-to-disable-timed-dependant-tests.patch b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0001-Add-option-to-disable-timed-dependant-tests.patch
index abff4e9331..a274f3a16e 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0001-Add-option-to-disable-timed-dependant-tests.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0001-Add-option-to-disable-timed-dependant-tests.patch
@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
-From 2bbe20b4f69e84e7a18bc79d382486953f479328 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 225abf37cd0b49960664b59f08e515a4c4ea5ad0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Jeremy Puhlman <jpuhlman@mvista.com>
 Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2020 18:30:36 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] Add option to disable timed dependant tests
 
-The disabled tests rely on timing to pass correctly. On a virtualized 
+The disabled tests rely on timing to pass correctly. On a virtualized
 system under heavy load, these tests randomly fail because they miss
 a timer or other timing related issues.
 
 Upstream-Status: Pending
 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Puhlman <jpuhlman@mvista.com>
+
 ---
  configure.in     | 6 ++++++
  include/apr.h.in | 1 +
@@ -16,10 +17,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Jeremy Puhlman <jpuhlman@mvista.com>
  3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
-index d9f32d6..f0c5661 100644
+index bfd488b..3663220 100644
 --- a/configure.in
 +++ b/configure.in
-@@ -2886,6 +2886,12 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(timedlocks,
+@@ -3023,6 +3023,12 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(timedlocks,
  )
  AC_SUBST(apr_has_timedlocks)
  
@@ -45,10 +46,10 @@ index ee99def..c46a5f4 100644
  #define APR_PROCATTR_USER_SET_REQUIRES_PASSWORD @apr_procattr_user_set_requires_password@
  
 diff --git a/test/testlock.c b/test/testlock.c
-index a43f477..6233d0b 100644
+index e3437c1..04e01b9 100644
 --- a/test/testlock.c
 +++ b/test/testlock.c
-@@ -396,13 +396,13 @@ abts_suite *testlock(abts_suite *suite)
+@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ abts_suite *testlock(abts_suite *suite)
      abts_run_test(suite, threads_not_impl, NULL);
  #else
      abts_run_test(suite, test_thread_mutex, NULL);
@@ -56,6 +57,8 @@ index a43f477..6233d0b 100644
 +#if APR_HAS_TIMEDLOCKS && APR_HAVE_TIME_DEPENDANT_TESTS
      abts_run_test(suite, test_thread_timedmutex, NULL);
  #endif
+     abts_run_test(suite, test_thread_nestedmutex, NULL);
+@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ abts_suite *testlock(abts_suite *suite)
      abts_run_test(suite, test_thread_rwlock, NULL);
      abts_run_test(suite, test_cond, NULL);
      abts_run_test(suite, test_timeoutcond, NULL);
@@ -63,7 +66,4 @@ index a43f477..6233d0b 100644
 +#if APR_HAS_TIMEDLOCKS && APR_HAVE_TIME_DEPENDANT_TESTS
      abts_run_test(suite, test_timeoutmutex, NULL);
  #endif
- #endif
--- 
-2.23.0
-
+ #ifdef WIN32
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0001-configure-Remove-runtime-test-for-mmap-that-can-map-.patch b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0001-configure-Remove-runtime-test-for-mmap-that-can-map-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a78b16284f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0001-configure-Remove-runtime-test-for-mmap-that-can-map-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From 316b81c462f065927d7fec56aadd5c8cb94d1cf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2022 00:28:08 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] configure: Remove runtime test for mmap that can map
+ /dev/zero
+
+This never works for cross-compile moreover it ends up disabling
+ac_cv_file__dev_zero which then results in compiler errors in shared
+mutexes
+
+Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [Cross-compile specific]
+Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+
+---
+ configure.in | 30 ------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 30 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
+index 3663220..dce9789 100644
+--- a/configure.in
++++ b/configure.in
+@@ -1303,36 +1303,6 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([mmap munmap shm_open shm_unlink shmget shmat shmdt shmctl \
+ APR_CHECK_DEFINE(MAP_ANON, sys/mman.h)
+ AC_CHECK_FILE(/dev/zero)
+ 
+-# Not all systems can mmap /dev/zero (such as HP-UX).  Check for that.
+-if test "$ac_cv_func_mmap" = "yes" &&
+-  test "$ac_cv_file__dev_zero" = "yes"; then
+-    AC_CACHE_CHECK([for mmap that can map /dev/zero],
+-    [ac_cv_mmap__dev_zero],
+-    [AC_TRY_RUN([#include <sys/types.h>
+-#include <sys/stat.h>
+-#include <fcntl.h>
+-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
+-#include <sys/mman.h>
+-#endif
+-    int main()
+-    {
+-        int fd;
+-        void *m;
+-        fd = open("/dev/zero", O_RDWR);
+-        if (fd < 0) {
+-            return 1;
+-        }
+-        m = mmap(0, sizeof(void*), PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
+-        if (m == (void *)-1) {  /* aka MAP_FAILED */
+-            return 2;
+-        }
+-        if (munmap(m, sizeof(void*)) < 0) {
+-            return 3;
+-        }
+-        return 0;
+-    }], [], [ac_cv_file__dev_zero=no], [ac_cv_file__dev_zero=no])])
+-fi
+-
+ # Now we determine which one is our anonymous shmem preference.
+ haveshmgetanon="0"
+ havemmapzero="0"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0002-apr-Remove-workdir-path-references-from-installed-ap.patch b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0002-apr-Remove-workdir-path-references-from-installed-ap.patch
index 72e706f966..d63423f3a1 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0002-apr-Remove-workdir-path-references-from-installed-ap.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0002-apr-Remove-workdir-path-references-from-installed-ap.patch
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
-From 5925b20da8bbc34d9bf5a5dca123ef38864d43c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 689a8db96a6d1e1cae9cbfb35d05ac82140a6555 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
 Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 09:39:06 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 2/7] apr: Remove workdir path references from installed apr
- files
+Subject: [PATCH] apr: Remove workdir path references from installed apr files
 
 Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [configuration]
 
@@ -14,20 +13,23 @@ packages at target run time, the workdir path caused confusion.
 Rebase to 1.6.3
 
 Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
+
 ---
- apr-config.in | 26 ++------------------------
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+ apr-config.in | 32 ++------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/apr-config.in b/apr-config.in
-index 84b4073..bbbf651 100644
+index bed47ca..47874e5 100644
 --- a/apr-config.in
 +++ b/apr-config.in
-@@ -152,14 +152,7 @@ while test $# -gt 0; do
+@@ -164,16 +164,7 @@ while test $# -gt 0; do
      flags="$flags $LDFLAGS"
      ;;
      --includes)
 -    if test "$location" = "installed"; then
          flags="$flags -I$includedir $EXTRA_INCLUDES"
+-    elif test "$location" = "crosscompile"; then
+-        flags="$flags -I$APR_TARGET_DIR/$includedir $EXTRA_INCLUDES"
 -    elif test "$location" = "source"; then
 -        flags="$flags -I$APR_SOURCE_DIR/include $EXTRA_INCLUDES"
 -    else
@@ -37,13 +39,15 @@ index 84b4073..bbbf651 100644
      ;;
      --srcdir)
      echo $APR_SOURCE_DIR
-@@ -181,29 +174,14 @@ while test $# -gt 0; do
+@@ -197,33 +188,14 @@ while test $# -gt 0; do
      exit 0
      ;;
      --link-ld)
 -    if test "$location" = "installed"; then
 -        ### avoid using -L if libdir is a "standard" location like /usr/lib
 -        flags="$flags -L$libdir -l${APR_LIBNAME}"
+-    elif test "$location" = "crosscompile"; then
+-        flags="$flags -L$APR_TARGET_DIR/$libdir -l${APR_LIBNAME}"
 -    else
 -        ### this surely can't work since the library is in .libs?
 -        flags="$flags -L$APR_BUILD_DIR -l${APR_LIBNAME}"
@@ -62,6 +66,8 @@ index 84b4073..bbbf651 100644
 -        # Since the user is specifying they are linking with libtool, we
 -        # *know* that -R will be recognized by libtool.
 -        flags="$flags -L$libdir -R$libdir -l${APR_LIBNAME}"
+-    elif test "$location" = "crosscompile"; then
+-        flags="$flags  -L${APR_TARGET_DIR}/$libdir  -l${APR_LIBNAME}"
 -    else
 -        flags="$flags $LA_FILE"
 -    fi
@@ -69,6 +75,3 @@ index 84b4073..bbbf651 100644
      ;;
      --shlib-path-var)
      echo "$SHLIBPATH_VAR"
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0003-Makefile.in-configure.in-support-cross-compiling.patch b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0003-Makefile.in-configure.in-support-cross-compiling.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4dd53bd8eb..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0003-Makefile.in-configure.in-support-cross-compiling.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-From d5028c10f156c224475b340cfb1ba025d6797243 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
-Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 15:51:42 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 3/7] Makefile.in/configure.in: support cross compiling
-
-While cross compiling, the tools/gen_test_char could not
-be executed at build time, use AX_PROG_CC_FOR_BUILD to
-build native tools/gen_test_char
-
-Upstream-Status: Submitted [https://github.com/apache/apr/pull/8]
-
-Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
----
- Makefile.in  | 10 +++-------
- configure.in |  3 +++
- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
-index 5fb760e..8675f90 100644
---- a/Makefile.in
-+++ b/Makefile.in
-@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ LT_VERSION = @LT_VERSION@
- 
- CLEAN_TARGETS = apr-config.out apr.exp exports.c export_vars.c .make.dirs \
-        build/apr_rules.out tools/gen_test_char@EXEEXT@ \
--       tools/gen_test_char.o tools/gen_test_char.lo \
-+       tools/gen_test_char.o \
-        include/private/apr_escape_test_char.h
- DISTCLEAN_TARGETS = config.cache config.log config.status \
-        include/apr.h include/arch/unix/apr_private.h \
-@@ -131,13 +131,9 @@ check: $(TARGET_LIB)
- etags:
-        etags `find . -name '*.[ch]'`
- 
--OBJECTS_gen_test_char = tools/gen_test_char.lo $(LOCAL_LIBS)
--tools/gen_test_char.lo: tools/gen_test_char.c
-+tools/gen_test_char@EXEEXT@: tools/gen_test_char.c
-        $(APR_MKDIR) tools
--       $(LT_COMPILE)
--
--tools/gen_test_char@EXEEXT@: $(OBJECTS_gen_test_char)
--       $(LINK_PROG) $(OBJECTS_gen_test_char) $(ALL_LIBS)
-+       $(CC_FOR_BUILD) $(CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD) $< -o $@
- 
- include/private/apr_escape_test_char.h: tools/gen_test_char@EXEEXT@
-        $(APR_MKDIR) include/private
-diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
-index 719f331..361120f 100644
---- a/configure.in
-+++ b/configure.in
-@@ -183,6 +183,9 @@ dnl can only be used once within a configure script, so this prevents a
- dnl preload section from invoking the macro to get compiler info.
- AC_PROG_CC
- 
-+dnl Check build CC for gen_test_char compiling which is executed at build time.
-+AX_PROG_CC_FOR_BUILD
-+
- dnl AC_PROG_SED is only avaliable in recent autoconf versions.
- dnl Use AC_CHECK_PROG instead if AC_PROG_SED is not present.
- ifdef([AC_PROG_SED],
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0006-apr-fix-off_t-size-doesn-t-match-in-glibc-when-cross.patch b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0006-apr-fix-off_t-size-doesn-t-match-in-glibc-when-cross.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d1a2ebe881..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0006-apr-fix-off_t-size-doesn-t-match-in-glibc-when-cross.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-From 49661ea3858cf8494926cccf57d3e8c6dcb47117 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dengke Du <dengke.du@windriver.com>
-Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2016 18:13:08 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] apr: fix off_t size doesn't match in glibc when cross
- compiling
-
-In configure.in, it contains the following:
-
-        APR_CHECK_SIZEOF_EXTENDED([#include <sys/types.h>], off_t, 8)
-
-the macro "APR_CHECK_SIZEOF_EXTENDED" was defined in build/apr_common.m4,
-it use the "AC_TRY_RUN" macro, this macro let the off_t to 8, when cross
-compiling enable.
-
-So it was hardcoded for cross compiling, we should detect it dynamic based on
-the sysroot's glibc. We change it to the following:
-
-        AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(off_t)
-
-The same for the following hardcoded types for cross compiling:
-
-        pid_t   8
-        ssize_t 8
-        size_t  8
-        off_t   8
-
-Change the above correspondingly.
-
-Signed-off-by: Dengke Du <dengke.du@windriver.com>
-
-Upstream-Status: Pending
-
----
- configure.in | 8 ++++----
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
-index 27b8539..fb408d1 100644
---- a/configure.in
-+++ b/configure.in
-@@ -1801,7 +1801,7 @@ else
-     socklen_t_value="int"
- fi
- 
--APR_CHECK_SIZEOF_EXTENDED([#include <sys/types.h>], pid_t, 8)
-+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(pid_t)
- 
- if test "$ac_cv_sizeof_pid_t" = "$ac_cv_sizeof_short"; then
-     pid_t_fmt='#define APR_PID_T_FMT "hd"'
-@@ -1873,7 +1873,7 @@ APR_CHECK_TYPES_FMT_COMPATIBLE(size_t, unsigned long, lu, [size_t_fmt="lu"], [
- APR_CHECK_TYPES_FMT_COMPATIBLE(size_t, unsigned int, u, [size_t_fmt="u"])
- ])
- 
--APR_CHECK_SIZEOF_EXTENDED([#include <sys/types.h>], ssize_t, 8)
-+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(ssize_t)
- 
- dnl the else cases below should no longer occur;
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([which format to use for apr_ssize_t])
-@@ -1891,7 +1891,7 @@ fi
- 
- ssize_t_fmt="#define APR_SSIZE_T_FMT \"$ssize_t_fmt\""
- 
--APR_CHECK_SIZEOF_EXTENDED([#include <stddef.h>], size_t, 8)
-+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(size_t)
- 
- # else cases below should no longer occur;
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([which format to use for apr_size_t])
-@@ -1909,7 +1909,7 @@ fi
- 
- size_t_fmt="#define APR_SIZE_T_FMT \"$size_t_fmt\""
- 
--APR_CHECK_SIZEOF_EXTENDED([#include <sys/types.h>], off_t, 8)
-+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(off_t)
- 
- if test "${ac_cv_sizeof_off_t}${apr_cv_use_lfs64}" = "4yes"; then
-     # Enable LFS
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/libtoolize_check.patch b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/libtoolize_check.patch
index 740792e6b0..80ce43caa4 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/libtoolize_check.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/libtoolize_check.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
+From 17835709bc55657b7af1f7c99b3f572b819cf97e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Helmut Grohne <helmut@subdivi.de>
-Subject: check for libtoolize rather than libtool
-Last-Update: 2014-09-19
+Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2023 07:04:00 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] check for libtoolize rather than libtool
 
 libtool is now in package libtool-bin, but apr only needs libtoolize.
 
@@ -8,14 +9,22 @@ Upstream-Status: Pending [ from debian: https://sources.debian.org/data/main/a/a
 
 Signed-off-by: Robert Yang <liezhi.yang@windriver.com>
 
---- apr.orig/build/buildcheck.sh
-+++ apr/build/buildcheck.sh
-@@ -39,11 +39,11 @@ fi
+---
+ build/buildcheck.sh | 10 ++++------
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/build/buildcheck.sh b/build/buildcheck.sh
+index 44921b5..08bc8a8 100755
+--- a/build/buildcheck.sh
++++ b/build/buildcheck.sh
+@@ -39,13 +39,11 @@ fi
  # ltmain.sh (GNU libtool 1.1361 2004/01/02 23:10:52) 1.5a
  # output is multiline from 1.5 onwards
  
 -# Require libtool 1.4 or newer
--libtool=`build/PrintPath glibtool1 glibtool libtool libtool15 libtool14`
+-if test -z "$libtool"; then
+-  libtool=`build/PrintPath glibtool1 glibtool libtool libtool15 libtool14`
+-fi
 -lt_pversion=`$libtool --version 2>/dev/null|sed -e 's/([^)]*)//g;s/^[^0-9]*//;s/[- ].*//g;q'`
 +# Require libtoolize 1.4 or newer
 +libtoolize=`build/PrintPath glibtoolize1 glibtoolize libtoolize libtoolize15 libtoolize14`
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr_1.7.0.bb b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr_1.7.2.bb
index c9b9bf0f50..807dce21da 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr_1.7.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr_1.7.2.bb
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 SUMMARY = "Apache Portable Runtime (APR) library"
-DESCRIPTION = "The Apache Portable Runtime (APR) is a supporting library for the \
-Apache web server. It provides a set of APIs that map to the underlying \
-operating system (OS). Where the OS does not support a particular function, \
-APR will provide an emulation."
+
+DESCRIPTION = "Create and maintain software libraries that provide a predictable \
+and consistent interface to underlying platform-specific implementations."
+
 HOMEPAGE = "http://apr.apache.org/"
 SECTION = "libs"
 DEPENDS = "util-linux"
@@ -16,17 +16,15 @@ BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
 SRC_URI = "${APACHE_MIRROR}/apr/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://run-ptest \
            file://0002-apr-Remove-workdir-path-references-from-installed-ap.patch \
-           file://0003-Makefile.in-configure.in-support-cross-compiling.patch \
            file://0004-Fix-packet-discards-HTTP-redirect.patch \
            file://0005-configure.in-fix-LTFLAGS-to-make-it-work-with-ccache.patch \
-           file://0006-apr-fix-off_t-size-doesn-t-match-in-glibc-when-cross.patch \
            file://0007-explicitly-link-libapr-against-phtread-to-make-gold-.patch \
            file://libtoolize_check.patch \
            file://0001-Add-option-to-disable-timed-dependant-tests.patch \
+           file://0001-configure-Remove-runtime-test-for-mmap-that-can-map-.patch \
            "
 
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "7a14a83d664e87599ea25ff4432e48a7"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "e2e148f0b2e99b8e5c6caa09f6d4fb4dd3e83f744aa72a952f94f5a14436f7ea"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "75e77cc86776c030c0a5c408dfbd0bf2a0b75eed5351e52d5439fa1e5509a43e"
 
 inherit autotools-brokensep lib_package binconfig multilib_header ptest multilib_script
 
@@ -34,17 +32,30 @@ OE_BINCONFIG_EXTRA_MANGLE = " -e 's:location=source:location=installed:'"
 
 # Added to fix some issues with cmake. Refer to https://github.com/bmwcarit/meta-ros/issues/68#issuecomment-19896928
 CACHED_CONFIGUREVARS += "apr_cv_mutex_recursive=yes"
-
+# Enable largefile
+CACHED_CONFIGUREVARS += "apr_cv_use_lfs64=yes"
+# Additional AC_TRY_RUN tests which will need to be cached for cross compile
+CACHED_CONFIGUREVARS += "apr_cv_epoll=yes epoll_create1=yes apr_cv_sock_cloexec=yes \
+    ac_cv_struct_rlimit=yes \
+    ac_cv_func_sem_open=yes \
+    apr_cv_process_shared_works=yes \
+    apr_cv_mutex_robust_shared=yes \
+    "
 # Also suppress trying to use sctp.
 #
 CACHED_CONFIGUREVARS += "ac_cv_header_netinet_sctp_h=no ac_cv_header_netinet_sctp_uio_h=no"
 
-CACHED_CONFIGUREVARS += "ac_cv_sizeof_struct_iovec=yes"
+# ac_cv_sizeof_struct_iovec is deduced using runtime check which will fail during cross-compile
+CACHED_CONFIGUREVARS += "${@['ac_cv_sizeof_struct_iovec=16','ac_cv_sizeof_struct_iovec=8'][d.getVar('SITEINFO_BITS') != '32']}"
+
 CACHED_CONFIGUREVARS += "ac_cv_file__dev_zero=yes"
 
+CACHED_CONFIGUREVARS:append:libc-musl = " ac_cv_strerror_r_rc_int=yes"
 PACKAGECONFIG ??= "${@bb.utils.filter('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'ipv6', d)}"
+PACKAGECONFIG:append:libc-musl = " xsi-strerror"
 PACKAGECONFIG[ipv6] = "--enable-ipv6,--disable-ipv6,"
 PACKAGECONFIG[timed-tests] = "--enable-timed-tests,--disable-timed-tests,"
+PACKAGECONFIG[xsi-strerror] = "ac_cv_strerror_r_rc_int=yes,ac_cv_strerror_r_rc_int=no,"
 
 do_configure_prepend() {
         # Avoid absolute paths for grep since it causes failures
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/argp-standalone/argp-standalone_1.3.bb b/meta/recipes-support/argp-standalone/argp-standalone_1.3.bb
index 21bbcab3d3..d1db562bb5 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/argp-standalone/argp-standalone_1.3.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/argp-standalone/argp-standalone_1.3.bb
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 # Released under the MIT license (see COPYING.MIT for the terms)
 
 SUMMARY = "Glibc hierarchical argument parsing standalone library"
+DESCRIPTION = "Standalone version of arguments parsing functions from GLIBC"
 HOMEPAGE = "http://www.lysator.liu.se/~nisse/misc/"
 LICENSE = "LGPL-2.1"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://argp.h;beginline=1;endline=20;md5=008b7e53dea6f9e1d9fdef0d9cf3184a"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell_0.60.8.bb b/meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell_0.60.8.bb
index f1d931b39c..9147c820e7 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell_0.60.8.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell_0.60.8.bb
@@ -1,14 +1,21 @@
 SUMMARY = "GNU Aspell spell-checker"
-DESCRIPTION = "GNU Aspell is a spell-checker which can be used either as a \
-standalone application or embedded in other programs. Its main feature is that \
-it does a much better job of suggesting possible spellings than just about any \
-other spell-checker available for the English language"
+
+DESCRIPTION = "Spell checker designed to eventually replace Ispell. \
+It can either be used as a library or as an independent spell checker. \
+Its main feature is that it does a superior job of suggesting possible \
+replacements for a misspelled word than just about any other spell \
+checker out there for the English language."
+
 SECTION = "console/utils"
 
+HOMEPAGE = "http://aspell.net/"
+
 LICENSE = "LGPLv2 | LGPLv2.1"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=7fbc338309ac38fefcd64b04bb903e34"
 
-SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/aspell/aspell-${PV}.tar.gz"
+SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/aspell/aspell-${PV}.tar.gz \
+           file://CVE-2019-25051.patch \
+"
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "012fa9209203ae4e5a61c2a668fd10e3"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f9b77e515334a751b2e60daab5db23499e26c9209f5e7b7443b05235ad0226f2"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/aspell/files/CVE-2019-25051.patch b/meta/recipes-support/aspell/files/CVE-2019-25051.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8513f6de79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/aspell/files/CVE-2019-25051.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+From 0718b375425aad8e54e1150313b862e4c6fd324a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kevin Atkinson <kevina@gnu.org>
+Date: Sat, 21 Dec 2019 20:32:47 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] objstack: assert that the alloc size will fit within a chunk
+ to prevent a buffer overflow
+
+Bug found using OSS-Fuze.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://github.com/gnuaspell/aspell/commit/0718b375425aad8e54e1150313b862e4c6fd324a]
+CVE: CVE-2019-25051
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ common/objstack.hpp | 18 ++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/common/objstack.hpp b/common/objstack.hpp
+index 3997bf7..bd97ccd 100644
+--- a/common/objstack.hpp
++++ b/common/objstack.hpp
+@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
+ #include "parm_string.hpp"
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <assert.h>
++#include <stddef.h>
+ 
+ namespace acommon {
+ 
+@@ -26,6 +27,12 @@ class ObjStack
+   byte * temp_end;
+   void setup_chunk();
+   void new_chunk();
++  bool will_overflow(size_t sz) const {
++    return offsetof(Node,data) + sz > chunk_size;
++  }
++  void check_size(size_t sz) {
++    assert(!will_overflow(sz));
++  }
+ 
+   ObjStack(const ObjStack &);
+   void operator=(const ObjStack &);
+@@ -56,7 +63,7 @@ class ObjStack
+   void * alloc_bottom(size_t size)  {
+     byte * tmp = bottom;
+     bottom += size;
+-    if (bottom > top) {new_chunk(); tmp = bottom; bottom += size;}
++    if (bottom > top) {check_size(size); new_chunk(); tmp = bottom; bottom += size;}
+     return tmp;
+   }
+   // This alloc_bottom will insure that the object is aligned based on the
+@@ -66,7 +73,7 @@ class ObjStack
+     align_bottom(align);
+     byte * tmp = bottom;
+     bottom += size;
+-    if (bottom > top) {new_chunk(); goto loop;}
++    if (bottom > top) {check_size(size); new_chunk(); goto loop;}
+     return tmp;
+   }
+   char * dup_bottom(ParmString str) {
+@@ -79,7 +86,7 @@ class ObjStack
+   // always be aligned as such.
+   void * alloc_top(size_t size) {
+     top -= size;
+-    if (top < bottom) {new_chunk(); top -= size;}
++    if (top < bottom) {check_size(size); new_chunk(); top -= size;}
+     return top;
+   }
+   // This alloc_top will insure that the object is aligned based on
+@@ -88,7 +95,7 @@ class ObjStack
+   {loop:
+     top -= size;
+     align_top(align);
+-    if (top < bottom) {new_chunk(); goto loop;}
++    if (top < bottom) {check_size(size); new_chunk(); goto loop;}
+     return top;
+   }
+   char * dup_top(ParmString str) {
+@@ -117,6 +124,7 @@ class ObjStack
+   void * alloc_temp(size_t size) {
+     temp_end = bottom + size;
+     if (temp_end > top) {
++      check_size(size);
+       new_chunk();
+       temp_end = bottom + size;
+     }
+@@ -131,6 +139,7 @@ class ObjStack
+     } else {
+       size_t s = temp_end - bottom;
+       byte * p = bottom;
++      check_size(size);
+       new_chunk();
+       memcpy(bottom, p, s);
+       temp_end = bottom + size;
+@@ -150,6 +159,7 @@ class ObjStack
+     } else {
+       size_t s = temp_end - bottom;
+       byte * p = bottom;
++      check_size(size);
+       new_chunk();
+       memcpy(bottom, p, s);
+       temp_end = bottom + size;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/atk/at-spi2-atk_2.34.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/atk/at-spi2-atk_2.34.1.bb
index c297912588..ad30617e56 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/atk/at-spi2-atk_2.34.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/atk/at-spi2-atk_2.34.1.bb
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 SUMMARY = "AT-SPI 2 Toolkit Bridge"
+DESCRIPTION = "Contains a library that bridges ATK to At-Spi2 D-Bus service. Toolkit widgets use it to provide their content to screen readers such as Orca."
 HOMEPAGE = "https://wiki.linuxfoundation.org/accessibility/d-bus"
+BUGTRACKER = "http://bugzilla.gnome.org/"
 LICENSE = "LGPL-2.1+"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=4fbd65380cdd255951079008b364516c"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/atk/at-spi2-core_2.34.0.bb b/meta/recipes-support/atk/at-spi2-core_2.34.0.bb
index bcef8ef169..2ad09878b7 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/atk/at-spi2-core_2.34.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/atk/at-spi2-core_2.34.0.bb
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
 SUMMARY = "Assistive Technology Service Provider Interface (dbus core)"
-DESCRIPTION = "At-Spi2 is a protocol over DBus, toolkit widgets use it to \
-provide their content to screen readers such as Orca."
+
+DESCRIPTION = "It provides a Service Provider Interface for the Assistive Technologies available on the GNOME platform and a library against which applications can be linked."
+
 HOMEPAGE = "https://wiki.linuxfoundation.org/accessibility/d-bus"
+BUGTRACKER = "http://bugzilla.gnome.org/"
 LICENSE = "LGPL-2.1+"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=4fbd65380cdd255951079008b364516c"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/atk/atk_2.34.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/atk/atk_2.34.1.bb
index 741350ffe5..25ef3c6c52 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/atk/atk_2.34.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/atk/atk_2.34.1.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 SUMMARY = "Accessibility toolkit for GNOME"
+DESCRIPTION = "Provides application programming interfaces (APIs) for implementing accessibility support in software."
 HOMEPAGE = "https://wiki.gnome.org/Accessibility"
 BUGTRACKER = "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/atk/-/issues"
 SECTION = "x11/libs"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/attr/acl_2.2.53.bb b/meta/recipes-support/attr/acl_2.2.53.bb
index b120c1f16f..7cee45948d 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/attr/acl_2.2.53.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/attr/acl_2.2.53.bb
@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
 SUMMARY = "Utilities for managing POSIX Access Control Lists"
-HOMEPAGE = "http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/acl/"
 DESCRIPTION = "ACL allows you to provide different levels of access to files \
 and folders for different users."
+
+HOMEPAGE = "http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/acl/"
+BUGTRACKER = "http://savannah.nongnu.org/bugs/?group=acl"
+
 SECTION = "libs"
 
 LICENSE = "LGPLv2.1+ & GPLv2+"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/attr/attr.inc b/meta/recipes-support/attr/attr.inc
index 8515f96bf7..30ba0b4445 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/attr/attr.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/attr/attr.inc
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
 SUMMARY = "Utilities for manipulating filesystem extended attributes"
-DESCRIPTION = "A set of tools for manipulating extended attributes on filesystem \
-objects, in particular getfattr(1) and setfattr(1). An attr(1) command \
-is also provided which is largely compatible with the SGI IRIX tool of \
-the same name."
+DESCRIPTION = "Implement the ability for a user to attach name:value pairs to objects within the XFS filesystem."
+
 HOMEPAGE = "http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/attr/"
 SECTION = "libs"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/bash-completion/bash-completion_2.10.bb b/meta/recipes-support/bash-completion/bash-completion_2.10.bb
index 58e565dee5..1f99bf7386 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/bash-completion/bash-completion_2.10.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/bash-completion/bash-completion_2.10.bb
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 SUMMARY = "Programmable Completion for Bash 4"
-DESCRIPTION = "bash completion extends bash's standard completion behavior to \
-achieve complex command lines with just a few keystrokes."
+DESCRIPTION = "Collection of command line command completions for the Bash shell, \
+collection of helper functions to assist in creating new completions, \
+and set of facilities for loading completions automatically on demand, as well \
+as installing them."
+
 HOMEPAGE = "https://github.com/scop/bash-completion"
 BUGTRACKER = "https://github.com/scop/bash-completion/issues"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/bmap-tools/bmap-tools_3.5.bb b/meta/recipes-support/bmap-tools/bmap-tools_3.5.bb
index 986f0124e2..6a93cacc18 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/bmap-tools/bmap-tools_3.5.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/bmap-tools/bmap-tools_3.5.bb
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ SECTION = "console/utils"
 LICENSE = "GPLv2"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=b234ee4d69f5fce4486a80fdaf4a4263"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://github.com/intel/${BPN}"
+SRC_URI = "git://github.com/intel/${BPN};branch=main;protocol=https"
 
 SRCREV = "db7087b883bf52cbff063ad17a41cc1cbb85104d"
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost-1.72.0.inc b/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost-1.72.0.inc
index 55a095bf1c..d152895f09 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost-1.72.0.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost-1.72.0.inc
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ BOOST_VER = "${@"_".join(d.getVar("PV").split("."))}"
 BOOST_MAJ = "${@"_".join(d.getVar("PV").split(".")[0:2])}"
 BOOST_P = "boost_${BOOST_VER}"
 
-SRC_URI = "https://dl.bintray.com/boostorg/release/${PV}/source/${BOOST_P}.tar.bz2"
+SRC_URI = "https://boostorg.jfrog.io/artifactory/main/release/${PV}/source/${BOOST_P}.tar.bz2"
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "cb40943d2a2cb8ce08d42bc48b0f84f0"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "59c9b274bc451cf91a9ba1dd2c7fdcaf5d60b1b3aa83f2c9fa143417cc660722"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost.inc b/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost.inc
index 8eb9494381..1c13fb3599 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost.inc
@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
 SUMMARY = "Free peer-reviewed portable C++ source libraries"
+DESCRIPTION = "Provides free peer-reviewed portable C++ source libraries.  The emphasis is on libraries which work well with the C++ \
+Standard Library.  One goal is to establish 'existing practice' and \
+provide reference implementations so that the Boost libraries are suitable for eventual standardization.  Some of the libraries have already been proposed for inclusion in the C++ Standards Committee's \
+upcoming C++ Standard Library Technical Report."
 SECTION = "libs"
 DEPENDS = "bjam-native zlib bzip2"
 
@@ -161,7 +165,7 @@ do_configure() {
 
         # D2194:Fixing the failure of "error: duplicate initialization of gcc with the following parameters" during compilation.
         rm -f ${WORKDIR}/user-config.jam
-        echo 'using gcc : 4.3.1 : ${CXX} : <cflags>"${CFLAGS}" <cxxflags>"${CXXFLAGS}" <linkflags>"${LDFLAGS}" ;' >> ${WORKDIR}/user-config.jam
+        echo 'using gcc : : ${CXX} : <cflags>"${CFLAGS}" <cxxflags>"${CXXFLAGS}" <linkflags>"${LDFLAGS}" ;' >> ${WORKDIR}/user-config.jam
 
         # If we want Python then we need to tell Boost *exactly* where to find it
         if ${@bb.utils.contains('BOOST_LIBS', 'python', 'true', 'false', d)}; then
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost/0001-Fix-Wsign-compare-warning-with-glibc-2.34-on-Linux-p.patch b/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost/0001-Fix-Wsign-compare-warning-with-glibc-2.34-on-Linux-p.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..46c706931b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost/0001-Fix-Wsign-compare-warning-with-glibc-2.34-on-Linux-p.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From f9d0e594d43afcb4ab0043117249feb266ba4515 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Romain Geissler <romain.geissler@amadeus.com>
+Date: Tue, 10 Aug 2021 14:22:28 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix -Wsign-compare warning with glibc 2.34 on Linux
+ platforms.
+
+In file included from /data/mwrep/res/osp/Boost/21-0-0-0/include/boost/thread/thread_only.hpp:17,
+                 from /data/mwrep/res/osp/Boost/21-0-0-0/include/boost/thread/thread.hpp:12,
+                 from src/GetTest.cpp:12:
+/data/mwrep/res/osp/Boost/21-0-0-0/include/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp: In member function 'void boost::thread_attributes::set_stack_size(std::size_t)':
+/data/mwrep/res/osp/Boost/21-0-0-0/include/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp:61:19: error: comparison of integer expressions of different signedness: 'std::size_t' {aka 'long unsigned int'} and 'long int' [-Werror=sign-compare]
+   61 |           if (size<PTHREAD_STACK_MIN) size=PTHREAD_STACK_MIN;
+      |                   ^
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [1.78.0 https://github.com/boostorg/thread/commit/f9d0e594d43afcb4ab0043117249feb266ba4515]
+---
+ boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp b/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp
+index bc9b1367..c43b276d 100644
+--- a/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp
++++ b/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ namespace boost
+           std::size_t page_size = ::sysconf( _SC_PAGESIZE);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef PTHREAD_STACK_MIN
+-          if (size<PTHREAD_STACK_MIN) size=PTHREAD_STACK_MIN;
++          if (size<static_cast<std::size_t>(PTHREAD_STACK_MIN)) size=PTHREAD_STACK_MIN;
+ #endif
+           size = ((size+page_size-1)/page_size)*page_size;
+           int res = pthread_attr_setstacksize(&val_, size);
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost/0001-Revert-change-to-elide-a-warning-that-caused-Solaris.patch b/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost/0001-Revert-change-to-elide-a-warning-that-caused-Solaris.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3784cf9165
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost/0001-Revert-change-to-elide-a-warning-that-caused-Solaris.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+From 74fb0a26099bc51d717f5f154b37231ce7df3e98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Rob Boehne <robb@datalogics.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2019 11:25:20 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] Revert change to elide a warning that caused Solaris builds
+ to fail.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [1.73.0 https://github.com/boostorg/thread/commit/74fb0a26099bc51d717f5f154b37231ce7df3e98]
+---
+ boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp b/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp
+index aefbeb43..bc9b1367 100644
+--- a/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp
++++ b/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp
+@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ namespace boost
+ #else
+           std::size_t page_size = ::sysconf( _SC_PAGESIZE);
+ #endif
+-#if PTHREAD_STACK_MIN > 0
++#ifdef PTHREAD_STACK_MIN
+           if (size<PTHREAD_STACK_MIN) size=PTHREAD_STACK_MIN;
+ #endif
+           size = ((size+page_size-1)/page_size)*page_size;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost_1.72.0.bb b/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost_1.72.0.bb
index df1cc16937..b3ec11933c 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost_1.72.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost_1.72.0.bb
@@ -9,4 +9,6 @@ SRC_URI += " \
            file://0001-dont-setup-compiler-flags-m32-m64.patch \
            file://0001-revert-cease-dependence-on-range.patch \
            file://0001-added-typedef-executor_type.patch \
+           file://0001-Revert-change-to-elide-a-warning-that-caused-Solaris.patch \
+           file://0001-Fix-Wsign-compare-warning-with-glibc-2.34-on-Linux-p.patch \
            "
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates/0001-Revert-mozilla-certdata2pem.py-print-a-warning-for-e.patch b/meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates/0001-Revert-mozilla-certdata2pem.py-print-a-warning-for-e.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5c4a32f526
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates/0001-Revert-mozilla-certdata2pem.py-print-a-warning-for-e.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From cb43ec15b700b25f3c4fe44043a1a021aaf5b768 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de>
+Date: Mon, 18 Oct 2021 12:05:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Revert "mozilla/certdata2pem.py: print a warning for expired
+ certificates."
+
+This avoids a dependency on python3-cryptography, and only checks
+for expired certs (which is upstream concern, but not ours).
+
+Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [oe-core specific]
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de>
+---
+ debian/changelog        |  1 -
+ debian/control          |  2 +-
+ mozilla/certdata2pem.py | 11 -----------
+ 3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
+index 531e4d0..4006509 100644
+--- a/debian/changelog
++++ b/debian/changelog
+@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ ca-certificates (20211004) unstable; urgency=low
+     - "Trustis FPS Root CA"
+     - "Staat der Nederlanden Root CA - G3"
+   * Blacklist expired root certificate "DST Root CA X3" (closes: #995432)
+-  * mozilla/certdata2pem.py: print a warning for expired certificates.
+ 
+  -- Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>  Thu, 07 Oct 2021 17:12:47 +0200
+ 
+diff --git a/debian/control b/debian/control
+index 4434b7a..5c6ba24 100644
+--- a/debian/control
++++ b/debian/control
+@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Section: misc
+ Priority: optional
+ Maintainer: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>
+ Build-Depends: debhelper-compat (= 13), po-debconf
+-Build-Depends-Indep: python3, openssl, python3-cryptography
++Build-Depends-Indep: python3, openssl
+ Standards-Version: 4.5.0.2
+ Vcs-Git: https://salsa.debian.org/debian/ca-certificates.git
+ Vcs-Browser: https://salsa.debian.org/debian/ca-certificates
+diff --git a/mozilla/certdata2pem.py b/mozilla/certdata2pem.py
+index ede23d4..7d796f1 100644
+--- a/mozilla/certdata2pem.py
++++ b/mozilla/certdata2pem.py
+@@ -21,16 +21,12 @@
+ # USA.
+ 
+ import base64
+-import datetime
+ import os.path
+ import re
+ import sys
+ import textwrap
+ import io
+ 
+-from cryptography import x509
+-
+-
+ objects = []
+ 
+ # Dirty file parser.
+@@ -121,13 +117,6 @@ for obj in objects:
+     if obj['CKA_CLASS'] == 'CKO_CERTIFICATE':
+         if not obj['CKA_LABEL'] in trust or not trust[obj['CKA_LABEL']]:
+             continue
+-
+-        cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(obj['CKA_VALUE'])
+-        if cert.not_valid_after < datetime.datetime.now():
+-            print('!'*74)
+-            print('Trusted but expired certificate found: %s' % obj['CKA_LABEL'])
+-            print('!'*74)
+-
+         bname = obj['CKA_LABEL'][1:-1].replace('/', '_')\
+                                       .replace(' ', '_')\
+                                       .replace('(', '=')\
+-- 
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates/sbindir.patch b/meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates/sbindir.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a113fa8b15..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates/sbindir.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Pending
-
-Let us alter the install destination of the script via SBINDIR
-
---- ca-certificates-20130119.orig/sbin/Makefile
-+++ ca-certificates-20130119/sbin/Makefile
-@@ -3,9 +3,12 @@
- #
- #
-
-+SBINDIR = /usr/sbin
-+
- all:
-
- clean:
-
- install:
--       install -m755 update-ca-certificates $(DESTDIR)/usr/sbin/
-+       install -d $(DESTDIR)$(SBINDIR)
-+       install -m755 update-ca-certificates $(DESTDIR)$(SBINDIR)/
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates/update-ca-certificates-support-Toybox.patch b/meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates/update-ca-certificates-support-Toybox.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 6e2171f758..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates/update-ca-certificates-support-Toybox.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From 30378026d136efa779732e3f6664e2ecf461e458 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com>
-Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2016 12:38:09 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] update-ca-certificates: support Toybox
-
-"mktemp -t" is deprecated and does not work when using Toybox. Replace
-with something that works also with Toybox.
-
-Upstream-Status: Pending
-
-Signed-off-by: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com>
----
- sbin/update-ca-certificates | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/sbin/update-ca-certificates b/sbin/update-ca-certificates
-index 79c41bb..ae9e3f1 100755
---- a/sbin/update-ca-certificates
-+++ b/sbin/update-ca-certificates
-@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ trap cleanup 0
- 
- # Helper files.  (Some of them are not simple arrays because we spawn
- # subshells later on.)
--TEMPBUNDLE="$(mktemp -t "${CERTBUNDLE}.tmp.XXXXXX")"
--ADDED="$(mktemp -t "ca-certificates.tmp.XXXXXX")"
--REMOVED="$(mktemp -t "ca-certificates.tmp.XXXXXX")"
-+TEMPBUNDLE="$(mktemp -p${TMPDIR:-/tmp} "${CERTBUNDLE}.tmp.XXXXXX")"
-+ADDED="$(mktemp -p${TMPDIR:-/tmp} "ca-certificates.tmp.XXXXXX")"
-+REMOVED="$(mktemp -p${TMPDIR:-/tmp} "ca-certificates.tmp.XXXXXX")"
- 
- # Adds a certificate to the list of trusted ones.  This includes a symlink
- # in /etc/ssl/certs to the certificate file and its inclusion into the
--- 
-2.1.4
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates_20210119.bb b/meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates_20211016.bb
index 888a235c1a..a54d6b458a 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates_20210119.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates_20211016.bb
@@ -14,15 +14,14 @@ DEPENDS_class-nativesdk = "openssl-native"
 # Need rehash from openssl and run-parts from debianutils
 PACKAGE_WRITE_DEPS += "openssl-native debianutils-native"
 
-SRCREV = "181be7ebd169b4a6fb5d90c3e6dc791e90534144"
+SRCREV = "07de54fdcc5806bde549e1edf60738c6bccf50e8"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://salsa.debian.org/debian/ca-certificates.git;protocol=https \
+SRC_URI = "git://salsa.debian.org/debian/ca-certificates.git;protocol=https;branch=master \
            file://0002-update-ca-certificates-use-SYSROOT.patch \
            file://0001-update-ca-certificates-don-t-use-Debianisms-in-run-p.patch \
-           file://update-ca-certificates-support-Toybox.patch \
            file://default-sysroot.patch \
-           file://sbindir.patch \
            file://0003-update-ca-certificates-use-relative-symlinks-from-ET.patch \
+           file://0001-Revert-mozilla-certdata2pem.py-print-a-warning-for-e.patch \
            "
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "(?P<pver>\d+)"
 
@@ -83,8 +82,8 @@ do_install_append_class-native () {
     SYSROOT="${D}${base_prefix}" ${D}${sbindir}/update-ca-certificates
 }
 
-RDEPENDS_${PN}_class-target = "openssl-bin"
-RDEPENDS_${PN}_class-native = "openssl-native"
-RDEPENDS_${PN}_class-nativesdk = "nativesdk-openssl-bin"
+RDEPENDS_${PN}_append_class-target = " openssl-bin openssl"
+RDEPENDS_${PN}_append_class-native = " openssl-native"
+RDEPENDS_${PN}_append_class-nativesdk = " nativesdk-openssl-bin nativesdk-openssl"
 
 BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/consolekit/consolekit_0.4.6.bb b/meta/recipes-support/consolekit/consolekit_0.4.6.bb
index 89f2d77b66..22e755747b 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/consolekit/consolekit_0.4.6.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/consolekit/consolekit_0.4.6.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 SUMMARY = "Framework for defining and tracking users, login sessions, and seats"
+DESCRIPTION = "It provides a mechanism for software to react to changes \
+of any of these items or of any of the metadata associated with them."
 HOMEPAGE = "http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/ConsoleKit"
 BUGTRACKER = "https://bugs.freedesktop.org/buglist.cgi?query_format=specific&product=ConsoleKit"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22876.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22876.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fc396aabef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22876.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+transfer: strip credentials from the auto-referer header field
+
+CVE-2021-22876
+
+Patch taken from Ubuntu curl 7.68.0-1ubuntu2.5.
+
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22876.html
+Upstream-Status: backport
+---
+ lib/transfer.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/transfer.c b/lib/transfer.c
+index e76834eb3..744e1c00b 100644
+--- a/lib/transfer.c
++++ b/lib/transfer.c
+@@ -1570,6 +1570,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_follow(struct Curl_easy *data,
+       data->set.followlocation++; /* count location-followers */
+ 
+       if(data->set.http_auto_referer) {
++        CURLU *u;
++        char *referer;
++
+         /* We are asked to automatically set the previous URL as the referer
+            when we get the next URL. We pick the ->url field, which may or may
+            not be 100% correct */
+@@ -1579,9 +1582,27 @@ CURLcode Curl_follow(struct Curl_easy *data,
+           data->change.referer_alloc = FALSE;
+         }
+ 
+-        data->change.referer = strdup(data->change.url);
+-        if(!data->change.referer)
++        /* Make a copy of the URL without crenditals and fragment */
++        u = curl_url();
++        if(!u)
++          return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
++
++        uc = curl_url_set(u, CURLUPART_URL, data->change.url, 0);
++        if(!uc)
++          uc = curl_url_set(u, CURLUPART_FRAGMENT, NULL, 0);
++        if(!uc)
++          uc = curl_url_set(u, CURLUPART_USER, NULL, 0);
++        if(!uc)
++          uc = curl_url_set(u, CURLUPART_PASSWORD, NULL, 0);
++        if(!uc)
++          uc = curl_url_get(u, CURLUPART_URL, &referer, 0);
++
++        curl_url_cleanup(u);
++
++        if(uc || referer == NULL)
+           return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
++
++        data->change.referer = referer;
+         data->change.referer_alloc = TRUE; /* yes, free this later */
+       }
+     }
+-- 
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22890.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22890.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8c0ecbfe7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22890.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,464 @@
+vtls: add 'isproxy' argument to Curl_ssl_get/addsessionid()
+
+To make sure we set and extract the correct session.
+
+Patch taken from Ubuntu curl 7.68.0-1ubuntu2.5.
+
+CVE-2021-22890
+
+Reported-by: Mingtao Yang
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22890.html
+Upstream-Status: backport
+---
+ lib/vtls/bearssl.c   |  9 +++++---
+ lib/vtls/gtls.c      |  9 +++++---
+ lib/vtls/mbedtls.c   |  8 ++++---
+ lib/vtls/mesalink.c  |  9 +++++---
+ lib/vtls/openssl.c   | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ lib/vtls/schannel.c  | 10 +++++----
+ lib/vtls/sectransp.c |  9 ++++----
+ lib/vtls/vtls.c      |  9 ++++++--
+ lib/vtls/vtls.h      |  2 ++
+ lib/vtls/wolfssl.c   |  8 ++++---
+ 10 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/bearssl.c b/lib/vtls/bearssl.c
+index 67f945831..32cb0a4c2 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/bearssl.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/bearssl.c
+@@ -372,7 +372,8 @@ static CURLcode bearssl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+     void *session;
+ 
+     Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
+-    if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &session, NULL, sockindex)) {
++    if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
++                              &session, NULL, sockindex)) {
+       br_ssl_engine_set_session_parameters(&BACKEND->ctx.eng, session);
+       infof(data, "BearSSL: re-using session ID\n");
+     }
+@@ -560,10 +561,12 @@ static CURLcode bearssl_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+       return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+     br_ssl_engine_get_session_parameters(&BACKEND->ctx.eng, session);
+     Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
+-    incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &oldsession, NULL, sockindex));
++    incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
++                                      &oldsession, NULL, sockindex));
+     if(incache)
+       Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, oldsession);
+-    ret = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, session, 0, sockindex);
++    ret = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
++                                session, 0, sockindex);
+     Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn);
+     if(ret) {
+       free(session);
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/gtls.c b/lib/vtls/gtls.c
+index 5f740eeba..46e149c7d 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/gtls.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/gtls.c
+@@ -937,7 +937,8 @@ gtls_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
+     size_t ssl_idsize;
+ 
+     Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
+-    if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, &ssl_idsize, sockindex)) {
++    if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
++                              &ssl_sessionid, &ssl_idsize, sockindex)) {
+       /* we got a session id, use it! */
+       gnutls_session_set_data(session, ssl_sessionid, ssl_idsize);
+ 
+@@ -1485,7 +1486,8 @@ gtls_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
+       gnutls_session_get_data(session, connect_sessionid, &connect_idsize);
+ 
+       Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
+-      incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL,
++      incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
++                                        &ssl_sessionid, NULL,
+                                         sockindex));
+       if(incache) {
+         /* there was one before in the cache, so instead of risking that the
+@@ -1494,7 +1496,8 @@ gtls_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
+       }
+ 
+       /* store this session id */
+-      result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, connect_sessionid, connect_idsize,
++      result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
++                                     connect_sessionid, connect_idsize,
+                                      sockindex);
+       Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn);
+       if(result) {
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c b/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c
+index f057315f3..19df8478e 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c
+@@ -453,7 +453,8 @@ mbed_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
+     void *old_session = NULL;
+ 
+     Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
+-    if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_session, NULL, sockindex)) {
++    if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
++                              &old_session, NULL, sockindex)) {
+       ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_session(&BACKEND->ssl, old_session);
+       if(ret) {
+         Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn);
+@@ -709,6 +710,7 @@ mbed_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
+     int ret;
+     mbedtls_ssl_session *our_ssl_sessionid;
+     void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL;
++    bool isproxy = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE;
+ 
+     our_ssl_sessionid = malloc(sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session));
+     if(!our_ssl_sessionid)
+@@ -727,10 +729,10 @@ mbed_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
+ 
+     /* If there's already a matching session in the cache, delete it */
+     Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
+-    if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex))
++    if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, isproxy, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex))
+       Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, old_ssl_sessionid);
+ 
+-    retcode = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, our_ssl_sessionid, 0, sockindex);
++    retcode = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, isproxy, our_ssl_sessionid, 0, sockindex);
+     Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn);
+     if(retcode) {
+       mbedtls_ssl_session_free(our_ssl_sessionid);
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/mesalink.c b/lib/vtls/mesalink.c
+index cab1e390b..79d1e3dfa 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/mesalink.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/mesalink.c
+@@ -263,7 +263,8 @@ mesalink_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+     void *ssl_sessionid = NULL;
+ 
+     Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
+-    if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex)) {
++    if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
++                              &ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex)) {
+       /* we got a session id, use it! */
+       if(!SSL_set_session(BACKEND->handle, ssl_sessionid)) {
+         Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn);
+@@ -347,12 +348,14 @@ mesalink_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+     bool incache;
+     SSL_SESSION *our_ssl_sessionid;
+     void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL;
++    bool inproxy = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE;
+ 
+     our_ssl_sessionid = SSL_get_session(BACKEND->handle);
+ 
+     Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
+     incache =
+-      !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex));
++      !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, isproxy, &old_ssl_sessionid,
++                              NULL, sockindex));
+     if(incache) {
+       if(old_ssl_sessionid != our_ssl_sessionid) {
+         infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing\n");
+@@ -363,7 +366,7 @@ mesalink_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+ 
+     if(!incache) {
+       result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(
+-        conn, our_ssl_sessionid, 0 /* unknown size */, sockindex);
++        conn, isproxy, our_ssl_sessionid, 0 /* unknown size */, sockindex);
+       if(result) {
+         Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn);
+         failf(data, "failed to store ssl session");
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/openssl.c b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+index 1d09cadca..64f43605a 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/openssl.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+@@ -422,12 +422,23 @@ static int ossl_get_ssl_conn_index(void)
+  */
+ static int ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index(void)
+ {
+-  static int ssl_ex_data_sockindex_index = -1;
+-  if(ssl_ex_data_sockindex_index < 0) {
+-    ssl_ex_data_sockindex_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+-        NULL);
++  static int sockindex_index = -1;
++  if(sockindex_index < 0) {
++    sockindex_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+   }
+-  return ssl_ex_data_sockindex_index;
++  return sockindex_index;
++}
++
++/* Return an extra data index for proxy boolean.
++ * This index can be used with SSL_get_ex_data() and SSL_set_ex_data().
++ */
++static int ossl_get_proxy_index(void)
++{
++  static int proxy_index = -1;
++  if(proxy_index < 0) {
++    proxy_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++  }
++  return proxy_index;
+ }
+ 
+ static int passwd_callback(char *buf, int num, int encrypting,
+@@ -1079,7 +1090,8 @@ static int Curl_ossl_init(void)
+ #endif
+ 
+   /* Initialize the extra data indexes */
+-  if(ossl_get_ssl_conn_index() < 0 || ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index() < 0)
++  if(ossl_get_ssl_conn_index() < 0 || ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index() < 0 ||
++     ossl_get_proxy_index() < 0)
+     return 0;
+ 
+   return 1;
+@@ -2341,8 +2353,10 @@ static int ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid)
+   curl_socket_t *sockindex_ptr;
+   int connectdata_idx = ossl_get_ssl_conn_index();
+   int sockindex_idx = ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index();
++  int proxy_idx = ossl_get_proxy_index();
++  bool isproxy;
+ 
+-  if(connectdata_idx < 0 || sockindex_idx < 0)
++  if(connectdata_idx < 0 || sockindex_idx < 0 || proxy_idx < 0)
+     return 0;
+ 
+   conn = (struct connectdata*) SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, connectdata_idx);
+@@ -2355,13 +2369,18 @@ static int ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid)
+   sockindex_ptr = (curl_socket_t*) SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, sockindex_idx);
+   sockindex = (int)(sockindex_ptr - conn->sock);
+ 
++  isproxy = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, proxy_idx) ? TRUE : FALSE;
++
+   if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)) {
+     bool incache;
+     void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL;
+ 
+     Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
+-    incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL,
+-                                      sockindex));
++    if(isproxy)
++      incache = FALSE;
++    else
++      incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, isproxy,
++                                        &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex));
+     if(incache) {
+       if(old_ssl_sessionid != ssl_sessionid) {
+         infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing\n");
+@@ -2371,7 +2390,7 @@ static int ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid)
+     }
+ 
+     if(!incache) {
+-      if(!Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, ssl_sessionid,
++      if(!Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, isproxy, ssl_sessionid,
+                                       0 /* unknown size */, sockindex)) {
+         /* the session has been put into the session cache */
+         res = 1;
+@@ -2868,16 +2887,25 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+     void *ssl_sessionid = NULL;
+     int connectdata_idx = ossl_get_ssl_conn_index();
+     int sockindex_idx = ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index();
++    int proxy_idx = ossl_get_proxy_index();
+ 
+-    if(connectdata_idx >= 0 && sockindex_idx >= 0) {
++    if(connectdata_idx >= 0 && sockindex_idx >= 0 && proxy_idx >= 0) {
+       /* Store the data needed for the "new session" callback.
+        * The sockindex is stored as a pointer to an array element. */
+       SSL_set_ex_data(BACKEND->handle, connectdata_idx, conn);
+       SSL_set_ex_data(BACKEND->handle, sockindex_idx, conn->sock + sockindex);
++#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
++      SSL_set_ex_data(BACKEND->handle, proxy_idx, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? (void *) 1:
++                      NULL);
++#else
++      SSL_set_ex_data(BACKEND->handle, proxy_idx, NULL);
++#endif
++
+     }
+ 
+     Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
+-    if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex)) {
++    if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
++                              &ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex)) {
+       /* we got a session id, use it! */
+       if(!SSL_set_session(BACKEND->handle, ssl_sessionid)) {
+         Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn);
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/schannel.c b/lib/vtls/schannel.c
+index f665ee340..a354ce95d 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/schannel.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/schannel.c
+@@ -487,7 +487,8 @@ schannel_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+   /* check for an existing re-usable credential handle */
+   if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)) {
+     Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
+-    if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, (void **)&old_cred, NULL, sockindex)) {
++    if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
++                              (void **)&old_cred, NULL, sockindex)) {
+       BACKEND->cred = old_cred;
+       DEBUGF(infof(data, "schannel: re-using existing credential handle\n"));
+ 
+@@ -1193,8 +1194,9 @@ schannel_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+   struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+   SECURITY_STATUS sspi_status = SEC_E_OK;
+   CERT_CONTEXT *ccert_context = NULL;
++  bool isproxy = SSL_IS_PROXY();
+ #ifdef DEBUGBUILD
+-  const char * const hostname = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->http_proxy.host.name :
++  const char * const hostname = isproxy ? conn->http_proxy.host.name :
+     conn->host.name;
+ #endif
+ #ifdef HAS_ALPN
+@@ -1268,7 +1270,7 @@ schannel_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+     struct curl_schannel_cred *old_cred = NULL;
+ 
+     Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
+-    incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, (void **)&old_cred, NULL,
++    incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, isproxy, (void **)&old_cred, NULL,
+                                       sockindex));
+     if(incache) {
+       if(old_cred != BACKEND->cred) {
+@@ -1280,7 +1282,7 @@ schannel_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+       }
+     }
+     if(!incache) {
+-      result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, (void *)BACKEND->cred,
++      result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, isproxy, (void *)BACKEND->cred,
+                                      sizeof(struct curl_schannel_cred),
+                                      sockindex);
+       if(result) {
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/sectransp.c b/lib/vtls/sectransp.c
+index 7dd028fb7..9c67d465a 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/sectransp.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/sectransp.c
+@@ -1376,7 +1376,8 @@ static CURLcode sectransp_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
+   const char * const ssl_cafile = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile);
+   const bool verifypeer = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer);
+   char * const ssl_cert = SSL_SET_OPTION(cert);
+-  const char * const hostname = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->http_proxy.host.name :
++  bool isproxy = SSL_IS_PROXY();
++  const char * const hostname = isproxy ? conn->http_proxy.host.name :
+     conn->host.name;
+   const long int port = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->port : conn->remote_port;
+ #ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+@@ -1584,7 +1585,7 @@ static CURLcode sectransp_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
+       if(data->set.httpversion >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2 &&
+-         (!SSL_IS_PROXY() || !conn->bits.tunnel_proxy)) {
++         (!isproxy || !conn->bits.tunnel_proxy)) {
+         CFArrayAppendValue(alpnArr, CFSTR(NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID));
+         infof(data, "ALPN, offering %s\n", NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID);
+       }
+@@ -1916,7 +1917,7 @@ static CURLcode sectransp_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
+     size_t ssl_sessionid_len;
+ 
+     Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
+-    if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, (void **)&ssl_sessionid,
++    if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, isproxy, (void **)&ssl_sessionid,
+                               &ssl_sessionid_len, sockindex)) {
+       /* we got a session id, use it! */
+       err = SSLSetPeerID(BACKEND->ssl_ctx, ssl_sessionid, ssl_sessionid_len);
+@@ -1944,7 +1945,7 @@ static CURLcode sectransp_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
+         return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+       }
+ 
+-      result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, ssl_sessionid, ssl_sessionid_len,
++      result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, isproxy, ssl_sessionid, ssl_sessionid_len,
+                                      sockindex);
+       Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn);
+       if(result) {
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/vtls.c b/lib/vtls/vtls.c
+index dfefa1bd5..aaf73ef8f 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/vtls.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/vtls.c
+@@ -305,6 +305,7 @@ void Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(struct connectdata *conn)
+  * there's one suitable, it is provided. Returns TRUE when no entry matched.
+  */
+ bool Curl_ssl_getsessionid(struct connectdata *conn,
++                           const bool isProxy,
+                            void **ssl_sessionid,
+                            size_t *idsize, /* set 0 if unknown */
+                            int sockindex)
+@@ -315,7 +316,6 @@ bool Curl_ssl_getsessionid(struct connectdata *conn,
+   long *general_age;
+   bool no_match = TRUE;
+ 
+-  const bool isProxy = CONNECT_PROXY_SSL();
+   struct ssl_primary_config * const ssl_config = isProxy ?
+     &conn->proxy_ssl_config :
+     &conn->ssl_config;
+@@ -324,6 +324,11 @@ bool Curl_ssl_getsessionid(struct connectdata *conn,
+   int port = isProxy ? (int)conn->port : conn->remote_port;
+   *ssl_sessionid = NULL;
+ 
++#ifdef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
++  if(isProxy)
++    return TRUE;
++#endif
++
+   DEBUGASSERT(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid));
+ 
+   if(!SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid))
+@@ -411,6 +416,7 @@ void Curl_ssl_delsessionid(struct connectdata *conn, void *ssl_sessionid)
+  * later on.
+  */
+ CURLcode Curl_ssl_addsessionid(struct connectdata *conn,
++                               bool isProxy,
+                                void *ssl_sessionid,
+                                size_t idsize,
+                                int sockindex)
+@@ -423,7 +429,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_ssl_addsessionid(struct connectdata *conn,
+   char *clone_conn_to_host;
+   int conn_to_port;
+   long *general_age;
+-  const bool isProxy = CONNECT_PROXY_SSL();
+   struct ssl_primary_config * const ssl_config = isProxy ?
+     &conn->proxy_ssl_config :
+     &conn->ssl_config;
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/vtls.h b/lib/vtls/vtls.h
+index a81b2f22d..a5e348752 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/vtls.h
++++ b/lib/vtls/vtls.h
+@@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ void Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(struct connectdata *conn);
+  * under sessionid mutex).
+  */
+ bool Curl_ssl_getsessionid(struct connectdata *conn,
++                           const bool isproxy,
+                            void **ssl_sessionid,
+                            size_t *idsize, /* set 0 if unknown */
+                            int sockindex);
+@@ -211,6 +212,7 @@ bool Curl_ssl_getsessionid(struct connectdata *conn,
+  * object with cache (e.g. incrementing refcount on success)
+  */
+ CURLcode Curl_ssl_addsessionid(struct connectdata *conn,
++                               const bool isProxy,
+                                void *ssl_sessionid,
+                                size_t idsize,
+                                int sockindex);
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/wolfssl.c b/lib/vtls/wolfssl.c
+index 8c2d3f4a2..dd9f907ff 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/wolfssl.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/wolfssl.c
+@@ -392,7 +392,8 @@ wolfssl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
+     void *ssl_sessionid = NULL;
+ 
+     Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
+-    if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex)) {
++    if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
++                              &ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex)) {
+       /* we got a session id, use it! */
+       if(!SSL_set_session(BACKEND->handle, ssl_sessionid)) {
+         char error_buffer[WOLFSSL_MAX_ERROR_SZ];
+@@ -618,9 +619,10 @@ wolfssl_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
+     void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL;
+ 
+     our_ssl_sessionid = SSL_get_session(BACKEND->handle);
++    bool isproxy = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE;
+ 
+     Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
+-    incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL,
++    incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, isproxy, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL,
+                                       sockindex));
+     if(incache) {
+       if(old_ssl_sessionid != our_ssl_sessionid) {
+@@ -631,7 +633,7 @@ wolfssl_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
+     }
+ 
+     if(!incache) {
+-      result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, our_ssl_sessionid,
++      result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, isproxy, our_ssl_sessionid,
+                                      0 /* unknown size */, sockindex);
+       if(result) {
+         Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn);
+-- 
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22898.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22898.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0800e10175
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22898.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 39ce47f219b09c380b81f89fe54ac586c8db6bde Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Harry Sintonen <sintonen@iki.fi>
+Date: Fri, 7 May 2021 13:09:57 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] telnet: check sscanf() for correct number of matches
+
+CVE: CVE-2021-22898
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Link: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/39ce47f219b09c380b81f89fe54ac586c8db6bde
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22898.html
+---
+ lib/telnet.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/telnet.c b/lib/telnet.c
+index 26e0658ba9cc..fdd137fb0c04 100644
+--- a/lib/telnet.c
++++ b/lib/telnet.c
+@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ static void suboption(struct Curl_easy *data)
+         size_t tmplen = (strlen(v->data) + 1);
+         /* Add the variable only if it fits */
+         if(len + tmplen < (int)sizeof(temp)-6) {
+-          if(sscanf(v->data, "%127[^,],%127s", varname, varval)) {
++          if(sscanf(v->data, "%127[^,],%127s", varname, varval) == 2) {
+             msnprintf((char *)&temp[len], sizeof(temp) - len,
+                       "%c%s%c%s", CURL_NEW_ENV_VAR, varname,
+                       CURL_NEW_ENV_VALUE, varval);
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22924.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22924.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..68fde45ddf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22924.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+Subject: [PATCH] vtls: fix connection reuse checks for issuer cert and
+ case sensitivity CVE-2021-22924
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22924.html
+CVE: CVE-2021-22924
+Upstream-Status: backport from Ubuntu curl_7.68.0-1ubuntu2.6
+Signed-off-by: Mike Crowe <mac@mcrowe.com>
+---
+ lib/url.c          |  5 +++--
+ lib/urldata.h      |  2 +-
+ lib/vtls/gtls.c    | 10 +++++-----
+ lib/vtls/nss.c     |  4 ++--
+ lib/vtls/openssl.c | 12 ++++++------
+ lib/vtls/vtls.c    | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 6 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c
+index 47fc66aed..eebad8d32 100644
+--- a/lib/url.c
++++ b/lib/url.c
+@@ -3555,6 +3555,9 @@ static CURLcode create_conn(struct Curl_easy *data,
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.CApath = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH_PROXY];
+   data->set.ssl.primary.CAfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE_ORIG];
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.CAfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE_PROXY];
++  data->set.ssl.primary.issuercert = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT_ORIG];
++  data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.issuercert =
++    data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT_PROXY];
+   data->set.ssl.primary.random_file = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE];
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.random_file =
+     data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE];
+@@ -3575,8 +3578,6 @@ static CURLcode create_conn(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ 
+   data->set.ssl.CRLfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE_ORIG];
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.CRLfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE_PROXY];
+-  data->set.ssl.issuercert = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT_ORIG];
+-  data->set.proxy_ssl.issuercert = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT_PROXY];
+   data->set.ssl.cert = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_ORIG];
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.cert = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_PROXY];
+   data->set.ssl.cert_type = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_TYPE_ORIG];
+diff --git a/lib/urldata.h b/lib/urldata.h
+index fbb8b645e..615fbf369 100644
+--- a/lib/urldata.h
++++ b/lib/urldata.h
+@@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ struct ssl_primary_config {
+   long version_max;      /* max supported version the client wants to use*/
+   char *CApath;          /* certificate dir (doesn't work on windows) */
+   char *CAfile;          /* certificate to verify peer against */
++  char *issuercert;      /* optional issuer certificate filename */
+   char *clientcert;
+   char *random_file;     /* path to file containing "random" data */
+   char *egdsocket;       /* path to file containing the EGD daemon socket */
+@@ -240,7 +241,6 @@ struct ssl_config_data {
+   struct ssl_primary_config primary;
+   long certverifyresult; /* result from the certificate verification */
+   char *CRLfile;   /* CRL to check certificate revocation */
+-  char *issuercert;/* optional issuer certificate filename */
+   curl_ssl_ctx_callback fsslctx; /* function to initialize ssl ctx */
+   void *fsslctxp;        /* parameter for call back */
+   char *cert; /* client certificate file name */
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/gtls.c b/lib/vtls/gtls.c
+index 46e149c7d..8c051024f 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/gtls.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/gtls.c
+@@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@ gtls_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
+   if(!chainp) {
+     if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer) ||
+        SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost) ||
+-       SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) {
++       SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)) {
+ #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+       if(SSL_SET_OPTION(authtype) == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP
+          && SSL_SET_OPTION(username) != NULL
+@@ -1241,21 +1241,21 @@ gtls_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
+        gnutls_x509_crt_t format */
+     gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_cert, chainp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
+ 
+-  if(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) {
++  if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)) {
+     gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509_issuer);
+-    issuerp = load_file(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
++    issuerp = load_file(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
+     gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_issuer, &issuerp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+     rc = gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer(x509_cert, x509_issuer);
+     gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_issuer);
+     unload_file(issuerp);
+     if(rc <= 0) {
+       failf(data, "server certificate issuer check failed (IssuerCert: %s)",
+-            SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)?SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert):"none");
++            SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)?SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert):"none");
+       gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
+       return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
+     }
+     infof(data, "\t server certificate issuer check OK (Issuer Cert: %s)\n",
+-          SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)?SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert):"none");
++          SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)?SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert):"none");
+   }
+ 
+   size = sizeof(certbuf);
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/nss.c b/lib/vtls/nss.c
+index ef51b0d91..375c78b1b 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/nss.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/nss.c
+@@ -2151,9 +2151,9 @@ static CURLcode nss_do_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+   if(result)
+     goto error;
+ 
+-  if(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) {
++  if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)) {
+     SECStatus ret = SECFailure;
+-    char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
++    char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
+     if(nickname) {
+       /* we support only nicknames in case of issuercert for now */
+       ret = check_issuer_cert(BACKEND->handle, nickname);
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/openssl.c b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+index 64f43605a..7e81fd3a0 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/openssl.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+@@ -3547,7 +3547,7 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn,
+        deallocating the certificate. */
+ 
+     /* e.g. match issuer name with provided issuer certificate */
+-    if(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) {
++    if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)) {
+       fp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+       if(fp == NULL) {
+         failf(data,
+@@ -3560,10 +3560,10 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn,
+         return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+       }
+ 
+-      if(BIO_read_filename(fp, SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) <= 0) {
++      if(BIO_read_filename(fp, SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)) <= 0) {
+         if(strict)
+           failf(data, "SSL: Unable to open issuer cert (%s)",
+-                SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
++                SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
+         BIO_free(fp);
+         X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert);
+         BACKEND->server_cert = NULL;
+@@ -3574,7 +3574,7 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn,
+       if(!issuer) {
+         if(strict)
+           failf(data, "SSL: Unable to read issuer cert (%s)",
+-                SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
++                SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
+         BIO_free(fp);
+         X509_free(issuer);
+         X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert);
+@@ -3585,7 +3585,7 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn,
+       if(X509_check_issued(issuer, BACKEND->server_cert) != X509_V_OK) {
+         if(strict)
+           failf(data, "SSL: Certificate issuer check failed (%s)",
+-                SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
++                SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
+         BIO_free(fp);
+         X509_free(issuer);
+         X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert);
+@@ -3594,7 +3594,7 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn,
+       }
+ 
+       infof(data, " SSL certificate issuer check ok (%s)\n",
+-            SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
++            SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
+       BIO_free(fp);
+       X509_free(issuer);
+     }
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/vtls.c b/lib/vtls/vtls.c
+index aaf73ef8f..8c681da14 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/vtls.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/vtls.c
+@@ -82,6 +82,16 @@
+   else                                       \
+     dest->var = NULL;
+ 
++static bool safecmp(char *a, char *b)
++{
++  if(a && b)
++    return !strcmp(a, b);
++  else if(!a && !b)
++    return TRUE; /* match */
++  return FALSE; /* no match */
++}
++
++
+ bool
+ Curl_ssl_config_matches(struct ssl_primary_config* data,
+                         struct ssl_primary_config* needle)
+@@ -91,11 +101,12 @@ Curl_ssl_config_matches(struct ssl_primary_config* data,
+      (data->verifypeer == needle->verifypeer) &&
+      (data->verifyhost == needle->verifyhost) &&
+      (data->verifystatus == needle->verifystatus) &&
+-     Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->CApath, needle->CApath) &&
+-     Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->CAfile, needle->CAfile) &&
+-     Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->clientcert, needle->clientcert) &&
+-     Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->random_file, needle->random_file) &&
+-     Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->egdsocket, needle->egdsocket) &&
++     safecmp(data->CApath, needle->CApath) &&
++     safecmp(data->CAfile, needle->CAfile) &&
++     safecmp(data->issuercert, needle->issuercert) &&
++     safecmp(data->clientcert, needle->clientcert) &&
++     safecmp(data->random_file, needle->random_file) &&
++     safecmp(data->egdsocket, needle->egdsocket) &&
+      Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->cipher_list, needle->cipher_list) &&
+      Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->cipher_list13, needle->cipher_list13) &&
+      Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->pinned_key, needle->pinned_key))
+@@ -117,6 +128,7 @@ Curl_clone_primary_ssl_config(struct ssl_primary_config *source,
+ 
+   CLONE_STRING(CApath);
+   CLONE_STRING(CAfile);
++  CLONE_STRING(issuercert);
+   CLONE_STRING(clientcert);
+   CLONE_STRING(random_file);
+   CLONE_STRING(egdsocket);
+@@ -131,6 +143,7 @@ void Curl_free_primary_ssl_config(struct ssl_primary_config* sslc)
+ {
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->CApath);
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->CAfile);
++  Curl_safefree(sslc->issuercert);
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->clientcert);
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->random_file);
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->egdsocket);
+-- 
+2.30.2
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22925.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22925.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..13b55f76be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22925.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+Subject: [PATCH] telnet: fix option parser to not send uninitialized
+ contents CVE-2021-22925
+
+Reported-by: Red Hat Product Security
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22925.html
+CVE: CVE-2021-22925
+Upstream-Status: backport from Ubuntu curl_7.68.0-1ubuntu2.6
+Signed-off-by: Mike Crowe <mac@mcrowe.com>
+---
+ lib/telnet.c | 17 +++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/telnet.c b/lib/telnet.c
+index 4bf4c652c..3347ad6d1 100644
+--- a/lib/telnet.c
++++ b/lib/telnet.c
+@@ -967,12 +967,17 @@ static void suboption(struct connectdata *conn)
+         size_t tmplen = (strlen(v->data) + 1);
+         /* Add the variable only if it fits */
+         if(len + tmplen < (int)sizeof(temp)-6) {
+-          if(sscanf(v->data, "%127[^,],%127s", varname, varval) == 2) {
+-            msnprintf((char *)&temp[len], sizeof(temp) - len,
+-                      "%c%s%c%s", CURL_NEW_ENV_VAR, varname,
+-                      CURL_NEW_ENV_VALUE, varval);
+-            len += tmplen;
+-          }
++          int rv;
++          char sep[2] = "";
++          varval[0] = 0;
++          rv = sscanf(v->data, "%127[^,]%1[,]%127s", varname, sep, varval);
++          if(rv == 1)
++            len += msnprintf((char *)&temp[len], sizeof(temp) - len,
++                             "%c%s", CURL_NEW_ENV_VAR, varname);
++          else if(rv >= 2)
++            len += msnprintf((char *)&temp[len], sizeof(temp) - len,
++                             "%c%s%c%s", CURL_NEW_ENV_VAR, varname,
++                             CURL_NEW_ENV_VALUE, varval);
+         }
+       }
+       msnprintf((char *)&temp[len], sizeof(temp) - len,
+-- 
+2.30.2
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22946-pre1.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22946-pre1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4afd755149
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22946-pre1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+Backport of:
+
+From 1397a7de6e312e019a3b339f855ba0a5cafa9127 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 09:15:51 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ftp: separate FTPS from FTP over "HTTPS proxy"
+
+When using HTTPS proxy, SSL is used but not in the view of the FTP
+protocol handler itself so separate the connection's use of SSL from the
+FTP control connection's sue.
+
+Reported-by: Mingtao Yang
+Fixes #5523
+Closes #6006
+
+Upstream-Status: backport from 7.68.0-1ubuntu2.7
+Signed-off-by: Mike Crowe <mac@mcrowe.com>
+---
+ lib/ftp.c     | 13 ++++++-------
+ lib/urldata.h |  1 +
+ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/ftp.c b/lib/ftp.c
+index 3382772..677527f 100644
+--- a/lib/ftp.c
++++ b/lib/ftp.c
+@@ -2488,7 +2488,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_loggedin(struct connectdata *conn)
+ {
+   CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+ 
+-  if(conn->ssl[FIRSTSOCKET].use) {
++  if(conn->bits.ftp_use_control_ssl) {
+     /* PBSZ = PROTECTION BUFFER SIZE.
+ 
+     The 'draft-murray-auth-ftp-ssl' (draft 12, page 7) says:
+@@ -2633,11 +2633,8 @@ static CURLcode ftp_statemach_act(struct connectdata *conn)
+       }
+ #endif
+ 
+-      if(data->set.use_ssl &&
+-         (!conn->ssl[FIRSTSOCKET].use ||
+-          (conn->bits.proxy_ssl_connected[FIRSTSOCKET] &&
+-           !conn->proxy_ssl[FIRSTSOCKET].use))) {
+-        /* We don't have a SSL/TLS connection yet, but FTPS is
++      if(data->set.use_ssl && !conn->bits.ftp_use_control_ssl) {
++        /* We don't have a SSL/TLS control connection yet, but FTPS is
+            requested. Try a FTPS connection now */
+ 
+         ftpc->count3 = 0;
+@@ -2682,6 +2679,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_statemach_act(struct connectdata *conn)
+         result = Curl_ssl_connect(conn, FIRSTSOCKET);
+         if(!result) {
+           conn->bits.ftp_use_data_ssl = FALSE; /* clear-text data */
++          conn->bits.ftp_use_control_ssl = TRUE; /* SSL on control */
+           result = ftp_state_user(conn);
+         }
+       }
+@@ -3072,7 +3070,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_block_statemach(struct connectdata *conn)
+  *
+  */
+ static CURLcode ftp_connect(struct connectdata *conn,
+-                                 bool *done) /* see description above */
++                            bool *done) /* see description above */
+ {
+   CURLcode result;
+   struct ftp_conn *ftpc = &conn->proto.ftpc;
+@@ -3093,6 +3091,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_connect(struct connectdata *conn,
+     result = Curl_ssl_connect(conn, FIRSTSOCKET);
+     if(result)
+       return result;
++    conn->bits.ftp_use_control_ssl = TRUE;
+   }
+ 
+   Curl_pp_init(pp); /* init the generic pingpong data */
+diff --git a/lib/urldata.h b/lib/urldata.h
+index ff2d686..d1fb4a9 100644
+--- a/lib/urldata.h
++++ b/lib/urldata.h
+@@ -461,6 +461,7 @@ struct ConnectBits {
+                          EPRT doesn't work we disable it for the forthcoming
+                          requests */
+   BIT(ftp_use_data_ssl); /* Enabled SSL for the data connection */
++  BIT(ftp_use_control_ssl); /* Enabled SSL for the control connection */
+ #endif
+   BIT(netrc);         /* name+password provided by netrc */
+   BIT(userpwd_in_url); /* name+password found in url */
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22946.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22946.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..98032d8b78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22946.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
+Backport of:
+
+From 96d71feb27e533a8b337512841a537952916262c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Patrick Monnerat <patrick@monnerat.net>
+Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2021 11:56:22 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ftp,imap,pop3: do not ignore --ssl-reqd
+
+In imap and pop3, check if TLS is required even when capabilities
+request has failed.
+
+In ftp, ignore preauthentication (230 status of server greeting) if TLS
+is required.
+
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22946.html
+Upstream-Status: backport from 7.68.0-1ubuntu2.7
+Signed-off-by: Mike Crowe <mac@mcrowe.com>
+CVE: CVE-2021-22946
+---
+ lib/ftp.c               |  9 ++++---
+ lib/imap.c              | 24 ++++++++----------
+ lib/pop3.c              | 33 +++++++++++-------------
+ tests/data/Makefile.inc |  2 ++
+ tests/data/test984      | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ tests/data/test985      | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ tests/data/test986      | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 7 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 tests/data/test984
+ create mode 100644 tests/data/test985
+ create mode 100644 tests/data/test986
+
+diff --git a/lib/ftp.c b/lib/ftp.c
+index 677527f..91b43d8 100644
+--- a/lib/ftp.c
++++ b/lib/ftp.c
+@@ -2606,9 +2606,12 @@ static CURLcode ftp_statemach_act(struct connectdata *conn)
+     /* we have now received a full FTP server response */
+     switch(ftpc->state) {
+     case FTP_WAIT220:
+-      if(ftpcode == 230)
+-        /* 230 User logged in - already! */
+-        return ftp_state_user_resp(conn, ftpcode, ftpc->state);
++      if(ftpcode == 230) {
++        /* 230 User logged in - already! Take as 220 if TLS required. */
++        if(data->set.use_ssl <= CURLUSESSL_TRY ||
++           conn->bits.ftp_use_control_ssl)
++          return ftp_state_user_resp(conn, ftpcode, ftpc->state);
++      }
+       else if(ftpcode != 220) {
+         failf(data, "Got a %03d ftp-server response when 220 was expected",
+               ftpcode);
+diff --git a/lib/imap.c b/lib/imap.c
+index 66172bd..9880ce1 100644
+--- a/lib/imap.c
++++ b/lib/imap.c
+@@ -917,22 +917,18 @@ static CURLcode imap_state_capability_resp(struct connectdata *conn,
+       line += wordlen;
+     }
+   }
+-  else if(imapcode == IMAP_RESP_OK) {
+-    if(data->set.use_ssl && !conn->ssl[FIRSTSOCKET].use) {
+-      /* We don't have a SSL/TLS connection yet, but SSL is requested */
+-      if(imapc->tls_supported)
+-        /* Switch to TLS connection now */
+-        result = imap_perform_starttls(conn);
+-      else if(data->set.use_ssl == CURLUSESSL_TRY)
+-        /* Fallback and carry on with authentication */
+-        result = imap_perform_authentication(conn);
+-      else {
+-        failf(data, "STARTTLS not supported.");
+-        result = CURLE_USE_SSL_FAILED;
+-      }
++  else if(data->set.use_ssl && !conn->ssl[FIRSTSOCKET].use) {
++    /* PREAUTH is not compatible with STARTTLS. */
++    if(imapcode == IMAP_RESP_OK && imapc->tls_supported && !imapc->preauth) {
++      /* Switch to TLS connection now */
++      result = imap_perform_starttls(conn);
+     }
+-    else
++    else if(data->set.use_ssl <= CURLUSESSL_TRY)
+       result = imap_perform_authentication(conn);
++    else {
++      failf(data, "STARTTLS not available.");
++      result = CURLE_USE_SSL_FAILED;
++    }
+   }
+   else
+     result = imap_perform_authentication(conn);
+diff --git a/lib/pop3.c b/lib/pop3.c
+index 57c1373..145b2b4 100644
+--- a/lib/pop3.c
++++ b/lib/pop3.c
+@@ -721,28 +721,23 @@ static CURLcode pop3_state_capa_resp(struct connectdata *conn, int pop3code,
+       }
+     }
+   }
+-  else if(pop3code == '+') {
+-    if(data->set.use_ssl && !conn->ssl[FIRSTSOCKET].use) {
+-      /* We don't have a SSL/TLS connection yet, but SSL is requested */
+-      if(pop3c->tls_supported)
+-        /* Switch to TLS connection now */
+-        result = pop3_perform_starttls(conn);
+-      else if(data->set.use_ssl == CURLUSESSL_TRY)
+-        /* Fallback and carry on with authentication */
+-        result = pop3_perform_authentication(conn);
+-      else {
+-        failf(data, "STLS not supported.");
+-        result = CURLE_USE_SSL_FAILED;
+-      }
+-    }
+-    else
+-      result = pop3_perform_authentication(conn);
+-  }
+   else {
+     /* Clear text is supported when CAPA isn't recognised */
+-    pop3c->authtypes |= POP3_TYPE_CLEARTEXT;
++    if(pop3code != '+')
++      pop3c->authtypes |= POP3_TYPE_CLEARTEXT;
+ 
+-    result = pop3_perform_authentication(conn);
++    if(!data->set.use_ssl || conn->ssl[FIRSTSOCKET].use)
++      result = pop3_perform_authentication(conn);
++    else if(pop3code == '+' && pop3c->tls_supported)
++      /* Switch to TLS connection now */
++      result = pop3_perform_starttls(conn);
++    else if(data->set.use_ssl <= CURLUSESSL_TRY)
++      /* Fallback and carry on with authentication */
++      result = pop3_perform_authentication(conn);
++    else {
++      failf(data, "STLS not supported.");
++      result = CURLE_USE_SSL_FAILED;
++    }
+   }
+ 
+   return result;
+diff --git a/tests/data/Makefile.inc b/tests/data/Makefile.inc
+index f9535a6..0fa6799 100644
+--- a/tests/data/Makefile.inc
++++ b/tests/data/Makefile.inc
+@@ -112,6 +112,8 @@ test945 test946 test947 test948 test949 test950 test951 test952 test953 \
+ test954 test955 test956 test957 test958 test959 test960 test961 test962 \
+ test963 test964 test965 test966 test967 test968 test969 \
+ \
++test984 test985 test986 \
++\
+ test1000 test1001 test1002 test1003 test1004 test1005 test1006 test1007 \
+ test1008 test1009 test1010 test1011 test1012 test1013 test1014 test1015 \
+ test1016 test1017 test1018 test1019 test1020 test1021 test1022 test1023 \
+diff --git a/tests/data/test984 b/tests/data/test984
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e573f23
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/data/test984
+@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
++<testcase>
++<info>
++<keywords>
++IMAP
++STARTTLS
++</keywords>
++</info>
++
++#
++# Server-side
++<reply>
++<servercmd>
++REPLY CAPABILITY A001 BAD Not implemented
++</servercmd>
++</reply>
++
++#
++# Client-side
++<client>
++<features>
++SSL
++</features>
++<server>
++imap
++</server>
++ <name>
++IMAP require STARTTLS with failing capabilities
++ </name>
++ <command>
++imap://%HOSTIP:%IMAPPORT/%TESTNUMBER -T log/upload%TESTNUMBER -u user:secret --ssl-reqd
++</command>
++<file name="log/upload%TESTNUMBER">
++Date: Mon, 7 Feb 1994 21:52:25 -0800 (PST)
++From: Fred Foobar <foobar@example.COM>
++Subject: afternoon meeting
++To: joe@example.com
++Message-Id: <B27397-0100000@example.COM>
++MIME-Version: 1.0
++Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCII
++
++Hello Joe, do you think we can meet at 3:30 tomorrow?
++</file>
++</client>
++
++#
++# Verify data after the test has been "shot"
++<verify>
++# 64 is CURLE_USE_SSL_FAILED
++<errorcode>
++64
++</errorcode>
++<protocol>
++A001 CAPABILITY
++</protocol>
++</verify>
++</testcase>
+diff --git a/tests/data/test985 b/tests/data/test985
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..d0db4aa
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/data/test985
+@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
++<testcase>
++<info>
++<keywords>
++POP3
++STARTTLS
++</keywords>
++</info>
++
++#
++# Server-side
++<reply>
++<servercmd>
++REPLY CAPA -ERR Not implemented
++</servercmd>
++<data nocheck="yes">
++From: me@somewhere
++To: fake@nowhere
++
++body
++
++--
++  yours sincerely
++</data>
++</reply>
++
++#
++# Client-side
++<client>
++<features>
++SSL
++</features>
++<server>
++pop3
++</server>
++ <name>
++POP3 require STARTTLS with failing capabilities
++ </name>
++ <command>
++pop3://%HOSTIP:%POP3PORT/%TESTNUMBER -u user:secret --ssl-reqd
++ </command>
++</client>
++
++#
++# Verify data after the test has been "shot"
++<verify>
++# 64 is CURLE_USE_SSL_FAILED
++<errorcode>
++64
++</errorcode>
++<protocol>
++CAPA
++</protocol>
++</verify>
++</testcase>
+diff --git a/tests/data/test986 b/tests/data/test986
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..a709437
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/data/test986
+@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
++<testcase>
++<info>
++<keywords>
++FTP
++STARTTLS
++</keywords>
++</info>
++
++#
++# Server-side
++<reply>
++<servercmd>
++REPLY welcome 230 Welcome
++REPLY AUTH 500 unknown command
++</servercmd>
++</reply>
++
++# Client-side
++<client>
++<features>
++SSL
++</features>
++<server>
++ftp
++</server>
++ <name>
++FTP require STARTTLS while preauthenticated
++ </name>
++<file name="log/test%TESTNUMBER.txt">
++data
++    to
++      see
++that FTPS
++works
++  so does it?
++</file>
++ <command>
++--ssl-reqd --ftp-ssl-control ftp://%HOSTIP:%FTPPORT/%TESTNUMBER -T log/test%TESTNUMBER.txt -u user:secret
++</command>
++</client>
++
++# Verify data after the test has been "shot"
++<verify>
++# 64 is CURLE_USE_SSL_FAILED
++<errorcode>
++64
++</errorcode>
++<protocol>
++AUTH SSL
++AUTH TLS
++</protocol>
++</verify>
++</testcase>
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22947.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22947.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..070a328e27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2021-22947.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
+Backport of:
+
+From 259b4f2e1fd01fbc55e569ee0a507afeae34f77c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Patrick Monnerat <patrick@monnerat.net>
+Date: Tue, 7 Sep 2021 13:26:42 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ftp,imap,pop3,smtp: reject STARTTLS server response
+ pipelining
+
+If a server pipelines future responses within the STARTTLS response, the
+former are preserved in the pingpong cache across TLS negotiation and
+used as responses to the encrypted commands.
+
+This fix detects pipelined STARTTLS responses and rejects them with an
+error.
+
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22947.html
+Upstream-Status: backport from 7.68.0-1ubuntu2.7
+Signed-off-by: Mike Crowe <mac@mcrowe.com>
+CVE: CVE-2021-22947
+
+---
+ lib/ftp.c               |  3 +++
+ lib/imap.c              |  4 +++
+ lib/pop3.c              |  4 +++
+ lib/smtp.c              |  4 +++
+ tests/data/Makefile.inc |  2 ++
+ tests/data/test980      | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ tests/data/test981      | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ tests/data/test982      | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ tests/data/test983      | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 9 files changed, 237 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 tests/data/test980
+ create mode 100644 tests/data/test981
+ create mode 100644 tests/data/test982
+ create mode 100644 tests/data/test983
+
+diff --git a/lib/ftp.c b/lib/ftp.c
+index 91b43d8..31a34e8 100644
+--- a/lib/ftp.c
++++ b/lib/ftp.c
+@@ -2670,6 +2670,9 @@ static CURLcode ftp_statemach_act(struct connectdata *conn)
+     case FTP_AUTH:
+       /* we have gotten the response to a previous AUTH command */
+ 
++      if(pp->cache_size)
++        return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; /* Forbid pipelining in response. */
++
+       /* RFC2228 (page 5) says:
+        *
+        * If the server is willing to accept the named security mechanism,
+diff --git a/lib/imap.c b/lib/imap.c
+index 9880ce1..0ca700f 100644
+--- a/lib/imap.c
++++ b/lib/imap.c
+@@ -946,6 +946,10 @@ static CURLcode imap_state_starttls_resp(struct connectdata *conn,
+ 
+   (void)instate; /* no use for this yet */
+ 
++  /* Pipelining in response is forbidden. */
++  if(data->conn->proto.imapc.pp.cache_size)
++    return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY;
++
+   if(imapcode != IMAP_RESP_OK) {
+     if(data->set.use_ssl != CURLUSESSL_TRY) {
+       failf(data, "STARTTLS denied");
+diff --git a/lib/pop3.c b/lib/pop3.c
+index 145b2b4..8a2d52e 100644
+--- a/lib/pop3.c
++++ b/lib/pop3.c
+@@ -753,6 +753,10 @@ static CURLcode pop3_state_starttls_resp(struct connectdata *conn,
+ 
+   (void)instate; /* no use for this yet */
+ 
++  /* Pipelining in response is forbidden. */
++  if(data->conn->proto.pop3c.pp.cache_size)
++    return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY;
++
+   if(pop3code != '+') {
+     if(data->set.use_ssl != CURLUSESSL_TRY) {
+       failf(data, "STARTTLS denied");
+diff --git a/lib/smtp.c b/lib/smtp.c
+index e187287..66183e2 100644
+--- a/lib/smtp.c
++++ b/lib/smtp.c
+@@ -820,6 +820,10 @@ static CURLcode smtp_state_starttls_resp(struct connectdata *conn,
+ 
+   (void)instate; /* no use for this yet */
+ 
++  /* Pipelining in response is forbidden. */
++  if(data->conn->proto.smtpc.pp.cache_size)
++    return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY;
++
+   if(smtpcode != 220) {
+     if(data->set.use_ssl != CURLUSESSL_TRY) {
+       failf(data, "STARTTLS denied, code %d", smtpcode);
+diff --git a/tests/data/Makefile.inc b/tests/data/Makefile.inc
+index 0fa6799..60e8176 100644
+--- a/tests/data/Makefile.inc
++++ b/tests/data/Makefile.inc
+@@ -112,6 +112,8 @@ test945 test946 test947 test948 test949 test950 test951 test952 test953 \
+ test954 test955 test956 test957 test958 test959 test960 test961 test962 \
+ test963 test964 test965 test966 test967 test968 test969 \
+ \
++test980 test981 test982 test983 \
++\
+ test984 test985 test986 \
+ \
+ test1000 test1001 test1002 test1003 test1004 test1005 test1006 test1007 \
+diff --git a/tests/data/test980 b/tests/data/test980
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..97567f8
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/data/test980
+@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
++<testcase>
++<info>
++<keywords>
++SMTP
++STARTTLS
++</keywords>
++</info>
++
++#
++# Server-side
++<reply>
++<servercmd>
++CAPA STARTTLS
++AUTH PLAIN
++REPLY STARTTLS 454 currently unavailable\r\n235 Authenticated\r\n250 2.1.0 Sender ok\r\n250 2.1.5 Recipient ok\r\n354 Enter mail\r\n250 2.0.0 Accepted
++REPLY AUTH 535 5.7.8 Authentication credentials invalid
++</servercmd>
++</reply>
++
++#
++# Client-side
++<client>
++<features>
++SSL
++</features>
++<server>
++smtp
++</server>
++ <name>
++SMTP STARTTLS pipelined server response
++ </name>
++<stdin>
++mail body
++</stdin>
++ <command>
++smtp://%HOSTIP:%SMTPPORT/%TESTNUMBER --mail-rcpt recipient@example.com --mail-from sender@example.com -u user:secret --ssl --sasl-ir -T -
++</command>
++</client>
++
++#
++# Verify data after the test has been "shot"
++<verify>
++# 8 is CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY
++<errorcode>
++8
++</errorcode>
++<protocol>
++EHLO %TESTNUMBER
++STARTTLS
++</protocol>
++</verify>
++</testcase>
+diff --git a/tests/data/test981 b/tests/data/test981
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..2b98ce4
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/data/test981
+@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
++<testcase>
++<info>
++<keywords>
++IMAP
++STARTTLS
++</keywords>
++</info>
++
++#
++# Server-side
++<reply>
++<servercmd>
++CAPA STARTTLS
++REPLY STARTTLS A002 BAD currently unavailable\r\nA003 OK Authenticated\r\nA004 OK Accepted
++REPLY LOGIN A003 BAD Authentication credentials invalid
++</servercmd>
++</reply>
++
++#
++# Client-side
++<client>
++<features>
++SSL
++</features>
++<server>
++imap
++</server>
++ <name>
++IMAP STARTTLS pipelined server response
++ </name>
++ <command>
++imap://%HOSTIP:%IMAPPORT/%TESTNUMBER -T log/upload%TESTNUMBER -u user:secret --ssl
++</command>
++<file name="log/upload%TESTNUMBER">
++Date: Mon, 7 Feb 1994 21:52:25 -0800 (PST)
++From: Fred Foobar <foobar@example.COM>
++Subject: afternoon meeting
++To: joe@example.com
++Message-Id: <B27397-0100000@example.COM>
++MIME-Version: 1.0
++Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCII
++
++Hello Joe, do you think we can meet at 3:30 tomorrow?
++</file>
++</client>
++
++#
++# Verify data after the test has been "shot"
++<verify>
++# 8 is CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY
++<errorcode>
++8
++</errorcode>
++<protocol>
++A001 CAPABILITY
++A002 STARTTLS
++</protocol>
++</verify>
++</testcase>
+diff --git a/tests/data/test982 b/tests/data/test982
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..9e07cc0
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/data/test982
+@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
++<testcase>
++<info>
++<keywords>
++POP3
++STARTTLS
++</keywords>
++</info>
++
++#
++# Server-side
++<reply>
++<servercmd>
++CAPA STLS USER
++REPLY STLS -ERR currently unavailable\r\n+OK user accepted\r\n+OK authenticated
++REPLY PASS -ERR Authentication credentials invalid
++</servercmd>
++<data nocheck="yes">
++From: me@somewhere
++To: fake@nowhere
++
++body
++
++--
++  yours sincerely
++</data>
++</reply>
++
++#
++# Client-side
++<client>
++<features>
++SSL
++</features>
++<server>
++pop3
++</server>
++ <name>
++POP3 STARTTLS pipelined server response
++ </name>
++ <command>
++pop3://%HOSTIP:%POP3PORT/%TESTNUMBER -u user:secret --ssl
++ </command>
++</client>
++
++#
++# Verify data after the test has been "shot"
++<verify>
++# 8 is CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY
++<errorcode>
++8
++</errorcode>
++<protocol>
++CAPA
++STLS
++</protocol>
++</verify>
++</testcase>
+diff --git a/tests/data/test983 b/tests/data/test983
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..300ec45
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/data/test983
+@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
++<testcase>
++<info>
++<keywords>
++FTP
++STARTTLS
++</keywords>
++</info>
++
++#
++# Server-side
++<reply>
++<servercmd>
++REPLY AUTH 500 unknown command\r\n500 unknown command\r\n331 give password\r\n230 Authenticated\r\n257 "/"\r\n200 OK\r\n200 OK\r\n200 OK\r\n226 Transfer complete
++REPLY PASS 530 Login incorrect
++</servercmd>
++</reply>
++
++# Client-side
++<client>
++<features>
++SSL
++</features>
++<server>
++ftp
++</server>
++ <name>
++FTP STARTTLS pipelined server response
++ </name>
++<file name="log/test%TESTNUMBER.txt">
++data
++    to
++      see
++that FTPS
++works
++  so does it?
++</file>
++ <command>
++--ssl --ftp-ssl-control ftp://%HOSTIP:%FTPPORT/%TESTNUMBER -T log/test%TESTNUMBER.txt -u user:secret -P %CLIENTIP
++</command>
++</client>
++
++# Verify data after the test has been "shot"
++<verify>
++# 8 is CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY
++<errorcode>
++8
++</errorcode>
++<protocol>
++AUTH SSL
++</protocol>
++</verify>
++</testcase>
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-22576.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-22576.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..13479e7f0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-22576.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+From 852aa5ad351ea53e5f01d2f44b5b4370c2bf5425 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Patrick Monnerat <patrick@monnerat.net>
+Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 11:44:05 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] url: check sasl additional parameters for connection reuse.
+
+Also move static function safecmp() as non-static Curl_safecmp() since
+its purpose is needed at several places.
+
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-22576.html
+
+CVE-2022-22576
+
+Closes #8746
+---
+ lib/strcase.c   | 10 ++++++++++
+ lib/strcase.h   |  2 ++
+ lib/url.c       | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ lib/urldata.h   |  1 +
+ lib/vtls/vtls.c | 21 ++++++---------------
+ 5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-22576
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/852aa5ad351ea53e5f01d2f44b5b4370c2bf5425.patch]
+Comment: Refreshed patch
+Signed-off-by: Sana.Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com>
+
+diff --git a/lib/strcase.c b/lib/strcase.c
+index dd46ca1ba0e5..692a3f14aee7 100644
+--- a/lib/strcase.c
++++ b/lib/strcase.c
+@@ -251,6 +251,16 @@
+   } while(*src++ && --n);
+ }
+ 
++/* Compare case-sensitive NUL-terminated strings, taking care of possible
++ * null pointers. Return true if arguments match.
++ */
++bool Curl_safecmp(char *a, char *b)
++{
++  if(a && b)
++    return !strcmp(a, b);
++  return !a && !b;
++}
++
+ /* --- public functions --- */
+ 
+ int curl_strequal(const char *first, const char *second)
+diff --git a/lib/strcase.h b/lib/strcase.h
+index b234d3815220..2635f5117e99 100644
+--- a/lib/strcase.h
++++ b/lib/strcase.h
+@@ -48,4 +48,6 @@
+ void Curl_strntoupper(char *dest, const char *src, size_t n);
+ void Curl_strntolower(char *dest, const char *src, size_t n);
+ 
++bool Curl_safecmp(char *a, char *b);
++
+ #endif /* HEADER_CURL_STRCASE_H */
+diff --git a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c
+index 9a988b4d58d8..e1647b133854 100644
+--- a/lib/url.c
++++ b/lib/url.c
+@@ -730,6 +730,7 @@
+   Curl_safefree(conn->allocptr.host);
+   Curl_safefree(conn->allocptr.cookiehost);
+   Curl_safefree(conn->allocptr.rtsp_transport);
++  Curl_safefree(conn->oauth_bearer);  
+   Curl_safefree(conn->trailer);
+   Curl_safefree(conn->host.rawalloc); /* host name buffer */
+   Curl_safefree(conn->conn_to_host.rawalloc); /* host name buffer */
+@@ -1251,7 +1252,9 @@
+         /* This protocol requires credentials per connection,
+            so verify that we're using the same name and password as well */
+         if(strcmp(needle->user, check->user) ||
+-           strcmp(needle->passwd, check->passwd)) {
++           strcmp(needle->passwd, check->passwd) ||
++           !Curl_safecmp(needle->sasl_authzid, check->sasl_authzid) ||
++           !Curl_safecmp(needle->oauth_bearer, check->oauth_bearer)) {                 
+           /* one of them was different */
+           continue;
+         }
+@@ -3392,6 +3395,14 @@
+       result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+       goto out;
+     }
++  }
++
++  if(data->set.str[STRING_BEARER]) {
++    conn->oauth_bearer = strdup(data->set.str[STRING_BEARER]);
++    if(!conn->oauth_bearer) {
++      result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
++      goto out;
++    }
+   }
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_UNIX_SOCKETS
+diff --git a/lib/urldata.h b/lib/urldata.h
+index 07eb19b87034..1d89b8d7fa68 100644
+--- a/lib/urldata.h
++++ b/lib/urldata.h
+@@ -949,6 +949,8 @@
+ 
+   char *sasl_authzid;     /* authorisation identity string, allocated */
+ 
++  char *oauth_bearer; /* OAUTH2 bearer, allocated */
++
+   int httpversion;        /* the HTTP version*10 reported by the server */
+   int rtspversion;        /* the RTSP version*10 reported by the server */
+ 
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/vtls.c b/lib/vtls/vtls.c
+index 03b85ba065e5..a40ac06f684f 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/vtls.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/vtls.c
+@@ -82,15 +82,6 @@
+   else                                       \
+     dest->var = NULL;
+ 
+-static bool safecmp(char *a, char *b)
+-{
+-  if(a && b)
+-    return !strcmp(a, b);
+-  else if(!a && !b)
+-    return TRUE; /* match */
+-  return FALSE; /* no match */
+-}
+-
+ 
+ bool
+ Curl_ssl_config_matches(struct ssl_primary_config* data,
+@@ -101,12 +101,12 @@
+      (data->verifypeer == needle->verifypeer) &&
+      (data->verifyhost == needle->verifyhost) &&
+      (data->verifystatus == needle->verifystatus) &&
+-     safecmp(data->CApath, needle->CApath) &&
+-     safecmp(data->CAfile, needle->CAfile) &&
+-     safecmp(data->issuercert, needle->issuercert) &&
+-     safecmp(data->clientcert, needle->clientcert) &&
+-     safecmp(data->random_file, needle->random_file) &&
+-     safecmp(data->egdsocket, needle->egdsocket) &&
++     Curl_safecmp(data->CApath, needle->CApath) &&
++     Curl_safecmp(data->CAfile, needle->CAfile) &&
++     Curl_safecmp(data->issuercert, needle->issuercert) &&
++     Curl_safecmp(data->clientcert, needle->clientcert) &&
++     Curl_safecmp(data->random_file, needle->random_file) &&
++     Curl_safecmp(data->egdsocket, needle->egdsocket) &&     
+      Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->cipher_list, needle->cipher_list) &&
+      Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->cipher_list13, needle->cipher_list13) &&
+      Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->pinned_key, needle->pinned_key))
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27774-1.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27774-1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..063c11712a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27774-1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 2a797e099731facf62a2c675396334bc2ad3bc7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 16:24:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] connect: store "conn_remote_port" in the info struct
+
+To make it available after the connection ended.
+
+Prerequisite for the patches that address CVE-2022-27774.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/08b8ef4e726ba10f45081ecda5b3cea788d3c839]
+Signed-off-by: Robert Joslyn <robert.joslyn@redrectangle.org>
+---
+ lib/connect.c | 1 +
+ lib/urldata.h | 6 +++++-
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/connect.c b/lib/connect.c
+index b3d4057..a977d67 100644
+--- a/lib/connect.c
++++ b/lib/connect.c
+@@ -624,6 +624,7 @@ void Curl_persistconninfo(struct connectdata *conn)
+   conn->data->info.conn_scheme = conn->handler->scheme;
+   conn->data->info.conn_protocol = conn->handler->protocol;
+   conn->data->info.conn_primary_port = conn->primary_port;
++  conn->data->info.conn_remote_port = conn->remote_port;
+   conn->data->info.conn_local_port = conn->local_port;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/lib/urldata.h b/lib/urldata.h
+index fafb7a3..ab1b267 100644
+--- a/lib/urldata.h
++++ b/lib/urldata.h
+@@ -1148,7 +1148,11 @@ struct PureInfo {
+      reused, in the connection cache. */
+ 
+   char conn_primary_ip[MAX_IPADR_LEN];
+-  long conn_primary_port;
++  long conn_primary_port; /* this is the destination port to the connection,
++                             which might have been a proxy */
++  long conn_remote_port;  /* this is the "remote port", which is the port
++                             number of the used URL, independent of proxy or
++                             not */
+   char conn_local_ip[MAX_IPADR_LEN];
+   long conn_local_port;
+   const char *conn_scheme;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27774-2.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27774-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c64d614194
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27774-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From 5c2f3b3a5f115625134669d90d591de9c5aafc8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 16:24:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] transfer: redirects to other protocols or ports clear auth
+
+... unless explicitly permitted.
+
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27774.html
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Closes #8748
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/620ea21410030a9977396b4661806bc187231b79]
+Signed-off-by: Robert Joslyn <robert.joslyn@redrectangle.org>
+---
+ lib/transfer.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/transfer.c b/lib/transfer.c
+index 744e1c0..ac69d27 100644
+--- a/lib/transfer.c
++++ b/lib/transfer.c
+@@ -1627,10 +1627,57 @@ CURLcode Curl_follow(struct Curl_easy *data,
+       return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+   }
+   else {
+-
+     uc = curl_url_get(data->state.uh, CURLUPART_URL, &newurl, 0);
+     if(uc)
+       return Curl_uc_to_curlcode(uc);
++
++    /* Clear auth if this redirects to a different port number or protocol,
++       unless permitted */
++    if(!data->set.allow_auth_to_other_hosts && (type != FOLLOW_FAKE)) {
++      char *portnum;
++      int port;
++      bool clear = FALSE;
++
++      if(data->set.use_port && data->state.allow_port)
++        /* a custom port is used */
++        port = (int)data->set.use_port;
++      else {
++        uc = curl_url_get(data->state.uh, CURLUPART_PORT, &portnum,
++                          CURLU_DEFAULT_PORT);
++        if(uc) {
++          free(newurl);
++          return Curl_uc_to_curlcode(uc);
++        }
++        port = atoi(portnum);
++        free(portnum);
++      }
++      if(port != data->info.conn_remote_port) {
++        infof(data, "Clear auth, redirects to port from %u to %u",
++              data->info.conn_remote_port, port);
++        clear = TRUE;
++      }
++      else {
++        char *scheme;
++        const struct Curl_handler *p;
++        uc = curl_url_get(data->state.uh, CURLUPART_SCHEME, &scheme, 0);
++        if(uc) {
++          free(newurl);
++          return Curl_uc_to_curlcode(uc);
++        }
++
++        p = Curl_builtin_scheme(scheme);
++        if(p && (p->protocol != data->info.conn_protocol)) {
++          infof(data, "Clear auth, redirects scheme from %s to %s",
++                data->info.conn_scheme, scheme);
++          clear = TRUE;
++        }
++        free(scheme);
++      }
++      if(clear) {
++        Curl_safefree(data->set.str[STRING_USERNAME]);
++        Curl_safefree(data->set.str[STRING_PASSWORD]);
++      }
++    }
+   }
+ 
+   if(type == FOLLOW_FAKE) {
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27774-3.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27774-3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a585f6a8fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27774-3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+From 5dccf21ad49eed925e8f76b0cb844877239ce23d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 17:59:15 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] openssl: don't leak the SRP credentials in redirects either
+
+Follow-up to 620ea21410030
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Closes #8751
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/139a54ed0a172adaaf1a78d6f4fff50b2c3f9e08]
+Signed-off-by: Robert Joslyn <robert.joslyn@redrectangle.org>
+---
+ lib/http.c         | 10 +++++-----
+ lib/http.h         |  6 ++++++
+ lib/vtls/openssl.c |  3 ++-
+ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/http.c b/lib/http.c
+index 8b16c09..5291c07 100644
+--- a/lib/http.c
++++ b/lib/http.c
+@@ -732,10 +732,10 @@ output_auth_headers(struct connectdata *conn,
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+- * allow_auth_to_host() tells if autentication, cookies or other "sensitive
+- * data" can (still) be sent to this host.
++ * Curl_allow_auth_to_host() tells if authentication, cookies or other
++ * "sensitive data" can (still) be sent to this host.
+  */
+-static bool allow_auth_to_host(struct Curl_easy *data)
++bool Curl_allow_auth_to_host(struct Curl_easy *data)
+ {
+   struct connectdata *conn = data->conn;
+   return (!data->state.this_is_a_follow ||
+@@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ Curl_http_output_auth(struct connectdata *conn,
+ 
+   /* To prevent the user+password to get sent to other than the original host
+      due to a location-follow */
+-  if(allow_auth_to_host(data)
++  if(Curl_allow_auth_to_host(data)
+      || conn->bits.netrc
+     )
+     result = output_auth_headers(conn, authhost, request, path, FALSE);
+@@ -1891,7 +1891,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_add_custom_headers(struct connectdata *conn,
+                    checkprefix("Cookie:", compare)) &&
+                   /* be careful of sending this potentially sensitive header to
+                      other hosts */
+-                  !allow_auth_to_host(data))                     
++                  !Curl_allow_auth_to_host(data))                        
+             ;
+           else {
+             result = Curl_add_bufferf(&req_buffer, "%s\r\n", compare);
+diff --git a/lib/http.h b/lib/http.h
+index 4c1825f..4fbae1d 100644
+--- a/lib/http.h
++++ b/lib/http.h
+@@ -273,4 +273,10 @@ Curl_http_output_auth(struct connectdata *conn,
+                       bool proxytunnel); /* TRUE if this is the request setting
+                                             up the proxy tunnel */
+ 
++/*
++ * Curl_allow_auth_to_host() tells if authentication, cookies or other
++ * "sensitive data" can (still) be sent to this host.
++ */
++bool Curl_allow_auth_to_host(struct Curl_easy *data);
++
+ #endif /* HEADER_CURL_HTTP_H */
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/openssl.c b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+index 006a8c8..a14cecc 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/openssl.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+@@ -2739,7 +2739,8 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+-  if(ssl_authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) {
++  if((ssl_authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) &&
++     Curl_allow_auth_to_host(data)) {
+     char * const ssl_username = SSL_SET_OPTION(username);
+ 
+     infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s\n", ssl_username);
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27774-4.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27774-4.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2258681cab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27774-4.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 7395752e2f7b87dc8c8f2a7137075e2da554aaea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 07:46:19 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] gnutls: don't leak the SRP credentials in redirects
+
+Follow-up to 620ea21410030 and 139a54ed0a172a
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Closes #8752
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/093531556203decd92d92bccd431edbe5561781c]
+Signed-off-by: Robert Joslyn <robert.joslyn@redrectangle.org>
+---
+ lib/vtls/gtls.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/gtls.c b/lib/vtls/gtls.c
+index 8c05102..3d0758d 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/gtls.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/gtls.c
+@@ -581,11 +581,11 @@ gtls_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
+   }
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+-  if(SSL_SET_OPTION(authtype) == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) {
++  if((SSL_SET_OPTION(authtype) == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) &&
++     Curl_allow_auth_to_host(data)) {
+     infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s\n", SSL_SET_OPTION(username));
+ 
+-    rc = gnutls_srp_allocate_client_credentials(
+-           &BACKEND->srp_client_cred);
++    rc = gnutls_srp_allocate_client_credentials(&BACKEND->srp_client_cred);
+     if(rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
+       failf(data, "gnutls_srp_allocate_client_cred() failed: %s",
+             gnutls_strerror(rc));
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27775.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27775.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b3fe7b4494
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27775.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From 058f98dc3fe595f21dc26a5b9b1699e519ba5705 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 11:48:00 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] conncache: include the zone id in the "bundle" hashkey
+
+Make connections to two separate IPv6 zone ids create separate
+connections.
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27775.html
+Closes #8747
+---
+ lib/conncache.c | 8 ++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-27775
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/058f98dc3fe595f21dc26a5b9b1699e519ba5705.patch]
+Comment: Refreshed patch
+Signed-off-by: Sana.Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com>
+
+diff --git a/lib/conncache.c b/lib/conncache.c
+index ec669b971dc3..8948b53fa500 100644
+--- a/lib/conncache.c
++++ b/lib/conncache.c
+@@ -156,8 +156,12 @@
+     /* report back which name we used */
+     *hostp = hostname;
+ 
+-  /* put the number first so that the hostname gets cut off if too long */
+-  msnprintf(buf, len, "%ld%s", port, hostname);
++  /* put the numbers first so that the hostname gets cut off if too long */
++#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
++  msnprintf(buf, len, "%u/%ld/%s", conn->scope_id, port, hostname);
++#else
++  msnprintf(buf, len, "%ld/%s", port, hostname);
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ /* Returns number of connections currently held in the connection cache.
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27776.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27776.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1a13df2d95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27776.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+From 6e659993952aa5f90f48864be84a1bbb047fc258 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 13:05:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] http: avoid auth/cookie on redirects same host diff port
+
+CVE-2022-27776
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27776.html
+Closes #8749
+---
+ lib/http.c    | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ lib/urldata.h | 16 +++++++++-------
+ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-27776
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/6e659993952aa5f90f48864be84a1bbb047fc258.patch]
+Comment: Refreshed patch
+Signed-off-by: Sana.Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com>
+
+diff --git a/lib/http.c b/lib/http.c
+index ce79fc4e31c8..f0476f3b9272 100644
+--- a/lib/http.c
++++ b/lib/http.c
+@@ -731,6 +731,21 @@
+   return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * allow_auth_to_host() tells if autentication, cookies or other "sensitive
++ * data" can (still) be sent to this host.
++ */
++static bool allow_auth_to_host(struct Curl_easy *data)
++{
++  struct connectdata *conn = data->conn;
++  return (!data->state.this_is_a_follow ||
++          data->set.allow_auth_to_other_hosts ||
++          (data->state.first_host &&
++           strcasecompare(data->state.first_host, conn->host.name) &&
++           (data->state.first_remote_port == conn->remote_port) &&
++           (data->state.first_remote_protocol == conn->handler->protocol)));
++}
++
+ /**
+  * Curl_http_output_auth() setups the authentication headers for the
+  * host/proxy and the correct authentication
+@@ -799,15 +799,12 @@
+        with it */
+     authproxy->done = TRUE;
+ 
+-  /* To prevent the user+password to get sent to other than the original
+-     host due to a location-follow, we do some weirdo checks here */
+-  if(!data->state.this_is_a_follow ||
+-     conn->bits.netrc ||
+-     !data->state.first_host ||
+-     data->set.allow_auth_to_other_hosts ||
+-     strcasecompare(data->state.first_host, conn->host.name)) {
++  /* To prevent the user+password to get sent to other than the original host
++     due to a location-follow */
++  if(allow_auth_to_host(data)
++     || conn->bits.netrc
++    )
+     result = output_auth_headers(conn, authhost, request, path, FALSE);
+-  }
+   else
+     authhost->done = TRUE;
+ 
+@@ -1879,10 +1891,7 @@
+                    checkprefix("Cookie:", compare)) &&
+                   /* be careful of sending this potentially sensitive header to
+                      other hosts */
+-                  (data->state.this_is_a_follow &&
+-                   data->state.first_host &&
+-                   !data->set.allow_auth_to_other_hosts &&
+-                   !strcasecompare(data->state.first_host, conn->host.name)))
++                  !allow_auth_to_host(data))                     
+             ;
+           else {
+             result = Curl_add_bufferf(&req_buffer, "%s\r\n", compare);
+@@ -2065,6 +2074,7 @@
+       return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ 
+     data->state.first_remote_port = conn->remote_port;
++    data->state.first_remote_protocol = conn->handler->protocol;    
+   }
+ 
+   if((conn->handler->protocol&(PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP|CURLPROTO_FTP)) &&
+diff --git a/lib/urldata.h b/lib/urldata.h
+index 1d89b8d7fa68..ef2174d9e727 100644
+--- a/lib/urldata.h
++++ b/lib/urldata.h
+@@ -1342,13 +1342,15 @@
+   char *ulbuf; /* allocated upload buffer or NULL */
+   curl_off_t current_speed;  /* the ProgressShow() function sets this,
+                                 bytes / second */
+-  char *first_host; /* host name of the first (not followed) request.
+-                       if set, this should be the host name that we will
+-                       sent authorization to, no else. Used to make Location:
+-                       following not keep sending user+password... This is
+-                       strdup() data.
+-                    */
+-  int first_remote_port; /* remote port of the first (not followed) request */
++
++  /* host name, port number and protocol of the first (not followed) request.
++     if set, this should be the host name that we will sent authorization to,
++     no else. Used to make Location: following not keep sending user+password.
++     This is strdup()ed data. */
++  char *first_host;
++  int first_remote_port;
++  unsigned int first_remote_protocol;
++
+   struct curl_ssl_session *session; /* array of 'max_ssl_sessions' size */
+   long sessionage;                  /* number of the most recent session */
+   unsigned int tempcount; /* number of entries in use in tempwrite, 0 - 3 */
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27781.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27781.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ea1bc22928
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27781.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From 7a1f183039a6a6c9099a114f5e5c94777413c767 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 9 May 2022 10:07:15 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] nss: return error if seemingly stuck in a cert loop
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2022-27781
+
+Reported-by: Florian Kohnhäuser
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27781.html
+Closes #8822
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/5c7da89d404bf59c8dd82a001119a16d18365917]
+Signed-off-by: Robert Joslyn <robert.joslyn@redrectangle.org>
+---
+ lib/vtls/nss.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/nss.c b/lib/vtls/nss.c
+index 375c78b..86102f7 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/nss.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/nss.c
+@@ -950,6 +950,9 @@ static void display_cert_info(struct Curl_easy *data,
+   PR_Free(common_name);
+ }
+ 
++/* A number of certs that will never occur in a real server handshake */
++#define TOO_MANY_CERTS 300
++
+ static CURLcode display_conn_info(struct connectdata *conn, PRFileDesc *sock)
+ {
+   CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+@@ -986,6 +989,11 @@ static CURLcode display_conn_info(struct connectdata *conn, PRFileDesc *sock)
+         cert2 = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert, now, certUsageSSLCA);
+         while(cert2) {
+           i++;
++          if(i >= TOO_MANY_CERTS) {
++            CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert2);
++            failf(data, "certificate loop");
++            return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
++          }
+           if(cert2->isRoot) {
+             CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert2);
+             break;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27782-1.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27782-1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6b6d0e1938
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27782-1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+From 907a16c832d9ce0ffa7e9b2297548063095a7242 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 9 May 2022 23:13:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] tls: check more TLS details for connection reuse
+
+CVE-2022-27782
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27782.html
+Closes #8825
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/f18af4f874cecab82a9797e8c7541e0990c7a64c]
+Signed-off-by: Robert Joslyn <robert.joslyn@redrectangle.org>
+---
+ lib/setopt.c       | 29 +++++++++++++++++------------
+ lib/url.c          | 17 ++++++++++-------
+ lib/urldata.h      | 13 +++++++------
+ lib/vtls/gtls.c    | 30 ++++++++++++++++--------------
+ lib/vtls/mbedtls.c |  2 +-
+ lib/vtls/nss.c     |  6 +++---
+ lib/vtls/openssl.c | 10 +++++-----
+ lib/vtls/vtls.c    |  1 +
+ 8 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/setopt.c b/lib/setopt.c
+index 4648c87..bebb2e4 100644
+--- a/lib/setopt.c
++++ b/lib/setopt.c
+@@ -2130,6 +2130,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param)
+ 
+   case CURLOPT_SSL_OPTIONS:
+     arg = va_arg(param, long);
++    data->set.ssl.primary.ssl_options = (unsigned char)(arg & 0xff);
+     data->set.ssl.enable_beast =
+       (bool)((arg&CURLSSLOPT_ALLOW_BEAST) ? TRUE : FALSE);
+     data->set.ssl.no_revoke = !!(arg & CURLSSLOPT_NO_REVOKE);
+@@ -2139,6 +2140,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param)
+ #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
+   case CURLOPT_PROXY_SSL_OPTIONS:
+     arg = va_arg(param, long);
++    data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.ssl_options = (unsigned char)(arg & 0xff);
+     data->set.proxy_ssl.enable_beast =
+       (bool)((arg&CURLSSLOPT_ALLOW_BEAST) ? TRUE : FALSE);
+     data->set.proxy_ssl.no_revoke = !!(arg & CURLSSLOPT_NO_REVOKE);
+@@ -2541,44 +2543,47 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param)
+   case CURLOPT_TLSAUTH_USERNAME:
+     result = Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_ORIG],
+                             va_arg(param, char *));
+-    if(data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_ORIG] && !data->set.ssl.authtype)
+-      data->set.ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default to SRP */
++    if(data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_ORIG] &&
++       !data->set.ssl.primary.authtype)
++      data->set.ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default to SRP */
+     break;
+   case CURLOPT_PROXY_TLSAUTH_USERNAME:
+     result = Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_PROXY],
+                             va_arg(param, char *));
+     if(data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_PROXY] &&
+-       !data->set.proxy_ssl.authtype)
+-      data->set.proxy_ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default to SRP */
++       !data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.authtype)
++      data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default to
++                                                                  SRP */
+     break;
+   case CURLOPT_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD:
+     result = Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD_ORIG],
+                             va_arg(param, char *));
+-    if(data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_ORIG] && !data->set.ssl.authtype)
+-      data->set.ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default to SRP */
++    if(data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_ORIG] &&
++       !data->set.ssl.primary.authtype)
++      data->set.ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default to SRP */
+     break;
+   case CURLOPT_PROXY_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD:
+     result = Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD_PROXY],
+                             va_arg(param, char *));
+     if(data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_PROXY] &&
+-       !data->set.proxy_ssl.authtype)
+-      data->set.proxy_ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default to SRP */
++       !data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.authtype)
++      data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default */
+     break;
+   case CURLOPT_TLSAUTH_TYPE:
+     argptr = va_arg(param, char *);
+     if(!argptr ||
+        strncasecompare(argptr, "SRP", strlen("SRP")))
+-      data->set.ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP;
++      data->set.ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP;
+     else
+-      data->set.ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE;
++      data->set.ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE;
+     break;
+   case CURLOPT_PROXY_TLSAUTH_TYPE:
+     argptr = va_arg(param, char *);
+     if(!argptr ||
+        strncasecompare(argptr, "SRP", strlen("SRP")))
+-      data->set.proxy_ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP;
++      data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP;
+     else
+-      data->set.proxy_ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE;
++      data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE;
+     break;
+ #endif
+ #ifdef USE_ARES
+diff --git a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c
+index efa3dc7..6518be9 100644
+--- a/lib/url.c
++++ b/lib/url.c
+@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_init_userdefined(struct Curl_easy *data)
+   set->ssl.primary.verifypeer = TRUE;
+   set->ssl.primary.verifyhost = TRUE;
+ #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+-  set->ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE;
++  set->ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE;
+ #endif
+   set->ssh_auth_types = CURLSSH_AUTH_DEFAULT; /* defaults to any auth
+                                                       type */
+@@ -3594,8 +3594,9 @@ static CURLcode create_conn(struct Curl_easy *data,
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.pinned_key =
+     data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_PROXY];
+ 
+-  data->set.ssl.CRLfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE_ORIG];
+-  data->set.proxy_ssl.CRLfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE_PROXY];
++  data->set.ssl.primary.CRLfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE_ORIG];
++  data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.CRLfile =
++    data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE_PROXY];
+   data->set.ssl.cert = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_ORIG];
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.cert = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_PROXY];
+   data->set.ssl.cert_type = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_TYPE_ORIG];
+@@ -3609,10 +3610,12 @@ static CURLcode create_conn(struct Curl_easy *data,
+   data->set.ssl.primary.clientcert = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_ORIG];
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.clientcert = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_PROXY];
+ #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+-  data->set.ssl.username = data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_ORIG];
+-  data->set.proxy_ssl.username = data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_PROXY];
+-  data->set.ssl.password = data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD_ORIG];
+-  data->set.proxy_ssl.password = data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD_PROXY];
++  data->set.ssl.primary.username = data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_ORIG];
++  data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.username =
++    data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_PROXY];
++  data->set.ssl.primary.password = data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD_ORIG];
++  data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.password =
++    data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD_PROXY];
+ #endif
+ 
+   if(!Curl_clone_primary_ssl_config(&data->set.ssl.primary,
+diff --git a/lib/urldata.h b/lib/urldata.h
+index ab1b267..ad0ef8f 100644
+--- a/lib/urldata.h
++++ b/lib/urldata.h
+@@ -231,6 +231,13 @@ struct ssl_primary_config {
+   char *cipher_list;     /* list of ciphers to use */
+   char *cipher_list13;   /* list of TLS 1.3 cipher suites to use */
+   char *pinned_key;
++  char *CRLfile;         /* CRL to check certificate revocation */
++  #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
++    char *username; /* TLS username (for, e.g., SRP) */
++    char *password; /* TLS password (for, e.g., SRP) */
++    enum CURL_TLSAUTH authtype; /* TLS authentication type (default SRP) */
++  #endif
++  unsigned char ssl_options;  /* the CURLOPT_SSL_OPTIONS bitmask */
+   BIT(verifypeer);       /* set TRUE if this is desired */
+   BIT(verifyhost);       /* set TRUE if CN/SAN must match hostname */
+   BIT(verifystatus);     /* set TRUE if certificate status must be checked */
+@@ -240,7 +247,6 @@ struct ssl_primary_config {
+ struct ssl_config_data {
+   struct ssl_primary_config primary;
+   long certverifyresult; /* result from the certificate verification */
+-  char *CRLfile;   /* CRL to check certificate revocation */
+   curl_ssl_ctx_callback fsslctx; /* function to initialize ssl ctx */
+   void *fsslctxp;        /* parameter for call back */
+   char *cert; /* client certificate file name */
+@@ -248,11 +254,6 @@ struct ssl_config_data {
+   char *key; /* private key file name */
+   char *key_type; /* format for private key (default: PEM) */
+   char *key_passwd; /* plain text private key password */
+-#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+-  char *username; /* TLS username (for, e.g., SRP) */
+-  char *password; /* TLS password (for, e.g., SRP) */
+-  enum CURL_TLSAUTH authtype; /* TLS authentication type (default SRP) */
+-#endif
+   BIT(certinfo);     /* gather lots of certificate info */
+   BIT(falsestart);
+   BIT(enable_beast); /* allow this flaw for interoperability's sake*/
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/gtls.c b/lib/vtls/gtls.c
+index 3d0758d..92c301c 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/gtls.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/gtls.c
+@@ -581,9 +581,10 @@ gtls_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
+   }
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+-  if((SSL_SET_OPTION(authtype) == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) &&
++  if((SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.authtype) == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) &&
+      Curl_allow_auth_to_host(data)) {
+-    infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s\n", SSL_SET_OPTION(username));
++    infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s\n",
++          SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.username));
+ 
+     rc = gnutls_srp_allocate_client_credentials(&BACKEND->srp_client_cred);
+     if(rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
+@@ -593,8 +594,8 @@ gtls_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
+     }
+ 
+     rc = gnutls_srp_set_client_credentials(BACKEND->srp_client_cred,
+-                                           SSL_SET_OPTION(username),
+-                                           SSL_SET_OPTION(password));
++                                           SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.username),
++                                           SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.password));
+     if(rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
+       failf(data, "gnutls_srp_set_client_cred() failed: %s",
+             gnutls_strerror(rc));
+@@ -648,19 +649,19 @@ gtls_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
+   }
+ #endif
+ 
+-  if(SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile)) {
++  if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.CRLfile)) {
+     /* set the CRL list file */
+     rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_crl_file(BACKEND->cred,
+-                                              SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile),
++                                              SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.CRLfile),
+                                               GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+     if(rc < 0) {
+       failf(data, "error reading crl file %s (%s)",
+-            SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile), gnutls_strerror(rc));
++            SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.CRLfile), gnutls_strerror(rc));
+       return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
+     }
+     else
+       infof(data, "found %d CRL in %s\n",
+-            rc, SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile));
++            rc, SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.CRLfile));
+   }
+ 
+   /* Initialize TLS session as a client */
+@@ -879,7 +880,7 @@ gtls_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+   /* put the credentials to the current session */
+-  if(SSL_SET_OPTION(authtype) == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) {
++  if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.authtype) == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) {
+     rc = gnutls_credentials_set(session, GNUTLS_CRD_SRP,
+                                 BACKEND->srp_client_cred);
+     if(rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
+@@ -1061,8 +1062,8 @@ gtls_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
+        SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost) ||
+        SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)) {
+ #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+-      if(SSL_SET_OPTION(authtype) == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP
+-         && SSL_SET_OPTION(username) != NULL
++      if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.authtype) == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP
++         && SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.username) != NULL
+          && !SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)
+          && gnutls_cipher_get(session)) {
+         /* no peer cert, but auth is ok if we have SRP user and cipher and no
+@@ -1116,7 +1117,8 @@ gtls_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
+         failf(data, "server certificate verification failed. CAfile: %s "
+               "CRLfile: %s", SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile) ? SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile):
+               "none",
+-              SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile)?SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile):"none");
++              SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.CRLfile) ?
++              SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.CRLfile) : "none");
+         return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+       }
+       else
+@@ -1703,8 +1705,8 @@ static int Curl_gtls_shutdown(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+   gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(BACKEND->cred);
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+-  if(SSL_SET_OPTION(authtype) == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP
+-     && SSL_SET_OPTION(username) != NULL)
++  if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.authtype) == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP
++     && SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.username) != NULL)
+     gnutls_srp_free_client_credentials(BACKEND->srp_client_cred);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c b/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c
+index 19df847..62d2b00 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c
+@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ mbed_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
+   const bool verifypeer = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer);
+   const char * const ssl_capath = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CApath);
+   char * const ssl_cert = SSL_SET_OPTION(cert);
+-  const char * const ssl_crlfile = SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile);
++  const char * const ssl_crlfile = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.CRLfile);
+   const char * const hostname = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->http_proxy.host.name :
+     conn->host.name;
+   const long int port = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->port : conn->remote_port;
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/nss.c b/lib/vtls/nss.c
+index 86102f7..62fd7a2 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/nss.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/nss.c
+@@ -1955,13 +1955,13 @@ static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+     }
+   }
+ 
+-  if(SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile)) {
+-    const CURLcode rv = nss_load_crl(SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile));
++  if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.CRLfile)) {
++    const CURLcode rv = nss_load_crl(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.CRLfile));
+     if(rv) {
+       result = rv;
+       goto error;
+     }
+-    infof(data, "  CRLfile: %s\n", SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile));
++    infof(data, "  CRLfile: %s\n", SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.CRLfile));
+   }
+ 
+   if(SSL_SET_OPTION(cert)) {
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/openssl.c b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+index a14cecc..ec5a8f5 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/openssl.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+@@ -2454,14 +2454,14 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+     &data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult : &data->set.ssl.certverifyresult;
+   const long int ssl_version = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version);
+ #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+-  const enum CURL_TLSAUTH ssl_authtype = SSL_SET_OPTION(authtype);
++  const enum CURL_TLSAUTH ssl_authtype = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.authtype);
+ #endif
+   char * const ssl_cert = SSL_SET_OPTION(cert);
+   const char * const ssl_cert_type = SSL_SET_OPTION(cert_type);
+   const char * const ssl_cafile = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile);
+   const char * const ssl_capath = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CApath);
+   const bool verifypeer = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer);
+-  const char * const ssl_crlfile = SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile);
++  const char * const ssl_crlfile = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.CRLfile);
+   char error_buffer[256];
+ 
+   DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state);
+@@ -2741,15 +2741,15 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+ #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+   if((ssl_authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) &&
+      Curl_allow_auth_to_host(data)) {
+-    char * const ssl_username = SSL_SET_OPTION(username);
+-
++    char * const ssl_username = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.username);
++    char * const ssl_password = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.password);
+     infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s\n", ssl_username);
+ 
+     if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(BACKEND->ctx, ssl_username)) {
+       failf(data, "Unable to set SRP user name");
+       return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
+     }
+-    if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(BACKEND->ctx, SSL_SET_OPTION(password))) {
++    if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(BACKEND->ctx, ssl_password)) {
+       failf(data, "failed setting SRP password");
+       return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
+     }
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/vtls.c b/lib/vtls/vtls.c
+index e38f74e..e8cb70f 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/vtls.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/vtls.c
+@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ Curl_ssl_config_matches(struct ssl_primary_config* data,
+ {
+   if((data->version == needle->version) &&
+      (data->version_max == needle->version_max) &&
++     (data->ssl_options == needle->ssl_options) &&
+      (data->verifypeer == needle->verifypeer) &&
+      (data->verifyhost == needle->verifyhost) &&
+      (data->verifystatus == needle->verifystatus) &&
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27782-2.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27782-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3d56025210
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-27782-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From 0a115a8903dffc7f723d1d4d71fb821d69eb8761 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 9 May 2022 23:13:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] url: check SSH config match on connection reuse
+
+CVE-2022-27782
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27782.html
+Closes #8825
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/1645e9b44505abd5cbaf65da5282c3f33b5924a5]
+Signed-off-by: Robert Joslyn <robert.joslyn@redrectangle.org>
+---
+ lib/url.c      | 11 +++++++++++
+ lib/vssh/ssh.h |  6 +++---
+ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c
+index 6518be9..8da0245 100644
+--- a/lib/url.c
++++ b/lib/url.c
+@@ -1027,6 +1027,12 @@ static void prune_dead_connections(struct Curl_easy *data)
+   }
+ }
+ 
++static bool ssh_config_matches(struct connectdata *one,
++                               struct connectdata *two)
++{
++  return (Curl_safecmp(one->proto.sshc.rsa, two->proto.sshc.rsa) &&
++          Curl_safecmp(one->proto.sshc.rsa_pub, two->proto.sshc.rsa_pub));
++}
+ /*
+  * Given one filled in connection struct (named needle), this function should
+  * detect if there already is one that has all the significant details
+@@ -1260,6 +1266,11 @@ ConnectionExists(struct Curl_easy *data,
+         }
+       }
+ 
++      if(get_protocol_family(needle->handler->protocol) == PROTO_FAMILY_SSH) {
++        if(!ssh_config_matches(needle, check))
++          continue;
++      }
++
+       if(!needle->bits.httpproxy || (needle->handler->flags&PROTOPT_SSL) ||
+          needle->bits.tunnel_proxy) {
+         /* The requested connection does not use a HTTP proxy or it uses SSL or
+diff --git a/lib/vssh/ssh.h b/lib/vssh/ssh.h
+index 0d4ee52..8f2632e 100644
+--- a/lib/vssh/ssh.h
++++ b/lib/vssh/ssh.h
+@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
+  *                            | (__| |_| |  _ <| |___
+  *                             \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+  *
+- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2020, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
++ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2022, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+  *
+  * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+  * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+@@ -120,8 +120,8 @@ struct ssh_conn {
+ 
+   /* common */
+   const char *passphrase;     /* pass-phrase to use */
+-  char *rsa_pub;              /* path name */
+-  char *rsa;                  /* path name */
++  char *rsa_pub;              /* strdup'ed public key file */
++  char *rsa;                  /* strdup'ed private key file */
+   bool authed;                /* the connection has been authenticated fine */
+   sshstate state;             /* always use ssh.c:state() to change state! */
+   sshstate nextstate;         /* the state to goto after stopping */
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-32206.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-32206.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3d76aeb43d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-32206.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 25e7be39be5f8ed696b6085ced9cf6c17e6128f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 16 May 2022 16:28:13 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] content_encoding: return error on too many compression steps
+
+The max allowed steps is arbitrarily set to 5.
+
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-32206.html
+CVE-2022-32206
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Closes #9049
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/3a09fbb7f264c67c43]
+Signed-off-by: Robert Joslyn <robert.joslyn@redrectangle.org>
+---
+ lib/content_encoding.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/content_encoding.c b/lib/content_encoding.c
+index 6d47537..91e621f 100644
+--- a/lib/content_encoding.c
++++ b/lib/content_encoding.c
+@@ -934,6 +934,9 @@ static const content_encoding *find_encoding(const char *name, size_t len)
+   return NULL;
+ }
+ 
++/* allow no more than 5 "chained" compression steps */
++#define MAX_ENCODE_STACK 5
++
+ /* Set-up the unencoding stack from the Content-Encoding header value.
+  * See RFC 7231 section 3.1.2.2. */
+ CURLcode Curl_build_unencoding_stack(struct connectdata *conn,
+@@ -941,6 +944,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_build_unencoding_stack(struct connectdata *conn,
+ {
+   struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+   struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req;
++  int counter = 0;
+ 
+   do {
+     const char *name;
+@@ -975,6 +979,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_build_unencoding_stack(struct connectdata *conn,
+       if(!encoding)
+         encoding = &error_encoding;  /* Defer error at stack use. */
+ 
++      if(++counter >= MAX_ENCODE_STACK) {
++        failf(data, "Reject response due to %u content encodings",
++              counter);
++        return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING;
++      }    
+       /* Stack the unencoding stage. */
+       writer = new_unencoding_writer(conn, encoding, k->writer_stack);
+       if(!writer)
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-32207.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-32207.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f75aaecd64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-32207.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+From af92181055d7d64dfc0bc9d5a13c8b98af3196be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Wed, 25 May 2022 10:09:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] fopen: add Curl_fopen() for better overwriting of files
+
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-32207.html
+CVE-2022-32207
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Closes #9050
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/20f9dd6bae50b]
+Signed-off-by: Robert Joslyn <robert.joslyn@redrectangle.org>
+---
+ CMakeLists.txt          |   1 +
+ configure.ac            |   1 +
+ lib/Makefile.inc        |   4 +-
+ lib/cookie.c            |  19 ++-----
+ lib/curl_config.h.cmake |   3 ++
+ lib/fopen.c             | 113 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ lib/fopen.h             |  30 +++++++++++
+ 7 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 lib/fopen.c
+ create mode 100644 lib/fopen.h
+
+diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt
+index 73b053b..cc587b0 100644
+--- a/CMakeLists.txt
++++ b/CMakeLists.txt
+@@ -869,6 +869,7 @@ elseif(HAVE_LIBSOCKET)
+   set(CMAKE_REQUIRED_LIBRARIES socket)
+ endif()
+ 
++check_symbol_exists(fchmod        "${CURL_INCLUDES}" HAVE_FCHMOD)
+ check_symbol_exists(basename      "${CURL_INCLUDES}" HAVE_BASENAME)
+ check_symbol_exists(socket        "${CURL_INCLUDES}" HAVE_SOCKET)
+ check_symbol_exists(select        "${CURL_INCLUDES}" HAVE_SELECT)
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index d090622..7071077 100755
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -4059,6 +4059,7 @@ AC_CHECK_DECLS([getpwuid_r], [], [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_DECL_GETPWUID_R_MISSING, 1, "Se
+ 
+ 
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([fnmatch \
++  fchmod \
+   geteuid \
+   getpass_r \
+   getppid \
+diff --git a/lib/Makefile.inc b/lib/Makefile.inc
+index 46ded90..79307d8 100644
+--- a/lib/Makefile.inc
++++ b/lib/Makefile.inc
+@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ LIB_CFILES = file.c timeval.c base64.c hostip.c progress.c formdata.c   \
+   curl_multibyte.c hostcheck.c conncache.c dotdot.c                     \
+   x509asn1.c http2.c smb.c curl_endian.c curl_des.c system_win32.c      \
+   mime.c sha256.c setopt.c curl_path.c curl_ctype.c curl_range.c psl.c  \
+-  doh.c urlapi.c curl_get_line.c altsvc.c socketpair.c rename.c
++  doh.c urlapi.c curl_get_line.c altsvc.c socketpair.c rename.c fopen.c
+ 
+ LIB_HFILES = arpa_telnet.h netrc.h file.h timeval.h hostip.h progress.h \
+   formdata.h cookie.h http.h sendf.h ftp.h url.h dict.h if2ip.h         \
+@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ LIB_HFILES = arpa_telnet.h netrc.h file.h timeval.h hostip.h progress.h \
+   x509asn1.h http2.h sigpipe.h smb.h curl_endian.h curl_des.h           \
+   curl_printf.h system_win32.h rand.h mime.h curl_sha256.h setopt.h     \
+   curl_path.h curl_ctype.h curl_range.h psl.h doh.h urlapi-int.h        \
+-  curl_get_line.h altsvc.h quic.h socketpair.h rename.h
++  curl_get_line.h altsvc.h quic.h socketpair.h rename.h fopen.h
+ 
+ LIB_RCFILES = libcurl.rc
+ 
+diff --git a/lib/cookie.c b/lib/cookie.c
+index 68054e1..a9ad20a 100644
+--- a/lib/cookie.c
++++ b/lib/cookie.c
+@@ -97,8 +97,8 @@ Example set of cookies:
+ #include "curl_memrchr.h"
+ #include "inet_pton.h"
+ #include "parsedate.h"
+-#include "rand.h"
+ #include "rename.h"
++#include "fopen.h"
+ 
+ /* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */
+ #include "curl_printf.h"
+@@ -1524,18 +1524,9 @@ static int cookie_output(struct Curl_easy *data,
+     use_stdout = TRUE;
+   }
+   else {
+-    unsigned char randsuffix[9];
+-
+-    if(Curl_rand_hex(data, randsuffix, sizeof(randsuffix)))
+-      return 2;
+-
+-    tempstore = aprintf("%s.%s.tmp", filename, randsuffix);
+-    if(!tempstore)
+-      return 1;
+-
+-    out = fopen(tempstore, FOPEN_WRITETEXT);
+-    if(!out)
+-      goto error;
++      error = Curl_fopen(data, filename, &out, &tempstore);
++      if(error)
++        goto error;
+   }
+ 
+   fputs("# Netscape HTTP Cookie File\n"
+@@ -1581,7 +1572,7 @@ static int cookie_output(struct Curl_easy *data,
+   if(!use_stdout) {
+     fclose(out);
+     out = NULL;
+-    if(Curl_rename(tempstore, filename)) {
++    if(tempstore && Curl_rename(tempstore, filename)) {
+       unlink(tempstore);
+       goto error;
+     }
+diff --git a/lib/curl_config.h.cmake b/lib/curl_config.h.cmake
+index 98cdf51..fe43751 100644
+--- a/lib/curl_config.h.cmake
++++ b/lib/curl_config.h.cmake
+@@ -124,6 +124,9 @@
+ /* Define to 1 if you have the <assert.h> header file. */
+ #cmakedefine HAVE_ASSERT_H 1
+ 
++/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */
++#cmakedefine HAVE_FCHMOD 1
++
+ /* Define to 1 if you have the `basename' function. */
+ #cmakedefine HAVE_BASENAME 1
+ 
+diff --git a/lib/fopen.c b/lib/fopen.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ad3691b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/lib/fopen.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
++/***************************************************************************
++ *                                  _   _ ____  _
++ *  Project                     ___| | | |  _ \| |
++ *                             / __| | | | |_) | |
++ *                            | (__| |_| |  _ <| |___
++ *                             \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2022, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
++ *
++ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
++ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
++ * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html.
++ *
++ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
++ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
++ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
++ *
++ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
++ * KIND, either express or implied.
++ *
++ * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl
++ *
++ ***************************************************************************/
++
++#include "curl_setup.h"
++
++#if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_COOKIES) || !defined(CURL_DISABLE_ALTSVC) ||  \
++  !defined(CURL_DISABLE_HSTS)
++
++#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
++#include <fcntl.h>
++#endif
++
++#include "urldata.h"
++#include "rand.h"
++#include "fopen.h"
++/* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */
++#include "curl_printf.h"
++#include "curl_memory.h"
++#include "memdebug.h"
++
++/*
++ * Curl_fopen() opens a file for writing with a temp name, to be renamed
++ * to the final name when completed. If there is an existing file using this
++ * name at the time of the open, this function will clone the mode from that
++ * file.  if 'tempname' is non-NULL, it needs a rename after the file is
++ * written.
++ */
++CURLcode Curl_fopen(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *filename,
++                    FILE **fh, char **tempname)
++{
++  CURLcode result = CURLE_WRITE_ERROR;
++  unsigned char randsuffix[9];
++  char *tempstore = NULL;
++  struct_stat sb;
++  int fd = -1;
++  *tempname = NULL;
++
++  if(stat(filename, &sb) == -1 || !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
++    /* a non-regular file, fallback to direct fopen() */
++    *fh = fopen(filename, FOPEN_WRITETEXT);
++    if(*fh)
++      return CURLE_OK;
++    goto fail;
++  }
++
++  result = Curl_rand_hex(data, randsuffix, sizeof(randsuffix));
++  if(result)
++    goto fail;
++
++  tempstore = aprintf("%s.%s.tmp", filename, randsuffix);
++  if(!tempstore) {
++    result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
++    goto fail;
++  }
++
++  result = CURLE_WRITE_ERROR;
++  fd = open(tempstore, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600);
++  if(fd == -1)
++    goto fail;
++
++#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
++  {
++    struct_stat nsb;
++    if((fstat(fd, &nsb) != -1) &&
++       (nsb.st_uid == sb.st_uid) && (nsb.st_gid == sb.st_gid)) {
++      /* if the user and group are the same, clone the original mode */
++      if(fchmod(fd, sb.st_mode) == -1)
++        goto fail;
++    }
++  }
++#endif
++
++  *fh = fdopen(fd, FOPEN_WRITETEXT);
++  if(!*fh)
++    goto fail;
++
++  *tempname = tempstore;
++  return CURLE_OK;
++
++fail:
++  if(fd != -1) {
++    close(fd);
++    unlink(tempstore);
++  }
++
++  free(tempstore);
++
++  *tempname = NULL;
++  return result;
++}
++
++#endif /* ! disabled */
+diff --git a/lib/fopen.h b/lib/fopen.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..289e55f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/lib/fopen.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
++#ifndef HEADER_CURL_FOPEN_H
++#define HEADER_CURL_FOPEN_H
++/***************************************************************************
++ *                                  _   _ ____  _
++ *  Project                     ___| | | |  _ \| |
++ *                             / __| | | | |_) | |
++ *                            | (__| |_| |  _ <| |___
++ *                             \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2022, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
++ *
++ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
++ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
++ * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html.
++ *
++ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
++ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
++ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
++ *
++ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
++ * KIND, either express or implied.
++ *
++ * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl
++ *
++ ***************************************************************************/
++
++CURLcode Curl_fopen(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *filename,
++                    FILE **fh, char **tempname);
++
++#endif
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-32208.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-32208.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2939314d09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-32208.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+From 3b90f0b2a7a84645acce151c86b40d25b5de6615 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2022 09:27:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] krb5: return error properly on decode errors
+
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-32208.html
+CVE-2022-32208
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Closes #9051
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/6ecdf5136b52af7]
+Signed-off-by: Robert Joslyn <robert.joslyn@redrectangle.org>
+---
+ lib/krb5.c     |  5 +----
+ lib/security.c | 13 ++++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/krb5.c b/lib/krb5.c
+index f50287a..5b77e35 100644
+--- a/lib/krb5.c
++++ b/lib/krb5.c
+@@ -86,11 +86,8 @@ krb5_decode(void *app_data, void *buf, int len,
+   enc.value = buf;
+   enc.length = len;
+   maj = gss_unwrap(&min, *context, &enc, &dec, NULL, NULL);
+-  if(maj != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+-    if(len >= 4)
+-      strcpy(buf, "599 ");
++  if(maj != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+     return -1;
+-  }
+ 
+   memcpy(buf, dec.value, dec.length);
+   len = curlx_uztosi(dec.length);
+diff --git a/lib/security.c b/lib/security.c
+index fbfa707..3542210 100644
+--- a/lib/security.c
++++ b/lib/security.c
+@@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ static CURLcode read_data(struct connectdata *conn,
+ {
+   int len;
+   CURLcode result;
++  int nread;
+ 
+   result = socket_read(fd, &len, sizeof(len));
+   if(result)
+@@ -200,7 +201,10 @@ static CURLcode read_data(struct connectdata *conn,
+   if(len) {
+     /* only realloc if there was a length */
+     len = ntohl(len);
+-    buf->data = Curl_saferealloc(buf->data, len);
++    if(len > CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH)
++      len = 0;
++    else
++      buf->data = Curl_saferealloc(buf->data, len);
+   }
+   if(!len || !buf->data)
+     return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+@@ -208,8 +212,11 @@ static CURLcode read_data(struct connectdata *conn,
+   result = socket_read(fd, buf->data, len);
+   if(result)
+     return result;
+-  buf->size = conn->mech->decode(conn->app_data, buf->data, len,
+-                                 conn->data_prot, conn);
++  nread = buf->size = conn->mech->decode(conn->app_data, buf->data, len,
++                                         conn->data_prot, conn);
++  if(nread < 0)
++    return CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
++  buf->size = (size_t)nread;
+   buf->index = 0;
+   return CURLE_OK;
+ }
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-32221.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-32221.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8e662abd3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-32221.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From 75c04a3e75e8e3025a17ca3033ca307da9691cd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumbhar@mvista.com>
+Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2022 10:49:58 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-32221
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/a64e3e59938abd7d6]
+CVE: CVE-2022-32221
+Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumbhar@mvista.com>
+
+setopt: when POST is set, reset the 'upload' field.
+---
+ lib/setopt.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/setopt.c b/lib/setopt.c
+index bebb2e4..4d96f6b 100644
+--- a/lib/setopt.c
++++ b/lib/setopt.c
+@@ -486,6 +486,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param)
+     }
+     else
+       data->set.httpreq = HTTPREQ_GET;
++    data->set.upload = FALSE;
+     break;
+ 
+   case CURLOPT_COPYPOSTFIELDS:
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-35252.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-35252.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a5160c01f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-35252.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+From c9212bdb21f0cc90a1a60dfdbb716deefe78fd40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2022 00:09:17 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] cookie: reject cookies with "control bytes"
+
+Rejects 0x01 - 0x1f (except 0x09) plus 0x7f
+
+Reported-by: Axel Chong
+
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-35252.html
+
+CVE-2022-35252
+
+Closes #9381
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/8dfc93e573ca740544a2d79ebb]
+
+Signed-off-by: Robert Joslyn <robert.joslyn@redrectangle.org>
+---
+ lib/cookie.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/cookie.c b/lib/cookie.c
+index a9ad20a..66c7715 100644
+--- a/lib/cookie.c
++++ b/lib/cookie.c
+@@ -412,6 +412,30 @@ static bool bad_domain(const char *domain)
+   return !strchr(domain, '.') && !strcasecompare(domain, "localhost");
+ }
+ 
++/*
++  RFC 6265 section 4.1.1 says a server should accept this range:
++
++  cookie-octet    = %x21 / %x23-2B / %x2D-3A / %x3C-5B / %x5D-7E
++
++  But Firefox and Chrome as of June 2022 accept space, comma and double-quotes
++  fine. The prime reason for filtering out control bytes is that some HTTP
++  servers return 400 for requests that contain such.
++*/
++static int invalid_octets(const char *p)
++{
++  /* Reject all bytes \x01 - \x1f (*except* \x09, TAB) + \x7f */
++  static const char badoctets[] = {
++    "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x0a"
++    "\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14"
++    "\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f\x7f"
++  };
++  size_t vlen, len;
++  /* scan for all the octets that are *not* in cookie-octet */
++  len = strcspn(p, badoctets);
++  vlen = strlen(p);
++  return (len != vlen);
++}
++
+ /****************************************************************************
+  *
+  * Curl_cookie_add()
+@@ -558,6 +582,11 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data,
+             badcookie = TRUE;
+             break;
+           }
++          if(invalid_octets(whatptr) || invalid_octets(name)) {
++            infof(data, "invalid octets in name/value, cookie dropped");
++            badcookie = TRUE;
++            break;
++          }
+         }
+         else if(!len) {
+           /* this was a "<name>=" with no content, and we must allow
+-- 
+2.35.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-35260.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-35260.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..476c996b0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-35260.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+From 3ff3989ec53d9ddcf4bdd99f5d5788dd87486768 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2022 14:37:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] netrc: replace fgets with Curl_get_line
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2022-35260
+Reference to upstream patch: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/c97ec984fb2bc919a3aa863e0476dffa377b184c
+
+Make the parser only accept complete lines and avoid problems with
+overly long lines.
+
+Reported-by: Hiroki Kurosawa
+
+Closes #9789
+---
+ lib/curl_get_line.c | 4 ++--
+ lib/netrc.c         | 5 +++--
+ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/curl_get_line.c b/lib/curl_get_line.c
+index c4194851ae09..4b9eea9e631c 100644
+--- a/lib/curl_get_line.c
++++ b/lib/curl_get_line.c
+@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@
+ #include "memdebug.h"
+ 
+ /*
+- * get_line() makes sure to only return complete whole lines that fit in 'len'
+- * bytes and end with a newline.
++ * Curl_get_line() makes sure to only return complete whole lines that fit in
++ * 'len' bytes and end with a newline.
+  */
+ char *Curl_get_line(char *buf, int len, FILE *input)
+ {
+diff --git a/lib/netrc.c b/lib/netrc.c
+index 1c9da31993c9..93239132c9d8 100644
+--- a/lib/netrc.c
++++ b/lib/netrc.c
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ #include "netrc.h"
+ #include "strtok.h"
+ #include "strcase.h"
++#include "curl_get_line.h"
+ 
+ /* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */
+ #include "curl_printf.h"
+@@ -83,7 +84,7 @@ static int parsenetrc(const char *host,
+     char netrcbuffer[4096];
+     int  netrcbuffsize = (int)sizeof(netrcbuffer);
+ 
+-    while(!done && fgets(netrcbuffer, netrcbuffsize, file)) {
++    while(!done && Curl_get_line(netrcbuffer, netrcbuffsize, file)) {
+       tok = strtok_r(netrcbuffer, " \t\n", &tok_buf);
+       if(tok && *tok == '#')
+         /* treat an initial hash as a comment line */
+@@ -169,7 +170,7 @@ static int parsenetrc(const char *host,
+ 
+         tok = strtok_r(NULL, " \t\n", &tok_buf);
+       } /* while(tok) */
+-    } /* while fgets() */
++    } /* while Curl_get_line() */
+ 
+     out:
+     if(!retcode) {
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-43552.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-43552.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d729441454
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-43552.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+rom 4f20188ac644afe174be6005ef4f6ffba232b8b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2022 08:38:37 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] smb/telnet: do not free the protocol struct in *_done()
+
+It is managed by the generic layer.
+
+Reported-by: Trail of Bits
+
+Closes #10112
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-43552
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/4f20188ac644afe174be6005ef4f6ffba232b8b2]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/smb.c    | 14 ++------------
+ lib/telnet.c |  3 ---
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/smb.c b/lib/smb.c
+index 12f9925..8db3b27 100644
+--- a/lib/smb.c
++++ b/lib/smb.c
+@@ -61,8 +61,6 @@ static CURLcode smb_connect(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done);
+ static CURLcode smb_connection_state(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done);
+ static CURLcode smb_do(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done);
+ static CURLcode smb_request_state(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done);
+-static CURLcode smb_done(struct connectdata *conn, CURLcode status,
+-                         bool premature);
+ static CURLcode smb_disconnect(struct connectdata *conn, bool dead);
+ static int smb_getsock(struct connectdata *conn, curl_socket_t *socks);
+ static CURLcode smb_parse_url_path(struct connectdata *conn);
+@@ -74,7 +72,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_smb = {
+   "SMB",                                /* scheme */
+   smb_setup_connection,                 /* setup_connection */
+   smb_do,                               /* do_it */
+-  smb_done,                             /* done */
++  ZERO_NULL,                            /* done */
+   ZERO_NULL,                            /* do_more */
+   smb_connect,                          /* connect_it */
+   smb_connection_state,                 /* connecting */
+@@ -99,7 +97,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_smbs = {
+   "SMBS",                               /* scheme */
+   smb_setup_connection,                 /* setup_connection */
+   smb_do,                               /* do_it */
+-  smb_done,                             /* done */
++  ZERO_NULL,                            /* done */
+   ZERO_NULL,                            /* do_more */
+   smb_connect,                          /* connect_it */
+   smb_connection_state,                 /* connecting */
+@@ -919,14 +917,6 @@ static CURLcode smb_request_state(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done)
+   return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+ 
+-static CURLcode smb_done(struct connectdata *conn, CURLcode status,
+-                         bool premature)
+-{
+-  (void) premature;
+-  Curl_safefree(conn->data->req.protop);
+-  return status;
+-}
+-
+ static CURLcode smb_disconnect(struct connectdata *conn, bool dead)
+ {
+   struct smb_conn *smbc = &conn->proto.smbc;
+diff --git a/lib/telnet.c b/lib/telnet.c
+index 3347ad6..e3b9208 100644
+--- a/lib/telnet.c
++++ b/lib/telnet.c
+@@ -1294,9 +1294,6 @@ static CURLcode telnet_done(struct connectdata *conn,
+ 
+   curl_slist_free_all(tn->telnet_vars);
+   tn->telnet_vars = NULL;
+-
+-  Curl_safefree(conn->data->req.protop);
+-
+   return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-23916.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-23916.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..054615963e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-23916.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+From 119fb187192a9ea13dc90d9d20c215fc82799ab9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Patrick Monnerat <patrick@monnerat.net>
+Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2023 08:33:09 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] content_encoding: do not reset stage counter for each header
+
+Test 418 verifies
+
+Closes #10492
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/119fb187192a9ea13dc90d9d20c215fc82799ab9]
+CVE: CVE-2023-23916
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/content_encoding.c  |   7 +-
+ lib/urldata.h           |   1 +
+ tests/data/Makefile.inc |   2 +-
+ tests/data/test418      | 152 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 tests/data/test418
+
+diff --git a/lib/content_encoding.c b/lib/content_encoding.c
+index 91e621f..7e098a5 100644
+--- a/lib/content_encoding.c
++++ b/lib/content_encoding.c
+@@ -944,7 +944,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_build_unencoding_stack(struct connectdata *conn,
+ {
+   struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+   struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req;
+-  int counter = 0;
+ 
+   do {
+     const char *name;
+@@ -979,9 +978,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_build_unencoding_stack(struct connectdata *conn,
+       if(!encoding)
+         encoding = &error_encoding;  /* Defer error at stack use. */
+ 
+-      if(++counter >= MAX_ENCODE_STACK) {
+-        failf(data, "Reject response due to %u content encodings",
+-              counter);
++      if(k->writer_stack_depth++ >= MAX_ENCODE_STACK) {
++        failf(data, "Reject response due to more than %u content encodings",
++              MAX_ENCODE_STACK);
+         return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING;
+       }    
+       /* Stack the unencoding stage. */
+diff --git a/lib/urldata.h b/lib/urldata.h
+index ad0ef8f..168f874 100644
+--- a/lib/urldata.h
++++ b/lib/urldata.h
+@@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ struct SingleRequest {
+ #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_DOH
+   struct dohdata doh; /* DoH specific data for this request */
+ #endif
++  unsigned char writer_stack_depth; /* Unencoding stack depth. */
+   BIT(header);       /* incoming data has HTTP header */
+   BIT(content_range); /* set TRUE if Content-Range: was found */
+   BIT(upload_done);  /* set to TRUE when doing chunked transfer-encoding
+diff --git a/tests/data/Makefile.inc b/tests/data/Makefile.inc
+index 60e8176..40de8bc 100644
+--- a/tests/data/Makefile.inc
++++ b/tests/data/Makefile.inc
+@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ test350 test351 test352 test353 test354 test355 test356 test357 \
+ test393 test394 test395 \
+ \
+ test400 test401 test402 test403 test404 test405 test406 test407 test408 \
+-test409 \
++test409 test418 \
+ \
+ test490 test491 test492 \
+ \
+diff --git a/tests/data/test418 b/tests/data/test418
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..50e974e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/data/test418
+@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
++<testcase>
++<info>
++<keywords>
++HTTP
++gzip
++</keywords>
++</info>
++
++#
++# Server-side
++<reply>
++<data nocheck="yes">
++HTTP/1.1 200 OK
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++Transfer-Encoding: gzip
++
++-foo-
++</data>
++</reply>
++
++#
++# Client-side
++<client>
++<server>
++http
++</server>
++ <name>
++Response with multiple Transfer-Encoding headers
++ </name>
++ <command>
++http://%HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT/%TESTNUMBER -sS
++</command>
++</client>
++
++#
++# Verify data after the test has been "shot"
++<verify>
++<protocol crlf="yes">
++GET /%TESTNUMBER HTTP/1.1
++Host: %HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT
++User-Agent: curl/%VERSION
++Accept: */*
++
++</protocol>
++
++# CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING is 61
++<errorcode>
++61
++</errorcode>
++<stderr mode="text">
++curl: (61) Reject response due to more than 5 content encodings
++</stderr>
++</verify>
++</testcase>
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27533.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27533.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..64ba135056
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27533.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+Backport of:
+
+From 538b1e79a6e7b0bb829ab4cecc828d32105d0684 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 12:07:33 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] telnet: only accept option arguments in ascii
+
+To avoid embedded telnet negotiation commands etc.
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Closes #10728
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/curl/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2023-27533.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
+Upstream commit https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/538b1e79a6e7b0bb829ab4cecc828d32105d0684]
+CVE: CVE-2023-27533
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/telnet.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/lib/telnet.c
++++ b/lib/telnet.c
+@@ -815,6 +815,17 @@ static void printsub(struct Curl_easy *d
+   }
+ }
+ 
++static bool str_is_nonascii(const char *str)
++{
++  size_t len = strlen(str);
++  while(len--) {
++    if(*str & 0x80)
++      return TRUE;
++    str++;
++  }
++  return FALSE;
++}
++
+ static CURLcode check_telnet_options(struct connectdata *conn)
+ {
+   struct curl_slist *head;
+@@ -829,6 +840,8 @@ static CURLcode check_telnet_options(str
+   /* Add the user name as an environment variable if it
+      was given on the command line */
+   if(conn->bits.user_passwd) {
++    if(str_is_nonascii(data->conn->user))
++      return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
+     msnprintf(option_arg, sizeof(option_arg), "USER,%s", conn->user);
+     beg = curl_slist_append(tn->telnet_vars, option_arg);
+     if(!beg) {
+@@ -844,6 +857,9 @@ static CURLcode check_telnet_options(str
+     if(sscanf(head->data, "%127[^= ]%*[ =]%255s",
+               option_keyword, option_arg) == 2) {
+ 
++      if(str_is_nonascii(option_arg))
++        continue;
++
+       /* Terminal type */
+       if(strcasecompare(option_keyword, "TTYPE")) {
+         strncpy(tn->subopt_ttype, option_arg, 31);
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27534-pre1.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27534-pre1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..46c57afb73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27534-pre1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From 6c51adeb71da076c5c40a45e339e06bb4394a86b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Vigeant <evigeant@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2022 11:47:09 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] cur_path: do not add '/' if homedir ends with one
+
+When using SFTP and a path relative to the user home, do not add a
+trailing '/' to the user home dir if it already ends with one.
+
+Closes #9844
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-27534
+Note:
+- The upstream patch for CVE-2023-27534 does three things:
+1) creates new path with dynbuf(dynamic buffer)
+2) solves the tilde error which causes CVE-2023-27534
+3) modifies the below added functionality to not add a trailing "/" to the user home dir if it already ends with one with dynbuf.
+- dynbuf functionalities are added in curl in later versions and are not essential to fix the vulnerability but does add extra feature in later versions.
+- This patch completes the 3rd task of the patch which was implemented without using dynbuf
+Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/6c51adeb71da076c5c40a45e339e06bb4394a86b]
+
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <sdoshi@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/curl_path.c | 10 +++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/curl_path.c b/lib/curl_path.c
+index f429634..40b92ee 100644
+--- a/lib/curl_path.c
++++ b/lib/curl_path.c
+@@ -70,10 +70,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_getworkingpath(struct connectdata *conn,
+       /* It is referenced to the home directory, so strip the
+          leading '/' */
+       memcpy(real_path, homedir, homelen);
+-      real_path[homelen] = '/';
+-      real_path[homelen + 1] = '\0';
++      /* Only add a trailing '/' if homedir does not end with one */
++      if(homelen == 0 || real_path[homelen - 1] != '/') {
++        real_path[homelen] = '/';
++        homelen++;
++        real_path[homelen] = '\0';
++      }
+       if(working_path_len > 3) {
+-        memcpy(real_path + homelen + 1, working_path + 3,
++        memcpy(real_path + homelen, working_path + 3,
+                1 + working_path_len -3);
+       }
+     }
+-- 
+2.24.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27534.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27534.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3ecd181290
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27534.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 4e2b52b5f7a3bf50a0f1494155717b02cc1df6d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2023 16:22:11 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] curl_path: create the new path with dynbuf
+
+Closes #10729
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-27534
+Note: This patch is needed to backport CVE-2023-27534
+Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/4e2b52b5f7a3bf50a0f1494155717b02cc1df6d6]
+
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <sdoshi@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/curl_path.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/curl_path.c b/lib/curl_path.c
+index 40b92ee..598c5dd 100644
+--- a/lib/curl_path.c
++++ b/lib/curl_path.c
+@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_getworkingpath(struct connectdata *conn,
+       memcpy(real_path, working_path, 1 + working_path_len);
+   }
+   else if(conn->handler->protocol & CURLPROTO_SFTP) {
+-    if((working_path_len > 1) && (working_path[1] == '~')) {
++    if((working_path_len > 2) && !memcmp(working_path, "/~/", 3)) {
+       size_t homelen = strlen(homedir);
+       real_path = malloc(homelen + working_path_len + 1);
+       if(real_path == NULL) {
+-- 
+2.24.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27535-pre1.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27535-pre1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..034b72f7e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27535-pre1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+From ed5095ed94281989e103c72e032200b83be37878 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 6 Oct 2022 00:49:10 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] strcase: add and use Curl_timestrcmp
+
+This is a strcmp() alternative function for comparing "secrets",
+designed to take the same time no matter the content to not leak
+match/non-match info to observers based on how fast it is.
+
+The time this function takes is only a function of the shortest input
+string.
+
+Reported-by: Trail of Bits
+
+Closes #9658
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/ed5095ed94281989e103c72e032200b83be37878 & https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/f18af4f874cecab82a9797e8c7541e0990c7a64c]
+Comment: to backport fix for CVE-2023-27535, add function Curl_timestrcmp.
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/netrc.c             |  6 +++---
+ lib/strcase.c           | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ lib/strcase.h           |  1 +
+ lib/url.c               | 33 +++++++++++++--------------------
+ lib/vauth/digest_sspi.c |  4 ++--
+ lib/vtls/vtls.c         | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 6 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/netrc.c b/lib/netrc.c
+index 9323913..fe3fd1e 100644
+--- a/lib/netrc.c
++++ b/lib/netrc.c
+@@ -124,9 +124,9 @@ static int parsenetrc(const char *host,
+           /* we are now parsing sub-keywords concerning "our" host */
+           if(state_login) {
+             if(specific_login) {
+-              state_our_login = strcasecompare(login, tok);
++              state_our_login = !Curl_timestrcmp(login, tok);
+             }
+-            else if(!login || strcmp(login, tok)) {
++            else if(!login || Curl_timestrcmp(login, tok)) {
+               if(login_alloc) {
+                 free(login);
+                 login_alloc = FALSE;
+@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ static int parsenetrc(const char *host,
+           }
+           else if(state_password) {
+             if((state_our_login || !specific_login)
+-                && (!password || strcmp(password, tok))) {
++               && (!password || Curl_timestrcmp(password, tok))) {
+               if(password_alloc) {
+                 free(password);
+                 password_alloc = FALSE;
+diff --git a/lib/strcase.c b/lib/strcase.c
+index 70bf21c..ec776b3 100644
+--- a/lib/strcase.c
++++ b/lib/strcase.c
+@@ -261,6 +261,28 @@ bool Curl_safecmp(char *a, char *b)
+   return !a && !b;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Curl_timestrcmp() returns 0 if the two strings are identical. The time this
++ * function spends is a function of the shortest string, not of the contents.
++ */
++int Curl_timestrcmp(const char *a, const char *b)
++{
++  int match = 0;
++  int i = 0;
++
++  if(a && b) {
++    while(1) {
++      match |= a[i]^b[i];
++      if(!a[i] || !b[i])
++        break;
++      i++;
++    }
++  }
++  else
++    return a || b;
++  return match;
++}
++
+ /* --- public functions --- */
+ 
+ int curl_strequal(const char *first, const char *second)
+diff --git a/lib/strcase.h b/lib/strcase.h
+index 8929a53..8077108 100644
+--- a/lib/strcase.h
++++ b/lib/strcase.h
+@@ -49,5 +49,6 @@ void Curl_strntoupper(char *dest, const char *src, size_t n);
+ void Curl_strntolower(char *dest, const char *src, size_t n);
+ 
+ bool Curl_safecmp(char *a, char *b);
++int Curl_timestrcmp(const char *first, const char *second);
+ 
+ #endif /* HEADER_CURL_STRCASE_H */
+diff --git a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c
+index 9f14a7b..dfbde3b 100644
+--- a/lib/url.c
++++ b/lib/url.c
+@@ -886,19 +886,10 @@ socks_proxy_info_matches(const struct proxy_info* data,
+   /* the user information is case-sensitive
+      or at least it is not defined as case-insensitive
+      see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.2.1 */
+-  if((data->user == NULL) != (needle->user == NULL))
+-    return FALSE;
+-  /* curl_strequal does a case insentive comparison, so do not use it here! */
+-  if(data->user &&
+-     needle->user &&
+-     strcmp(data->user, needle->user) != 0)
+-    return FALSE;
+-  if((data->passwd == NULL) != (needle->passwd == NULL))
+-    return FALSE;
++
+   /* curl_strequal does a case insentive comparison, so do not use it here! */
+-  if(data->passwd &&
+-     needle->passwd &&
+-     strcmp(data->passwd, needle->passwd) != 0)
++  if(Curl_timestrcmp(data->user, needle->user) ||
++     Curl_timestrcmp(data->passwd, needle->passwd))
+     return FALSE;
+   return TRUE;
+ }
+@@ -1257,10 +1248,10 @@ ConnectionExists(struct Curl_easy *data,
+       if(!(needle->handler->flags & PROTOPT_CREDSPERREQUEST)) {
+         /* This protocol requires credentials per connection,
+            so verify that we're using the same name and password as well */
+-        if(strcmp(needle->user, check->user) ||
+-           strcmp(needle->passwd, check->passwd) ||
+-           !Curl_safecmp(needle->sasl_authzid, check->sasl_authzid) ||
+-           !Curl_safecmp(needle->oauth_bearer, check->oauth_bearer)) {                 
++        if(Curl_timestrcmp(needle->user, check->user) ||
++           Curl_timestrcmp(needle->passwd, check->passwd) ||
++           Curl_timestrcmp(needle->sasl_authzid, check->sasl_authzid) ||
++           Curl_timestrcmp(needle->oauth_bearer, check->oauth_bearer)) {                       
+           /* one of them was different */
+           continue;
+         }
+@@ -1326,8 +1317,8 @@ ConnectionExists(struct Curl_easy *data,
+            possible. (Especially we must not reuse the same connection if
+            partway through a handshake!) */
+         if(wantNTLMhttp) {
+-          if(strcmp(needle->user, check->user) ||
+-             strcmp(needle->passwd, check->passwd)) {
++          if(Curl_timestrcmp(needle->user, check->user) ||
++             Curl_timestrcmp(needle->passwd, check->passwd)) {
+ 
+             /* we prefer a credential match, but this is at least a connection
+                that can be reused and "upgraded" to NTLM */
+@@ -1348,8 +1339,10 @@ ConnectionExists(struct Curl_easy *data,
+           if(!check->http_proxy.user || !check->http_proxy.passwd)
+             continue;
+ 
+-          if(strcmp(needle->http_proxy.user, check->http_proxy.user) ||
+-             strcmp(needle->http_proxy.passwd, check->http_proxy.passwd))
++          if(Curl_timestrcmp(needle->http_proxy.user,
++                             check->http_proxy.user) ||
++             Curl_timestrcmp(needle->http_proxy.passwd,
++                             check->http_proxy.passwd))
+             continue;
+         }
+         else if(check->proxy_ntlm_state != NTLMSTATE_NONE) {
+diff --git a/lib/vauth/digest_sspi.c b/lib/vauth/digest_sspi.c
+index a109056..3986386 100644
+--- a/lib/vauth/digest_sspi.c
++++ b/lib/vauth/digest_sspi.c
+@@ -450,8 +450,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_digest_http_message(struct Curl_easy *data,
+      has changed then delete that context. */
+   if((userp && !digest->user) || (!userp && digest->user) ||
+      (passwdp && !digest->passwd) || (!passwdp && digest->passwd) ||
+-     (userp && digest->user && strcmp(userp, digest->user)) ||
+-     (passwdp && digest->passwd && strcmp(passwdp, digest->passwd))) {
++     (userp && digest->user && Curl_timestrcmp(userp, digest->user)) ||
++     (passwdp && digest->passwd && Curl_timestrcmp(passwdp, digest->passwd))) {
+     if(digest->http_context) {
+       s_pSecFn->DeleteSecurityContext(digest->http_context);
+       Curl_safefree(digest->http_context);
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/vtls.c b/lib/vtls/vtls.c
+index e8cb70f..70a9391 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/vtls.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/vtls.c
+@@ -98,9 +98,15 @@ Curl_ssl_config_matches(struct ssl_primary_config* data,
+      Curl_safecmp(data->issuercert, needle->issuercert) &&
+      Curl_safecmp(data->clientcert, needle->clientcert) &&
+      Curl_safecmp(data->random_file, needle->random_file) &&
+-     Curl_safecmp(data->egdsocket, needle->egdsocket) &&     
++     Curl_safecmp(data->egdsocket, needle->egdsocket) &&    
++#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP 
++     !Curl_timestrcmp(data->username, needle->username) &&    
++     !Curl_timestrcmp(data->password, needle->password) &&    
++     (data->authtype == needle->authtype) &&   
++#endif 
+      Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->cipher_list, needle->cipher_list) &&
+      Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->cipher_list13, needle->cipher_list13) &&
++     Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->CRLfile, needle->CRLfile) &&
+      Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->pinned_key, needle->pinned_key))
+     return TRUE;
+ 
+@@ -117,6 +123,9 @@ Curl_clone_primary_ssl_config(struct ssl_primary_config *source,
+   dest->verifyhost = source->verifyhost;
+   dest->verifystatus = source->verifystatus;
+   dest->sessionid = source->sessionid;
++#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
++  dest->authtype = source->authtype;
++#endif
+ 
+   CLONE_STRING(CApath);
+   CLONE_STRING(CAfile);
+@@ -127,6 +136,11 @@ Curl_clone_primary_ssl_config(struct ssl_primary_config *source,
+   CLONE_STRING(cipher_list);
+   CLONE_STRING(cipher_list13);
+   CLONE_STRING(pinned_key);
++  CLONE_STRING(CRLfile);
++#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
++  CLONE_STRING(username);
++  CLONE_STRING(password);
++#endif
+ 
+   return TRUE;
+ }
+@@ -142,6 +156,11 @@ void Curl_free_primary_ssl_config(struct ssl_primary_config* sslc)
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->cipher_list);
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->cipher_list13);
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->pinned_key);
++  Curl_safefree(sslc->CRLfile);
++#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
++  Curl_safefree(sslc->username);
++  Curl_safefree(sslc->password);
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_SSL
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27535.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27535.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e38390a57c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27535.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+From 8f4608468b890dce2dad9f91d5607ee7e9c1aba1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2023 17:47:06 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] ftp: add more conditions for connection reuse
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Closes #10730
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/curl/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2023-27535.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
+Upstream commit https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/8f4608468b890dce2dad9f91d5607ee7e9c1aba1]
+CVE: CVE-2023-27535
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/ftp.c     | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ lib/ftp.h     |  5 +++++
+ lib/setopt.c  |  2 +-
+ lib/url.c     | 16 +++++++++++++++-
+ lib/urldata.h |  4 ++--
+ 5 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/ftp.c b/lib/ftp.c
+index 31a34e8..7a82a74 100644
+--- a/lib/ftp.c
++++ b/lib/ftp.c
+@@ -4059,6 +4059,10 @@ static CURLcode ftp_disconnect(struct connectdata *conn, bool dead_connection)
+   }
+ 
+   freedirs(ftpc);
++  free(ftpc->account);
++  ftpc->account = NULL;
++  free(ftpc->alternative_to_user);
++  ftpc->alternative_to_user = NULL;
+   free(ftpc->prevpath);
+   ftpc->prevpath = NULL;
+   free(ftpc->server_os);
+@@ -4326,11 +4330,31 @@ static CURLcode ftp_setup_connection(struct connectdata *conn)
+   struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+   char *type;
+   struct FTP *ftp;
++  struct ftp_conn *ftpc = &conn->proto.ftpc;
+ 
+-  conn->data->req.protop = ftp = calloc(sizeof(struct FTP), 1);
++  ftp = calloc(sizeof(struct FTP), 1);
+   if(NULL == ftp)
+     return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ 
++  /* clone connection related data that is FTP specific */
++  if(data->set.str[STRING_FTP_ACCOUNT]) {
++    ftpc->account = strdup(data->set.str[STRING_FTP_ACCOUNT]);
++    if(!ftpc->account) {
++      free(ftp);
++      return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
++    }
++  }
++  if(data->set.str[STRING_FTP_ALTERNATIVE_TO_USER]) {
++    ftpc->alternative_to_user =
++      strdup(data->set.str[STRING_FTP_ALTERNATIVE_TO_USER]);
++    if(!ftpc->alternative_to_user) {
++      Curl_safefree(ftpc->account);
++      free(ftp);
++      return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
++    }
++  }
++  conn->data->req.protop = ftp;
++
+   ftp->path = &data->state.up.path[1]; /* don't include the initial slash */
+ 
+   /* FTP URLs support an extension like ";type=<typecode>" that
+@@ -4366,7 +4390,9 @@ static CURLcode ftp_setup_connection(struct connectdata *conn)
+   /* get some initial data into the ftp struct */
+   ftp->transfer = FTPTRANSFER_BODY;
+   ftp->downloadsize = 0;
+-  conn->proto.ftpc.known_filesize = -1; /* unknown size for now */
++  ftpc->known_filesize = -1; /* unknown size for now */
++  ftpc->use_ssl = data->set.use_ssl;
++  ftpc->ccc = data->set.ftp_ccc;
+ 
+   return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+diff --git a/lib/ftp.h b/lib/ftp.h
+index 984347f..163dcb3 100644
+--- a/lib/ftp.h
++++ b/lib/ftp.h
+@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@ struct FTP {
+    struct */
+ struct ftp_conn {
+   struct pingpong pp;
++  char *account;
++  char *alternative_to_user;
+   char *entrypath; /* the PWD reply when we logged on */
+   char **dirs;   /* realloc()ed array for path components */
+   int dirdepth;  /* number of entries used in the 'dirs' array */
+@@ -141,6 +143,9 @@ struct ftp_conn {
+   ftpstate state; /* always use ftp.c:state() to change state! */
+   ftpstate state_saved; /* transfer type saved to be reloaded after
+                            data connection is established */
++  unsigned char use_ssl;   /* if AUTH TLS is to be attempted etc, for FTP or
++                              IMAP or POP3 or others! (type: curl_usessl)*/
++  unsigned char ccc;       /* ccc level for this connection */
+   curl_off_t retr_size_saved; /* Size of retrieved file saved */
+   char *server_os;     /* The target server operating system. */
+   curl_off_t known_filesize; /* file size is different from -1, if wildcard
+diff --git a/lib/setopt.c b/lib/setopt.c
+index 4d96f6b..a91bb70 100644
+--- a/lib/setopt.c
++++ b/lib/setopt.c
+@@ -2126,7 +2126,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param)
+     arg = va_arg(param, long);
+     if((arg < CURLUSESSL_NONE) || (arg >= CURLUSESSL_LAST))
+       return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
+-    data->set.use_ssl = (curl_usessl)arg;
++    data->set.use_ssl = (unsigned char)arg;
+     break;
+ 
+   case CURLOPT_SSL_OPTIONS:
+diff --git a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c
+index dfbde3b..f84375c 100644
+--- a/lib/url.c
++++ b/lib/url.c
+@@ -1257,10 +1257,24 @@ ConnectionExists(struct Curl_easy *data,
+         }
+       }
+ 
+-      if(get_protocol_family(needle->handler->protocol) & PROTO_FAMILY_SSH) {
++#ifdef USE_SSH
++      else if(get_protocol_family(needle->handler->protocol) & PROTO_FAMILY_SSH) {
+         if(!ssh_config_matches(needle, check))
+           continue;
+       }
++#endif
++#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FTP
++      else if(get_protocol_family(needle->handler->protocol) & PROTO_FAMILY_FTP) {
++        /* Also match ACCOUNT, ALTERNATIVE-TO-USER, USE_SSL and CCC options */
++        if(Curl_timestrcmp(needle->proto.ftpc.account,
++                           check->proto.ftpc.account) ||
++           Curl_timestrcmp(needle->proto.ftpc.alternative_to_user,
++                           check->proto.ftpc.alternative_to_user) ||
++           (needle->proto.ftpc.use_ssl != check->proto.ftpc.use_ssl) ||
++           (needle->proto.ftpc.ccc != check->proto.ftpc.ccc))
++          continue;
++      }
++#endif
+ 
+       if(!needle->bits.httpproxy || (needle->handler->flags&PROTOPT_SSL) ||
+          needle->bits.tunnel_proxy) {
+diff --git a/lib/urldata.h b/lib/urldata.h
+index 168f874..51b793b 100644
+--- a/lib/urldata.h
++++ b/lib/urldata.h
+@@ -1730,8 +1730,6 @@ struct UserDefined {
+   void *ssh_keyfunc_userp;         /* custom pointer to callback */
+   enum CURL_NETRC_OPTION
+        use_netrc;        /* defined in include/curl.h */
+-  curl_usessl use_ssl;   /* if AUTH TLS is to be attempted etc, for FTP or
+-                            IMAP or POP3 or others! */
+   long new_file_perms;    /* Permissions to use when creating remote files */
+   long new_directory_perms; /* Permissions to use when creating remote dirs */
+   long ssh_auth_types;   /* allowed SSH auth types */
+@@ -1851,6 +1849,8 @@ struct UserDefined {
+   BIT(http09_allowed); /* allow HTTP/0.9 responses */
+   BIT(mail_rcpt_allowfails); /* allow RCPT TO command to fail for some
+                                 recipients */
++  unsigned char use_ssl;   /* if AUTH TLS is to be attempted etc, for FTP or
++                              IMAP or POP3 or others! (type: curl_usessl)*/
+ };
+ 
+ struct Names {
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27536.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27536.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b04a77de25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27536.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From cb49e67303dbafbab1cebf4086e3ec15b7d56ee5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2023 09:22:43 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] url: only reuse connections with same GSS delegation
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Closes #10731
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/cb49e67303dbafbab1cebf4086e3ec15b7d56ee5]
+CVE: CVE-2023-27536
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/url.c     | 6 ++++++
+ lib/urldata.h | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c
+index f84375c..87f4eb0 100644
+--- a/lib/url.c
++++ b/lib/url.c
+@@ -1257,6 +1257,11 @@ ConnectionExists(struct Curl_easy *data,
+         }
+       }
+ 
++      /* GSS delegation differences do not actually affect every connection
++         and auth method, but this check takes precaution before efficiency */
++      if(needle->gssapi_delegation != check->gssapi_delegation)
++       continue;
++
+ #ifdef USE_SSH
+       else if(get_protocol_family(needle->handler->protocol) & PROTO_FAMILY_SSH) {
+         if(!ssh_config_matches(needle, check))
+@@ -1708,6 +1713,7 @@ static struct connectdata *allocate_conn(struct Curl_easy *data)
+   conn->fclosesocket = data->set.fclosesocket;
+   conn->closesocket_client = data->set.closesocket_client;
+   conn->lastused = Curl_now(); /* used now */
++  conn->gssapi_delegation = data->set.gssapi_delegation;
+ 
+   return conn;
+   error:
+diff --git a/lib/urldata.h b/lib/urldata.h
+index 51b793b..b8a611b 100644
+--- a/lib/urldata.h
++++ b/lib/urldata.h
+@@ -1118,6 +1118,7 @@ struct connectdata {
+                               handle */
+   BIT(sock_accepted); /* TRUE if the SECONDARYSOCKET was created with
+                          accept() */
++  long gssapi_delegation; /* inherited from set.gssapi_delegation */
+ };
+ 
+ /* The end of connectdata. */
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27538.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27538.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6c40989d3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27538.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From af369db4d3833272b8ed443f7fcc2e757a0872eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2023 08:22:51 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] url: fix the SSH connection reuse check
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Closes #10735
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-27538
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/af369db4d3833272b8ed443f7fcc2e757a0872eb]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/url.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c
+index 8da0245..9f14a7b 100644
+--- a/lib/url.c
++++ b/lib/url.c
+@@ -1266,7 +1266,7 @@ ConnectionExists(struct Curl_easy *data,
+         }
+       }
+ 
+-      if(get_protocol_family(needle->handler->protocol) == PROTO_FAMILY_SSH) {
++      if(get_protocol_family(needle->handler->protocol) & PROTO_FAMILY_SSH) {
+         if(!ssh_config_matches(needle, check))
+           continue;
+       }
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-28320-fol1.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-28320-fol1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eaa6fdc327
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-28320-fol1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+From f446258f0269a62289cca0210157cb8558d0edc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Tue, 16 May 2023 23:40:42 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] hostip: include easy_lock.h before using
+ GLOBAL_INIT_IS_THREADSAFE
+
+Since that header file is the only place that define can be defined.
+
+Reported-by: Marc Deslauriers
+
+Follow-up to 13718030ad4b3209
+
+Closes #11121
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/f446258f0269a62289cca0210157cb8558d0edc3]
+CVE: CVE-2023-28320
+Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumbhar@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/easy_lock.h | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ lib/hostip.c    |  10 ++---
+ lib/hostip.h    |   9 ----
+ 3 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 lib/easy_lock.h
+
+diff --git a/lib/easy_lock.h b/lib/easy_lock.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..6399a39
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/lib/easy_lock.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
++#ifndef HEADER_CURL_EASY_LOCK_H
++#define HEADER_CURL_EASY_LOCK_H
++/***************************************************************************
++ *                                  _   _ ____  _
++ *  Project                     ___| | | |  _ \| |
++ *                             / __| | | | |_) | |
++ *                            | (__| |_| |  _ <| |___
++ *                             \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
++ *
++ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
++ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
++ * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html.
++ *
++ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
++ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
++ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
++ *
++ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
++ * KIND, either express or implied.
++ *
++ * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl
++ *
++ ***************************************************************************/
++
++#include "curl_setup.h"
++
++#define GLOBAL_INIT_IS_THREADSAFE
++
++#if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT >= 0x600
++
++#ifdef __MINGW32__
++#ifndef __MINGW64_VERSION_MAJOR
++#if (__MINGW32_MAJOR_VERSION < 5) || \
++    (__MINGW32_MAJOR_VERSION == 5 && __MINGW32_MINOR_VERSION == 0)
++/* mingw >= 5.0.1 defines SRWLOCK, and slightly different from MS define */
++typedef PVOID SRWLOCK, *PSRWLOCK;
++#endif
++#endif
++#ifndef SRWLOCK_INIT
++#define SRWLOCK_INIT NULL
++#endif
++#endif /* __MINGW32__ */
++
++#define curl_simple_lock SRWLOCK
++#define CURL_SIMPLE_LOCK_INIT SRWLOCK_INIT
++
++#define curl_simple_lock_lock(m) AcquireSRWLockExclusive(m)
++#define curl_simple_lock_unlock(m) ReleaseSRWLockExclusive(m)
++
++#elif defined(HAVE_ATOMIC) && defined(HAVE_STDATOMIC_H)
++#include <stdatomic.h>
++#if defined(HAVE_SCHED_YIELD)
++#include <sched.h>
++#endif
++
++#define curl_simple_lock atomic_int
++#define CURL_SIMPLE_LOCK_INIT 0
++
++/* a clang-thing */
++#ifndef __has_builtin
++#define __has_builtin(x) 0
++#endif
++
++#ifndef __INTEL_COMPILER
++/* The Intel compiler tries to look like GCC *and* clang *and* lies in its
++   __has_builtin() function, so override it. */
++
++/* if GCC on i386/x86_64 or if the built-in is present */
++#if ( (defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__clang__)) &&     \
++      (defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__))) ||    \
++  __has_builtin(__builtin_ia32_pause)
++#define HAVE_BUILTIN_IA32_PAUSE
++#endif
++
++#endif
++
++static inline void curl_simple_lock_lock(curl_simple_lock *lock)
++{
++  for(;;) {
++    if(!atomic_exchange_explicit(lock, true, memory_order_acquire))
++      break;
++    /* Reduce cache coherency traffic */
++    while(atomic_load_explicit(lock, memory_order_relaxed)) {
++      /* Reduce load (not mandatory) */
++#ifdef HAVE_BUILTIN_IA32_PAUSE
++      __builtin_ia32_pause();
++#elif defined(__aarch64__)
++      __asm__ volatile("yield" ::: "memory");
++#elif defined(HAVE_SCHED_YIELD)
++      sched_yield();
++#endif
++    }
++  }
++}
++
++static inline void curl_simple_lock_unlock(curl_simple_lock *lock)
++{
++  atomic_store_explicit(lock, false, memory_order_release);
++}
++
++#else
++
++#undef  GLOBAL_INIT_IS_THREADSAFE
++
++#endif
++
++#endif /* HEADER_CURL_EASY_LOCK_H */
+diff --git a/lib/hostip.c b/lib/hostip.c
+index 5231a74..d5bf881 100644
+--- a/lib/hostip.c
++++ b/lib/hostip.c
+@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@
+ #include "curl_memory.h"
+ #include "memdebug.h"
+ 
++#include "easy_lock.h"
++
+ #if defined(CURLRES_SYNCH) &&                   \
+   defined(HAVE_ALARM) &&                        \
+   defined(SIGALRM) &&                           \
+@@ -77,10 +79,6 @@
+ #define USE_ALARM_TIMEOUT
+ #endif
+ 
+-#ifdef USE_ALARM_TIMEOUT
+-#include "easy_lock.h"
+-#endif
+-
+ #define MAX_HOSTCACHE_LEN (255 + 7) /* max FQDN + colon + port number + zero */
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -259,8 +257,8 @@ void Curl_hostcache_prune(struct Curl_easy *data)
+ /* Beware this is a global and unique instance. This is used to store the
+    return address that we can jump back to from inside a signal handler. This
+    is not thread-safe stuff. */
+-sigjmp_buf curl_jmpenv;
+-curl_simple_lock curl_jmpenv_lock;
++static sigjmp_buf curl_jmpenv;
++static curl_simple_lock curl_jmpenv_lock;
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* lookup address, returns entry if found and not stale */
+diff --git a/lib/hostip.h b/lib/hostip.h
+index baf1e58..d7f73d9 100644
+--- a/lib/hostip.h
++++ b/lib/hostip.h
+@@ -196,15 +196,6 @@ Curl_cache_addr(struct Curl_easy *data, Curl_addrinfo *addr,
+ #define CURL_INADDR_NONE INADDR_NONE
+ #endif
+ 
+-#ifdef HAVE_SIGSETJMP
+-/* Forward-declaration of variable defined in hostip.c. Beware this
+- * is a global and unique instance. This is used to store the return
+- * address that we can jump back to from inside a signal handler.
+- * This is not thread-safe stuff.
+- */
+-extern sigjmp_buf curl_jmpenv;
+-#endif
+-
+ /*
+  * Function provided by the resolver backend to set DNS servers to use.
+  */
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-28320.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-28320.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0c9b67440a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-28320.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+From 13718030ad4b3209a7583b4f27f683cd3a6fa5f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Harry Sintonen <sintonen@iki.fi>
+Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2023 09:22:26 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] hostip: add locks around use of global buffer for alarm()
+
+When building with the sync name resolver and timeout ability we now
+require thread-safety to be present to enable it.
+
+Closes #11030
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/13718030ad4b3209a7583b4f27f683cd3a6fa5f2]
+CVE: CVE-2023-28320
+Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumbhar@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/hostip.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/hostip.c b/lib/hostip.c
+index f5bb634..5231a74 100644
+--- a/lib/hostip.c
++++ b/lib/hostip.c
+@@ -68,12 +68,19 @@
+ #include "curl_memory.h"
+ #include "memdebug.h"
+ 
+-#if defined(CURLRES_SYNCH) && \
+-    defined(HAVE_ALARM) && defined(SIGALRM) && defined(HAVE_SIGSETJMP)
++#if defined(CURLRES_SYNCH) &&                   \
++  defined(HAVE_ALARM) &&                        \
++  defined(SIGALRM) &&                           \
++  defined(HAVE_SIGSETJMP) &&                    \
++  defined(GLOBAL_INIT_IS_THREADSAFE)
+ /* alarm-based timeouts can only be used with all the dependencies satisfied */
+ #define USE_ALARM_TIMEOUT
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef USE_ALARM_TIMEOUT
++#include "easy_lock.h"
++#endif
++
+ #define MAX_HOSTCACHE_LEN (255 + 7) /* max FQDN + colon + port number + zero */
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -248,11 +255,12 @@ void Curl_hostcache_prune(struct Curl_easy *data)
+     Curl_share_unlock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_DNS);
+ }
+ 
+-#ifdef HAVE_SIGSETJMP
++#ifdef USE_ALARM_TIMEOUT
+ /* Beware this is a global and unique instance. This is used to store the
+    return address that we can jump back to from inside a signal handler. This
+    is not thread-safe stuff. */
+ sigjmp_buf curl_jmpenv;
++curl_simple_lock curl_jmpenv_lock;
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* lookup address, returns entry if found and not stale */
+@@ -614,7 +622,6 @@ enum resolve_t Curl_resolv(struct connectdata *conn,
+ static
+ RETSIGTYPE alarmfunc(int sig)
+ {
+-  /* this is for "-ansi -Wall -pedantic" to stop complaining!   (rabe) */
+   (void)sig;
+   siglongjmp(curl_jmpenv, 1);
+ }
+@@ -695,6 +702,8 @@ enum resolve_t Curl_resolv_timeout(struct connectdata *conn,
+      This should be the last thing we do before calling Curl_resolv(),
+      as otherwise we'd have to worry about variables that get modified
+      before we invoke Curl_resolv() (and thus use "volatile"). */
++  curl_simple_lock_lock(&curl_jmpenv_lock);
++
+   if(sigsetjmp(curl_jmpenv, 1)) {
+     /* this is coming from a siglongjmp() after an alarm signal */
+     failf(data, "name lookup timed out");
+@@ -763,6 +772,8 @@ clean_up:
+ #endif
+ #endif /* HAVE_SIGACTION */
+ 
++  curl_simple_lock_unlock(&curl_jmpenv_lock);
++
+   /* switch back the alarm() to either zero or to what it was before minus
+      the time we spent until now! */
+   if(prev_alarm) {
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-28321.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-28321.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..da1d1fdcd6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-28321.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu curl_7.68.0-1ubuntu2.20 with
+minor change to tests/data/test1397 part so the patch can be apply.
+upstream: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/199f2d440d8659b42 ]
+CVE: CVE-2023-28321
+Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+This backport was obtained from SUSE.
+
+From 199f2d440d8659b42670c1b796220792b01a97bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2023 21:07:02 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] hostcheck: fix host name wildcard checking
+
+The leftmost "label" of the host name can now only match against single
+'*'. Like the browsers have worked for a long time.
+
+- extended unit test 1397 for this
+- move some SOURCE variables from unit/Makefile.am to unit/Makefile.inc
+
+Reported-by: Hiroki Kurosawa
+Closes #11018
+---
+ lib/hostcheck.c         |  50 +++++++--------
+ tests/data/test1397     |  10 ++-
+ tests/unit/Makefile.am  |  94 ----------------------------
+ tests/unit/Makefile.inc |  94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ tests/unit/unit1397.c   | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
+ 5 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 180 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/hostcheck.c
++++ b/lib/hostcheck.c
+@@ -58,15 +58,19 @@
+  * apparent distinction between a name and an IP. We need to detect the use of
+  * an IP address and not wildcard match on such names.
+  *
++ * Only match on "*" being used for the leftmost label, not "a*", "a*b" nor
++ * "*b".
++ *
++ * @unittest: 1397
++ *
+  * NOTE: hostmatch() gets called with copied buffers so that it can modify the
+  * contents at will.
+  */
+ 
+ static int hostmatch(char *hostname, char *pattern)
+ {
+-  const char *pattern_label_end, *pattern_wildcard, *hostname_label_end;
+-  int wildcard_enabled;
+-  size_t prefixlen, suffixlen;
++  const char *pattern_label_end, *hostname_label_end;
++  size_t suffixlen;
+   struct in_addr ignored;
+ #ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+   struct sockaddr_in6 si6;
+@@ -80,13 +84,12 @@ static int hostmatch(char *hostname, cha
+   if(pattern[len-1]=='.')
+     pattern[len-1] = 0;
+ 
+-  pattern_wildcard = strchr(pattern, '*');
+-  if(pattern_wildcard == NULL)
++  if(strncmp(pattern, "*.", 2))
+     return strcasecompare(pattern, hostname) ?
+       CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+ 
+   /* detect IP address as hostname and fail the match if so */
+-  if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &ignored) > 0)
++  else if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &ignored) > 0)
+     return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+ #ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+   if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &si6.sin6_addr) > 0)
+@@ -95,14 +98,9 @@ static int hostmatch(char *hostname, cha
+ 
+   /* We require at least 2 dots in pattern to avoid too wide wildcard
+      match. */
+-  wildcard_enabled = 1;
+   pattern_label_end = strchr(pattern, '.');
+-  if(pattern_label_end == NULL || strchr(pattern_label_end + 1, '.') == NULL ||
+-     pattern_wildcard > pattern_label_end ||
+-     strncasecompare(pattern, "xn--", 4)) {
+-    wildcard_enabled = 0;
+-  }
+-  if(!wildcard_enabled)
++  if(pattern_label_end == NULL ||
++     strchr(pattern_label_end + 1, '.') == NULL)
+     return strcasecompare(pattern, hostname) ?
+       CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+ 
+@@ -117,11 +115,9 @@ static int hostmatch(char *hostname, cha
+   if(hostname_label_end - hostname < pattern_label_end - pattern)
+     return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+ 
+-  prefixlen = pattern_wildcard - pattern;
+-  suffixlen = pattern_label_end - (pattern_wildcard + 1);
+-  return strncasecompare(pattern, hostname, prefixlen) &&
+-    strncasecompare(pattern_wildcard + 1, hostname_label_end - suffixlen,
+-                    suffixlen) ?
++  suffixlen = pattern_label_end - (pattern + 1);
++  return strncasecompare(pattern + 1, hostname_label_end - suffixlen,
++                         suffixlen) ?
+     CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+ }
+ 
+--- a/tests/data/test1397
++++ b/tests/data/test1397
+@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@
+ <info>
+ <keywords>
+ unittest
+-ssl
+-wildcard
++Curl_cert_hostcheck
+ </keywords>
+ </info>
+ 
+@@ -16,9 +15,8 @@ none
+ <features>
+ unittest
+ </features>
+- <name>
+-Check wildcard certificate matching function Curl_cert_hostcheck
+- </name>
++<name>
++Curl_cert_hostcheck unit tests
++</name>
+ </client>
+-
+ </testcase>
+--- a/tests/unit/unit1397.c
++++ b/tests/unit/unit1397.c
+@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@
+  ***************************************************************************/
+ #include "curlcheck.h"
+ 
+-#include "hostcheck.h" /* from the lib dir */
+-
+ static CURLcode unit_setup(void)
+ {
+   return CURLE_OK;
+@@ -30,50 +28,94 @@ static CURLcode unit_setup(void)
+ 
+ static void unit_stop(void)
+ {
+-  /* done before shutting down and exiting */
+ }
+ 
+-UNITTEST_START
++* only these backends define the tested functions */
++#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_GSKIT) || \
++  defined(USE_SCHANNEL)
++#include "hostcheck.h"
++struct testcase {
++  const char *host;
++  const char *pattern;
++  bool match;
++};
++
++static struct testcase tests[] = {
++  {"", "", FALSE},
++  {"a", "", FALSE},
++  {"", "b", FALSE},
++  {"a", "b", FALSE},
++  {"aa", "bb", FALSE},
++  {"\xff", "\xff", TRUE},
++  {"aa.aa.aa", "aa.aa.bb", FALSE},
++  {"aa.aa.aa", "aa.aa.aa", TRUE},
++  {"aa.aa.aa", "*.aa.bb", FALSE},
++  {"aa.aa.aa", "*.aa.aa", TRUE},
++  {"192.168.0.1", "192.168.0.1", TRUE},
++  {"192.168.0.1", "*.168.0.1", FALSE},
++  {"192.168.0.1", "*.0.1", FALSE},
++  {"h.ello", "*.ello", FALSE},
++  {"h.ello.", "*.ello", FALSE},
++  {"h.ello", "*.ello.", FALSE},
++  {"h.e.llo", "*.e.llo", TRUE},
++  {"h.e.llo", " *.e.llo", FALSE},
++  {" h.e.llo", "*.e.llo", TRUE},
++  {"h.e.llo.", "*.e.llo", TRUE},
++  {"*.e.llo.", "*.e.llo", TRUE},
++  {"************.e.llo.", "*.e.llo", TRUE},
++  {"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
++   "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"
++   "CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC"
++   "DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD"
++   "EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE"
++   ".e.llo.", "*.e.llo", TRUE},
++  {"\xfe\xfe.e.llo.", "*.e.llo", TRUE},
++  {"h.e.llo.", "*.e.llo.", TRUE},
++  {"h.e.llo", "*.e.llo.", TRUE},
++  {".h.e.llo", "*.e.llo.", FALSE},
++  {"h.e.llo", "*.*.llo.", FALSE},
++  {"h.e.llo", "h.*.llo", FALSE},
++  {"h.e.llo", "h.e.*", FALSE},
++  {"hello", "*.ello", FALSE},
++  {"hello", "**llo", FALSE},
++  {"bar.foo.example.com", "*.example.com", FALSE},
++  {"foo.example.com", "*.example.com", TRUE},
++  {"baz.example.net", "b*z.example.net", FALSE},
++  {"foobaz.example.net", "*baz.example.net", FALSE},
++  {"xn--l8j.example.local", "x*.example.local", FALSE},
++  {"xn--l8j.example.net", "*.example.net", TRUE},
++  {"xn--l8j.example.net", "*j.example.net", FALSE},
++  {"xn--l8j.example.net", "xn--l8j.example.net", TRUE},
++  {"xn--l8j.example.net", "xn--l8j.*.net", FALSE},
++  {"xl8j.example.net", "*.example.net", TRUE},
++  {"fe80::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619", "*::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619", FALSE},
++  {"fe80::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619", "fe80::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619", TRUE},
++  {NULL, NULL, FALSE}
++};
+ 
+-/* only these backends define the tested functions */
+-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_GSKIT)
++UNITTEST_START
++{
++  int i;
++  for(i = 0; tests[i].host; i++) {
++    if(tests[i].match != Curl_cert_hostcheck(tests[i].pattern,
++                                             tests[i].host)) {
++      fprintf(stderr,
++              "HOST: %s\n"
++              "PTRN: %s\n"
++              "did %sMATCH\n",
++              tests[i].host,
++              tests[i].pattern,
++              tests[i].match ? "NOT ": "");
++      unitfail++;
++    }
++  }
++}
+ 
+-  /* here you start doing things and checking that the results are good */
++UNITTEST_STOP
++#else
+ 
+-fail_unless(Curl_cert_hostcheck("www.example.com", "www.example.com"),
+-            "good 1");
+-fail_unless(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.example.com", "www.example.com"),
+-            "good 2");
+-fail_unless(Curl_cert_hostcheck("xxx*.example.com", "xxxwww.example.com"),
+-            "good 3");
+-fail_unless(Curl_cert_hostcheck("f*.example.com", "foo.example.com"),
+-            "good 4");
+-fail_unless(Curl_cert_hostcheck("192.168.0.0", "192.168.0.0"),
+-            "good 5");
+-
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("xxx.example.com", "www.example.com"), "bad 1");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*", "www.example.com"), "bad 2");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.*.com", "www.example.com"), "bad 3");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.example.com", "baa.foo.example.com"), "bad 4");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("f*.example.com", "baa.example.com"), "bad 5");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.com", "example.com"), "bad 6");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*fail.com", "example.com"), "bad 7");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.example.", "www.example."), "bad 8");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.example.", "www.example"), "bad 9");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("", "www"), "bad 10");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*", "www"), "bad 11");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.168.0.0", "192.168.0.0"), "bad 12");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("www.example.com", "192.168.0.0"), "bad 13");
+-
+-#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619",
+-                            "fe80::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619"), "bad 14");
+-fail_unless(Curl_cert_hostcheck("fe80::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619",
+-                                "fe80::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619"), "good 6");
+-#endif
++UNITTEST_START
+ 
++UNITTEST_STOP
+ #endif
+ 
+-  /* you end the test code like this: */
+-
+-UNITTEST_STOP
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-28322.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-28322.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9351a2c286
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-28322.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,380 @@
+CVE: CVE-2023-28322
+Upstream-Status: Backport [ import patch from ubuntu curl_7.68.0-1ubuntu2.20
+upstream https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/7815647d6582c0a4900be2e1de ]
+Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+Backport of:
+
+From 7815647d6582c0a4900be2e1de6c5e61272c496b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2023 08:28:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] lib: unify the upload/method handling
+
+By making sure we set state.upload based on the set.method value and not
+independently as set.upload, we reduce confusion and mixup risks, both
+internally and externally.
+
+Closes #11017
+---
+ lib/curl_rtmp.c    | 4 ++--
+ lib/file.c         | 4 ++--
+ lib/ftp.c          | 8 ++++----
+ lib/http.c         | 4 ++--
+ lib/imap.c         | 6 +++---
+ lib/rtsp.c         | 4 ++--
+ lib/setopt.c       | 6 ++----
+ lib/smb.c          | 6 +++---
+ lib/smtp.c         | 4 ++--
+ lib/tftp.c         | 8 ++++----
+ lib/transfer.c     | 4 ++--
+ lib/urldata.h      | 2 +-
+ lib/vssh/libssh.c  | 6 +++---
+ lib/vssh/libssh2.c | 6 +++---
+ lib/vssh/wolfssh.c | 2 +-
+ 15 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/curl_rtmp.c
++++ b/lib/curl_rtmp.c
+@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static CURLcode rtmp_connect(struct conn
+   /* We have to know if it's a write before we send the
+    * connect request packet
+    */
+-  if(conn->data->set.upload)
++  if(conn->data->state.upload)
+     r->Link.protocol |= RTMP_FEATURE_WRITE;
+ 
+   /* For plain streams, use the buffer toggle trick to keep data flowing */
+@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static CURLcode rtmp_do(struct connectda
+   if(!RTMP_ConnectStream(r, 0))
+     return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
+ 
+-  if(conn->data->set.upload) {
++  if(conn->data->state.upload) {
+     Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(data, data->state.infilesize);
+     Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, FIRSTSOCKET);
+   }
+--- a/lib/file.c
++++ b/lib/file.c
+@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ static CURLcode file_connect(struct conn
+   file->freepath = real_path; /* free this when done */
+ 
+   file->fd = fd;
+-  if(!data->set.upload && (fd == -1)) {
++  if(!data->state.upload && (fd == -1)) {
+     failf(data, "Couldn't open file %s", data->state.up.path);
+     file_done(conn, CURLE_FILE_COULDNT_READ_FILE, FALSE);
+     return CURLE_FILE_COULDNT_READ_FILE;
+@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ static CURLcode file_do(struct connectda
+ 
+   Curl_pgrsStartNow(data);
+ 
+-  if(data->set.upload)
++  if(data->state.upload)
+     return file_upload(conn);
+ 
+   file = conn->data->req.protop;
+--- a/lib/ftp.c
++++ b/lib/ftp.c
+@@ -1371,7 +1371,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_prepare_transf
+                 data->set.str[STRING_CUSTOMREQUEST]:
+                 (data->set.ftp_list_only?"NLST":"LIST"));
+       }
+-      else if(data->set.upload) {
++      else if(data->state.upload) {
+         PPSENDF(&conn->proto.ftpc.pp, "PRET STOR %s", conn->proto.ftpc.file);
+       }
+       else {
+@@ -3303,7 +3303,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_done(struct connectd
+     /* the response code from the transfer showed an error already so no
+        use checking further */
+     ;
+-  else if(data->set.upload) {
++  else if(data->state.upload) {
+     if((-1 != data->state.infilesize) &&
+        (data->state.infilesize != data->req.writebytecount) &&
+        !data->set.crlf &&
+@@ -3570,7 +3570,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_do_more(struct conne
+                            connected back to us */
+       }
+     }
+-    else if(data->set.upload) {
++    else if(data->state.upload) {
+       result = ftp_nb_type(conn, data->set.prefer_ascii, FTP_STOR_TYPE);
+       if(result)
+         return result;
+@@ -4209,7 +4209,7 @@ CURLcode ftp_parse_url_path(struct conne
+     ftpc->file = NULL; /* instead of point to a zero byte,
+                             we make it a NULL pointer */
+ 
+-  if(data->set.upload && !ftpc->file && (ftp->transfer == FTPTRANSFER_BODY)) {
++  if(data->state.upload && !ftpc->file && (ftp->transfer == FTPTRANSFER_BODY)) {
+     /* We need a file name when uploading. Return error! */
+     failf(data, "Uploading to a URL without a file name!");
+     free(rawPath);
+--- a/lib/http.c
++++ b/lib/http.c
+@@ -2080,7 +2080,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct connectdata *c
+   }
+ 
+   if((conn->handler->protocol&(PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP|CURLPROTO_FTP)) &&
+-     data->set.upload) {
++     data->state.upload) {
+     httpreq = HTTPREQ_PUT;
+   }
+ 
+@@ -2261,7 +2261,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct connectdata *c
+     if((conn->handler->protocol & PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP) &&
+        (((httpreq == HTTPREQ_POST_MIME || httpreq == HTTPREQ_POST_FORM) &&
+          http->postsize < 0) ||
+-        ((data->set.upload || httpreq == HTTPREQ_POST) &&
++        ((data->state.upload || httpreq == HTTPREQ_POST) &&
+          data->state.infilesize == -1))) {
+       if(conn->bits.authneg)
+         /* don't enable chunked during auth neg */
+--- a/lib/imap.c
++++ b/lib/imap.c
+@@ -1469,11 +1469,11 @@ static CURLcode imap_done(struct connect
+     result = status;         /* use the already set error code */
+   }
+   else if(!data->set.connect_only && !imap->custom &&
+-          (imap->uid || imap->mindex || data->set.upload ||
++          (imap->uid || imap->mindex || data->state.upload ||
+           data->set.mimepost.kind != MIMEKIND_NONE)) {
+     /* Handle responses after FETCH or APPEND transfer has finished */
+ 
+-    if(!data->set.upload && data->set.mimepost.kind == MIMEKIND_NONE)
++    if(!data->state.upload && data->set.mimepost.kind == MIMEKIND_NONE)
+       state(conn, IMAP_FETCH_FINAL);
+     else {
+       /* End the APPEND command first by sending an empty line */
+@@ -1539,7 +1539,7 @@ static CURLcode imap_perform(struct conn
+     selected = TRUE;
+ 
+   /* Start the first command in the DO phase */
+-  if(conn->data->set.upload || data->set.mimepost.kind != MIMEKIND_NONE)
++  if(conn->data->state.upload || data->set.mimepost.kind != MIMEKIND_NONE)
+     /* APPEND can be executed directly */
+     result = imap_perform_append(conn);
+   else if(imap->custom && (selected || !imap->mailbox))
+--- a/lib/rtsp.c
++++ b/lib/rtsp.c
+@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_do(struct connectda
+      rtspreq == RTSPREQ_SET_PARAMETER ||
+      rtspreq == RTSPREQ_GET_PARAMETER) {
+ 
+-    if(data->set.upload) {
++    if(data->state.upload) {
+       putsize = data->state.infilesize;
+       data->set.httpreq = HTTPREQ_PUT;
+ 
+@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_do(struct connectda
+         result =
+           Curl_add_bufferf(&req_buffer,
+                            "Content-Length: %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T"\r\n",
+-                           (data->set.upload ? putsize : postsize));
++                           (data->state.upload ? putsize : postsize));
+         if(result)
+           return result;
+       }
+--- a/lib/setopt.c
++++ b/lib/setopt.c
+@@ -258,8 +258,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *
+      * We want to sent data to the remote host. If this is HTTP, that equals
+      * using the PUT request.
+      */
+-    data->set.upload = (0 != va_arg(param, long)) ? TRUE : FALSE;
+-    if(data->set.upload) {
++    arg = va_arg(param, long);
++    if(arg) {
+       /* If this is HTTP, PUT is what's needed to "upload" */
+       data->set.httpreq = HTTPREQ_PUT;
+       data->set.opt_no_body = FALSE; /* this is implied */
+@@ -486,7 +486,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *
+     }
+     else
+       data->set.httpreq = HTTPREQ_GET;
+-    data->set.upload = FALSE;
+     break;
+ 
+   case CURLOPT_COPYPOSTFIELDS:
+@@ -797,7 +796,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *
+      */
+     if(va_arg(param, long)) {
+       data->set.httpreq = HTTPREQ_GET;
+-      data->set.upload = FALSE; /* switch off upload */
+       data->set.opt_no_body = FALSE; /* this is implied */
+     }
+     break;
+--- a/lib/smb.c
++++ b/lib/smb.c
+@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ static CURLcode smb_send_open(struct con
+   byte_count = strlen(req->path);
+   msg.name_length = smb_swap16((unsigned short)byte_count);
+   msg.share_access = smb_swap32(SMB_FILE_SHARE_ALL);
+-  if(conn->data->set.upload) {
++  if(conn->data->state.upload) {
+     msg.access = smb_swap32(SMB_GENERIC_READ | SMB_GENERIC_WRITE);
+     msg.create_disposition = smb_swap32(SMB_FILE_OVERWRITE_IF);
+   }
+@@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ static CURLcode smb_request_state(struct
+     smb_m = (const struct smb_nt_create_response*) msg;
+     req->fid = smb_swap16(smb_m->fid);
+     conn->data->req.offset = 0;
+-    if(conn->data->set.upload) {
++    if(conn->data->state.upload) {
+       conn->data->req.size = conn->data->state.infilesize;
+       Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(conn->data, conn->data->req.size);
+       next_state = SMB_UPLOAD;
+--- a/lib/smtp.c
++++ b/lib/smtp.c
+@@ -1210,7 +1210,7 @@ static CURLcode smtp_done(struct connect
+     result = status;         /* use the already set error code */
+   }
+   else if(!data->set.connect_only && data->set.mail_rcpt &&
+-          (data->set.upload || data->set.mimepost.kind)) {
++          (data->state.upload || data->set.mimepost.kind)) {
+     /* Calculate the EOB taking into account any terminating CRLF from the
+        previous line of the email or the CRLF of the DATA command when there
+        is "no mail data". RFC-5321, sect. 4.1.1.4.
+@@ -1297,7 +1297,7 @@ static CURLcode smtp_perform(struct conn
+   smtp->eob = 2;
+ 
+   /* Start the first command in the DO phase */
+-  if((data->set.upload || data->set.mimepost.kind) && data->set.mail_rcpt)
++  if((data->state.upload || data->set.mimepost.kind) && data->set.mail_rcpt)
+     /* MAIL transfer */
+     result = smtp_perform_mail(conn);
+   else
+--- a/lib/tftp.c
++++ b/lib/tftp.c
+@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ static CURLcode tftp_parse_option_ack(tf
+ 
+       /* tsize should be ignored on upload: Who cares about the size of the
+          remote file? */
+-      if(!data->set.upload) {
++      if(!data->state.upload) {
+         if(!tsize) {
+           failf(data, "invalid tsize -:%s:- value in OACK packet", value);
+           return CURLE_TFTP_ILLEGAL;
+@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static CURLcode tftp_send_first(tftp_sta
+       return result;
+     }
+ 
+-    if(data->set.upload) {
++    if(data->state.upload) {
+       /* If we are uploading, send an WRQ */
+       setpacketevent(&state->spacket, TFTP_EVENT_WRQ);
+       state->conn->data->req.upload_fromhere =
+@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ static CURLcode tftp_send_first(tftp_sta
+     if(!data->set.tftp_no_options) {
+       char buf[64];
+       /* add tsize option */
+-      if(data->set.upload && (data->state.infilesize != -1))
++      if(data->state.upload && (data->state.infilesize != -1))
+         msnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T,
+                   data->state.infilesize);
+       else
+@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static CURLcode tftp_send_first(tftp_sta
+     break;
+ 
+   case TFTP_EVENT_OACK:
+-    if(data->set.upload) {
++    if(data->state.upload) {
+       result = tftp_connect_for_tx(state, event);
+     }
+     else {
+--- a/lib/transfer.c
++++ b/lib/transfer.c
+@@ -1405,6 +1405,7 @@ void Curl_init_CONNECT(struct Curl_easy
+ {
+   data->state.fread_func = data->set.fread_func_set;
+   data->state.in = data->set.in_set;
++  data->state.upload = (data->set.httpreq == HTTPREQ_PUT);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1816,7 +1817,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_retry_request(struct conne
+ 
+   /* if we're talking upload, we can't do the checks below, unless the protocol
+      is HTTP as when uploading over HTTP we will still get a response */
+-  if(data->set.upload &&
++  if(data->state.upload &&
+      !(conn->handler->protocol&(PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP|CURLPROTO_RTSP)))
+     return CURLE_OK;
+ 
+--- a/lib/urldata.h
++++ b/lib/urldata.h
+@@ -1427,6 +1427,7 @@ struct UrlState {
+   BIT(stream_depends_e); /* set or don't set the Exclusive bit */
+   BIT(previouslypending); /* this transfer WAS in the multi->pending queue */
+   BIT(cookie_engine);
++  BIT(upload);         /* upload request */
+ };
+ 
+ 
+@@ -1762,7 +1763,6 @@ struct UserDefined {
+   BIT(http_auto_referer); /* set "correct" referer when following
+                              location: */
+   BIT(opt_no_body);    /* as set with CURLOPT_NOBODY */
+-  BIT(upload);         /* upload request */
+   BIT(verbose);        /* output verbosity */
+   BIT(krb);            /* Kerberos connection requested */
+   BIT(reuse_forbid);   /* forbidden to be reused, close after use */
+--- a/lib/vssh/libssh.c
++++ b/lib/vssh/libssh.c
+@@ -1076,7 +1076,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(stru
+     }
+ 
+     case SSH_SFTP_TRANS_INIT:
+-      if(data->set.upload)
++      if(data->state.upload)
+         state(conn, SSH_SFTP_UPLOAD_INIT);
+       else {
+         if(protop->path[strlen(protop->path)-1] == '/')
+@@ -1686,7 +1686,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(stru
+       /* Functions from the SCP subsystem cannot handle/return SSH_AGAIN */
+       ssh_set_blocking(sshc->ssh_session, 1);
+ 
+-      if(data->set.upload) {
++      if(data->state.upload) {
+         if(data->state.infilesize < 0) {
+           failf(data, "SCP requires a known file size for upload");
+           sshc->actualcode = CURLE_UPLOAD_FAILED;
+@@ -1787,7 +1787,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(stru
+         break;
+       }
+     case SSH_SCP_DONE:
+-      if(data->set.upload)
++      if(data->state.upload)
+         state(conn, SSH_SCP_SEND_EOF);
+       else
+         state(conn, SSH_SCP_CHANNEL_FREE);
+--- a/lib/vssh/libssh2.c
++++ b/lib/vssh/libssh2.c
+@@ -1664,7 +1664,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct
+     }
+ 
+     case SSH_SFTP_TRANS_INIT:
+-      if(data->set.upload)
++      if(data->state.upload)
+         state(conn, SSH_SFTP_UPLOAD_INIT);
+       else {
+         if(sftp_scp->path[strlen(sftp_scp->path)-1] == '/')
+@@ -2366,7 +2366,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct
+         break;
+       }
+ 
+-      if(data->set.upload) {
++      if(data->state.upload) {
+         if(data->state.infilesize < 0) {
+           failf(data, "SCP requires a known file size for upload");
+           sshc->actualcode = CURLE_UPLOAD_FAILED;
+@@ -2504,7 +2504,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct
+     break;
+ 
+     case SSH_SCP_DONE:
+-      if(data->set.upload)
++      if(data->state.upload)
+         state(conn, SSH_SCP_SEND_EOF);
+       else
+         state(conn, SSH_SCP_CHANNEL_FREE);
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-32001.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-32001.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f533992bcd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-32001.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 0c667188e0c6cda615a036b8a2b4125f2c404dde Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: SaltyMilk <soufiane.elmelcaoui@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2023 21:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] fopen: optimize
+
+Closes #11419
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/0c667188e0c6cda615a036b8a2b4125f2c404dde]
+CVE: CVE-2023-32001
+Signed-off-by: Ashish Sharma <asharma@mvista.com>
+
+ lib/fopen.c | 12 ++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/fopen.c b/lib/fopen.c
+index c9c9e3d6e73a2..b6e3cadddef65 100644
+--- a/lib/fopen.c
++++ b/lib/fopen.c
+@@ -56,13 +56,13 @@ CURLcode Curl_fopen(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *filename,
+   int fd = -1;
+   *tempname = NULL;
+ 
+-  if(stat(filename, &sb) == -1 || !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
+-    /* a non-regular file, fallback to direct fopen() */
+-    *fh = fopen(filename, FOPEN_WRITETEXT);
+-    if(*fh)
+-      return CURLE_OK;
++  *fh = fopen(filename, FOPEN_WRITETEXT);
++  if(!*fh)
+     goto fail;
+-  }
++  if(fstat(fileno(*fh), &sb) == -1 || !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode))
++    return CURLE_OK;
++  fclose(*fh);
++  *fh = NULL;
+ 
+   result = Curl_rand_hex(data, randsuffix, sizeof(randsuffix));
+   if(result)
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-38545.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-38545.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c6b6726886
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-38545.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+From 600a1caeb2312fdee5ef1caf7d613c12a8b2424a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mike Crowe <mac@mcrowe.com>
+Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 20:50:28 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] socks: return error if hostname too long for remote resolve
+To: libcurl development <curl-library@cool.haxx.se>
+
+Prior to this change the state machine attempted to change the remote
+resolve to a local resolve if the hostname was longer than 255
+characters. Unfortunately that did not work as intended and caused a
+security issue.
+
+Name resolvers cannot resolve hostnames longer than 255 characters.
+
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2023-38545.html
+
+Unfortunately CURLE_PROXY and CURLPX_LONG_HOSTNAME were introduced in
+7.73.0 so they can't be used in 7.69.1. Let's use
+CURLE_COULDNT_RESOLVE_HOST as the best available alternative and update
+the test appropriately.
+
+libcurl's test support has been improved considerably since 7.69.1 which
+means that the test must be modified to remove use of %VERSION and
+%TESTNUMBER and the stderr output can no longer be checked.
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-38545
+Upstream-Status: Backport [fb4415d8aee6c1045be932a34fe6107c2f5ed147]
+Signed-off-by: Mike Crowe <mac@mcrowe.com>
+---
+ lib/socks.c             | 13 +++++----
+ tests/data/Makefile.inc |  2 +-
+ tests/data/test728      | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 tests/data/test728
+
+diff --git a/lib/socks.c b/lib/socks.c
+index 37099130e..f3bf40533 100644
+--- a/lib/socks.c
++++ b/lib/socks.c
+@@ -521,11 +521,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_SOCKS5(const char *proxy_user,
+       infof(conn->data, "SOCKS5: connecting to HTTP proxy %s port %d\n",
+             hostname, remote_port);
+ 
+-    /* RFC1928 chapter 5 specifies max 255 chars for domain name in packet */
++    /* RFC1928 chapter 5 specifies max 255 chars for domain name in packet. */
+     if(!socks5_resolve_local && hostname_len > 255) {
+-      infof(conn->data, "SOCKS5: server resolving disabled for hostnames of "
+-            "length > 255 [actual len=%zu]\n", hostname_len);
+-      socks5_resolve_local = TRUE;
++      failf(data, "SOCKS5: the destination hostname is too long to be "
++            "resolved remotely by the proxy.");
++      /* This version of libcurl doesn't have CURLE_PROXY and
++       * therefore CURLPX_LONG_HOSTNAME, so let's report the best we
++       * can. */
++      return CURLE_COULDNT_RESOLVE_HOST;
+     }
+ 
+     if(auth & ~(CURLAUTH_BASIC | CURLAUTH_GSSAPI))
+@@ -837,7 +840,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_SOCKS5(const char *proxy_user,
+ 
+     if(!socks5_resolve_local) {
+       socksreq[len++] = 3; /* ATYP: domain name = 3 */
+-      socksreq[len++] = (char) hostname_len; /* one byte address length */
++      socksreq[len++] = (unsigned char) hostname_len; /* one byte length */
+       memcpy(&socksreq[len], hostname, hostname_len); /* address w/o NULL */
+       len += hostname_len;
+       infof(data, "SOCKS5 connect to %s:%d (remotely resolved)\n",
+diff --git a/tests/data/Makefile.inc b/tests/data/Makefile.inc
+index 3d8565c36..5ee2284ff 100644
+--- a/tests/data/Makefile.inc
++++ b/tests/data/Makefile.inc
+@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ test662 test663 test664 test665 test666 test667 test668 \
+ test670 test671 test672 test673 \
+ \
+ test700 test701 test702 test703 test704 test705 test706 test707 test708 \
+-test709 test710 test711 test712 test713 test714 test715 test716 test717 \
++test709 test710 test711 test712 test713 test714 test715 test716 test717 test728 \
+ \
+ test800 test801 test802 test803 test804 test805 test806 test807 test808 \
+ test809 test810 test811 test812 test813 test814 test815 test816 test817 \
+diff --git a/tests/data/test728 b/tests/data/test728
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..7b1d8b2f3
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/data/test728
+@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
++<testcase>
++<info>
++<keywords>
++HTTP
++HTTP GET
++SOCKS5
++SOCKS5h
++followlocation
++</keywords>
++</info>
++
++#
++# Server-side
++<reply>
++# The hostname in this redirect is 256 characters and too long (> 255) for
++# SOCKS5 remote resolve. curl must return error CURLE_PROXY in this case.
++<data>
++HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
++Location: http://AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA/
++Content-Length: 0
++Connection: close
++
++</data>
++</reply>
++
++#
++# Client-side
++<client>
++<features>
++proxy
++</features>
++<server>
++http
++socks5
++</server>
++ <name>
++SOCKS5h with HTTP redirect to hostname too long
++ </name>
++ <command>
++--no-progress-meter --location --proxy socks5h://%HOSTIP:%SOCKSPORT http://%HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT/728
++</command>
++</client>
++
++#
++# Verify data after the test has been "shot"
++<verify>
++<strip>
++^User-Agent:.*
++</strip>
++<protocol>
++GET /728 HTTP/1.1
++Host: %HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT
++Accept: */*
++
++</protocol>
++<errorcode>
++6
++</errorcode>
++</verify>
++</testcase>
+-- 
+2.39.2
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-38546.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-38546.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..30ef2fd038
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-38546.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+From 7b67721f12cbe6ed1a41e7332f3b5a7186a5e23f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2023 23:28:32 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] cookie: remove unnecessary struct fields
+To: libcurl development <curl-library@cool.haxx.se>
+
+Plus: reduce the hash table size from 256 to 63. It seems unlikely to
+make much of a speed difference for most use cases but saves 1.5KB of
+data per instance.
+
+Closes #11862
+
+This patch taken from Debian's 7.64.0-4+deb10u7 package which applied with
+only a little fuzz.
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-38546
+Upstream-Status: Backport [61275672b46d9abb32857404]
+Signed-off-by: Mike Crowe <mac@mcrowe.com>
+---
+ lib/cookie.c | 13 +------------
+ lib/cookie.h |  7 ++-----
+ lib/easy.c   |  4 +---
+ 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/cookie.c b/lib/cookie.c
+index 68054e1c4..a378f28e1 100644
+--- a/lib/cookie.c
++++ b/lib/cookie.c
+@@ -114,7 +114,6 @@ static void freecookie(struct Cookie *co)
+   free(co->name);
+   free(co->value);
+   free(co->maxage);
+-  free(co->version);
+   free(co);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -641,11 +640,7 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data,
+           }
+         }
+         else if(strcasecompare("version", name)) {
+-          strstore(&co->version, whatptr);
+-          if(!co->version) {
+-            badcookie = TRUE;
+-            break;
+-          }
++          /* just ignore */
+         }
+         else if(strcasecompare("max-age", name)) {
+           /* Defined in RFC2109:
+@@ -1042,7 +1037,6 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data,
+         free(clist->path);
+         free(clist->spath);
+         free(clist->expirestr);
+-        free(clist->version);
+         free(clist->maxage);
+ 
+         *clist = *co;  /* then store all the new data */
+@@ -1111,9 +1105,6 @@ struct CookieInfo *Curl_cookie_init(struct Curl_easy *data,
+     c = calloc(1, sizeof(struct CookieInfo));
+     if(!c)
+       return NULL; /* failed to get memory */
+-    c->filename = strdup(file?file:"none"); /* copy the name just in case */
+-    if(!c->filename)
+-      goto fail; /* failed to get memory */
+   }
+   else {
+     /* we got an already existing one, use that */
+@@ -1241,7 +1232,6 @@ static struct Cookie *dup_cookie(struct Cookie *src)
+     CLONE(name);
+     CLONE(value);
+     CLONE(maxage);
+-    CLONE(version);
+     d->expires = src->expires;
+     d->tailmatch = src->tailmatch;
+     d->secure = src->secure;
+@@ -1457,7 +1447,6 @@ void Curl_cookie_cleanup(struct CookieInfo *c)
+ {
+   if(c) {
+     unsigned int i;
+-    free(c->filename);
+     for(i = 0; i < COOKIE_HASH_SIZE; i++)
+       Curl_cookie_freelist(c->cookies[i]);
+     free(c); /* free the base struct as well */
+diff --git a/lib/cookie.h b/lib/cookie.h
+index b3865e601..2e667cda0 100644
+--- a/lib/cookie.h
++++ b/lib/cookie.h
+@@ -36,8 +36,6 @@ struct Cookie {
+   char *expirestr;   /* the plain text version */
+   bool tailmatch;    /* whether we do tail-matching of the domain name */
+ 
+-  /* RFC 2109 keywords. Version=1 means 2109-compliant cookie sending */
+-  char *version;     /* Version = <value> */
+   char *maxage;      /* Max-Age = <value> */
+ 
+   bool secure;       /* whether the 'secure' keyword was used */
+@@ -54,15 +52,14 @@ struct Cookie {
+ #define COOKIE_PREFIX__SECURE (1<<0)
+ #define COOKIE_PREFIX__HOST (1<<1)
+ 
+-#define COOKIE_HASH_SIZE 256
++#define COOKIE_HASH_SIZE 63
+ 
+ struct CookieInfo {
+   /* linked list of cookies we know of */
+   struct Cookie *cookies[COOKIE_HASH_SIZE];
+ 
+-  char *filename;  /* file we read from/write to */
+   bool running;    /* state info, for cookie adding information */
+-  long numcookies; /* number of cookies in the "jar" */
++  int numcookies;  /* number of cookies in the "jar" */
+   bool newsession; /* new session, discard session cookies on load */
+   int lastct;      /* last creation-time used in the jar */
+ };
+diff --git a/lib/easy.c b/lib/easy.c
+index b648e80c1..cdca0fb03 100644
+--- a/lib/easy.c
++++ b/lib/easy.c
+@@ -840,9 +840,7 @@ struct Curl_easy *curl_easy_duphandle(struct Curl_easy *data)
+   if(data->cookies) {
+     /* If cookies are enabled in the parent handle, we enable them
+        in the clone as well! */
+-    outcurl->cookies = Curl_cookie_init(data,
+-                                        data->cookies->filename,
+-                                        outcurl->cookies,
++    outcurl->cookies = Curl_cookie_init(data, NULL, outcurl->cookies,
+                                         data->set.cookiesession);
+     if(!outcurl->cookies)
+       goto fail;
+-- 
+2.39.2
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-46218.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-46218.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c9677b6a84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-46218.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+CVE: CVE-2023-46218
+Upstream-Status: Backport [ import from ubuntu http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/c/curl/curl_7.68.0-1ubuntu2.21.debian.tar.xz  upstream https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/2b0994c29a721c91c57  ]
+Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+Backport of:
+
+From 2b0994c29a721c91c572cff7808c572a24d251eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 23 Nov 2023 08:15:47 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cookie: lowercase the domain names before PSL checks
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+
+Closes #12387
+---
+ lib/cookie.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/cookie.c
++++ b/lib/cookie.c
+@@ -967,15 +967,23 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ #ifdef USE_LIBPSL
+   /* Check if the domain is a Public Suffix and if yes, ignore the cookie. */
+   if(domain && co->domain && !isip(co->domain)) {
+-    const psl_ctx_t *psl = Curl_psl_use(data);
+-    int acceptable;
+-
+-    if(psl) {
+-      acceptable = psl_is_cookie_domain_acceptable(psl, domain, co->domain);
+-      Curl_psl_release(data);
++    bool acceptable = FALSE;
++    char lcase[256];
++    char lcookie[256];
++    size_t dlen = strlen(domain);
++    size_t clen = strlen(co->domain);
++    if((dlen < sizeof(lcase)) && (clen < sizeof(lcookie))) {
++      const psl_ctx_t *psl = Curl_psl_use(data);
++      if(psl) {
++        /* the PSL check requires lowercase domain name and pattern */
++        Curl_strntolower(lcase, domain, dlen + 1);
++        Curl_strntolower(lcookie, co->domain, clen + 1);
++        acceptable = psl_is_cookie_domain_acceptable(psl, lcase, lcookie);
++        Curl_psl_release(data);
++      }
++      else
++        acceptable = !bad_domain(domain);
+     }
+-    else
+-      acceptable = !bad_domain(domain);
+ 
+     if(!acceptable) {
+       infof(data, "cookie '%s' dropped, domain '%s' must not "
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2024-2398.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2024-2398.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a3840336f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2024-2398.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+Backport of:
+
+From deca8039991886a559b67bcd6701db800a5cf764 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Eissing <stefan@eissing.org>
+Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 09:36:08 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] http2: push headers better cleanup
+
+- provide common cleanup method for push headers
+
+Closes #13054
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/curl/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2024-2398.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
+Upstream commit https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/deca8039991886a559b67bcd6701db800a5cf764]
+CVE: CVE-2024-2398
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/http2.c | 34 +++++++++++++++-------------------
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/http2.c
++++ b/lib/http2.c
+@@ -515,6 +515,15 @@ static struct Curl_easy *duphandle(struc
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static void free_push_headers(struct HTTP *stream)
++{
++  size_t i;
++  for(i = 0; i<stream->push_headers_used; i++)
++    free(stream->push_headers[i]);
++  Curl_safefree(stream->push_headers);
++  stream->push_headers_used = 0;
++}
++
+ static int push_promise(struct Curl_easy *data,
+                         struct connectdata *conn,
+                         const nghttp2_push_promise *frame)
+@@ -528,7 +537,6 @@ static int push_promise(struct Curl_easy
+     struct curl_pushheaders heads;
+     CURLMcode rc;
+     struct http_conn *httpc;
+-    size_t i;
+     /* clone the parent */
+     struct Curl_easy *newhandle = duphandle(data);
+     if(!newhandle) {
+@@ -557,11 +565,7 @@ static int push_promise(struct Curl_easy
+     Curl_set_in_callback(data, false);
+ 
+     /* free the headers again */
+-    for(i = 0; i<stream->push_headers_used; i++)
+-      free(stream->push_headers[i]);
+-    free(stream->push_headers);
+-    stream->push_headers = NULL;
+-    stream->push_headers_used = 0;
++    free_push_headers(stream);
+ 
+     if(rv) {
+       /* denied, kill off the new handle again */
+@@ -995,10 +999,10 @@ static int on_header(nghttp2_session *se
+             stream->push_headers_alloc) {
+       char **headp;
+       stream->push_headers_alloc *= 2;
+-      headp = Curl_saferealloc(stream->push_headers,
+-                               stream->push_headers_alloc * sizeof(char *));
++      headp = realloc(stream->push_headers,
++                      stream->push_headers_alloc * sizeof(char *));
+       if(!headp) {
+-        stream->push_headers = NULL;
++        free_push_headers(stream);
+         return NGHTTP2_ERR_TEMPORAL_CALLBACK_FAILURE;
+       }
+       stream->push_headers = headp;
+@@ -1179,14 +1183,7 @@ void Curl_http2_done(struct Curl_easy *d
+   if(http->header_recvbuf) {
+     Curl_add_buffer_free(&http->header_recvbuf);
+     Curl_add_buffer_free(&http->trailer_recvbuf);
+-    if(http->push_headers) {
+-      /* if they weren't used and then freed before */
+-      for(; http->push_headers_used > 0; --http->push_headers_used) {
+-        free(http->push_headers[http->push_headers_used - 1]);
+-      }
+-      free(http->push_headers);
+-      http->push_headers = NULL;
+-    }
++    free_push_headers(http);
+   }
+ 
+   if(!httpc->h2) /* not HTTP/2 ? */
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb
index c3d629108a..2f351d585a 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
 SUMMARY = "Command line tool and library for client-side URL transfers"
+DESCRIPTION = "It uses URL syntax to transfer data to and from servers. \
+curl is a widely used because of its ability to be flexible and complete \
+complex tasks. For example, you can use curl for things like user authentication, \
+HTTP post, SSL connections, proxy support, FTP uploads, and more!"
 HOMEPAGE = "http://curl.haxx.se/"
 BUGTRACKER = "http://curl.haxx.se/mail/list.cgi?list=curl-tracker"
 SECTION = "console/network"
@@ -13,6 +17,48 @@ SRC_URI = "https://curl.haxx.se/download/curl-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://CVE-2020-8284.patch \
            file://CVE-2020-8285.patch \
            file://CVE-2020-8286.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-22876.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-22890.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-22898.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-22924.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-22925.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-22946-pre1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-22946.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-22947.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-27776.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-27775.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-22576.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-27774-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-27774-2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-27774-3.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-27774-4.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-27781.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-27782-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-27782-2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-32206.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-32207.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-32208.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-35252.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-32221.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-35260.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-43552.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-23916.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-27534-pre1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-27534.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-27538.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-27533.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-27535-pre1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-27535.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-27536.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-28320.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-28320-fol1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-32001.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38545.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38546.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-28321.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-28322.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-46218.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-2398.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "ec5fc263f898a3dfef08e805f1ecca42"
@@ -20,6 +66,15 @@ SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2ff5e5bd507adf6aa88ff4bbafd4c7af464867ffb688be93b9930717a5
 
 # Curl has used many names over the years...
 CVE_PRODUCT = "haxx:curl haxx:libcurl curl:curl curl:libcurl libcurl:libcurl daniel_stenberg:curl"
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST = "CVE-2021-22922 CVE-2021-22923 CVE-2021-22926 CVE-2021-22945"
+
+# As per link https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-22897
+# and https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2021-22897
+# This CVE issue affects Windows only Hence whitelisting this CVE
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2021-22897"
+
+# This CVE reports that apple had to upgrade curl because of other already reported CVEs
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-42915"
 
 inherit autotools pkgconfig binconfig multilib_header
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/db/db_5.3.28.bb b/meta/recipes-support/db/db_5.3.28.bb
index 318efcb61d..b2ae98f05c 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/db/db_5.3.28.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/db/db_5.3.28.bb
@@ -10,11 +10,12 @@
 # same system at the same time if really necessary.
 SECTION = "libs"
 SUMMARY = "Berkeley Database v5"
+DESCRIPTION = "Provides the foundational storage services for your application, no matter how demanding and unique your requirements may seem to be"
 HOMEPAGE = "https://www.oracle.com/database/technologies/related/berkeleydb.html"
 LICENSE = "Sleepycat"
 RCONFLICTS_${PN} = "db3"
 
-CVE_PRODUCT = "oracle_berkeley_db"
+CVE_PRODUCT = "oracle_berkeley_db berkeley_db"
 CVE_VERSION = "11.2.${PV}"
 
 PR = "r1"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/debianutils/debianutils_4.9.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/debianutils/debianutils_4.9.1.bb
index 904c52780f..8603fecbd0 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/debianutils/debianutils_4.9.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/debianutils/debianutils_4.9.1.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
 SUMMARY = "Miscellaneous utilities specific to Debian"
+DESCRIPTION = "Provides a number of small utilities which are used \
+primarily by the installation scripts of Debian packages, although \
+you may use them directly. "
+HOMEPAGE = "https://packages.debian.org/sid/debianutils"
+BUGTRACKER = "https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/pkgreport.cgi?pkg=debianutils;dist=unstable"
 SECTION = "base"
 LICENSE = "GPLv2 & SMAIL_GPL"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://debian/copyright;md5=f01a5203d50512fc4830b4332b696a9f"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/diffoscope/diffoscope_136.bb b/meta/recipes-support/diffoscope/diffoscope_172.bb
index 3e3e1dfc00..b26713c47f 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/diffoscope/diffoscope_136.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/diffoscope/diffoscope_172.bb
@@ -7,12 +7,19 @@ PYPI_PACKAGE = "diffoscope"
 
 inherit pypi setuptools3
 
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "c84d8d308a40176ba2f5dc4abdbf6f73"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0d6486d6eb6e0445ba21fee2e8bdd3a366ce786bfac98e00e5a95038b7815f15"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5ffe7f38555c6409bc7e7edc277ed77dd78641fe1306fc38d153dbbe445ddea4"
 
 RDEPENDS_${PN} += "binutils vim squashfs-tools python3-libarchive-c python3-magic"
 
 # Dependencies don't build for musl
 COMPATIBLE_HOST_libc-musl = 'null'
 
+do_install_append_class-native() {
+        create_wrapper ${D}${bindir}/diffoscope \
+                MAGIC=${STAGING_DIR_NATIVE}${datadir_native}/misc/magic.mgc \
+                RPM_CONFIGDIR=${STAGING_LIBDIR_NATIVE}/rpm \
+                LD_LIBRARY_PATH=${STAGING_LIBDIR_NATIVE} \
+                RPM_ETCCONFIGDIR=${STAGING_DIR_NATIVE}
+}
+
 BBCLASSEXTEND = "native"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/dos2unix/dos2unix_7.4.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/dos2unix/dos2unix_7.4.1.bb
index 1623285fd0..ea34e4c7a3 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/dos2unix/dos2unix_7.4.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/dos2unix/dos2unix_7.4.1.bb
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ SECTION = "support"
 LICENSE = "BSD-2-Clause"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING.txt;md5=0c977b18f0a384d03597a517d7d03e32"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://git.code.sf.net/p/dos2unix/dos2unix"
+SRC_URI = "git://git.code.sf.net/p/dos2unix/dos2unix;branch=master"
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "dos2unix-(?P<pver>(\d+(\.\d+)+))"
 
 SRCREV = "0490f0723b1a0851b17343f6164915f3474b5197"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/enchant/enchant2_2.2.8.bb b/meta/recipes-support/enchant/enchant2_2.2.8.bb
index 4ddbe55da5..7c624efea3 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/enchant/enchant2_2.2.8.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/enchant/enchant2_2.2.8.bb
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 SUMMARY = "Enchant Spell checker API Library"
+DESCRIPTION = "A library (and command-line program) that wraps a number of \
+different spelling libraries and programs with a consistent interface."
 SECTION = "libs"
 HOMEPAGE = "https://abiword.github.io/enchant/"
+BUGTRACKER = "https://github.com/AbiWord/enchant/issues/"
 LICENSE = "LGPLv2.1+"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING.LIB;md5=a916467b91076e631dd8edb7424769c7"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/fribidi/fribidi/CVE-2022-25308.patch b/meta/recipes-support/fribidi/fribidi/CVE-2022-25308.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8f2c2ade0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/fribidi/fribidi/CVE-2022-25308.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From ad3a19e6372b1e667128ed1ea2f49919884587e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Akira TAGOH <akira@tagoh.org>
+Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2022 17:30:12 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix the stack buffer overflow issue
+
+strlen() could returns 0. Without a conditional check for len,
+accessing S_ pointer with len - 1 may causes a stack buffer overflow.
+
+AddressSanitizer reports this like:
+==1219243==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffdce043c1f at pc 0x000000403547 bp 0x7ffdce0
+43b30 sp 0x7ffdce043b28
+READ of size 1 at 0x7ffdce043c1f thread T0
+    #0 0x403546 in main ../bin/fribidi-main.c:393
+    #1 0x7f226804e58f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d58f)
+    #2 0x7f226804e648 in __libc_start_main_impl (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d648)
+    #3 0x4036f4 in _start (/tmp/fribidi/build/bin/fribidi+0x4036f4)
+
+Address 0x7ffdce043c1f is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 63 in frame
+    #0 0x4022bf in main ../bin/fribidi-main.c:193
+
+  This frame has 5 object(s):
+    [32, 36) 'option_index' (line 233)
+    [48, 52) 'base' (line 386)
+    [64, 65064) 'S_' (line 375) <== Memory access at offset 63 underflows this variable
+    [65328, 130328) 'outstring' (line 385)
+    [130592, 390592) 'logical' (line 384)
+
+This fixes https://github.com/fribidi/fribidi/issues/181
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-25308
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/fribidi/fribidi/commit/ad3a19e6372b1e667128ed1ea2f49919884587e1]
+Signed-off-by: Pawan Badganchi <Pawan.Badganchi@kpit.com>
+
+---
+ bin/fribidi-main.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/bin/fribidi-main.c b/bin/fribidi-main.c
+index 3cf9fe1..3ae4fb6 100644
+--- a/bin/fribidi-main.c
++++ b/bin/fribidi-main.c
+@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ FRIBIDI_END_IGNORE_DEPRECATIONS
+            S_[sizeof (S_) - 1] = 0;
+            len = strlen (S_);
+            /* chop */
+-           if (S_[len - 1] == '\n')
++           if (len > 0 && S_[len - 1] == '\n')
+              {
+                len--;
+                S_[len] = '\0';
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/fribidi/fribidi/CVE-2022-25309.patch b/meta/recipes-support/fribidi/fribidi/CVE-2022-25309.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0efba3d05c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/fribidi/fribidi/CVE-2022-25309.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From f22593b82b5d1668d1997dbccd10a9c31ffea3b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dov Grobgeld <dov.grobgeld@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2022 09:09:49 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Protected against garbage in the CapRTL encoder
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-25309
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/fribidi/fribidi/commit/f22593b82b5d1668d1997dbccd10a9c31ffea3b3]
+Signed-off-by: Pawan Badganchi <Pawan.Badganchi@kpit.com>
+
+---
+ lib/fribidi-char-sets-cap-rtl.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/fribidi-char-sets-cap-rtl.c b/lib/fribidi-char-sets-cap-rtl.c
+index b0c0e4a..f74e010 100644
+--- a/lib/fribidi-char-sets-cap-rtl.c
++++ b/lib/fribidi-char-sets-cap-rtl.c
+@@ -232,7 +232,12 @@ fribidi_cap_rtl_to_unicode (
+            }
+        }
+       else
+-       us[j++] = caprtl_to_unicode[(int) s[i]];
++      {
++        if ((int)s[i] < 0)
++          us[j++] = '?';
++        else
++          us[j++] = caprtl_to_unicode[(int) s[i]];
++      }
+     }
+ 
+   return j;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/fribidi/fribidi/CVE-2022-25310.patch b/meta/recipes-support/fribidi/fribidi/CVE-2022-25310.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d79a82d648
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/fribidi/fribidi/CVE-2022-25310.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 175850b03e1af251d705c1d04b2b9b3c1c06e48f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Akira TAGOH <akira@tagoh.org>
+Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2022 19:06:10 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix SEGV issue in fribidi_remove_bidi_marks
+
+Escape from fribidi_remove_bidi_marks() immediately if str is null.
+
+This fixes https://github.com/fribidi/fribidi/issues/183
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-25310
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/fribidi/fribidi/commit/175850b03e1af251d705c1d04b2b9b3c1c06e48f]
+Signed-off-by: Pawan Badganchi <Pawan.Badganchi@kpit.com>
+
+---
+ lib/fribidi.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/fribidi.c b/lib/fribidi.c
+index f5da0da..70bdab2 100644
+--- a/lib/fribidi.c
++++ b/lib/fribidi.c
+@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ fribidi_remove_bidi_marks (
+   fribidi_boolean status = false;
+ 
+   if UNLIKELY
+-    (len == 0)
++    (len == 0 || str == NULL)
+     {
+       status = true;
+       goto out;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/fribidi/fribidi_1.0.9.bb b/meta/recipes-support/fribidi/fribidi_1.0.9.bb
index 0654b07dc7..62b7d72812 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/fribidi/fribidi_1.0.9.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/fribidi/fribidi_1.0.9.bb
@@ -1,9 +1,18 @@
 SUMMARY = "Free Implementation of the Unicode Bidirectional Algorithm"
+DESCRIPTION = "It provides utility functions to aid in the development \
+of interactive editors and widgets that implement BiDi functionality. \
+The BiDi algorithm is a prerequisite for supporting right-to-left scripts such \
+as Hebrew, Arabic, Syriac, and Thaana. "
 SECTION = "libs"
+HOMEPAGE = "http://fribidi.org/"
+BUGTRACKER = "https://github.com/fribidi/fribidi/issues"
 LICENSE = "LGPLv2.1+"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=a916467b91076e631dd8edb7424769c7"
 
 SRC_URI = "https://github.com/${BPN}/${BPN}/releases/download/v${PV}/${BP}.tar.xz \
+           file://CVE-2022-25308.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-25309.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-25310.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "1b767c259c3cd8e0c8496970f63c22dc"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c5e47ea9026fb60da1944da9888b4e0a18854a0e2410bbfe7ad90a054d36e0c7"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gdbm/gdbm_1.18.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/gdbm/gdbm_1.18.1.bb
index fbb1fe72d7..bfc9ee8f85 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/gdbm/gdbm_1.18.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gdbm/gdbm_1.18.1.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
 SUMMARY = "Key/value database library with extensible hashing"
+DESCRIPTION = "Library of database functions that use extensible hashing \
+and work similar to the standard UNIX dbm. These routines are provided \
+to a programmer needing to create and manipulate a hashed database."
 HOMEPAGE = "http://www.gnu.org/software/gdbm/"
 SECTION = "libs"
 LICENSE = "GPLv3"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gmp/gmp/cve-2021-43618.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gmp/gmp/cve-2021-43618.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..095fb21eaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gmp/gmp/cve-2021-43618.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+CVE: CVE-2021-43618
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Marco Bodrato <bodrato@mail.dm.unipi.it>
+# Date 1634836009 -7200
+# Node ID 561a9c25298e17bb01896801ff353546c6923dbd
+# Parent  e1fd9db13b475209a864577237ea4b9105b3e96e
+mpz/inp_raw.c: Avoid bit size overflows
+
+diff -r e1fd9db13b47 -r 561a9c25298e mpz/inp_raw.c
+--- a/mpz/inp_raw.c     Tue Dec 22 23:49:51 2020 +0100
++++ b/mpz/inp_raw.c     Thu Oct 21 19:06:49 2021 +0200
+@@ -88,8 +88,11 @@
+ 
+   abs_csize = ABS (csize);
+ 
++  if (UNLIKELY (abs_csize > ~(mp_bitcnt_t) 0 / 8))
++    return 0; /* Bit size overflows */
++
+   /* round up to a multiple of limbs */
+-  abs_xsize = BITS_TO_LIMBS (abs_csize*8);
++  abs_xsize = BITS_TO_LIMBS ((mp_bitcnt_t) abs_csize * 8);
+ 
+   if (abs_xsize != 0)
+     {
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gmp/gmp_6.2.0.bb b/meta/recipes-support/gmp/gmp_6.2.0.bb
index a19c74fca8..d29b74f829 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/gmp/gmp_6.2.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gmp/gmp_6.2.0.bb
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://gmplib.org/download/${BPN}/${BP}${REVISION}.tar.bz2 \
            file://use-includedir.patch \
            file://0001-Append-the-user-provided-flags-to-the-auto-detected-.patch \
            file://0001-confiure.ac-Believe-the-cflags-from-environment.patch \
+           file://cve-2021-43618.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "c24161e0dd44cae78cd5f67193492a21"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f51c99cb114deb21a60075ffb494c1a210eb9d7cb729ed042ddb7de9534451ea"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnome-desktop-testing/gnome-desktop-testing_2018.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/gnome-desktop-testing/gnome-desktop-testing_2018.1.bb
index 0defebeb15..19f32e8d1f 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/gnome-desktop-testing/gnome-desktop-testing_2018.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnome-desktop-testing/gnome-desktop-testing_2018.1.bb
@@ -1,11 +1,15 @@
 SUMMARY = "Test runner for GNOME-style installed tests"
+DESCRIPTION = "Runner provides an execution harness for GNOME installed tests. \
+These tests are useful for verifying the functionality of software as \
+installed and packaged, and complement rather than replace build-time \
+('make check') tests."
 HOMEPAGE = "https://wiki.gnome.org/GnomeGoals/InstalledTests"
 LICENSE = "LGPLv2+"
 
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=3bf50002aefd002f49e7bb854063f7e7 \
                     file://src/gnome-desktop-testing-runner.c;beginline=1;endline=20;md5=7ef3ad9da2ffcf7707dc11151fe007f4"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-desktop-testing.git;protocol=http"
+SRC_URI = "git://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-desktop-testing.git;protocol=http;branch=master"
 SRCREV = "4decade67b29ad170fcf3de148e41695fc459f48"
 
 DEPENDS = "glib-2.0"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/0001-configure.ac-use-a-custom-value-for-the-location-of-.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/0001-configure.ac-use-a-custom-value-for-the-location-of-.patch
index 2c204e0245..a0af2d48dc 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/0001-configure.ac-use-a-custom-value-for-the-location-of-.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/0001-configure.ac-use-a-custom-value-for-the-location-of-.patch
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From e7ad11cf54475e455fdb84d118e4782961698567 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From abc5c396aaddaef2e6811362e3e0cc0da28c2b34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Alexander Kanavin <alex.kanavin@gmail.com>
 Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2018 18:00:21 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] configure.ac: use a custom value for the location of
@@ -14,10 +14,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex.kanavin@gmail.com>
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 919ab31..cd58fdb 100644
+index 64cb8c6..3fe9027 100644
 --- a/configure.ac
 +++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -1855,7 +1855,7 @@ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GPGCONF_DISP_NAME, "GPGConf",
+@@ -1824,7 +1824,7 @@ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GPGCONF_DISP_NAME, "GPGConf",
  
  AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GPGTAR_NAME, "gpgtar", [The name of the gpgtar tool])
  
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/0003-dirmngr-uses-libgpg-error.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/0003-dirmngr-uses-libgpg-error.patch
index 3e798efd06..a13b4d5fb5 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/0003-dirmngr-uses-libgpg-error.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/0003-dirmngr-uses-libgpg-error.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 9c3858ffda6246bf9e1e6aeeb920532a56b19408 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 6c75656b68cb6e38b039ae532bd39437cd6daec5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com>
 Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2017 11:18:01 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 3/4] dirmngr uses libgpg error
+Subject: [PATCH] dirmngr uses libgpg error
 
 Upstream-Status: Pending
 Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com>
@@ -9,24 +9,20 @@ Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com>
 Rebase to 2.1.23
 
 Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
+
 ---
- dirmngr/Makefile.am | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+ dirmngr/Makefile.am | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
 
 diff --git a/dirmngr/Makefile.am b/dirmngr/Makefile.am
-index b404165..d3f916e 100644
+index 00d3c42..450d873 100644
 --- a/dirmngr/Makefile.am
 +++ b/dirmngr/Makefile.am
-@@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ endif
- dirmngr_LDADD = $(libcommonpth) \
+@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ dirmngr_LDADD = $(libcommonpth) \
          $(DNSLIBS) $(LIBASSUAN_LIBS) \
         $(LIBGCRYPT_LIBS) $(KSBA_LIBS) $(NPTH_LIBS) \
--       $(NTBTLS_LIBS) $(LIBGNUTLS_LIBS) $(LIBINTL) $(LIBICONV)
-+       $(NTBTLS_LIBS) $(LIBGNUTLS_LIBS) $(LIBINTL) $(LIBICONV) \
-+       $(GPG_ERROR_LIBS)
+        $(NTBTLS_LIBS) $(LIBGNUTLS_LIBS) $(LIBINTL) $(LIBICONV) $(NETLIBS) \
++       $(GPG_ERROR_LIBS) \
+         $(dirmngr_robj)
  if USE_LDAP
  dirmngr_LDADD += $(ldaplibs)
- endif
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/CVE-2022-34903.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/CVE-2022-34903.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5992949d35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/CVE-2022-34903.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 2f05fc96b1332caf97176841b1152da3f0aa16a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 17:52:36 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-34903
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=commit;h=34c649b3601383cd11dbc76221747ec16fd68e1b]
+CVE: CVE-2022-34903
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ g10/cpr.c | 13 ++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/g10/cpr.c b/g10/cpr.c
+index d502e8b..bc4b715 100644
+--- a/g10/cpr.c
++++ b/g10/cpr.c
+@@ -328,20 +328,15 @@ write_status_text_and_buffer (int no, const char *string,
+             }
+           first = 0;
+         }
+-      for (esc=0, s=buffer, n=len; n && !esc; s++, n--)
++      for (esc=0, s=buffer, n=len; n; s++, n--)
+         {
+           if (*s == '%' || *(const byte*)s <= lower_limit
+               || *(const byte*)s == 127 )
+             esc = 1;
+           if (wrap && ++count > wrap)
+-            {
+-              dowrap=1;
+-              break;
+-            }
+-        }
+-      if (esc)
+-        {
+-          s--; n++;
++            dowrap=1;
++          if (esc || dowrap)
++            break;
+         }
+       if (s != buffer)
+         es_fwrite (buffer, s-buffer, 1, statusfp);
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/relocate.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/relocate.patch
index e5a82aa76d..7f7812cd46 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/relocate.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/relocate.patch
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 59c077f32e81190955910cae02599c7a3edfa7fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From bd66af2ac7bb6d9294ac8055a55462ba7c4f9c9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
 Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2018 14:44:40 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] Allow the environment to override where gnupg looks for its
@@ -12,10 +12,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/common/homedir.c b/common/homedir.c
-index e9e75d0..19140aa 100644
+index 4b6e46e..58989b4 100644
 --- a/common/homedir.c
 +++ b/common/homedir.c
-@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ gnupg_socketdir (void)
+@@ -763,7 +763,7 @@ gnupg_socketdir (void)
    if (!name)
      {
        unsigned int dummy;
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ index e9e75d0..19140aa 100644
      }
  
    return name;
-@@ -786,7 +786,7 @@ gnupg_sysconfdir (void)
+@@ -789,7 +789,7 @@ gnupg_sysconfdir (void)
      }
    return name;
  #else /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ index e9e75d0..19140aa 100644
  #endif /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
  }
  
-@@ -815,7 +815,7 @@ gnupg_bindir (void)
+@@ -818,7 +818,7 @@ gnupg_bindir (void)
    else
      return rdir;
  #else /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ index e9e75d0..19140aa 100644
  #endif /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
  }
  
-@@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ gnupg_libexecdir (void)
+@@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ gnupg_libexecdir (void)
  #ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
    return gnupg_bindir ();
  #else /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ index e9e75d0..19140aa 100644
  #endif /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
  }
  
-@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ gnupg_libdir (void)
+@@ -845,7 +845,7 @@ gnupg_libdir (void)
      name = xstrconcat (w32_rootdir (), DIRSEP_S "lib" DIRSEP_S "gnupg", NULL);
    return name;
  #else /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ index e9e75d0..19140aa 100644
  #endif /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
  }
  
-@@ -856,7 +856,7 @@ gnupg_datadir (void)
+@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ gnupg_datadir (void)
      name = xstrconcat (w32_rootdir (), DIRSEP_S "share" DIRSEP_S "gnupg", NULL);
    return name;
  #else /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ index e9e75d0..19140aa 100644
  #endif /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
  }
  
-@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ gnupg_localedir (void)
+@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ gnupg_localedir (void)
                         NULL);
    return name;
  #else /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ index e9e75d0..19140aa 100644
  #endif /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
  }
  
-@@ -940,7 +940,7 @@ gnupg_cachedir (void)
+@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ gnupg_cachedir (void)
      }
    return dir;
  #else /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.2.20.bb b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.2.27.bb
index f754573c88..bd09b02017 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.2.20.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.2.27.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
 SUMMARY = "GNU Privacy Guard - encryption and signing tools (2.x)"
+DESCRIPTION = "A complete and free implementation of the OpenPGP standard \
+as defined by RFC4880 (also known as PGP). GnuPG allows you to encrypt \
+and sign your data and communications; it features a versatile key \
+management system, along with access modules for all kinds of public \
+key directories."
 HOMEPAGE = "http://www.gnupg.org/"
 LICENSE = "GPLv3 & LGPLv3"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=189af8afca6d6075ba6c9e0aa8077626 \
@@ -15,19 +20,20 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNUPG_MIRROR}/${BPN}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://0003-dirmngr-uses-libgpg-error.patch \
            file://0004-autogen.sh-fix-find-version-for-beta-checking.patch \
            file://0001-Woverride-init-is-not-needed-with-gcc-9.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-34903.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI_append_class-native = " file://0001-configure.ac-use-a-custom-value-for-the-location-of-.patch \
                                 file://relocate.patch"
 SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " file://relocate.patch"
 
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "4ff88920cf52b35db0dedaee87bdbbb1"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "04a7c9d48b74c399168ee8270e548588ddbe52218c337703d7f06373d326ca30"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "34e60009014ea16402069136e0a5f63d9b65f90096244975db5cea74b3d02399"
 
 EXTRA_OECONF = "--disable-ldap \
                 --disable-ccid-driver \
                 --with-zlib=${STAGING_LIBDIR}/.. \
                 --with-bzip2=${STAGING_LIBDIR}/.. \
                 --with-readline=${STAGING_LIBDIR}/.. \
+                --with-mailprog=${sbindir}/sendmail \
                 --enable-gpg-is-gpg2 \
                "
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2021-20231.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2021-20231.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6fe7a21e33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2021-20231.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From 15beb4b193b2714d88107e7dffca781798684e7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 14:06:32 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] key_share: avoid use-after-free around realloc
+
+Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+
+https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/15beb4b193b2714d88107e7dffca781798684e7e
+Upstream-Status: Backport 
+CVE: CVE-2021-CVE-2021-20231
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ lib/ext/key_share.c | 12 +++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/ext/key_share.c b/lib/ext/key_share.c
+index ab8abf8fe6..a8c4bb5cff 100644
+--- a/lib/ext/key_share.c
++++ b/lib/ext/key_share.c
+@@ -664,14 +664,14 @@ key_share_send_params(gnutls_session_t session,
+ {
+        unsigned i;
+        int ret;
+-       unsigned char *lengthp;
+-       unsigned int cur_length;
+        unsigned int generated = 0;
+        const gnutls_group_entry_st *group;
+        const version_entry_st *ver;
+ 
+        /* this extension is only being sent on client side */
+        if (session->security_parameters.entity == GNUTLS_CLIENT) {
++               unsigned int length_pos;
++
+                ver = _gnutls_version_max(session);
+                if (unlikely(ver == NULL || ver->key_shares == 0))
+                        return 0;
+@@ -679,16 +679,13 @@ key_share_send_params(gnutls_session_t session,
+                if (!have_creds_for_tls13(session))
+                        return 0;
+ 
+-               /* write the total length later */
+-               lengthp = &extdata->data[extdata->length];
++               length_pos = extdata->length;
+ 
+                ret =
+                    _gnutls_buffer_append_prefix(extdata, 16, 0);
+                if (ret < 0)
+                        return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
+ 
+-               cur_length = extdata->length;
+-
+                if (session->internals.hsk_flags & HSK_HRR_RECEIVED) { /* we know the group */
+                        group = get_group(session);
+                        if (unlikely(group == NULL))
+@@ -736,7 +733,8 @@ key_share_send_params(gnutls_session_t session,
+                }
+ 
+                /* copy actual length */
+-               _gnutls_write_uint16(extdata->length - cur_length, lengthp);
++               _gnutls_write_uint16(extdata->length - length_pos - 2,
++                                    &extdata->data[length_pos]);
+ 
+        } else { /* server */
+                ver = get_version(session);
+-- 
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2021-20232.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2021-20232.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e13917cddb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2021-20232.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+From 75a937d97f4fefc6f9b08e3791f151445f551cb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 14:06:50 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] pre_shared_key: avoid use-after-free around realloc
+
+Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+
+https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/75a937d97f4fefc6f9b08e3791f151445f551cb3
+Upstream-Status: Backport 
+CVE: CVE-2021-CVE-2021-20232
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ lib/ext/pre_shared_key.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/ext/pre_shared_key.c b/lib/ext/pre_shared_key.c
+index a042c6488e..380bf39ed5 100644
+--- a/lib/ext/pre_shared_key.c
++++ b/lib/ext/pre_shared_key.c
+@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ client_send_params(gnutls_session_t session,
+        size_t spos;
+        gnutls_datum_t username = {NULL, 0};
+        gnutls_datum_t user_key = {NULL, 0}, rkey = {NULL, 0};
+-       gnutls_datum_t client_hello;
++       unsigned client_hello_len;
+        unsigned next_idx;
+        const mac_entry_st *prf_res = NULL;
+        const mac_entry_st *prf_psk = NULL;
+@@ -428,8 +428,7 @@ client_send_params(gnutls_session_t session,
+        assert(extdata->length >= sizeof(mbuffer_st));
+        assert(ext_offset >= (ssize_t)sizeof(mbuffer_st));
+        ext_offset -= sizeof(mbuffer_st);
+-       client_hello.data = extdata->data+sizeof(mbuffer_st);
+-       client_hello.size = extdata->length-sizeof(mbuffer_st);
++       client_hello_len = extdata->length-sizeof(mbuffer_st);
+ 
+        next_idx = 0;
+ 
+@@ -440,6 +439,11 @@ client_send_params(gnutls_session_t session,
+        }
+ 
+        if (prf_res && rkey.size > 0) {
++               gnutls_datum_t client_hello;
++
++               client_hello.data = extdata->data+sizeof(mbuffer_st);
++               client_hello.size = client_hello_len;
++
+                ret = compute_psk_binder(session, prf_res,
+                                         binders_len, binders_pos,
+                                         ext_offset, &rkey, &client_hello, 1,
+@@ -474,6 +478,11 @@ client_send_params(gnutls_session_t session,
+        }
+ 
+        if (prf_psk && user_key.size > 0 && info) {
++               gnutls_datum_t client_hello;
++
++               client_hello.data = extdata->data+sizeof(mbuffer_st);
++               client_hello.size = client_hello_len;
++
+                ret = compute_psk_binder(session, prf_psk,
+                                         binders_len, binders_pos,
+                                         ext_offset, &user_key, &client_hello, 0,
+-- 
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2021-4209.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2021-4209.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0bcb55e573
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2021-4209.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 3db352734472d851318944db13be73da61300568 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2021 09:12:25 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] wrap_nettle_hash_fast: avoid calling _update with zero-length
+ input
+
+As Nettle's hash update functions internally call memcpy, providing
+zero-length input may cause undefined behavior.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+
+https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/3db352734472d851318944db13be73da61300568
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2021-4209
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ lib/nettle/mac.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/nettle/mac.c b/lib/nettle/mac.c
+index f9d4d7a8df..35e070fab0 100644
+--- a/lib/nettle/mac.c
++++ b/lib/nettle/mac.c
+@@ -788,7 +788,9 @@ static int wrap_nettle_hash_fast(gnutls_digest_algorithm_t algo,
+        if (ret < 0)
+                return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
+ 
+-       ctx.update(&ctx, text_size, text);
++       if (text_size > 0) {
++               ctx.update(&ctx, text_size, text);
++       }
+        ctx.digest(&ctx, ctx.length, digest);
+ 
+        return 0;
+-- 
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2022-2509.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2022-2509.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f8954945d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2022-2509.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+From 9835638d4e1f37781a47e777c76d5bb14218929b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Tue, 16 Aug 2022 12:23:14 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-2509
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/ce37f9eb265dbe9b6d597f5767449e8ee95848e2]
+CVE: CVE-2022-2509
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ NEWS                             |   4 +
+ lib/x509/pkcs7.c                 |   3 +-
+ tests/Makefile.am                |   2 +-
+ tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c | 215 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 222 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c
+
+diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
+index 755a67c..ba70bb3 100644
+--- a/NEWS
++++ b/NEWS
+@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@ See the end for copying conditions.
+ 
+ * Version 3.6.14 (released 2020-06-03)
+ 
++** libgnutls: Fixed double free during verification of pkcs7 signatures.
++   Reported by Jaak Ristioja (#1383). [GNUTLS-SA-2022-07-07, CVSS: medium]
++   [CVE-2022-2509]
++
+ ** libgnutls: Fixed insecure session ticket key construction, since 3.6.4.
+    The TLS server would not bind the session ticket encryption key with a
+    value supplied by the application until the initial key rotation, allowing
+diff --git a/lib/x509/pkcs7.c b/lib/x509/pkcs7.c
+index 98669e8..ccbc69d 100644
+--- a/lib/x509/pkcs7.c
++++ b/lib/x509/pkcs7.c
+@@ -1318,7 +1318,8 @@ gnutls_x509_crt_t find_signer(gnutls_pkcs7_t pkcs7, gnutls_x509_trust_list_t tl,
+                                issuer = find_verified_issuer_of(pkcs7, issuer, purpose, vflags);
+ 
+                                if (issuer != NULL && gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer(issuer, issuer)) {
+-                                       if (prev) gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(prev);
++                                       if (prev && prev != signer)
++                                               gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(prev);
+                                        prev = issuer;
+                                        break;
+                                }
+diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am
+index 11a083c..cd43a0f 100644
+--- a/tests/Makefile.am
++++ b/tests/Makefile.am
+@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ ctests += mini-record-2 simple gnutls_hmac_fast set_pkcs12_cred cert certuniquei
+         tls-record-size-limit-asym dh-compute ecdh-compute sign-verify-data-newapi \
+         sign-verify-newapi sign-verify-deterministic iov aead-cipher-vec \
+         tls13-without-timeout-func buffer status-request-revoked \
+-        set_x509_ocsp_multi_cli kdf-api keylog-func \
++        set_x509_ocsp_multi_cli kdf-api keylog-func pkcs7-verify-double-free \
+         dtls_hello_random_value tls_hello_random_value x509cert-dntypes
+ 
+ if HAVE_SECCOMP_TESTS
+diff --git a/tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c b/tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..fadf307
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (C) 2022 Red Hat, Inc.
++ *
++ * Author: Zoltan Fridrich
++ *
++ * This file is part of GnuTLS.
++ *
++ * GnuTLS is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
++ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
++ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
++ * (at your option) any later version.
++ *
++ * GnuTLS is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
++ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
++ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
++ * General Public License for more details.
++ *
++ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
++ * along with GnuTLS. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
++ */
++
++#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
++#include <config.h>
++#endif
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <gnutls/pkcs7.h>
++#include <gnutls/x509.h>
++
++#include "utils.h"
++
++static char rca_pem[] =
++       "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
++       "MIIDCjCCAfKgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAVMRMwEQYDVQQKDApFeGFt\n"
++       "cGxlIENBMCAXDTE3MDcyMTE0NDMzNloYDzIyMjIwNzIxMTQ0MzM2WjAVMRMwEQYD\n"
++       "VQQKDApFeGFtcGxlIENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA\n"
++       "v8hnKPJ/IA0SQB/A/a0Uh+npZ67vsgIMrtTQo0r0kJkmkBz5323xO3DVuJfB3QmX\n"
++       "v9zvoeCQLuDvWar5Aixfxgm6s5Q+yPvJj9t3NebDrU+Y4+qyewBIJUF8EF/5iBPC\n"
++       "ZHONmzbfIRWvQWGGgb2CRcOHp2J7AY/QLB6LsWPaLjs/DHva28Q13JaTTHIpdu8v\n"
++       "t6vHr0nXf66DN4MvtoF3N+o+v3snJCMsfXOqASi4tbWR7gtOfCfiz9uBjh0W2Dut\n"
++       "/jclBQkJkLe6esNSM+f4YiOpctVDjmfj8yoHCp394vt0wFqhG38wsTFAyVP6qIcf\n"
++       "5zoSu9ovEt2cTkhnZHjiiwIDAQABo2MwYTAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA4GA1Ud\n"
++       "DwEB/wQEAwIBBjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUhjeO6Uc5imbjOl2I2ltVA27Hu9YwHwYDVR0j\n"
++       "BBgwFoAUhjeO6Uc5imbjOl2I2ltVA27Hu9YwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAD+r\n"
++       "i/7FsbG0OFKGF2+JOnth6NjJQcMfM8LiglqAuBUijrv7vltoZ0Z3FJH1Vi4OeMXn\n"
++       "l7X/9tWUve0uFl75MfjDrf0+lCEdYRY1LCba2BrUgpbbkLywVUdnbsvndehegCgS\n"
++       "jss2/zys3Hlo3ZaHlTMQ/NQ4nrxcxkjOvkZSEOqgxJTLpzm6pr7YUts4k6c6lNiB\n"
++       "FSiJiDzsJCmWR9C3fBbUlfDfTJYGN3JwqX270KchXDElo8gNoDnF7jBMpLFFSEKm\n"
++       "MyfbNLX/srh+CEfZaN/OZV4A3MQ0L8vQEp6M4CJhvRLIuMVabZ2coJ0AzystrOMU\n"
++       "LirBWjg89RoAjFQ7bTE=\n"
++       "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
++
++static char ca_pem[] =
++       "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
++       "MIIDFzCCAf+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAVMRMwEQYDVQQKDApFeGFt\n"
++       "cGxlIENBMCAXDTE3MDcyMTE0NDQzNFoYDzIyMjIwNzIxMTQ0NDM0WjAiMSAwHgYD\n"
++       "VQQKDBdFeGFtcGxlIGludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAD\n"
++       "ggEPADCCAQoCggEBAKb9ACB8u//sP6MfNU1OsVw68xz3eTPLgKxS0vpqexm6iGVg\n"
++       "ug/o9uYRLzqiEukv/eyz9WzHmY7sqlOJjOFdv92+SaNg79Jc51WHPFXgea4/qyfr\n"
++       "4y14PGs0SNxm6T44sXurUs7cXydQVUgnq2VCaWFOTUdxXoAWkV8r8GaUoPD/klVz\n"
++       "RqxSZVETmX1XBKhsMnnov41kRwVph2C+VfUspsbaUZaz/o/S1/nokhXRACzKsMBr\n"
++       "obqiGxbY35uVzsmbAW5ErhQz98AWJL3Bub1fsEMXg6OEMmPH4AtX888dTIYZNw0E\n"
++       "bUIESspz1kjJQTtVQDHTprhwz16YiSVeUonlLgMCAwEAAaNjMGEwDwYDVR0TAQH/\n"
++       "BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwHQYDVR0OBBYEFPBjxDWjMhjXERirKF9O\n"
++       "o/5Cllc5MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIY3julHOYpm4zpdiNpbVQNux7vWMA0GCSqGSIb3\n"
++       "DQEBCwUAA4IBAQCTm+vv3hBa6lL5IT+Fw8aTxQ2Ne7mZ5oyazhvXYwwfKNMX3SML\n"
++       "W2JdPaL64ZwbxxxYvW401o5Z0CEgru3YFrsqB/hEdl0Uf8UWWJmE1rRa+miTmbjt\n"
++       "lrLNCWdrs6CiwvsPITTHg7jevB4KyZYsTSxQFcyr3N3xF+6EmOTC4IkhPPnXYXcp\n"
++       "248ih+WOavSYoRvzgB/Dip1WnPYU2mfIV3O8JReRryngA0TzWCLPLUoWR3R4jwtC\n"
++       "+1uSLoqaenz3qv3F1WEbke37az9YJuXx/5D8CqFQiZ62TUUtI6fYd8mkMBM4Qfh6\n"
++       "NW9XrCkI9wlpL5K9HllhuW0BhKeJkuPpyQ2p\n"
++       "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
++
++static char ee_pem[] =
++       "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
++       "MIIDIjCCAgqgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAiMSAwHgYDVQQKDBdFeGFt\n"
++       "cGxlIGludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBDQTAgFw0yMjA3MjExNDQ1MzdaGA8yMjIyMDcyMTE0\n"
++       "NDUzN1owFTETMBEGA1UEAwwKSm9obiBTbWl0aDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAD\n"
++       "ggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMb1uuxppBFY+WVD45iyHUq7DkIJNNOI/JRaybVJfPktWq2E\n"
++       "eNe7XhV05KKnqZTbDO2iYqNHqGhZ8pz/IstDRTZP3z/q1vXTG0P9Gx28rEy5TaUY\n"
++       "QjtD+ZoFUQm0ORMDBjd8jikqtJ87hKeuOPMH4rzdydotMaPQSm7KLzHBGBr6gg7z\n"
++       "g1IxPWkhMyHapoMqqrhjwjzoTY97UIXpZTEoIA+KpEC8f9CciBtL0i1MPBjWozB6\n"
++       "Jma9q5iEwZXuRr3cnPYeIPlK2drgDZCMuSFcYiT8ApLw5OhKqY1m2EvfZ2ox2s9R\n"
++       "68/HzYdPi3kZwiNEtlBvMlpt5yKBJAflp76d7DkCAwEAAaNuMGwwCwYDVR0PBAQD\n"
++       "AgWgMB0GA1UdJQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMCBggrBgEFBQcDBDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUc+Mi\n"
++       "kr8WMCk00SQo+P2iggp/oQkwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU8GPENaMyGNcRGKsoX06j/kKW\n"
++       "VzkwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAKU9+CUR0Jcfybd1+8Aqgh1RH96yQygnVuyt\n"
++       "Na9rFz4fM3ij9tGXDHXrkZw8bW1dWLU9quu8zeTxKxc3aiDIw739Alz0tukttDo7\n"
++       "dW7YqIb77zsIsWB9p7G9dlxT6ieUy+5IKk69BbeK8KR0vAciAG4KVQxPhuPy/LGX\n"
++       "PzqlJIJ4h61s3UOroReHPB1keLZgpORqrvtpClOmABH9TLFRJA/WFg8Q2XYB/p0x\n"
++       "l/pWiaoBC+8wK9cDoMUK5yOwXeuCLffCb+UlAD0+z/qxJ2pisE8E9X8rRKRrWI+i\n"
++       "G7LtJCEn86EQK8KuRlJxKgj8lClZhoULB0oL4jbblBuNow9WRmM=\n"
++       "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
++
++static char msg_pem[] =
++       "-----BEGIN PKCS7-----\n"
++       "MIIK2QYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIKyjCCCsYCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwCwYJKoZI\n"
++       "hvcNAQcBoIIJTzCCAwowggHyoAMCAQICAQEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwFTETMBEG\n"
++       "A1UECgwKRXhhbXBsZSBDQTAgFw0xNzA3MjExNDQzMjFaGA8yMjIyMDcyMTE0NDMy\n"
++       "MVowFTETMBEGA1UECgwKRXhhbXBsZSBDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP\n"
++       "ADCCAQoCggEBAL51eyE4j8wAKQKMGlO9HEY2iaGvsdPSJmidSdmCi1jnNK39Lx4Y\n"
++       "31h279hSHF5wtI6VM91HHfeLf1mjEZHlKrXXJQzBPLpbHWapD778drHBitOP8e56\n"
++       "fDMIfofLV4tkMk8690vPe4cJH1UHGspMyz6EQF9kPRaW80XtMV/6dalgL/9Esmaw\n"
++       "XBNPJAS1VutDuXQkJ/3/rWFLmkpYHHtGPjX782YRmT1s+VOVTsLqmKx0TEL8A381\n"
++       "bbElHPUAMjPcyWR5qqA8KWnS5Dwqk3LwI0AvuhQytCq0S7Xl4DXauvxwTRXv0UU7\n"
++       "W8r3MLAw9DnlnJiD/RFjw5rbGO3wMePk/qUCAwEAAaNjMGEwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUw\n"
++       "AwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwHQYDVR0OBBYEFIh2KRoKJoe2VtpOwWMkRAkR\n"
++       "mLWKMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIh2KRoKJoe2VtpOwWMkRAkRmLWKMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB\n"
++       "CwUAA4IBAQBovvlOjoy0MCT5U0eWfcPQQjY4Ssrn3IiPNlVkqSNo+FHX+2baTLVQ\n"
++       "5QTHxwXwzdIJiwtjFWDdGEQXqmuIvnFG+u/whGbeg6oQygfnQ5Y+q6epOxCsPgLQ\n"
++       "mKKEaF7mvh8DauUx4QSbYCNGCctOZuB1vlN9bJ3/5QbH+2pFPOfCr5CAyPDwHo6S\n"
++       "qO3yPcutRwT9xS7gXEHM9HhLp+DmdCGh4eVBPiFilyZm1d92lWxU8oxoSfXgzDT/\n"
++       "GCzlMykNZNs4JD9QmiRClP/3U0dQbOhah/Fda+N+L90xaqEgGcvwKKZa3pzo59pl\n"
++       "BbkcIP4YPyHeinwkgAn5UVJg9DOxNCS0MIIDFzCCAf+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG\n"
++       "9w0BAQsFADAVMRMwEQYDVQQKDApFeGFtcGxlIENBMCAXDTE3MDcyMTE0NDQxM1oY\n"
++       "DzIyMjIwNzIxMTQ0NDEzWjAiMSAwHgYDVQQKDBdFeGFtcGxlIGludGVybWVkaWF0\n"
++       "ZSBDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMPFDEvDANwvhviu\n"
++       "pwXTvaKyxyX94jVu1wgAhIRyQBVRiMbrn8MEufLG8oA0vKd8s92gv/lWe1jFb2rn\n"
++       "91jMkZWsjWjiJFD6SzqFfBo+XxOGikEqO1MAf92UqavmSGlXVRG1Vy7T7dWibZP0\n"
++       "WODhHYWayR0Y6owSz5IqNfrHXzDME+lSJxHgRFI7pK+b0OgiVmvyXDKFPvyU6GrP\n"
++       "lxXDi/XbjyPvC5gpiwtTgm+s8KERwmdlfZUNjkh2PpHx1g1joijHT3wIvO/Pek1E\n"
++       "C+Xs6w3XxGgL6TTL7FDuv4AjZVX9KK66/yBhX3aN8bkqAg+hs9XNk3zzWC0XEFOS\n"
++       "Qoh2va0CAwEAAaNjMGEwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw\n"
++       "HQYDVR0OBBYEFHwi/7dUWGjkMWJctOm7MCjjQj1cMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIh2KRoK\n"
++       "Joe2VtpOwWMkRAkRmLWKMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQCF6sHCBdYRwBwvfCve\n"
++       "og9cPnmPqZrG4AtmSvtoSsMvgvKb/4z3/gG8oPtTBkeRcAHoMoEp/oA+B2ylwIAc\n"
++       "S5U7jx+lYH/Pqih0X/OcOLbaMv8uzGSGQxk+L9LuuIT6E/THfRRIPEvkDkzC+/uk\n"
++       "7vUbG17bSEWeF0o/6sjzAY2aH1jnbCDyu0UC78GXkc6bZ5QlH98uLMDMrOmqcZjS\n"
++       "JFfvuRDQyKV5yBdBkYaobsIWSQDsgYxJzf/2y8c3r+HXqT+jhrXPWJ3btgMPxpu7\n"
++       "E8KmoFgp9EM+48oYlXJ66rk08/KjaVmgN7R+Hm3e2+MFT2kme4fBKalLjcazTe3x\n"
++       "0FisMIIDIjCCAgqgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAiMSAwHgYDVQQKDBdF\n"
++       "eGFtcGxlIGludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBDQTAgFw0yMjA3MjExNDQ1MzBaGA8yMjIyMDcy\n"
++       "MTE0NDUzMVowFTETMBEGA1UEAwwKSm9obiBTbWl0aDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEB\n"
++       "BQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMjhSqhdD5RjmOm6W3hG7zkgKBP9whRN/SipcdEMlkgc\n"
++       "F/U3QMu66qIfKwheNdWalC1JLtruLDWP92ysa6Vw+CCG8aSax1AgB//RKQB7kgPA\n"
++       "9js9hi/oCdBmCv2HJxhWSLz+MVoxgzW4C7S9FenI+btxe/99Uw4nOw7kwjsYDLKr\n"
++       "tMw8myv7aCW/63CuBYGtohiZupM3RI3kKFcZots+KRPLlZpjv+I2h9xSln8VxKNb\n"
++       "XiMrYwGfHB7iX7ghe1TvFjKatEUhsqa7AvIq7nfe/cyq97f0ODQO814njgZtk5iQ\n"
++       "JVavXHdhTVaypt1HdAFMuHX5UATylHxx9tRCgSIijUsCAwEAAaNuMGwwCwYDVR0P\n"
++       "BAQDAgWgMB0GA1UdJQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMCBggrBgEFBQcDBDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU\n"
++       "31+vHl4E/2Jpnwinbzf+d7usshcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUfCL/t1RYaOQxYly06bsw\n"
++       "KONCPVwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAAWe63DcNwmleQ3INFGDJZ/m2I/R/cBa\n"
++       "nnrxgR5Ey1ljHdA/x1z1JLTGmGVwqGExs5DNG9Q//Pmc9pZ1yPa8J4Xf8AvFcmkY\n"
++       "mWoH1HvW0xu/RF1UN5SAoD2PRQ+Vq4OSPD58IlEu/u4o1wZV7Wl91Cv6VNpiAb63\n"
++       "j9PA1YacOpOtcRqG59Vuj9HFm9f30ejHVo2+KJcpo290cR3Zg4fOm8mtjeMdt/QS\n"
++       "Atq+RqPAQ7yxqvEEv8zPIZj2kAOQm3mh/yYqBrR68lQUD/dBTP7ApIZkhUK3XK6U\n"
++       "nf9JvoF6Fn2+Cnqb//FLBgHSnoeqeQNwDLUXTsD02iYxHzJrhokSY4YxggFQMIIB\n"
++       "TAIBATAnMCIxIDAeBgNVBAoMF0V4YW1wbGUgaW50ZXJtZWRpYXRlIENBAgEBMAsG\n"
++       "CWCGSAFlAwQCATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQATHg6wNsBcs/Ub1GQfKwTpKCk5\n"
++       "8QXuNnZ0u7b6mKgrSY2Gf47fpL2aRgaR+BAQncbctu5EH/IL38pWjaGtOhFAj/5q\n"
++       "7luVQW11kuyJN3Bd/dtLqawWOwMmAIEigw6X50l5ZHnEVzFfxt+RKTNhk4XWVtbi\n"
++       "2iIlITOplW0rnvxYAwCxKL9ocaB7etK8au7ixMxbFp75Ts4iLX8dhlAFdCuFCk8k\n"
++       "B8mi9HHuwr3QYRqMPW61hu1wBL3yB8eoZNOwPXb0gkIh6ZvgptxgQzm/cc+Iw9fP\n"
++       "QkR0fTM7ElJ5QZmSV98AUbZDHmDvpmcjcUxfSPMc3IoT8T300usRu7QHqKJi\n"
++       "-----END PKCS7-----\n";
++
++const gnutls_datum_t rca_datum = { (void *)rca_pem, sizeof(rca_pem) - 1 };
++const gnutls_datum_t ca_datum = { (void *)ca_pem, sizeof(ca_pem) - 1 };
++const gnutls_datum_t ee_datum = { (void *)ee_pem, sizeof(ee_pem) - 1 };
++const gnutls_datum_t msg_datum = { (void *)msg_pem, sizeof(msg_pem) - 1 };
++
++static void tls_log_func(int level, const char *str)
++{
++       fprintf(stderr, "%s |<%d>| %s", "err", level, str);
++}
++
++#define CHECK(X)\
++{\
++       r = X;\
++       if (r < 0)\
++               fail("error in %d: %s\n", __LINE__, gnutls_strerror(r));\
++}\
++
++void doit(void)
++{
++       int r;
++       gnutls_x509_crt_t rca_cert = NULL;
++       gnutls_x509_crt_t ca_cert = NULL;
++       gnutls_x509_crt_t ee_cert = NULL;
++       gnutls_x509_trust_list_t tlist = NULL;
++       gnutls_pkcs7_t pkcs7 = NULL;
++       gnutls_datum_t data = { (unsigned char *)"xxx", 3 };
++
++       if (debug) {
++               gnutls_global_set_log_function(tls_log_func);
++               gnutls_global_set_log_level(4711);
++       }
++
++       // Import certificates
++       CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_init(&rca_cert));
++       CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_import(rca_cert, &rca_datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM));
++       CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_init(&ca_cert));
++       CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_import(ca_cert, &ca_datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM));
++       CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_init(&ee_cert));
++       CHECK(gnutls_x509_crt_import(ee_cert, &ee_datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM));
++
++       // Setup trust store
++       CHECK(gnutls_x509_trust_list_init(&tlist, 0));
++       CHECK(gnutls_x509_trust_list_add_named_crt(tlist, rca_cert, "rca", 3, 0));
++       CHECK(gnutls_x509_trust_list_add_named_crt(tlist, ca_cert, "ca", 2, 0));
++       CHECK(gnutls_x509_trust_list_add_named_crt(tlist, ee_cert, "ee", 2, 0));
++
++       // Setup pkcs7 structure
++       CHECK(gnutls_pkcs7_init(&pkcs7));
++       CHECK(gnutls_pkcs7_import(pkcs7, &msg_datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM));
++
++       // Signature verification
++       gnutls_pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, tlist, NULL, 0, 0, &data, 0);
++
++       gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(rca_cert);
++       gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(ca_cert);
++       gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(ee_cert);
++       gnutls_x509_trust_list_deinit(tlist, 0);
++       gnutls_pkcs7_deinit(pkcs7);
++}
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-0361.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-0361.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..943f4ca704
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-0361.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From 80a6ce8ddb02477cd724cd5b2944791aaddb702a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Sosedkin <asosedkin@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2022 16:05:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] auth/rsa: side-step potential side-channel
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Sosedkin <asosedkin@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Tested-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/80a6ce8ddb02477cd724cd5b2944791aaddb702a
+                           https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/4b7ff428291c7ed77c6d2635577c83a43bbae558]
+CVE: CVE-2023-0361
+Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumbhar@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/auth/rsa.c | 30 +++---------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c
+index 8108ee8..858701f 100644
+--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
++++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
+@@ -155,13 +155,10 @@ static int
+ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+                   size_t _data_size)
+ {
+-       const char attack_error[] = "auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 attack\n";
+        gnutls_datum_t ciphertext;
+        int ret, dsize;
+        ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
+        volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
+-       volatile uint8_t check_ver_min;
+-       volatile uint32_t ok;
+
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SSL3
+        if (get_num_version(session) == GNUTLS_SSL3) {
+@@ -187,7 +184,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+
+        ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
+        ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+-       check_ver_min = (session->internals.allow_wrong_pms == 0);
+
+        session->key.key.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
+        if (session->key.key.data == NULL) {
+@@ -206,10 +202,9 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+                return ret;
+        }
+
+-       ret =
+-           gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key,
+-                                        0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data,
+-                                        session->key.key.size);
++       gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key,
++                                    0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data,
++                                    session->key.key.size);
+        /* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
+         * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
+         * channel that can be used as an oracle, so treat very carefully */
+@@ -225,25 +220,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+         * Vlastimil Klima, Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
+         */
+
+-       /* ok is 0 in case of error and 1 in case of success. */
+-
+-       /* if ret < 0 */
+-       ok = CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+-       /* session->key.key.data[0] must equal ver_maj */
+-       ok &= CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[0], ver_maj);
+-       /* if check_ver_min then session->key.key.data[1] must equal ver_min */
+-       ok &= CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(check_ver_min, 0) &
+-               CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[1], ver_min);
+-
+-       if (ok) {
+-               /* call logging function unconditionally so all branches are
+-                * indistinguishable for timing and cache access when debug
+-                * logging is disabled */
+-               _gnutls_no_log("%s", attack_error);
+-       } else {
+-               _gnutls_debug_log("%s", attack_error);
+-       }
+-
+        /* This is here to avoid the version check attack
+         * discussed above.
+         */
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-5981.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-5981.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c518cfa0ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-5981.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+Backport of:
+
+From 29d6298d0b04cfff970b993915db71ba3f580b6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2023 09:26:57 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] auth/rsa_psk: side-step potential side-channel
+
+This removes branching that depends on secret data, porting changes
+for regular RSA key exchange from
+4804febddc2ed958e5ae774de2a8f85edeeff538 and
+80a6ce8ddb02477cd724cd5b2944791aaddb702a.  This also removes the
+allow_wrong_pms as it was used sorely to control debug output
+depending on the branching.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/gnutls28/3.6.13-2ubuntu1.9/gnutls28_3.6.13-2ubuntu1.9.debian.tar.xz
+Upstream-Commit: https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/29d6298d0b04cfff970b993915db71ba3f580b6d]
+CVE: CVE-2023-5981
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/auth/rsa.c     |  2 +-
+ lib/auth/rsa_psk.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
+ lib/gnutls_int.h   |  4 ---
+ lib/priority.c     |  1 -
+ 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
++++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
+@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t sess
+                                     session->key.key.size);
+        /* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
+         * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
+-        * channel that can be used as an oracle, so treat very carefully */
++        * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
+ 
+        /* Error handling logic:
+         * In case decryption fails then don't inform the peer. Just use the
+--- a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
++++ b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
+@@ -264,14 +264,13 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_se
+ {
+        gnutls_datum_t username;
+        psk_auth_info_t info;
+-       gnutls_datum_t plaintext;
+        gnutls_datum_t ciphertext;
+        gnutls_datum_t pwd_psk = { NULL, 0 };
+        int ret, dsize;
+-       int randomize_key = 0;
+        ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
+        gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t cred;
+        gnutls_datum_t premaster_secret = { NULL, 0 };
++       volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
+ 
+        cred = (gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t)
+            _gnutls_get_cred(session, GNUTLS_CRD_PSK);
+@@ -327,71 +326,47 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_se
+        }
+        ciphertext.size = dsize;
+ 
+-       ret =
+-           gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
+-                                       &ciphertext, &plaintext);
+-       if (ret < 0 || plaintext.size != GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE) {
+-               /* In case decryption fails then don't inform
+-                * the peer. Just use a random key. (in order to avoid
+-                * attack against pkcs-1 formatting).
+-                */
+-               gnutls_assert();
+-               _gnutls_debug_log
+-                   ("auth_rsa_psk: Possible PKCS #1 format attack\n");
+-               if (ret >= 0) {
+-                       gnutls_free(plaintext.data);
+-               }
+-               randomize_key = 1;
+-       } else {
+-               /* If the secret was properly formatted, then
+-                * check the version number.
+-                */
+-               if (_gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session) !=
+-                   plaintext.data[0]
+-                   || (session->internals.allow_wrong_pms == 0
+-                       && _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session) !=
+-                       plaintext.data[1])) {
+-                       /* No error is returned here, if the version number check
+-                        * fails. We proceed normally.
+-                        * That is to defend against the attack described in the paper
+-                        * "Attacking RSA-based sessions in SSL/TLS" by Vlastimil Klima,
+-                        * Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
+-                        */
+-                       gnutls_assert();
+-                       _gnutls_debug_log
+-                           ("auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 version check format attack\n");
+-               }
+-       }
++       ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
++       ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+ 
++       premaster_secret.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
++       if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
++               gnutls_assert();
++               return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
++       }
++       premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
+ 
+-       if (randomize_key != 0) {
+-               premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
+-               premaster_secret.data =
+-                   gnutls_malloc(premaster_secret.size);
+-               if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
+-                       gnutls_assert();
+-                       return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
+-               }
+-
+-               /* we do not need strong random numbers here.
+-                */
+-               ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
+-                                 premaster_secret.size);
+-               if (ret < 0) {
+-                       gnutls_assert();
+-                       goto cleanup;
+-               }
+-       } else {
+-               premaster_secret.data = plaintext.data;
+-               premaster_secret.size = plaintext.size;
++       /* Fallback value when decryption fails. Needs to be unpredictable. */
++       ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
++                        premaster_secret.size);
++       if (ret < 0) {
++               gnutls_assert();
++               goto cleanup;
+        }
+ 
++       gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
++                                    &ciphertext, premaster_secret.data,
++                                    premaster_secret.size);
++       /* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
++        * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
++        * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
++
++       /* Error handling logic:
++        * In case decryption fails then don't inform the peer. Just use the
++        * random key previously generated. (in order to avoid attack against
++        * pkcs-1 formatting).
++        *
++        * If we get version mismatches no error is returned either. We
++        * proceed normally. This is to defend against the attack described
++        * in the paper "Attacking RSA-based sessions in SSL/TLS" by
++        * Vlastimil Klima, Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
++        */
++
+        /* This is here to avoid the version check attack
+         * discussed above.
+         */
+-
+-       premaster_secret.data[0] = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
+-       premaster_secret.data[1] = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
++       premaster_secret.data[0] = ver_maj;
++       premaster_secret.data[1] = ver_min;
+ 
+        /* find the key of this username
+         */
+--- a/lib/gnutls_int.h
++++ b/lib/gnutls_int.h
+@@ -989,7 +989,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
+        bool _no_etm;
+        bool _no_ext_master_secret;
+        bool _allow_key_usage_violation;
+-       bool _allow_wrong_pms;
+        bool _dumbfw;
+        unsigned int _dh_prime_bits;    /* old (deprecated) variable */
+ 
+@@ -1007,7 +1006,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
+              (x)->no_etm = 1; \
+              (x)->no_ext_master_secret = 1; \
+              (x)->allow_key_usage_violation = 1; \
+-             (x)->allow_wrong_pms = 1; \
+              (x)->dumbfw = 1
+ 
+ #define ENABLE_PRIO_COMPAT(x) \
+@@ -1016,7 +1014,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
+              (x)->_no_etm = 1; \
+              (x)->_no_ext_master_secret = 1; \
+              (x)->_allow_key_usage_violation = 1; \
+-             (x)->_allow_wrong_pms = 1; \
+              (x)->_dumbfw = 1
+ 
+ /* DH and RSA parameters types.
+@@ -1141,7 +1138,6 @@ typedef struct {
+        bool no_etm;
+        bool no_ext_master_secret;
+        bool allow_key_usage_violation;
+-       bool allow_wrong_pms;
+        bool dumbfw;
+ 
+        /* old (deprecated) variable. This is used for both srp_prime_bits
+--- a/lib/priority.c
++++ b/lib/priority.c
+@@ -681,7 +681,6 @@ gnutls_priority_set(gnutls_session_t ses
+        COPY_TO_INTERNALS(no_etm);
+        COPY_TO_INTERNALS(no_ext_master_secret);
+        COPY_TO_INTERNALS(allow_key_usage_violation);
+-       COPY_TO_INTERNALS(allow_wrong_pms);
+        COPY_TO_INTERNALS(dumbfw);
+        COPY_TO_INTERNALS(dh_prime_bits);
+ 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2024-0553.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2024-0553.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f15c470879
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2024-0553.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+From 40dbbd8de499668590e8af51a15799fbc430595e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 19:13:17 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] rsa-psk: minimize branching after decryption
+
+This moves any non-trivial code between gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2
+and the function return in _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx up until the
+decryption.  This also avoids an extra memcpy to session->key.key.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/40dbbd8de499668590e8af51a15799fbc430595e]
+CVE: CVE-2024-0553
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/auth/rsa_psk.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
+index 93c2dc9..c6cfb92 100644
+--- a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
++++ b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
+@@ -269,7 +269,6 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+        int ret, dsize;
+        ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
+        gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t cred;
+-       gnutls_datum_t premaster_secret = { NULL, 0 };
+        volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
+ 
+        cred = (gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t)
+@@ -329,24 +328,48 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+        ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
+        ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+ 
+-       premaster_secret.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
+-       if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
++       /* Find the key of this username. A random value will be
++        * filled in if the key is not found.
++        */
++       ret = _gnutls_psk_pwd_find_entry(session, info->username,
++                                        strlen(info->username), &pwd_psk);
++       if (ret < 0)
++               return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
++
++       /* Allocate memory for premaster secret, and fill in the
++        * fields except the decryption result.
++        */
++       session->key.key.size = 2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE + 2 + pwd_psk.size;
++       session->key.key.data = gnutls_malloc(session->key.key.size);
++       if (session->key.key.data == NULL) {
+                gnutls_assert();
++               _gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
++               /* No need to zeroize, as the secret is not copied in yet */
++               _gnutls_free_datum(&session->key.key);
+                return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
+        }
+-       premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
+ 
+        /* Fallback value when decryption fails. Needs to be unpredictable. */
+-       ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
+-                        premaster_secret.size);
++       ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, session->key.key.data + 2,
++                        GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
+        if (ret < 0) {
+                gnutls_assert();
+-               goto cleanup;
++               _gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
++               /* No need to zeroize, as the secret is not copied in yet */
++               _gnutls_free_datum(&session->key.key);
++               return ret;
+        }
+ 
++       _gnutls_write_uint16(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE, session->key.key.data);
++       _gnutls_write_uint16(pwd_psk.size,
++                            &session->key.key.data[2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE]);
++       memcpy(&session->key.key.data[2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE + 2], pwd_psk.data,
++              pwd_psk.size);
++       _gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
++
+        gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
+-                                    &ciphertext, premaster_secret.data,
+-                                    premaster_secret.size);
++                                    &ciphertext, session->key.key.data + 2,
++                                    GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
+        /* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
+         * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
+         * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
+@@ -365,31 +388,10 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+        /* This is here to avoid the version check attack
+         * discussed above.
+         */
+-       premaster_secret.data[0] = ver_maj;
+-       premaster_secret.data[1] = ver_min;
++       session->key.key.data[2] = ver_maj;
++       session->key.key.data[3] = ver_min;
+ 
+-       /* find the key of this username
+-        */
+-       ret =
+-           _gnutls_psk_pwd_find_entry(session, info->username, strlen(info->username), &pwd_psk);
+-       if (ret < 0) {
+-               gnutls_assert();
+-               goto cleanup;
+-       }
+-
+-       ret =
+-           set_rsa_psk_session_key(session, &pwd_psk, &premaster_secret);
+-       if (ret < 0) {
+-               gnutls_assert();
+-               goto cleanup;
+-       }
+-
+-       ret = 0;
+-      cleanup:
+-       _gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
+-       _gnutls_free_temp_key_datum(&premaster_secret);
+-
+-       return ret;
++       return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.14.bb b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.14.bb
index 51578b4b3b..a1451daf2c 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.14.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.14.bb
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 SUMMARY = "GNU Transport Layer Security Library"
-HOMEPAGE = "http://www.gnu.org/software/gnutls/"
+DESCRIPTION = "a secure communications library implementing the SSL, \
+TLS and DTLS protocols and technologies around them."
+HOMEPAGE = "https://gnutls.org/"
 BUGTRACKER = "https://savannah.gnu.org/support/?group=gnutls"
 
 LICENSE = "GPLv3+ & LGPLv2.1+"
@@ -21,6 +23,13 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v${SHRT_VER}/gnutls-${PV}.tar
            file://arm_eabi.patch \
            file://0001-Modied-the-license-to-GPLv2.1-to-keep-with-LICENSE-f.patch \
            file://CVE-2020-24659.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-20231.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-20232.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-2509.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-4209.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-0361.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-5981.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-0553.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5630751adec7025b8ef955af4d141d00d252a985769f51b4059e5affa3d39d63"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/libtasn1/CVE-2021-46848.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/libtasn1/CVE-2021-46848.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9a8ceecbe7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/libtasn1/CVE-2021-46848.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 22fd12b290adea788122044cb58dc9e77754644f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumbhar@mvista.com>
+Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 12:07:50 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2021-46848
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/libtasn1/-/commit/44a700d2051a666235748970c2df047ff207aeb5]
+CVE: CVE-2021-46848
+Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumbhar@mvista.com>
+
+Fix ETYPE_OK off by one array size check.
+---
+ NEWS      | 4 ++++
+ lib/int.h | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
+index f042481..d8f684e 100644
+--- a/NEWS
++++ b/NEWS
+@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
+ GNU Libtasn1 NEWS                                     -*- outline -*-
+ 
++* Noteworthy changes in release ?.? (????-??-??) [?]
++- Fix ETYPE_OK out of bounds read.  Closes: #32.
++- Update gnulib files and various maintenance fixes.
++
+ * Noteworthy changes in release 4.16.0 (released 2020-02-01) [stable]
+ - asn1_decode_simple_ber: added support for constructed definite
+   octet strings. This allows this function decode the whole set of
+diff --git a/lib/int.h b/lib/int.h
+index ea16257..c877282 100644
+--- a/lib/int.h
++++ b/lib/int.h
+@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ typedef struct tag_and_class_st
+ #define ETYPE_TAG(etype) (_asn1_tags[etype].tag)
+ #define ETYPE_CLASS(etype) (_asn1_tags[etype].class)
+ #define ETYPE_OK(etype) (((etype) != ASN1_ETYPE_INVALID && \
+-                          (etype) <= _asn1_tags_size && \
++                          (etype) < _asn1_tags_size && \
+                           _asn1_tags[(etype)].desc != NULL)?1:0)
+ 
+ #define ETYPE_IS_STRING(etype) ((etype == ASN1_ETYPE_GENERALSTRING || \
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/libtasn1_4.16.0.bb b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/libtasn1_4.16.0.bb
index 8337b70241..d2b3c492ec 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/libtasn1_4.16.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnutls/libtasn1_4.16.0.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 SUMMARY = "Library for ASN.1 and DER manipulation"
+DESCRIPTION = "A highly portable C library that encodes and decodes \
+DER/BER data following an ASN.1 schema. "
 HOMEPAGE = "http://www.gnu.org/software/libtasn1/"
 
 LICENSE = "GPLv3+ & LGPLv2.1+"
@@ -10,6 +12,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://doc/COPYING;md5=d32239bcb673463ab874e80d47fae504 \
 
 SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/libtasn1/libtasn1-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://dont-depend-on-help2man.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-46848.patch \
            "
 
 DEPENDS = "bison-native"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gpgme/gpgme/0001-use-closefrom-on-linux-and-glibc-2.34.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gpgme/gpgme/0001-use-closefrom-on-linux-and-glibc-2.34.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1c46684c6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gpgme/gpgme/0001-use-closefrom-on-linux-and-glibc-2.34.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+From adb1d4e5498a19e9d591ac8f42f9ddfdb23a1354 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 Jul 2021 12:33:13 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] use closefrom() on linux and glibc 2.34+
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending
+Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+---
+ src/posix-io.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/posix-io.c b/src/posix-io.c
+index e712ef2..ab8ded9 100644
+--- a/src/posix-io.c
++++ b/src/posix-io.c
+@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ _gpgme_io_spawn (const char *path, char *const argv[], unsigned int flags,
+               if (fd_list[i].fd > fd)
+                 fd = fd_list[i].fd;
+             fd++;
+-#if defined(__sun) || defined(__FreeBSD__)
++#if defined(__sun) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || (defined(__GLIBC__) && __GNUC_PREREQ(2, 34))
+             closefrom (fd);
+             max_fds = fd;
+ #else /*!__sun */
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gpgme/gpgme_1.13.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/gpgme/gpgme_1.13.1.bb
index 6e945d3165..dacc9896e4 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/gpgme/gpgme_1.13.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gpgme/gpgme_1.13.1.bb
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNUPG_MIRROR}/gpgme/${BP}.tar.bz2 \
            file://0006-fix-build-path-issue.patch \
            file://0007-python-Add-variables-to-tests.patch \
            file://0008-do-not-auto-check-var-PYTHON.patch \
-          "
+           file://0001-use-closefrom-on-linux-and-glibc-2.34.patch \
+           "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "198f0a908ec3cd8f0ce9a4f3a4489645"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c4e30b227682374c23cddc7fdb9324a99694d907e79242a25a4deeedb393be46"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/iso-codes/iso-codes_4.4.bb b/meta/recipes-support/iso-codes/iso-codes_4.4.bb
index 4767dea84c..e8210eca9b 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/iso-codes/iso-codes_4.4.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/iso-codes/iso-codes_4.4.bb
@@ -1,11 +1,14 @@
 SUMMARY = "ISO language, territory, currency, script codes and their translations"
+DESCRIPTION = "Provides lists of various ISO standards (e.g. country, \
+language, language scripts, and currency names) in one place, rather \
+than repeated in many programs throughout the system."
 HOMEPAGE = "https://salsa.debian.org/iso-codes-team/iso-codes"
 BUGTRACKER = "https://salsa.debian.org/iso-codes-team/iso-codes/issues"
 
 LICENSE = "LGPLv2.1"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=4fbd65380cdd255951079008b364516c"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://salsa.debian.org/iso-codes-team/iso-codes.git;protocol=http;branch=main;"
+SRC_URI = "git://salsa.debian.org/iso-codes-team/iso-codes.git;protocol=https;branch=main;"
 SRCREV = "38edb926592954b87eb527124da0ec68d2a748f3"
 
 # inherit gettext cannot be used, because it adds gettext-native to BASEDEPENDS which
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/itstool/itstool_2.0.6.bb b/meta/recipes-support/itstool/itstool_2.0.6.bb
index 5f358f463d..54105af5f0 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/itstool/itstool_2.0.6.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/itstool/itstool_2.0.6.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
 SUMMARY = "ITS Tool allows you to translate your XML documents with PO files"
+DESCRIPTION = "It extracts messages from XML files and outputs PO template \
+files, then merges translations from MO files to create translated \
+XML files. It determines what to translate and how to chunk it into \
+messages using the W3C Internationalization Tag Set (ITS). "
 HOMEPAGE = "http://itstool.org/"
 LICENSE = "GPLv3"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=59c57b95fd7d0e9e238ebbc7ad47c5a5"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libassuan/libassuan_2.5.3.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libassuan/libassuan_2.5.3.bb
index 52b4c0f1b9..9ef5074120 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libassuan/libassuan_2.5.3.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libassuan/libassuan_2.5.3.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
 SUMMARY = "IPC library used by GnuPG and GPGME"
+DESCRIPTION = "A small library implementing the so-called Assuan protocol. \
+This protocol is used for IPC between most newer GnuPG components. \
+Both, server and client side functions are provided. "
 HOMEPAGE = "http://www.gnupg.org/related_software/libassuan/"
 BUGTRACKER = "https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/index"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libatomic-ops/libatomic-ops_7.6.10.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libatomic-ops/libatomic-ops_7.6.10.bb
index 7628eedb1b..3089d1f7ff 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libatomic-ops/libatomic-ops_7.6.10.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libatomic-ops/libatomic-ops_7.6.10.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 SUMMARY = "A library for atomic integer operations"
+DESCRIPTION = "Package provides semi-portable access to hardware-provided atomic memory update operations on a number of architectures."
 HOMEPAGE = "https://github.com/ivmai/libatomic_ops/"
 SECTION = "optional"
 PROVIDES += "libatomics-ops"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libbsd/libbsd_0.10.0.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libbsd/libbsd_0.10.0.bb
index 5b32b9af41..58925738cb 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libbsd/libbsd_0.10.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libbsd/libbsd_0.10.0.bb
@@ -29,6 +29,12 @@ HOMEPAGE = "https://libbsd.freedesktop.org/wiki/"
 # License: public-domain-Colin-Plumb
 LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause & BSD-4-Clause & ISC & PD"
 LICENSE_${PN} = "BSD-3-Clause & ISC & PD"
+LICENSE:${PN}-dbg = "BSD-3-Clause & ISC & PD"
+LICENSE:${PN}-dev = "BSD-3-Clause & ISC & PD"
+LICENSE:${PN}-doc = "BSD-3-Clause & BSD-4-Clause & ISC & PD"
+LICENSE:${PN}-locale = "BSD-3-Clause & ISC & PD"
+LICENSE:${PN}-src = "BSD-3-Clause & ISC & PD"
+LICENSE:${PN}-staticdev = "BSD-3-Clause & ISC & PD"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=2120be0173469a06ed185b688e0e1ae0"
 SECTION = "libs"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libcap/files/CVE-2023-2602.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libcap/files/CVE-2023-2602.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ca04d7297a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libcap/files/CVE-2023-2602.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+Backport of:
+
+From bc6b36682f188020ee4770fae1d41bde5b2c97bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 3 May 2023 19:18:36 -0700
+Subject: Correct the check of pthread_create()'s return value.
+
+This function returns a positive number (errno) on error, so the code
+wasn't previously freeing some memory in this situation.
+
+Discussion:
+
+  https://stackoverflow.com/a/3581020/14760867
+
+Credit for finding this bug in libpsx goes to David Gstir of
+X41 D-Sec GmbH (https://x41-dsec.de/) who performed a security
+audit of the libcap source code in April of 2023. The audit
+was sponsored by the Open Source Technology Improvement Fund
+(https://ostif.org/).
+
+Audit ref: LCAP-CR-23-01 (CVE-2023-2602)
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libcap2/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2023-2602.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
+Upstream commit https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git/commit/?id=bc6b36682f188020ee4770fae1d41bde5b2c97bb]
+CVE: CVE-2023-2602
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ psx/psx.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/libcap/psx.c
++++ b/libcap/psx.c
+@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ int psx_pthread_create(pthread_t *thread
+ 
+     psx_wait_for_idle();
+     int ret = pthread_create(thread, attr, start_routine, arg);
+-    if (ret != -1) {
++    if (ret == 0) {
+        psx_do_registration(*thread);
+     }
+     psx_resume_idle();
+@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ int __wrap_pthread_create(pthread_t *thr
+                          void *(*start_routine) (void *), void *arg) {
+     psx_wait_for_idle();
+     int ret = __real_pthread_create(thread, attr, start_routine, arg);
+-    if (ret != -1) {
++    if (ret == 0) {
+        psx_do_registration(*thread);
+     }
+     psx_resume_idle();
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libcap/files/CVE-2023-2603.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libcap/files/CVE-2023-2603.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cf86ac2a46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libcap/files/CVE-2023-2603.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+Backport of:
+
+From 422bec25ae4a1ab03fd4d6f728695ed279173b18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 3 May 2023 19:44:22 -0700
+Subject: Large strings can confuse libcap's internal strdup code.
+
+Avoid something subtle with really long strings: 1073741823 should
+be enough for anybody. This is an improved fix over something attempted
+in libcap-2.55 to address some static analysis findings.
+
+Reviewing the library, cap_proc_root() and cap_launcher_set_chroot()
+are the only two calls where the library is potentially exposed to a
+user controlled string input.
+
+Credit for finding this bug in libcap goes to Richard Weinberger of
+X41 D-Sec GmbH (https://x41-dsec.de/) who performed a security audit
+of the libcap source code in April of 2023. The audit was sponsored
+by the Open Source Technology Improvement Fund (https://ostif.org/).
+
+Audit ref: LCAP-CR-23-02 (CVE-2023-2603)
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libcap2/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2023-2603.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
+Upstream commit https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git/commit/?id=422bec25ae4a1ab03fd4d6f728695ed279173b18]
+CVE: CVE-2023-2603
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ libcap/cap_alloc.c | 12 +++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/libcap/cap_alloc.c
++++ b/libcap/cap_alloc.c
+@@ -76,13 +76,22 @@ cap_t cap_init(void)
+ char *_libcap_strdup(const char *old)
+ {
+     __u32 *raw_data;
++    size_t len;
+ 
+     if (old == NULL) {
+        errno = EINVAL;
+        return NULL;
+     }
+ 
+-    raw_data = malloc( sizeof(__u32) + strlen(old) + 1 );
++    len = strlen(old);
++    if ((len & 0x3fffffff) != len) {
++       _cap_debug("len is too long for libcap to manage");
++       errno = EINVAL;
++       return NULL;
++    }
++    len += sizeof(__u32) + 1;
++
++    raw_data = malloc(len);
+     if (raw_data == NULL) {
+        errno = ENOMEM;
+        return NULL;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libcap/libcap_2.32.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libcap/libcap_2.32.bb
index d78a58f7d2..64d5190aa7 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libcap/libcap_2.32.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libcap/libcap_2.32.bb
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 SUMMARY = "Library for getting/setting POSIX.1e capabilities"
+DESCRIPTION = "A library providing the API to access POSIX capabilities. \
+These allow giving various kinds of specific privileges to individual \
+users, without giving them full root permissions."
 HOMEPAGE = "http://sites.google.com/site/fullycapable/"
-
 # no specific GPL version required
-LICENSE = "BSD | GPLv2"
+LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause | GPLv2"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://License;md5=3f84fd6f29d453a56514cb7e4ead25f1"
 
 DEPENDS = "hostperl-runtime-native gperf-native"
@@ -11,6 +13,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/${BPN}2/${BPN}-${
            file://0001-ensure-the-XATTR_NAME_CAPS-is-defined-when-it-is-use.patch \
            file://0002-tests-do-not-run-target-executables.patch \
            file://0001-tests-do-not-statically-link-a-test.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-2602.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-2603.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "7416119c9fdcfd0e8dd190a432c668e9"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "1005e3d227f2340ad1e3360ef8b69d15e3c72a29c09f4894d7aac038bd26e2be"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libcheck/libcheck_0.14.0.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libcheck/libcheck_0.14.0.bb
index a88f009cdb..57963d83d4 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libcheck/libcheck_0.14.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libcheck/libcheck_0.14.0.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
 SUMMARY  = "Check - unit testing framework for C code"
+DESCRIPTION = "It features a simple interface for defining unit tests, \
+putting little in the way of the developer. Tests are run in a separate \
+address space, so both assertion failures and code errors that cause \
+segmentation faults or other signals can be caught. Test results are \
+reportable in the following: Subunit, TAP, XML, and a generic logging format."
 HOMEPAGE = "https://libcheck.github.io/check/"
 SECTION = "devel"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libcroco/libcroco_0.6.13.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libcroco/libcroco_0.6.13.bb
index a443ff23fe..66ee647ffa 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libcroco/libcroco_0.6.13.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libcroco/libcroco_0.6.13.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
 SUMMARY = "Cascading Style Sheet (CSS) parsing and manipulation toolkit"
+DESCRIPTION = "The Libcroco project is an effort to build a generic \
+Cascading Style Sheet (CSS) parsing and manipulation toolkit that can be \
+used by GNOME applications in need of CSS support."
 HOMEPAGE = "http://www.gnome.org/"
 BUGTRACKER = "https://bugzilla.gnome.org/"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libdaemon/libdaemon_0.14.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libdaemon/libdaemon_0.14.bb
index 070ee1890e..85a30bcac3 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libdaemon/libdaemon_0.14.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libdaemon/libdaemon_0.14.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
 SUMMARY = "Lightweight C library which eases the writing of UNIX daemons"
+DESCRIPTION = "Lightweight daemon framework for OpenBSD. It provides \
+facilities for logging and a signal handler to enable graceful shutdown, \
+as well as file locking to ensure that only a single copy of a given daemon \
+is running at a time."
 SECTION = "libs"
 AUTHOR = "Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>"
 HOMEPAGE = "http://0pointer.de/lennart/projects/libdaemon/"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libevdev/libevdev/determinism.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libevdev/libevdev/determinism.patch
index 33a6076b78..06128a8e7e 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libevdev/libevdev/determinism.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libevdev/libevdev/determinism.patch
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ Sort to remove this inconsistency.
 RP 2020/2/7
 
 Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
-Upstream-Status: Pending
+Submitted: https://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/input-tools/2021-February/001560.html
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/libevdev/libevdev/-/commit/8d70f449892c6f7659e07bb0f06b8347677bb7d8]
 
 Index: a/libevdev/make-event-names.py
 ===================================================================
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libevdev/libevdev_1.8.0.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libevdev/libevdev_1.8.0.bb
index 3523dc0968..fd7dd15c26 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libevdev/libevdev_1.8.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libevdev/libevdev_1.8.0.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
 SUMMARY = "Wrapper library for evdev devices"
+DESCRIPTION = "A library for handling evdev kernel devices. It abstracts \
+the evdev ioctls through type-safe interfaces and provides functions \
+to change the appearance of the device."
 HOMEPAGE = "http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/libevdev/"
 SECTION = "libs"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libevent/libevent/0002-test-regress.h-Increase-default-timeval-tolerance-50.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libevent/libevent/0002-test-regress.h-Increase-default-timeval-tolerance-50.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0b20eda3c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libevent/libevent/0002-test-regress.h-Increase-default-timeval-tolerance-50.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From dff8fd27edb23bc1486809186c6a4fe1f75f2179 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yi Fan Yu <yifan.yu@windriver.com>
+Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2021 22:35:59 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] test/regress.h: Increase default timeval tolerance 50 ms ->
+ 100 ms
+
+The default timeout tolerance is 50 ms,
+which causes intermittent failure in many the
+related tests in arm64 QEMU.
+
+See: https://bugzilla.yoctoproject.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14163
+(The root cause seems to be a heavy load)
+
+Upstream-Status: Submitted [https://github.com/libevent/libevent/pull/1157]
+
+Signed-off-by: Yi Fan Yu <yifan.yu@windriver.com>
+---
+ test/regress.h | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/test/regress.h b/test/regress.h
+index f06a7669..829af4a7 100644
+--- a/test/regress.h
++++ b/test/regress.h
+@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ int test_ai_eq_(const struct evutil_addrinfo *ai, const char *sockaddr_port,
+        tt_int_op(labs(timeval_msec_diff((tv1), (tv2)) - diff), <=, tolerance)
+ 
+ #define test_timeval_diff_eq(tv1, tv2, diff)                           \
+-       test_timeval_diff_leq((tv1), (tv2), (diff), 50)
++       test_timeval_diff_leq((tv1), (tv2), (diff), 100)
+ 
+ long timeval_msec_diff(const struct timeval *start, const struct timeval *end);
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libevent/libevent_2.1.11.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libevent/libevent_2.1.11.bb
index fb186eb89f..75f9979c5b 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libevent/libevent_2.1.11.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libevent/libevent_2.1.11.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
 SUMMARY = "An asynchronous event notification library"
+DESCRIPTION = "A software library that provides asynchronous event \
+notification. The libevent API provides a mechanism to execute a callback \
+function when a specific event occurs on a file descriptor or after a \
+timeout has been reached. libevent also supports callbacks triggered \
+by signals and regular timeouts"
 HOMEPAGE = "http://libevent.org/"
 BUGTRACKER = "https://github.com/libevent/libevent/issues"
 SECTION = "libs"
@@ -10,6 +15,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/libevent/libevent/releases/download/release-${PV}-
            file://Makefile-missing-test-dir.patch \
            file://run-ptest \
            file://0001-test-regress_dns.c-patch-out-tests-that-require-a-wo.patch \
+           file://0002-test-regress.h-Increase-default-timeval-tolerance-50.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "7f35cfe69b82d879111ec0d7b7b1c531"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libexif/libexif_0.6.22.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libexif/libexif_0.6.22.bb
index 3b08dc52be..86d4464253 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libexif/libexif_0.6.22.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libexif/libexif_0.6.22.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
 SUMMARY = "Library for reading extended image information (EXIF) from JPEG files"
+DESCRIPTION = "libexif is a library for parsing, editing, and saving EXIF data. It is \
+intended to replace lots of redundant implementations in command-line \
+utilities and programs with GUIs."
 HOMEPAGE = "https://libexif.github.io/"
 SECTION = "libs"
 LICENSE = "LGPLv2.1"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libfm/libfm-extra_1.3.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libfm/libfm-extra_1.3.1.bb
index 85102a1a3d..8971486715 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libfm/libfm-extra_1.3.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libfm/libfm-extra_1.3.1.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 SUMMARY = "Library for file management"
+DESCRIPTION = "Contains a library and other files required by menu-cache-gen libexec of menu-cache-1.1.0. "
 HOMEPAGE = "http://pcmanfm.sourceforge.net/"
 
 LICENSE = "LGPLv2+"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libfm/libfm_1.3.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libfm/libfm_1.3.1.bb
index 63ae7874b9..b6f9df0c55 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libfm/libfm_1.3.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libfm/libfm_1.3.1.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 SUMMARY = "Library for file management"
+DESCRIPTION = "LibFM provides file management functions built on top of Glib/GIO \
+giving a convenient higher-level API."
 HOMEPAGE = "http://pcmanfm.sourceforge.net/"
 
 LICENSE = "GPLv2+ & LGPLv2+"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/CVE-2021-33560.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/CVE-2021-33560.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bf26486d8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/CVE-2021-33560.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+From e8b7f10be275bcedb5fc05ed4837a89bfd605c61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+Date: Tue, 13 Apr 2021 10:00:00 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] cipher: Hardening ElGamal by introducing exponent blinding
+ too.
+
+* cipher/elgamal.c (do_encrypt): Also do exponent blinding.
+
+--
+
+Base blinding had been introduced with USE_BLINDING.  This patch add
+exponent blinding as well to mitigate side-channel attack on mpi_powm.
+
+GnuPG-bug-id: 5328
+Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2021-33560
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com>
+---
+ cipher/elgamal.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/cipher/elgamal.c b/cipher/elgamal.c
+index 4eb52d62..9835122f 100644
+--- a/cipher/elgamal.c
++++ b/cipher/elgamal.c
+@@ -522,8 +522,9 @@ do_encrypt(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_public_key *pkey )
+ static void
+ decrypt (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, ELG_secret_key *skey )
+ {
+-  gcry_mpi_t t1, t2, r;
++  gcry_mpi_t t1, t2, r, r1, h;
+   unsigned int nbits = mpi_get_nbits (skey->p);
++  gcry_mpi_t x_blind;
+ 
+   mpi_normalize (a);
+   mpi_normalize (b);
+@@ -534,20 +535,33 @@ decrypt (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, ELG_secret_key *skey )
+ 
+   t2 = mpi_snew (nbits);
+   r  = mpi_new (nbits);
++  r1 = mpi_new (nbits);
++  h  = mpi_new (nbits);
++  x_blind = mpi_snew (nbits);
+ 
+   /* We need a random number of about the prime size.  The random
+      number merely needs to be unpredictable; thus we use level 0.  */
+   _gcry_mpi_randomize (r, nbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);
+ 
++  /* Also, exponent blinding: x_blind = x + (p-1)*r1 */
++  _gcry_mpi_randomize (r1, nbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);
++  mpi_set_highbit (r1, nbits - 1);
++  mpi_sub_ui (h, skey->p, 1);
++  mpi_mul (x_blind, h, r1);
++  mpi_add (x_blind, skey->x, x_blind);
++
+   /* t1 = r^x mod p */
+-  mpi_powm (t1, r, skey->x, skey->p);
++  mpi_powm (t1, r, x_blind, skey->p);
+   /* t2 = (a * r)^-x mod p */
+   mpi_mulm (t2, a, r, skey->p);
+-  mpi_powm (t2, t2, skey->x, skey->p);
++  mpi_powm (t2, t2, x_blind, skey->p);
+   mpi_invm (t2, t2, skey->p);
+   /* t1 = (t1 * t2) mod p*/
+   mpi_mulm (t1, t1, t2, skey->p);
+ 
++  mpi_free (x_blind);
++  mpi_free (h);
++  mpi_free (r1);
+   mpi_free (r);
+   mpi_free (t2);
+ 
+-- 
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/CVE-2021-40528.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/CVE-2021-40528.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b3a18bc5aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/CVE-2021-40528.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+From 707c3c5c511ee70ad0e39ec613471f665305fbea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 11:15:07 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] cipher: Fix ElGamal encryption for other implementations.
+
+* cipher/elgamal.c (gen_k): Remove support of smaller K.
+(do_encrypt): Never use smaller K.
+(sign): Folllow the change of gen_k.
+
+--
+
+Cherry-pick master commit of:
+        632d80ef30e13de6926d503aa697f92b5dbfbc5e
+
+This change basically reverts encryption changes in two commits:
+
+        74386120dad6b3da62db37f7044267c8ef34689b
+        78531373a342aeb847950f404343a05e36022065
+
+Use of smaller K for ephemeral key in ElGamal encryption is only good,
+when we can guarantee that recipient's key is generated by our
+implementation (or compatible).
+
+For detail, please see:
+
+    Luca De Feo, Bertram Poettering, Alessandro Sorniotti,
+    "On the (in)security of ElGamal in OpenPGP";
+    in the proceedings of  CCS'2021.
+
+CVE-id: CVE-2021-33560
+GnuPG-bug-id: 5328
+Suggested-by: Luca De Feo, Bertram Poettering, Alessandro Sorniotti
+Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2021-40528
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+---
+ cipher/elgamal.c | 24 ++++++------------------
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/cipher/elgamal.c b/cipher/elgamal.c
+index 4eb52d62..ae7a631e 100644
+--- a/cipher/elgamal.c
++++ b/cipher/elgamal.c
+@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static const char *elg_names[] =
+ 
+ 
+ static int test_keys (ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, int nodie);
+-static gcry_mpi_t gen_k (gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k);
++static gcry_mpi_t gen_k (gcry_mpi_t p);
+ static gcry_err_code_t generate (ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits,
+                                  gcry_mpi_t **factors);
+ static int  check_secret_key (ELG_secret_key *sk);
+@@ -189,11 +189,10 @@ test_keys ( ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, int nodie )
+ 
+ /****************
+  * Generate a random secret exponent k from prime p, so that k is
+- * relatively prime to p-1.  With SMALL_K set, k will be selected for
+- * better encryption performance - this must never be used signing!
++ * relatively prime to p-1.
+  */
+ static gcry_mpi_t
+-gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k )
++gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p )
+ {
+   gcry_mpi_t k = mpi_alloc_secure( 0 );
+   gcry_mpi_t temp = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) );
+@@ -202,18 +201,7 @@ gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k )
+   unsigned int nbits, nbytes;
+   char *rndbuf = NULL;
+ 
+-  if (small_k)
+-    {
+-      /* Using a k much lesser than p is sufficient for encryption and
+-       * it greatly improves the encryption performance.  We use
+-       * Wiener's table and add a large safety margin. */
+-      nbits = wiener_map( orig_nbits ) * 3 / 2;
+-      if( nbits >= orig_nbits )
+-        BUG();
+-    }
+-  else
+-    nbits = orig_nbits;
+-
++  nbits = orig_nbits;
+ 
+   nbytes = (nbits+7)/8;
+   if( DBG_CIPHER )
+@@ -492,7 +480,7 @@ do_encrypt(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_public_key *pkey )
+    * error code.
+    */
+ 
+-  k = gen_k( pkey->p, 1 );
++  k = gen_k( pkey->p );
+   mpi_powm (a, pkey->g, k, pkey->p);
+ 
+   /* b = (y^k * input) mod p
+@@ -594,7 +582,7 @@ sign(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_secret_key *skey )
+     *
+     */
+     mpi_sub_ui(p_1, p_1, 1);
+-    k = gen_k( skey->p, 0 /* no small K ! */ );
++    k = gen_k( skey->p );
+     mpi_powm( a, skey->g, k, skey->p );
+     mpi_mul(t, skey->x, a );
+     mpi_subm(t, input, t, p_1 );
+-- 
+2.30.2
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.5.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.5.bb
index 9fd3b7c8c9..8045bab9ed 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.5.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.5.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
 SUMMARY = "General purpose cryptographic library based on the code from GnuPG"
+DESCRIPTION = "A cryptography library developed as a separated module of GnuPG. \
+It can also be used independently of GnuPG, but depends on its error-reporting \
+library Libgpg-error."
 HOMEPAGE = "http://directory.fsf.org/project/libgcrypt/"
 BUGTRACKER = "https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/index"
 SECTION = "libs"
@@ -25,6 +28,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNUPG_MIRROR}/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://0002-AES-move-look-up-tables-to-.data-section-and-unshare.patch \
            file://0003-GCM-move-look-up-table-to-.data-section-and-unshare-.patch \
            file://determinism.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-33560.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-40528.patch \
 "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "348cc4601ca34307fc6cd6c945467743"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "3b4a2a94cb637eff5bdebbcaf46f4d95c4f25206f459809339cdada0eb577ac3"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libgpg-error/libgpg-error_1.37.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libgpg-error/libgpg-error_1.37.bb
index b9a2b01c20..7b7404b516 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libgpg-error/libgpg-error_1.37.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libgpg-error/libgpg-error_1.37.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 SUMMARY = "Small library that defines common error values for all GnuPG components"
+DESCRIPTION = "Contains common error codes and error handling functions used by GnuPG, Libgcrypt, GPGME and more packages. "
 HOMEPAGE = "http://www.gnupg.org/related_software/libgpg-error/"
 BUGTRACKER = "https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/index"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libical/libical_3.0.7.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libical/libical_3.0.7.bb
index a50473e9ec..170f12b7a9 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libical/libical_3.0.7.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libical/libical_3.0.7.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
 SUMMARY = "iCal and scheduling (RFC 2445, 2446, 2447) library"
+DESCRIPTION = "An Open Source implementation of the iCalendar protocols \
+and protocol data units. The iCalendar specification describes how \
+calendar clients can communicate with calendar servers so users can store \
+their calendar data and arrange meetings with other users. "
 HOMEPAGE = "https://github.com/libical/libical"
 BUGTRACKER = "https://github.com/libical/libical/issues"
 LICENSE = "LGPLv2.1 | MPL-2.0"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libjitterentropy/libjitterentropy_2.2.0.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libjitterentropy/libjitterentropy_2.2.0.bb
index 710ef0172d..841edc6829 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libjitterentropy/libjitterentropy_2.2.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libjitterentropy/libjitterentropy_2.2.0.bb
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=a95aadbdfae7ed812bb2b7b86eb5981c \
                     file://COPYING.gplv2;md5=eb723b61539feef013de476e68b5c50a \
                     file://COPYING.bsd;md5=66a5cedaf62c4b2637025f049f9b826f \
                     "
-SRC_URI = "git://github.com/smuellerDD/jitterentropy-library.git \
+SRC_URI = "git://github.com/smuellerDD/jitterentropy-library.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
            file://0001-Makefile-cleanup-install-for-rebuilds.patch \
            file://0001-Make-man-pages-reproducible.patch"
 SRCREV = "933a44f33ed3d6612f7cfaa7ad1207c8da4886ba"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libksba/libksba/CVE-2022-3515.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libksba/libksba/CVE-2022-3515.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ff9f2f9275
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libksba/libksba/CVE-2022-3515.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 4b7d9cd4a018898d7714ce06f3faf2626c14582b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Wed, 5 Oct 2022 14:19:06 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Detect a possible overflow directly in the TLV parser.
+
+* src/ber-help.c (_ksba_ber_read_tl): Check for overflow of a commonly
+used sum.
+--
+
+It is quite common to have checks like
+
+    if (ti.nhdr + ti.length >= DIM(tmpbuf))
+       return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
+
+This patch detects possible integer overflows immmediately when
+creating the TI object.
+
+Reported-by: ZDI-CAN-18927, ZDI-CAN-18928, ZDI-CAN-18929
+
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libksba.git;a=patch;h=4b7d9cd4a018898d7714ce06f3faf2626c14582b]
+CVE: CVE-2022-3515 
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ src/ber-help.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/ber-help.c b/src/ber-help.c
+index 81c31ed..56efb6a 100644
+--- a/src/ber-help.c
++++ b/src/ber-help.c
+@@ -182,6 +182,12 @@ _ksba_ber_read_tl (ksba_reader_t reader, struct tag_info *ti)
+       ti->length = len;
+     }
+ 
++  if (ti->length > ti->nhdr && (ti->nhdr + ti->length) < ti->length)
++    {
++      ti->err_string = "header+length would overflow";
++      return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOVERFLOW);
++    }
++
+   /* Without this kludge some example certs can't be parsed */
+   if (ti->class == CLASS_UNIVERSAL && !ti->tag)
+     ti->length = 0;
+-- 
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libksba/libksba/CVE-2022-47629.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libksba/libksba/CVE-2022-47629.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b09d0eb557
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libksba/libksba/CVE-2022-47629.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+From b17444b3c47e32c77a3ba5335ae30ccbadcba3cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2022 16:36:46 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix an integer overflow in the CRL signature parser.
+
+* src/crl.c (parse_signature): N+N2 now checked for overflow.
+
+* src/ocsp.c (parse_response_extensions): Do not accept too large
+values.
+(parse_single_extensions): Ditto.
+--
+
+The second patch is an extra safegourd not related to the reported
+bug.
+
+GnuPG-bug-id: 6284
+Reported-by: Joseph Surin, elttam
+CVE: CVE-2022-47629
+https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libksba.git;a=commit;h=f61a5ea4e0f6a80fd4b28ef0174bee77793cf070
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ src/crl.c  |  2 +-
+ src/ocsp.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/crl.c b/src/crl.c
+index 87a3fa3..9d3028e 100644
+--- a/src/crl.c
++++ b/src/crl.c
+@@ -1434,7 +1434,7 @@ parse_signature (ksba_crl_t crl)
+          && !ti.is_constructed) )
+     return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CRL_OBJ);
+   n2 = ti.nhdr + ti.length;
+-  if (n + n2 >= DIM(tmpbuf))
++  if (n + n2 >= DIM(tmpbuf) || (n + n2) < n)
+     return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
+   memcpy (tmpbuf+n, ti.buf, ti.nhdr);
+   err = read_buffer (crl->reader, tmpbuf+n+ti.nhdr, ti.length);
+diff --git a/src/ocsp.c b/src/ocsp.c
+index 4b26f8d..c41234e 100644
+--- a/src/ocsp.c
++++ b/src/ocsp.c
+@@ -912,6 +912,12 @@ parse_response_extensions (ksba_ocsp_t ocsp,
+           else
+             ocsp->good_nonce = 1;
+         }
++      if (ti.length > (1<<24))
++        {
++          /* Bail out on much too large objects.  */
++          err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_BER);
++          goto leave;
++        }
+       ex = xtrymalloc (sizeof *ex + strlen (oid) + ti.length);
+       if (!ex)
+         {
+@@ -979,6 +985,12 @@ parse_single_extensions (struct ocsp_reqitem_s *ri,
+       err = parse_octet_string (&data, &datalen, &ti);
+       if (err)
+         goto leave;
++      if (ti.length > (1<<24))
++        {
++          /* Bail out on much too large objects.  */
++          err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_BER);
++          goto leave;
++        }
+       ex = xtrymalloc (sizeof *ex + strlen (oid) + ti.length);
+       if (!ex)
+         {
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libksba/libksba_1.3.5.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libksba/libksba_1.3.5.bb
index 336d7f8177..5293aa91e1 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libksba/libksba_1.3.5.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libksba/libksba_1.3.5.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
 SUMMARY = "Easy API to create and parse X.509 and CMS related objects"
+DESCRIPTION = "A library to make the tasks of working with X.509 certificates, \
+CMS data and related objects more easy. It provides a highlevel interface to \
+the implemented protocols and presents the data in a consistent way. The \
+library does not rely on another cryptographic library but provides \
+hooks for easy integration with Libgcrypt. "
 HOMEPAGE = "http://www.gnupg.org/related_software/libksba/"
 LICENSE = "GPLv3+ & (GPLv2+ | LGPLv3+)"
 LICENSE_${PN} = "GPLv2+ | LGPLv3+"
@@ -17,7 +22,10 @@ inherit autotools binconfig-disabled pkgconfig texinfo
 
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://gnupg.org/download/index.html"
 SRC_URI = "${GNUPG_MIRROR}/${BPN}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
-           file://ksba-add-pkgconfig-support.patch"
+           file://ksba-add-pkgconfig-support.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-47629.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-3515.patch \
+"
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "8302a3e263a7c630aa7dea7d341f07a2"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "41444fd7a6ff73a79ad9728f985e71c9ba8cd3e5e53358e70d5f066d35c1a340"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl_3.5.0.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl_3.5.0.bb
index 9d0e1441a9..f4b5d40bb2 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl_3.5.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl_3.5.0.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
 SUMMARY = "A library for applications dealing with netlink sockets"
+DESCRIPTION = "The libnl suite is a collection of libraries providing \
+APIs to netlink protocol based Linux kernel interfaces. libnl is the core \
+library implementing the fundamentals required to use the netlink protocol \
+such as socket handling, message construction and parsing, and sending \
+and receiving of data."
 HOMEPAGE = "http://www.infradead.org/~tgr/libnl/"
 SECTION = "libs/network"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre/fix-pcre-name-collision.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre/fix-pcre-name-collision.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 89b44f6aa6..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre/fix-pcre-name-collision.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [debian patch]
-
-This patch address a namespace collision with libc.
-
-Although there is no "#include <regex.h>" in the source file, at
-runtime, it's unintentionally linked to the libc version, the regcomp of
-libc is called instead the pcre one using pcre's data structure...
-that looks like a disaster.
-
-Can patch is from Debian (and Ubuntu 11.04alpha has it also).
-
-[sgw: added patch comment]
-Signed-off-by: Qing He <qing.he@intel.com>
-Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com>
-
---- a/pcreposix.h       2010-05-17 00:17:23.000000000 +0800
-+++ b/pcreposix.h       2009-01-15 04:32:17.000000000 +0800
-@@ -133,14 +130,19 @@
- 
- /* The functions */
- 
--PCREPOSIX_EXP_DECL int regcomp(regex_t *, const char *, int);
--PCREPOSIX_EXP_DECL int regexec(const regex_t *, const char *, size_t,
-+PCREPOSIX_EXP_DECL int pcreposix_regcomp(regex_t *, const char *, int);
-+PCREPOSIX_EXP_DECL int pcreposix_regexec(const regex_t *, const char *, size_t,
-                      regmatch_t *, int);
--PCREPOSIX_EXP_DECL size_t regerror(int, const regex_t *, char *, size_t);
--PCREPOSIX_EXP_DECL void regfree(regex_t *);
-+PCREPOSIX_EXP_DECL size_t pcreposix_regerror(int, const regex_t *, char *, size_t);
-+PCREPOSIX_EXP_DECL void pcreposix_regfree(regex_t *);
- 
- #ifdef __cplusplus
- }   /* extern "C" */
- #endif
- 
-+#define regcomp pcreposix_regcomp
-+#define regexec pcreposix_regexec
-+#define regerror pcreposix_regerror
-+#define regfree pcreposix_regfree
-+
- #endif /* End of pcreposix.h */
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2022-1586-regression.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2022-1586-regression.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..42ee417fe7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2022-1586-regression.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 5d1e62b0155292b994aa1c96d4ed8ce4346ef4c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zoltan Herczeg <hzmester@freemail.hu>
+Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2022 05:34:42 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix incorrect value reading in JIT.
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-1586
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/commit/d4fa336fbcc3]
+
+(cherry picked from commit d4fa336fbcc388f89095b184ba6d99422cfc676c)
+Signed-off-by: Shinu Chandran <shinucha@cisco.com>
+---
+ src/pcre2_jit_compile.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c b/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c
+index 493c96d..fa57942 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c
++++ b/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c
+@@ -7188,7 +7188,7 @@ while (*cc != XCL_END)
+     {
+     SLJIT_ASSERT(*cc == XCL_PROP || *cc == XCL_NOTPROP);
+     cc++;
+-    if (*cc == PT_CLIST && *cc == XCL_PROP)
++    if (*cc == PT_CLIST && cc[-1] == XCL_PROP)
+       {
+       other_cases = PRIV(ucd_caseless_sets) + cc[1];
+       while (*other_cases != NOTACHAR)
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2022-1586.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2022-1586.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fbbbc9ca77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2022-1586.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From 233c4248550d0c1d9bfee42198d5ee0855b7d413 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Mon, 23 May 2022 13:52:39 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-1586
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/commit/50a51cb7e67268e6ad417eb07c9de9bfea5cc55a
+
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ ChangeLog               | 3 +++
+ src/pcre2_jit_compile.c | 2 +-
+ src/pcre2_jit_test.c    | 4 ++++
+ 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+index 0926c29..b5d72dc 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog
++++ b/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
+ Change Log for PCRE2
+ --------------------
+ 
++23. Fixed a unicode properrty matching issue in JIT. The character was not
++fully read in caseless matching.
++
+ 
+ Version 10.34 21-November-2019
+ ------------------------------
+diff --git a/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c b/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c
+index f564127..5d43865 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c
++++ b/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c
+@@ -7119,7 +7119,7 @@ while (*cc != XCL_END)
+     {
+     SLJIT_ASSERT(*cc == XCL_PROP || *cc == XCL_NOTPROP);
+     cc++;
+-    if (*cc == PT_CLIST)
++    if (*cc == PT_CLIST && *cc == XCL_PROP)
+       {
+       other_cases = PRIV(ucd_caseless_sets) + cc[1];
+       while (*other_cases != NOTACHAR)
+diff --git a/src/pcre2_jit_test.c b/src/pcre2_jit_test.c
+index a9b3880..9df87fd 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2_jit_test.c
++++ b/src/pcre2_jit_test.c
+@@ -408,6 +408,10 @@ static struct regression_test_case regression_test_cases[] = {
+        { MUP, A, 0, 0 | F_PROPERTY, "[\xc3\xa2-\xc3\xa6\xc3\x81-\xc3\x84\xe2\x80\xa8-\xe2\x80\xa9\xe6\x92\xad\\p{Zs}]{2,}", "\xe2\x80\xa7\xe2\x80\xa9\xe6\x92\xad \xe6\x92\xae" },
+        { MUP, A, 0, 0 | F_PROPERTY, "[\\P{L&}]{2}[^\xc2\x85-\xc2\x89\\p{Ll}\\p{Lu}]{2}", "\xc3\xa9\xe6\x92\xad.a\xe6\x92\xad|\xc2\x8a#" },
+        { PCRE2_UCP, 0, 0, 0 | F_PROPERTY, "[a-b\\s]{2,5}[^a]", "AB  baaa" },
++       { MUP, 0, 0, 0 | F_NOMATCH, "[^\\p{Hangul}\\p{Z}]", " " },
++       { MUP, 0, 0, 0, "[\\p{Lu}\\P{Latin}]+", "c\xEA\xA4\xAE,A,b" },
++       { MUP, 0, 0, 0, "[\\x{a92e}\\p{Lu}\\P{Latin}]+", "c\xEA\xA4\xAE,A,b" },
++       { CMUP, 0, 0, 0, "[^S]\\B", "\xe2\x80\x8a" },
+ 
+        /* Possible empty brackets. */
+        { MU, A, 0, 0, "(?:|ab||bc|a)+d", "abcxabcabd" },
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2022-1587.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2022-1587.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..70f9f9f079
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2022-1587.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,660 @@
+From aa5aac0d209e3debf80fc2db924d9401fc50454b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Mon, 23 May 2022 14:11:11 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-1587
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/commit/03654e751e7f0700693526b67dfcadda6b42c9d0]
+CVE: CVE-2022-1587
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ ChangeLog               |   3 +
+ src/pcre2_jit_compile.c | 290 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ src/pcre2_jit_test.c    |   1 +
+ 3 files changed, 194 insertions(+), 100 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+index b5d72dc..de82de9 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog
++++ b/ChangeLog
+@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ Change Log for PCRE2
+ 23. Fixed a unicode properrty matching issue in JIT. The character was not
+ fully read in caseless matching.
+ 
++24. Fixed an issue affecting recursions in JIT caused by duplicated data
++transfers.
++
+ 
+ Version 10.34 21-November-2019
+ ------------------------------
+diff --git a/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c b/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c
+index 5d43865..493c96d 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c
++++ b/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c
+@@ -407,6 +407,9 @@ typedef struct compiler_common {
+   /* Locals used by fast fail optimization. */
+   sljit_s32 fast_fail_start_ptr;
+   sljit_s32 fast_fail_end_ptr;
++  /* Variables used by recursive call generator. */
++  sljit_s32 recurse_bitset_size;
++  uint8_t *recurse_bitset;
+ 
+   /* Flipped and lower case tables. */
+   const sljit_u8 *fcc;
+@@ -2109,19 +2112,39 @@ for (i = 0; i < RECURSE_TMP_REG_COUNT; i++)
+ 
+ #undef RECURSE_TMP_REG_COUNT
+ 
++static BOOL recurse_check_bit(compiler_common *common, sljit_sw bit_index)
++{
++uint8_t *byte;
++uint8_t mask;
++
++SLJIT_ASSERT((bit_index & (sizeof(sljit_sw) - 1)) == 0);
++
++bit_index >>= SLJIT_WORD_SHIFT;
++
++mask = 1 << (bit_index & 0x7);
++byte = common->recurse_bitset + (bit_index >> 3);
++
++if (*byte & mask)
++  return FALSE;
++
++*byte |= mask;
++return TRUE;
++}
++
+ static int get_recurse_data_length(compiler_common *common, PCRE2_SPTR cc, PCRE2_SPTR ccend,
+   BOOL *needs_control_head, BOOL *has_quit, BOOL *has_accept)
+ {
+ int length = 1;
+-int size;
++int size, offset;
+ PCRE2_SPTR alternative;
+ BOOL quit_found = FALSE;
+ BOOL accept_found = FALSE;
+ BOOL setsom_found = FALSE;
+ BOOL setmark_found = FALSE;
+-BOOL capture_last_found = FALSE;
+ BOOL control_head_found = FALSE;
+ 
++memset(common->recurse_bitset, 0, common->recurse_bitset_size);
++
+ #if defined DEBUG_FORCE_CONTROL_HEAD && DEBUG_FORCE_CONTROL_HEAD
+ SLJIT_ASSERT(common->control_head_ptr != 0);
+ control_head_found = TRUE;
+@@ -2144,15 +2167,17 @@ while (cc < ccend)
+       setsom_found = TRUE;
+     if (common->mark_ptr != 0)
+       setmark_found = TRUE;
+-    if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0)
+-      capture_last_found = TRUE;
++    if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, common->capture_last_ptr))
++      length++;
+     cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE;
+     break;
+ 
+     case OP_KET:
+-    if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0)
++    offset = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
++    if (offset != 0)
+       {
+-      length++;
++      if (recurse_check_bit(common, offset))
++        length++;
+       SLJIT_ASSERT(PRIVATE_DATA(cc + 1) != 0);
+       cc += PRIVATE_DATA(cc + 1);
+       }
+@@ -2169,39 +2194,55 @@ while (cc < ccend)
+     case OP_SBRA:
+     case OP_SBRAPOS:
+     case OP_SCOND:
+-    length++;
+     SLJIT_ASSERT(PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0);
++    if (recurse_check_bit(common, PRIVATE_DATA(cc)))
++      length++;
+     cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE;
+     break;
+ 
+     case OP_CBRA:
+     case OP_SCBRA:
+-    length += 2;
+-    if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0)
+-      capture_last_found = TRUE;
+-    if (common->optimized_cbracket[GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE)] == 0)
++    offset = GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE);
++    if (recurse_check_bit(common, OVECTOR(offset << 1)))
++      {
++      SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, OVECTOR((offset << 1) + 1)));
++      length += 2;
++      }
++    if (common->optimized_cbracket[offset] == 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, OVECTOR_PRIV(offset)))
++      length++;
++    if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, common->capture_last_ptr))
+       length++;
+     cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE + IMM2_SIZE;
+     break;
+ 
+     case OP_CBRAPOS:
+     case OP_SCBRAPOS:
+-    length += 2 + 2;
+-    if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0)
+-      capture_last_found = TRUE;
++    offset = GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE);
++    if (recurse_check_bit(common, OVECTOR(offset << 1)))
++      {
++      SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, OVECTOR((offset << 1) + 1)));
++      length += 2;
++      }
++    if (recurse_check_bit(common, OVECTOR_PRIV(offset)))
++      length++;
++    if (recurse_check_bit(common, PRIVATE_DATA(cc)))
++      length++;
++    if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, common->capture_last_ptr))
++      length++;
+     cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE + IMM2_SIZE;
+     break;
+ 
+     case OP_COND:
+     /* Might be a hidden SCOND. */
+     alternative = cc + GET(cc, 1);
+-    if (*alternative == OP_KETRMAX || *alternative == OP_KETRMIN)
++    if ((*alternative == OP_KETRMAX || *alternative == OP_KETRMIN) && recurse_check_bit(common, PRIVATE_DATA(cc)))
+       length++;
+     cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE;
+     break;
+ 
+     CASE_ITERATOR_PRIVATE_DATA_1
+-    if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0)
++    offset = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
++    if (offset != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, offset))
+       length++;
+     cc += 2;
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_UNICODE
+@@ -2210,8 +2251,12 @@ while (cc < ccend)
+     break;
+ 
+     CASE_ITERATOR_PRIVATE_DATA_2A
+-    if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0)
++    offset = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
++    if (offset != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, offset))
++      {
++      SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, offset + sizeof(sljit_sw)));
+       length += 2;
++      }
+     cc += 2;
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_UNICODE
+     if (common->utf && HAS_EXTRALEN(cc[-1])) cc += GET_EXTRALEN(cc[-1]);
+@@ -2219,8 +2264,12 @@ while (cc < ccend)
+     break;
+ 
+     CASE_ITERATOR_PRIVATE_DATA_2B
+-    if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0)
++    offset = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
++    if (offset != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, offset))
++      {
++      SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, offset + sizeof(sljit_sw)));
+       length += 2;
++      }
+     cc += 2 + IMM2_SIZE;
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_UNICODE
+     if (common->utf && HAS_EXTRALEN(cc[-1])) cc += GET_EXTRALEN(cc[-1]);
+@@ -2228,20 +2277,29 @@ while (cc < ccend)
+     break;
+ 
+     CASE_ITERATOR_TYPE_PRIVATE_DATA_1
+-    if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0)
++    offset = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
++    if (offset != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, offset))
+       length++;
+     cc += 1;
+     break;
+ 
+     CASE_ITERATOR_TYPE_PRIVATE_DATA_2A
+-    if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0)
++    offset = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
++    if (offset != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, offset))
++      {
++      SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, offset + sizeof(sljit_sw)));
+       length += 2;
++      }
+     cc += 1;
+     break;
+ 
+     CASE_ITERATOR_TYPE_PRIVATE_DATA_2B
+-    if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0)
++    offset = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
++    if (offset != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, offset))
++      {
++      SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, offset + sizeof(sljit_sw)));
+       length += 2;
++      }
+     cc += 1 + IMM2_SIZE;
+     break;
+ 
+@@ -2253,7 +2311,9 @@ while (cc < ccend)
+ #else
+     size = 1 + 32 / (int)sizeof(PCRE2_UCHAR);
+ #endif
+-    if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0)
++
++    offset = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
++    if (offset != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, offset))
+       length += get_class_iterator_size(cc + size);
+     cc += size;
+     break;
+@@ -2288,8 +2348,7 @@ while (cc < ccend)
+     case OP_THEN:
+     SLJIT_ASSERT(common->control_head_ptr != 0);
+     quit_found = TRUE;
+-    if (!control_head_found)
+-      control_head_found = TRUE;
++    control_head_found = TRUE;
+     cc++;
+     break;
+ 
+@@ -2309,8 +2368,6 @@ SLJIT_ASSERT(cc == ccend);
+ 
+ if (control_head_found)
+   length++;
+-if (capture_last_found)
+-  length++;
+ if (quit_found)
+   {
+   if (setsom_found)
+@@ -2343,14 +2400,12 @@ sljit_sw shared_srcw[3];
+ sljit_sw kept_shared_srcw[2];
+ int private_count, shared_count, kept_shared_count;
+ int from_sp, base_reg, offset, i;
+-BOOL setsom_found = FALSE;
+-BOOL setmark_found = FALSE;
+-BOOL capture_last_found = FALSE;
+-BOOL control_head_found = FALSE;
++
++memset(common->recurse_bitset, 0, common->recurse_bitset_size);
+ 
+ #if defined DEBUG_FORCE_CONTROL_HEAD && DEBUG_FORCE_CONTROL_HEAD
+ SLJIT_ASSERT(common->control_head_ptr != 0);
+-control_head_found = TRUE;
++recurse_check_bit(common, common->control_head_ptr);
+ #endif
+ 
+ switch (type)
+@@ -2438,11 +2493,10 @@ while (cc < ccend)
+     {
+     case OP_SET_SOM:
+     SLJIT_ASSERT(common->has_set_som);
+-    if (has_quit && !setsom_found)
++    if (has_quit && recurse_check_bit(common, OVECTOR(0)))
+       {
+       kept_shared_srcw[0] = OVECTOR(0);
+       kept_shared_count = 1;
+-      setsom_found = TRUE;
+       }
+     cc += 1;
+     break;
+@@ -2450,33 +2504,31 @@ while (cc < ccend)
+     case OP_RECURSE:
+     if (has_quit)
+       {
+-      if (common->has_set_som && !setsom_found)
++      if (common->has_set_som && recurse_check_bit(common, OVECTOR(0)))
+         {
+         kept_shared_srcw[0] = OVECTOR(0);
+         kept_shared_count = 1;
+-        setsom_found = TRUE;
+         }
+-      if (common->mark_ptr != 0 && !setmark_found)
++      if (common->mark_ptr != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, common->mark_ptr))
+         {
+         kept_shared_srcw[kept_shared_count] = common->mark_ptr;
+         kept_shared_count++;
+-        setmark_found = TRUE;
+         }
+       }
+-    if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0 && !capture_last_found)
++    if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, common->capture_last_ptr))
+       {
+       shared_srcw[0] = common->capture_last_ptr;
+       shared_count = 1;
+-      capture_last_found = TRUE;
+       }
+     cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE;
+     break;
+ 
+     case OP_KET:
+-    if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0)
++    private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
++    if (private_srcw[0] != 0)
+       {
+-      private_count = 1;
+-      private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
++      if (recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0]))
++        private_count = 1;
+       SLJIT_ASSERT(PRIVATE_DATA(cc + 1) != 0);
+       cc += PRIVATE_DATA(cc + 1);
+       }
+@@ -2493,50 +2545,66 @@ while (cc < ccend)
+     case OP_SBRA:
+     case OP_SBRAPOS:
+     case OP_SCOND:
+-    private_count = 1;
+     private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
++    if (recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0]))
++      private_count = 1;
+     cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE;
+     break;
+ 
+     case OP_CBRA:
+     case OP_SCBRA:
+-    offset = (GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE)) << 1;
+-    shared_srcw[0] = OVECTOR(offset);
+-    shared_srcw[1] = OVECTOR(offset + 1);
+-    shared_count = 2;
++    offset = GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE);
++    shared_srcw[0] = OVECTOR(offset << 1);
++    if (recurse_check_bit(common, shared_srcw[0]))
++      {
++      shared_srcw[1] = shared_srcw[0] + sizeof(sljit_sw);
++      SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, shared_srcw[1]));
++      shared_count = 2;
++      }
+ 
+-    if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0 && !capture_last_found)
++    if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, common->capture_last_ptr))
+       {
+-      shared_srcw[2] = common->capture_last_ptr;
+-      shared_count = 3;
+-      capture_last_found = TRUE;
++      shared_srcw[shared_count] = common->capture_last_ptr;
++      shared_count++;
+       }
+ 
+-    if (common->optimized_cbracket[GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE)] == 0)
++    if (common->optimized_cbracket[offset] == 0)
+       {
+-      private_count = 1;
+-      private_srcw[0] = OVECTOR_PRIV(GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE));
++      private_srcw[0] = OVECTOR_PRIV(offset);
++      if (recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0]))
++        private_count = 1;
+       }
++
+     cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE + IMM2_SIZE;
+     break;
+ 
+     case OP_CBRAPOS:
+     case OP_SCBRAPOS:
+-    offset = (GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE)) << 1;
+-    shared_srcw[0] = OVECTOR(offset);
+-    shared_srcw[1] = OVECTOR(offset + 1);
+-    shared_count = 2;
++    offset = GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE);
++    shared_srcw[0] = OVECTOR(offset << 1);
++    if (recurse_check_bit(common, shared_srcw[0]))
++      {
++      shared_srcw[1] = shared_srcw[0] + sizeof(sljit_sw);
++      SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, shared_srcw[1]));
++      shared_count = 2;
++      }
+ 
+-    if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0 && !capture_last_found)
++    if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, common->capture_last_ptr))
+       {
+-      shared_srcw[2] = common->capture_last_ptr;
+-      shared_count = 3;
+-      capture_last_found = TRUE;
++      shared_srcw[shared_count] = common->capture_last_ptr;
++      shared_count++;
+       }
+ 
+-    private_count = 2;
+     private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
+-    private_srcw[1] = OVECTOR_PRIV(GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE));
++    if (recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0]))
++      private_count = 1;
++
++    offset = OVECTOR_PRIV(offset);
++    if (recurse_check_bit(common, offset))
++      {
++      private_srcw[private_count] = offset;
++      private_count++;
++      }
+     cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE + IMM2_SIZE;
+     break;
+ 
+@@ -2545,18 +2613,17 @@ while (cc < ccend)
+     alternative = cc + GET(cc, 1);
+     if (*alternative == OP_KETRMAX || *alternative == OP_KETRMIN)
+       {
+-      private_count = 1;
+       private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
++      if (recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0]))
++        private_count = 1;
+       }
+     cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE;
+     break;
+ 
+     CASE_ITERATOR_PRIVATE_DATA_1
+-    if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc))
+-      {
++    private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
++    if (private_srcw[0] != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0]))
+       private_count = 1;
+-      private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
+-      }
+     cc += 2;
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_UNICODE
+     if (common->utf && HAS_EXTRALEN(cc[-1])) cc += GET_EXTRALEN(cc[-1]);
+@@ -2564,11 +2631,12 @@ while (cc < ccend)
+     break;
+ 
+     CASE_ITERATOR_PRIVATE_DATA_2A
+-    if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc))
++    private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
++    if (private_srcw[0] != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0]))
+       {
+       private_count = 2;
+-      private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
+-      private_srcw[1] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc) + sizeof(sljit_sw);
++      private_srcw[1] = private_srcw[0] + sizeof(sljit_sw);
++      SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[1]));
+       }
+     cc += 2;
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_UNICODE
+@@ -2577,11 +2645,12 @@ while (cc < ccend)
+     break;
+ 
+     CASE_ITERATOR_PRIVATE_DATA_2B
+-    if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc))
++    private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
++    if (private_srcw[0] != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0]))
+       {
+       private_count = 2;
+-      private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
+-      private_srcw[1] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc) + sizeof(sljit_sw);
++      private_srcw[1] = private_srcw[0] + sizeof(sljit_sw);
++      SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[1]));
+       }
+     cc += 2 + IMM2_SIZE;
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_UNICODE
+@@ -2590,30 +2659,30 @@ while (cc < ccend)
+     break;
+ 
+     CASE_ITERATOR_TYPE_PRIVATE_DATA_1
+-    if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc))
+-      {
++    private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
++    if (private_srcw[0] != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0]))
+       private_count = 1;
+-      private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
+-      }
+     cc += 1;
+     break;
+ 
+     CASE_ITERATOR_TYPE_PRIVATE_DATA_2A
+-    if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc))
++    private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
++    if (private_srcw[0] != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0]))
+       {
+       private_count = 2;
+-      private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
+       private_srcw[1] = private_srcw[0] + sizeof(sljit_sw);
++      SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[1]));
+       }
+     cc += 1;
+     break;
+ 
+     CASE_ITERATOR_TYPE_PRIVATE_DATA_2B
+-    if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc))
++    private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
++    if (private_srcw[0] != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0]))
+       {
+       private_count = 2;
+-      private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
+       private_srcw[1] = private_srcw[0] + sizeof(sljit_sw);
++      SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[1]));
+       }
+     cc += 1 + IMM2_SIZE;
+     break;
+@@ -2630,14 +2699,17 @@ while (cc < ccend)
+       switch(get_class_iterator_size(cc + i))
+         {
+         case 1:
+-        private_count = 1;
+         private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
+         break;
+ 
+         case 2:
+-        private_count = 2;
+         private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc);
+-        private_srcw[1] = private_srcw[0] + sizeof(sljit_sw);
++        if (recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0]))
++          {
++          private_count = 2;
++          private_srcw[1] = private_srcw[0] + sizeof(sljit_sw);
++          SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[1]));
++          }
+         break;
+ 
+         default:
+@@ -2652,28 +2724,25 @@ while (cc < ccend)
+     case OP_PRUNE_ARG:
+     case OP_THEN_ARG:
+     SLJIT_ASSERT(common->mark_ptr != 0);
+-    if (has_quit && !setmark_found)
++    if (has_quit && recurse_check_bit(common, common->mark_ptr))
+       {
+       kept_shared_srcw[0] = common->mark_ptr;
+       kept_shared_count = 1;
+-      setmark_found = TRUE;
+       }
+-    if (common->control_head_ptr != 0 && !control_head_found)
++    if (common->control_head_ptr != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, common->control_head_ptr))
+       {
+       shared_srcw[0] = common->control_head_ptr;
+       shared_count = 1;
+-      control_head_found = TRUE;
+       }
+     cc += 1 + 2 + cc[1];
+     break;
+ 
+     case OP_THEN:
+     SLJIT_ASSERT(common->control_head_ptr != 0);
+-    if (!control_head_found)
++    if (recurse_check_bit(common, common->control_head_ptr))
+       {
+       shared_srcw[0] = common->control_head_ptr;
+       shared_count = 1;
+-      control_head_found = TRUE;
+       }
+     cc++;
+     break;
+@@ -2681,7 +2750,7 @@ while (cc < ccend)
+     default:
+     cc = next_opcode(common, cc);
+     SLJIT_ASSERT(cc != NULL);
+-    break;
++    continue;
+     }
+ 
+   if (type != recurse_copy_shared_to_global && type != recurse_copy_kept_shared_to_global)
+@@ -13262,7 +13331,7 @@ SLJIT_ASSERT(!(common->req_char_ptr != 0 && common->start_used_ptr != 0));
+ common->cbra_ptr = OVECTOR_START + (re->top_bracket + 1) * 2 * sizeof(sljit_sw);
+ 
+ total_length = ccend - common->start;
+-common->private_data_ptrs = (sljit_s32 *)SLJIT_MALLOC(total_length * (sizeof(sljit_s32) + (common->has_then ? 1 : 0)), allocator_data);
++common->private_data_ptrs = (sljit_s32*)SLJIT_MALLOC(total_length * (sizeof(sljit_s32) + (common->has_then ? 1 : 0)), allocator_data);
+ if (!common->private_data_ptrs)
+   {
+   SLJIT_FREE(common->optimized_cbracket, allocator_data);
+@@ -13304,6 +13373,7 @@ if (!compiler)
+ common->compiler = compiler;
+ 
+ /* Main pcre_jit_exec entry. */
++LJIT_ASSERT((private_data_size & (sizeof(sljit_sw) - 1)) == 0);
+ sljit_emit_enter(compiler, 0, SLJIT_ARG1(SW), 5, 5, 0, 0, private_data_size);
+ 
+ /* Register init. */
+@@ -13524,20 +13594,40 @@ common->fast_fail_end_ptr = 0;
+ common->currententry = common->entries;
+ common->local_quit_available = TRUE;
+ quit_label = common->quit_label;
+-while (common->currententry != NULL)
++if (common->currententry != NULL)
+   {
+-  /* Might add new entries. */
+-  compile_recurse(common);
+-  if (SLJIT_UNLIKELY(sljit_get_compiler_error(compiler)))
++  /* A free bit for each private data. */
++  common->recurse_bitset_size = ((private_data_size / (int)sizeof(sljit_sw)) + 7) >> 3;
++  SLJIT_ASSERT(common->recurse_bitset_size > 0);
++  common->recurse_bitset = (sljit_u8*)SLJIT_MALLOC(common->recurse_bitset_size, allocator_data);;
++
++  if (common->recurse_bitset != NULL)
++    {
++    do
++      {
++      /* Might add new entries. */
++      compile_recurse(common);
++      if (SLJIT_UNLIKELY(sljit_get_compiler_error(compiler)))
++        break;
++      flush_stubs(common);
++      common->currententry = common->currententry->next;
++      }
++    while (common->currententry != NULL);
++
++    SLJIT_FREE(common->recurse_bitset, allocator_data);
++    }
++
++  if (common->currententry != NULL)
+     {
++    /* The common->recurse_bitset has been freed. */
++    SLJIT_ASSERT(sljit_get_compiler_error(compiler) || common->recurse_bitset == NULL);
++
+     sljit_free_compiler(compiler);
+     SLJIT_FREE(common->optimized_cbracket, allocator_data);
+     SLJIT_FREE(common->private_data_ptrs, allocator_data);
+     PRIV(jit_free_rodata)(common->read_only_data_head, allocator_data);
+     return PCRE2_ERROR_NOMEMORY;
+     }
+-  flush_stubs(common);
+-  common->currententry = common->currententry->next;
+   }
+ common->local_quit_available = FALSE;
+ common->quit_label = quit_label;
+diff --git a/src/pcre2_jit_test.c b/src/pcre2_jit_test.c
+index 9df87fd..2f84834 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2_jit_test.c
++++ b/src/pcre2_jit_test.c
+@@ -746,6 +746,7 @@ static struct regression_test_case regression_test_cases[] = {
+        { MU, A, 0, 0, "((?(R)a|(?1)){1,3}?)M", "aaaM" },
+        { MU, A, 0, 0, "((.)(?:.|\\2(?1))){0}#(?1)#", "#aabbccdde# #aabbccddee#" },
+        { MU, A, 0, 0, "((.)(?:\\2|\\2{4}b)){0}#(?:(?1))+#", "#aaaab# #aaaaab#" },
++       { MU, A, 0, 0 | F_NOMATCH, "(?1)$((.|\\2xx){1,2})", "abc" },
+ 
+        /* 16 bit specific tests. */
+        { CM, A, 0, 0 | F_FORCECONV, "\xc3\xa1", "\xc3\x81\xc3\xa1" },
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2022-41409.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2022-41409.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..882277ae73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2022-41409.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From 94e1c001761373b7d9450768aa15d04c25547a35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Philip Hazel <Philip.Hazel@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 16 Aug 2022 17:00:45 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Diagnose negative repeat value in pcre2test subject line
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-41409
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/commit/94e1c001761373b7d9450768aa15d04c25547a35]
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+
+---
+ ChangeLog            | 3 +++
+ src/pcre2test.c      | 4 ++--
+ testdata/testinput2  | 3 +++
+ testdata/testoutput2 | 4 ++++
+ 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+index eab50eb7..276eb57a 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog
++++ b/ChangeLog
+@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ fully read in caseless matching.
+ 24. Fixed an issue affecting recursions in JIT caused by duplicated data
+ transfers.
+ 
++20. A negative repeat value in a pcre2test subject line was not being 
++diagnosed, leading to infinite looping.
++
+ 
+ Version 10.34 21-November-2019
+ ------------------------------
+diff --git a/src/pcre2test.c b/src/pcre2test.c
+index 08f86096..f6f5d66c 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2test.c
++++ b/src/pcre2test.c
+@@ -6700,9 +6700,9 @@ while ((c = *p++) != 0)
+       }
+ 
+     i = (int32_t)li;
+-    if (i-- == 0)
++    if (i-- <= 0)
+       {
+-      fprintf(outfile, "** Zero repeat not allowed\n");
++      fprintf(outfile, "** Zero or negative repeat not allowed\n");
+       return PR_OK;
+       }
+ 
+diff --git a/testdata/testinput2 b/testdata/testinput2
+index 655e519..14e00ed 100644
+--- a/testdata/testinput2
++++ b/testdata/testinput2
+@@ -5772,4 +5772,7 @@ a)"xI
+ /(a)?a/I
+     manm
+ 
++--
++    \[X]{-10}
++
+ # End of testinput2
+diff --git a/testdata/testoutput2 b/testdata/testoutput2
+index c733c12..958f246 100644
+--- a/testdata/testoutput2
++++ b/testdata/testoutput2
+@@ -17435,6 +17435,10 @@ Subject length lower bound = 1
+     manm
+  0: a
+ 
++--
++    \[X]{-10}
++** Zero or negative repeat not allowed
++
+ # End of testinput2
+ Error -70: PCRE2_ERROR_BADDATA (unknown error number)
+ Error -62: bad serialized data
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.34.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.34.bb
index fa8655e027..53277270d2 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.34.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.34.bb
@@ -10,8 +10,12 @@ SECTION = "devel"
 LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENCE;md5=b1588d3bb4cb0e1f5a597d908f8c5b37"
 
-SRC_URI = "https://ftp.pcre.org/pub/pcre/pcre2-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
+SRC_URI = "http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/pcre2-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://pcre-cross.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-1586.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-1586-regression.patch \
+            file://CVE-2022-1587.patch \
+            file://CVE-2022-41409.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "d280b62ded13f9ccf2fac16ee5286366"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre_8.44.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre_8.44.bb
index e5471e81da..3267c5ad72 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre_8.44.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre_8.44.bb
@@ -7,8 +7,7 @@ HOMEPAGE = "http://www.pcre.org"
 SECTION = "devel"
 LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENCE;md5=3bb381a66a5385b246d4877922e7511e"
-SRC_URI = "https://ftp.pcre.org/pub/pcre/pcre-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
-           file://fix-pcre-name-collision.patch \
+SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/pcre/pcre-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://run-ptest \
            file://Makefile \
            "
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy_0.4.15.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy_0.4.15.bb
index 6f704d7a91..6c7d5a68a1 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy_0.4.15.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy_0.4.15.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
 SUMMARY = "Library providing automatic proxy configuration management"
+DESCRIPTION = "libproxy  provides  interfaces  to  get  the proxy that will be \
+used to access network resources. It uses various plugins to get proxy \
+configuration  via different mechanisms (e.g. environment variables or \
+desktop settings)."
 HOMEPAGE = "https://github.com/libproxy/libproxy"
 BUGTRACKER = "https://github.com/libproxy/libproxy/issues"
 SECTION = "libs"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libpsl/libpsl_0.21.0.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libpsl/libpsl_0.21.0.bb
index 9831b4b94f..66e64f785c 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libpsl/libpsl_0.21.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libpsl/libpsl_0.21.0.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
 SUMMARY = "Public Suffix List library"
+DESCRIPTION = "The libpsl package provides a library for accessing and \
+resolving information from the Public Suffix List (PSL). The PSL is a set of \
+domain names beyond the standard suffixes, such as .com."
+
+HOMEPAGE = "https://rockdaboot.github.io/libpsl/"
+BUGTRACKER = "https://github.com/rockdaboot/libpsl/issues"
 
 LICENSE = "MIT"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=5437030d9e4fbe7267ced058ddb8a7f5 \
@@ -13,11 +19,10 @@ SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "41bd1c75a375b85c337b59783f5deb93dbb443fb0a52d257f403df7bd6
 
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/rockdaboot/libpsl/releases"
 
-DEPENDS = "libidn2"
-
 inherit autotools gettext gtk-doc manpages pkgconfig lib_package
 
-PACKAGECONFIG ??= ""
+PACKAGECONFIG ?= "idn2"
 PACKAGECONFIG[manpages] = "--enable-man,--disable-man,libxslt-native"
-
+PACKAGECONFIG[icu] = "--enable-runtime=libicu --enable-builtin=libicu,,icu"
+PACKAGECONFIG[idn2] = "--enable-runtime=libidn2 --enable-builtin=libidn2,,libidn2 libunistring"
 BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4_2.68.4.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4_2.68.4.bb
index f984a06aba..e42ac30bf2 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4_2.68.4.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4_2.68.4.bb
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
 SUMMARY = "An HTTP library implementation in C"
+DESCRIPTION = "libsoup is an HTTP client/server library for GNOME. It uses GObjects \
+and the glib main loop, to integrate well with GNOME applications."
 HOMEPAGE = "https://wiki.gnome.org/Projects/libsoup"
 BUGTRACKER = "https://bugzilla.gnome.org/"
 SECTION = "x11/gnome/libs"
 LICENSE = "LGPLv2"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=5f30f0716dfdd0d91eb439ebec522ec2"
 
-DEPENDS = "glib-2.0 glib-2.0-native libxml2 sqlite3 intltool-native libpsl"
+DEPENDS = "glib-2.0 glib-2.0-native libxml2 sqlite3 libpsl"
 
 SHRT_VER = "${@d.getVar('PV').split('.')[0]}.${@d.getVar('PV').split('.')[1]}"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libunistring/libunistring_0.9.10.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libunistring/libunistring_0.9.10.bb
index 97fac4ecfa..2197b6656d 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libunistring/libunistring_0.9.10.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libunistring/libunistring_0.9.10.bb
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING.LIB;md5=6a6a8e020838b23406c81b19c1d46df6 \
                     file://README;beginline=45;endline=65;md5=08287d16ba8d839faed8d2dc14d7d6a5 \
                     file://doc/libunistring.texi;md5=287fa6075f78a3c85c1a52b0a92547cd \
                    "
+DEPENDS = "gperf-native"
 
 SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/libunistring/libunistring-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://iconv-m4-remove-the-test-to-convert-euc-jp.patch \
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libunwind/libunwind/0001-Fix-compilation-with-fno-common.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libunwind/libunwind/0001-Fix-compilation-with-fno-common.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..34a1f46b0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libunwind/libunwind/0001-Fix-compilation-with-fno-common.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
+From 51112447b316813ad1ae50ea66feca4eb755a424 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yichao Yu <yyc1992@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2020 00:43:32 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix compilation with -fno-common.
+
+[Khem Raj]
+Making all other archs consistent with IA64 which should not have this problem.
+Also move the FIXME to the correct place.
+
+Also add some minimum comments about this...
+
+[Philippe Coval]
+
+Patch ported to v1.3-stable branch,
+patch to be used used in openembedded-core dunfell branch (on v1.3.1)
+for oniro project.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libunwind/libunwind/pull/166]
+Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+Thanks-to: Yichao Yu <yyc1992@gmail.com>
+Origin: https://github.com/libunwind/libunwind/commit/29e17d8d2ccbca07c423e3089a6d5ae8a1c9cb6e
+Relate-to: https://booting.oniroproject.org/distro/oniro/-/issues/191
+Forwarded: https://github.com/libunwind/libunwind/pull/312
+Last-Update: 2021-11-25
+Signed-off-by: Philippe Coval <philippe.coval@huawei.com>
+---
+ src/aarch64/Ginit.c                        | 15 +++++++--------
+ src/arm/Ginit.c                            | 15 +++++++--------
+ src/coredump/_UPT_get_dyn_info_list_addr.c |  5 +++++
+ src/hppa/Ginit.c                           | 15 +++++++--------
+ src/ia64/Ginit.c                           |  1 +
+ src/mi/Gfind_dynamic_proc_info.c           |  1 +
+ src/mips/Ginit.c                           | 15 +++++++--------
+ src/ppc32/Ginit.c                          | 11 +++++++----
+ src/ppc64/Ginit.c                          | 11 +++++++----
+ src/ptrace/_UPT_get_dyn_info_list_addr.c   |  5 +++++
+ src/sh/Ginit.c                             | 15 +++++++--------
+ src/tilegx/Ginit.c                         | 15 +++++++--------
+ src/x86/Ginit.c                            | 15 +++++++--------
+ src/x86_64/Ginit.c                         | 15 +++++++--------
+ 14 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/aarch64/Ginit.c b/src/aarch64/Ginit.c
+index 9c4eae82..cb954b15 100644
+--- a/src/aarch64/Ginit.c
++++ b/src/aarch64/Ginit.c
+@@ -61,13 +61,6 @@ tdep_uc_addr (ucontext_t *uc, int reg)
+ 
+ # endif /* UNW_LOCAL_ONLY */
+ 
+-HIDDEN unw_dyn_info_list_t _U_dyn_info_list;
+-
+-/* XXX fix me: there is currently no way to locate the dyn-info list
+-       by a remote unwinder.  On ia64, this is done via a special
+-       unwind-table entry.  Perhaps something similar can be done with
+-       DWARF2 unwind info.  */
+-
+ static void
+ put_unwind_info (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_proc_info_t *proc_info, void *arg)
+ {
+@@ -78,7 +71,13 @@ static int
+ get_dyn_info_list_addr (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_word_t *dyn_info_list_addr,
+                         void *arg)
+ {
+-  *dyn_info_list_addr = (unw_word_t) &_U_dyn_info_list;
++#ifndef UNW_LOCAL_ONLY
++# pragma weak _U_dyn_info_list_addr
++  if (!_U_dyn_info_list_addr)
++    return -UNW_ENOINFO;
++#endif
++  // Access the `_U_dyn_info_list` from `LOCAL_ONLY` library, i.e. libunwind.so.
++  *dyn_info_list_addr = _U_dyn_info_list_addr ();
+   return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/arm/Ginit.c b/src/arm/Ginit.c
+index 2720d063..0bac0d72 100644
+--- a/src/arm/Ginit.c
++++ b/src/arm/Ginit.c
+@@ -57,18 +57,17 @@ tdep_uc_addr (unw_tdep_context_t *uc, int reg)
+ 
+ # endif /* UNW_LOCAL_ONLY */
+ 
+-HIDDEN unw_dyn_info_list_t _U_dyn_info_list;
+-
+-/* XXX fix me: there is currently no way to locate the dyn-info list
+-       by a remote unwinder.  On ia64, this is done via a special
+-       unwind-table entry.  Perhaps something similar can be done with
+-       DWARF2 unwind info.  */
+-
+ static int
+ get_dyn_info_list_addr (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_word_t *dyn_info_list_addr,
+                         void *arg)
+ {
+-  *dyn_info_list_addr = (unw_word_t) &_U_dyn_info_list;
++#ifndef UNW_LOCAL_ONLY
++# pragma weak _U_dyn_info_list_addr
++  if (!_U_dyn_info_list_addr)
++    return -UNW_ENOINFO;
++#endif
++  // Access the `_U_dyn_info_list` from `LOCAL_ONLY` library, i.e. libunwind.so.
++  *dyn_info_list_addr = _U_dyn_info_list_addr ();
+   return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/coredump/_UPT_get_dyn_info_list_addr.c b/src/coredump/_UPT_get_dyn_info_list_addr.c
+index 0d119055..739ed056 100644
+--- a/src/coredump/_UPT_get_dyn_info_list_addr.c
++++ b/src/coredump/_UPT_get_dyn_info_list_addr.c
+@@ -74,6 +74,11 @@ get_list_addr (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_word_t *dil_addr, void *arg,
+ 
+ #else
+ 
++/* XXX fix me: there is currently no way to locate the dyn-info list
++       by a remote unwinder.  On ia64, this is done via a special
++       unwind-table entry.  Perhaps something similar can be done with
++       DWARF2 unwind info.  */
++
+ static inline int
+ get_list_addr (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_word_t *dil_addr, void *arg,
+                int *countp)
+diff --git a/src/hppa/Ginit.c b/src/hppa/Ginit.c
+index 461e4b93..265455a6 100644
+--- a/src/hppa/Ginit.c
++++ b/src/hppa/Ginit.c
+@@ -64,13 +64,6 @@ _Uhppa_uc_addr (ucontext_t *uc, int reg)
+ 
+ # endif /* UNW_LOCAL_ONLY */
+ 
+-HIDDEN unw_dyn_info_list_t _U_dyn_info_list;
+-
+-/* XXX fix me: there is currently no way to locate the dyn-info list
+-       by a remote unwinder.  On ia64, this is done via a special
+-       unwind-table entry.  Perhaps something similar can be done with
+-       DWARF2 unwind info.  */
+-
+ static void
+ put_unwind_info (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_proc_info_t *proc_info, void *arg)
+ {
+@@ -81,7 +74,13 @@ static int
+ get_dyn_info_list_addr (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_word_t *dyn_info_list_addr,
+                         void *arg)
+ {
+-  *dyn_info_list_addr = (unw_word_t) &_U_dyn_info_list;
++#ifndef UNW_LOCAL_ONLY
++# pragma weak _U_dyn_info_list_addr
++  if (!_U_dyn_info_list_addr)
++    return -UNW_ENOINFO;
++#endif
++  // Access the `_U_dyn_info_list` from `LOCAL_ONLY` library, i.e. libunwind.so.
++  *dyn_info_list_addr = _U_dyn_info_list_addr ();
+   return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/ia64/Ginit.c b/src/ia64/Ginit.c
+index b09a2ad5..8601bb3c 100644
+--- a/src/ia64/Ginit.c
++++ b/src/ia64/Ginit.c
+@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ get_dyn_info_list_addr (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_word_t *dyn_info_list_addr,
+   if (!_U_dyn_info_list_addr)
+     return -UNW_ENOINFO;
+ #endif
++  // Access the `_U_dyn_info_list` from `LOCAL_ONLY` library, i.e. libunwind.so.
+   *dyn_info_list_addr = _U_dyn_info_list_addr ();
+   return 0;
+ }
+diff --git a/src/mi/Gfind_dynamic_proc_info.c b/src/mi/Gfind_dynamic_proc_info.c
+index 98d35012..2e7c62e5 100644
+--- a/src/mi/Gfind_dynamic_proc_info.c
++++ b/src/mi/Gfind_dynamic_proc_info.c
+@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ local_find_proc_info (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_word_t ip, unw_proc_info_t *pi,
+     return -UNW_ENOINFO;
+ #endif
+ 
++  // Access the `_U_dyn_info_list` from `LOCAL_ONLY` library, i.e. libunwind.so.
+   list = (unw_dyn_info_list_t *) (uintptr_t) _U_dyn_info_list_addr ();
+   for (di = list->first; di; di = di->next)
+     if (ip >= di->start_ip && ip < di->end_ip)
+diff --git a/src/mips/Ginit.c b/src/mips/Ginit.c
+index 3df170c7..bf7a8f5a 100644
+--- a/src/mips/Ginit.c
++++ b/src/mips/Ginit.c
+@@ -69,13 +69,6 @@ tdep_uc_addr (ucontext_t *uc, int reg)
+ 
+ # endif /* UNW_LOCAL_ONLY */
+ 
+-HIDDEN unw_dyn_info_list_t _U_dyn_info_list;
+-
+-/* XXX fix me: there is currently no way to locate the dyn-info list
+-       by a remote unwinder.  On ia64, this is done via a special
+-       unwind-table entry.  Perhaps something similar can be done with
+-       DWARF2 unwind info.  */
+-
+ static void
+ put_unwind_info (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_proc_info_t *proc_info, void *arg)
+ {
+@@ -86,7 +79,13 @@ static int
+ get_dyn_info_list_addr (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_word_t *dyn_info_list_addr,
+                         void *arg)
+ {
+-  *dyn_info_list_addr = (unw_word_t) (intptr_t) &_U_dyn_info_list;
++#ifndef UNW_LOCAL_ONLY
++# pragma weak _U_dyn_info_list_addr
++  if (!_U_dyn_info_list_addr)
++    return -UNW_ENOINFO;
++#endif
++  // Access the `_U_dyn_info_list` from `LOCAL_ONLY` library, i.e. libunwind.so.
++  *dyn_info_list_addr = _U_dyn_info_list_addr ();
+   return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/ppc32/Ginit.c b/src/ppc32/Ginit.c
+index ba302448..7b454558 100644
+--- a/src/ppc32/Ginit.c
++++ b/src/ppc32/Ginit.c
+@@ -91,9 +91,6 @@ tdep_uc_addr (ucontext_t *uc, int reg)
+ 
+ # endif /* UNW_LOCAL_ONLY */
+ 
+-HIDDEN unw_dyn_info_list_t _U_dyn_info_list;
+-
+-
+ static void
+ put_unwind_info (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_proc_info_t *proc_info, void *arg)
+ {
+@@ -104,7 +101,13 @@ static int
+ get_dyn_info_list_addr (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_word_t *dyn_info_list_addr,
+                         void *arg)
+ {
+-  *dyn_info_list_addr = (unw_word_t) &_U_dyn_info_list;
++#ifndef UNW_LOCAL_ONLY
++# pragma weak _U_dyn_info_list_addr
++  if (!_U_dyn_info_list_addr)
++    return -UNW_ENOINFO;
++#endif
++  // Access the `_U_dyn_info_list` from `LOCAL_ONLY` library, i.e. libunwind.so.
++  *dyn_info_list_addr = _U_dyn_info_list_addr ();
+   return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/ppc64/Ginit.c b/src/ppc64/Ginit.c
+index 4c88cd6e..7bfb395a 100644
+--- a/src/ppc64/Ginit.c
++++ b/src/ppc64/Ginit.c
+@@ -95,9 +95,6 @@ tdep_uc_addr (ucontext_t *uc, int reg)
+ 
+ # endif /* UNW_LOCAL_ONLY */
+ 
+-HIDDEN unw_dyn_info_list_t _U_dyn_info_list;
+-
+-
+ static void
+ put_unwind_info (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_proc_info_t *proc_info, void *arg)
+ {
+@@ -108,7 +105,13 @@ static int
+ get_dyn_info_list_addr (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_word_t *dyn_info_list_addr,
+                         void *arg)
+ {
+-  *dyn_info_list_addr = (unw_word_t) &_U_dyn_info_list;
++#ifndef UNW_LOCAL_ONLY
++# pragma weak _U_dyn_info_list_addr
++  if (!_U_dyn_info_list_addr)
++    return -UNW_ENOINFO;
++#endif
++  // Access the `_U_dyn_info_list` from `LOCAL_ONLY` library, i.e. libunwind.so.
++  *dyn_info_list_addr = _U_dyn_info_list_addr ();
+   return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/ptrace/_UPT_get_dyn_info_list_addr.c b/src/ptrace/_UPT_get_dyn_info_list_addr.c
+index cc5ed044..16671d45 100644
+--- a/src/ptrace/_UPT_get_dyn_info_list_addr.c
++++ b/src/ptrace/_UPT_get_dyn_info_list_addr.c
+@@ -71,6 +71,11 @@ get_list_addr (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_word_t *dil_addr, void *arg,
+ 
+ #else
+ 
++/* XXX fix me: there is currently no way to locate the dyn-info list
++       by a remote unwinder.  On ia64, this is done via a special
++       unwind-table entry.  Perhaps something similar can be done with
++       DWARF2 unwind info.  */
++
+ static inline int
+ get_list_addr (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_word_t *dil_addr, void *arg,
+                int *countp)
+diff --git a/src/sh/Ginit.c b/src/sh/Ginit.c
+index 52988a72..9fe96d2b 100644
+--- a/src/sh/Ginit.c
++++ b/src/sh/Ginit.c
+@@ -58,13 +58,6 @@ tdep_uc_addr (ucontext_t *uc, int reg)
+ 
+ # endif /* UNW_LOCAL_ONLY */
+ 
+-HIDDEN unw_dyn_info_list_t _U_dyn_info_list;
+-
+-/* XXX fix me: there is currently no way to locate the dyn-info list
+-       by a remote unwinder.  On ia64, this is done via a special
+-       unwind-table entry.  Perhaps something similar can be done with
+-       DWARF2 unwind info.  */
+-
+ static void
+ put_unwind_info (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_proc_info_t *proc_info, void *arg)
+ {
+@@ -75,7 +68,13 @@ static int
+ get_dyn_info_list_addr (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_word_t *dyn_info_list_addr,
+                         void *arg)
+ {
+-  *dyn_info_list_addr = (unw_word_t) &_U_dyn_info_list;
++#ifndef UNW_LOCAL_ONLY
++# pragma weak _U_dyn_info_list_addr
++  if (!_U_dyn_info_list_addr)
++    return -UNW_ENOINFO;
++#endif
++  // Access the `_U_dyn_info_list` from `LOCAL_ONLY` library, i.e. libunwind.so.
++  *dyn_info_list_addr = _U_dyn_info_list_addr ();
+   return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/tilegx/Ginit.c b/src/tilegx/Ginit.c
+index 7564a558..925e6413 100644
+--- a/src/tilegx/Ginit.c
++++ b/src/tilegx/Ginit.c
+@@ -64,13 +64,6 @@ tdep_uc_addr (ucontext_t *uc, int reg)
+ 
+ # endif /* UNW_LOCAL_ONLY */
+ 
+-HIDDEN unw_dyn_info_list_t _U_dyn_info_list;
+-
+-/* XXX fix me: there is currently no way to locate the dyn-info list
+-       by a remote unwinder.  On ia64, this is done via a special
+-       unwind-table entry.  Perhaps something similar can be done with
+-       DWARF2 unwind info.  */
+-
+ static void
+ put_unwind_info (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_proc_info_t *proc_info, void *arg)
+ {
+@@ -81,7 +74,13 @@ static int
+ get_dyn_info_list_addr (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_word_t *dyn_info_list_addr,
+                         void *arg)
+ {
+-  *dyn_info_list_addr = (unw_word_t) (intptr_t) &_U_dyn_info_list;
++#ifndef UNW_LOCAL_ONLY
++# pragma weak _U_dyn_info_list_addr
++  if (!_U_dyn_info_list_addr)
++    return -UNW_ENOINFO;
++#endif
++  // Access the `_U_dyn_info_list` from `LOCAL_ONLY` library, i.e. libunwind.so.
++  *dyn_info_list_addr = _U_dyn_info_list_addr ();
+   return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/x86/Ginit.c b/src/x86/Ginit.c
+index f6b8dc27..3cec74a2 100644
+--- a/src/x86/Ginit.c
++++ b/src/x86/Ginit.c
+@@ -54,13 +54,6 @@ tdep_uc_addr (ucontext_t *uc, int reg)
+ 
+ # endif /* UNW_LOCAL_ONLY */
+ 
+-HIDDEN unw_dyn_info_list_t _U_dyn_info_list;
+-
+-/* XXX fix me: there is currently no way to locate the dyn-info list
+-       by a remote unwinder.  On ia64, this is done via a special
+-       unwind-table entry.  Perhaps something similar can be done with
+-       DWARF2 unwind info.  */
+-
+ static void
+ put_unwind_info (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_proc_info_t *proc_info, void *arg)
+ {
+@@ -71,7 +64,13 @@ static int
+ get_dyn_info_list_addr (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_word_t *dyn_info_list_addr,
+                         void *arg)
+ {
+-  *dyn_info_list_addr = (unw_word_t) &_U_dyn_info_list;
++#ifndef UNW_LOCAL_ONLY
++# pragma weak _U_dyn_info_list_addr
++  if (!_U_dyn_info_list_addr)
++    return -UNW_ENOINFO;
++#endif
++  // Access the `_U_dyn_info_list` from `LOCAL_ONLY` library, i.e. libunwind.so.
++  *dyn_info_list_addr = _U_dyn_info_list_addr ();
+   return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/x86_64/Ginit.c b/src/x86_64/Ginit.c
+index b7e8e462..fe6bcc33 100644
+--- a/src/x86_64/Ginit.c
++++ b/src/x86_64/Ginit.c
+@@ -49,13 +49,6 @@ static struct unw_addr_space local_addr_space;
+ 
+ unw_addr_space_t unw_local_addr_space = &local_addr_space;
+ 
+-HIDDEN unw_dyn_info_list_t _U_dyn_info_list;
+-
+-/* XXX fix me: there is currently no way to locate the dyn-info list
+-       by a remote unwinder.  On ia64, this is done via a special
+-       unwind-table entry.  Perhaps something similar can be done with
+-       DWARF2 unwind info.  */
+-
+ static void
+ put_unwind_info (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_proc_info_t *proc_info, void *arg)
+ {
+@@ -66,7 +59,13 @@ static int
+ get_dyn_info_list_addr (unw_addr_space_t as, unw_word_t *dyn_info_list_addr,
+                         void *arg)
+ {
+-  *dyn_info_list_addr = (unw_word_t) &_U_dyn_info_list;
++#ifndef UNW_LOCAL_ONLY
++# pragma weak _U_dyn_info_list_addr
++  if (!_U_dyn_info_list_addr)
++    return -UNW_ENOINFO;
++#endif
++  // Access the `_U_dyn_info_list` from `LOCAL_ONLY` library, i.e. libunwind.so.
++  *dyn_info_list_addr = _U_dyn_info_list_addr ();
+   return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.32.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libunwind/libunwind_1.3.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libunwind/libunwind_1.3.1.bb
index 037e04c3c0..8ae94a834c 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libunwind/libunwind_1.3.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libunwind/libunwind_1.3.1.bb
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://download.savannah.nongnu.org/releases/libunwind/libunwind-${PV
            file://0004-Fix-build-on-mips-musl.patch \
            file://0005-ppc32-Consider-ucontext-mismatches-between-glibc-and.patch \
            file://0006-Fix-for-X32.patch \
+           file://0001-Fix-compilation-with-fno-common.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://musl-header-conflict.patch"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/liburcu/liburcu_0.11.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/liburcu/liburcu_0.11.1.bb
index 6a517e6f29..1902415c90 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/liburcu/liburcu_0.11.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/liburcu/liburcu_0.11.1.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
 SUMMARY = "Userspace RCU (read-copy-update) library"
+DESCRIPTION = "A userspace RCU (read-copy-update) library. This data \
+synchronization library provides read-side access which scales linearly \
+with the number of cores. "
 HOMEPAGE = "http://lttng.org/urcu"
 BUGTRACKER = "http://lttng.org/project/issues"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libusb/libusb1_1.0.22.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libusb/libusb1_1.0.22.bb
index 1d9d772575..ffa8f0320c 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libusb/libusb1_1.0.22.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libusb/libusb1_1.0.22.bb
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 SUMMARY = "Userspace library to access USB (version 1.0)"
-HOMEPAGE = "http://libusb.sf.net"
+DESCRIPTION = "A cross-platform library to access USB devices from Linux, \
+macOS, Windows, OpenBSD/NetBSD, Haiku and Solaris userspace."
+HOMEPAGE = "https://libusb.info"
 BUGTRACKER = "http://www.libusb.org/report"
 SECTION = "libs"
 
@@ -8,7 +10,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=fbc093901857fcd118f065f900982c24"
 
 BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
 
-SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/libusb/libusb-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
+SRC_URI = "https://github.com/libusb/libusb/releases/download/v${PV}/libusb-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://no-dll.patch \
            file://run-ptest \
           "
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libxslt/libxslt/CVE-2021-30560.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libxslt/libxslt/CVE-2021-30560.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..614047ea7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libxslt/libxslt/CVE-2021-30560.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+From 50f9c9cd3b7dfe9b3c8c795247752d1fdcadcac8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
+Date: Sat, 12 Jun 2021 20:02:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix use-after-free in xsltApplyTemplates
+
+xsltApplyTemplates without a select expression could delete nodes in
+the source document.
+
+1. Text nodes with strippable whitespace
+
+Whitespace from input documents is already stripped, so there's no
+need to strip it again. Under certain circumstances, xsltApplyTemplates
+could be fooled into deleting text nodes that are still referenced,
+resulting in a use-after-free.
+
+2. The DTD
+
+The DTD was only unlinked, but there's no good reason to do this just
+now. Maybe it was meant as a micro-optimization.
+
+3. Unknown nodes
+
+Useless and dangerous as well, especially with XInclude nodes.
+See https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/issues/268
+
+Simply stop trying to uselessly delete nodes when applying a template.
+This part of the code is probably a leftover from a time where
+xsltApplyStripSpaces wasn't implemented yet. Also note that
+xsltApplyTemplates with a select expression never tried to delete
+nodes.
+
+Also stop xsltDefaultProcessOneNode from deleting nodes for the same
+reasons.
+
+This fixes CVE-2021-30560.
+
+CVE: CVE-2021-30560
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxslt/commit/50f9c9cd3b7dfe9b3c8c795247752d1fdcadcac8.patch]
+Comment: No change in any hunk
+Signed-off-by: Omkar Patil <Omkar.Patil@kpit.com>
+
+---
+ libxslt/transform.c | 119 +++-----------------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libxslt/transform.c b/libxslt/transform.c
+index 04522154..3aba354f 100644
+--- a/libxslt/transform.c
++++ b/libxslt/transform.c
+@@ -1895,7 +1895,7 @@ static void
+ xsltDefaultProcessOneNode(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
+                          xsltStackElemPtr params) {
+     xmlNodePtr copy;
+-    xmlNodePtr delete = NULL, cur;
++    xmlNodePtr cur;
+     int nbchild = 0, oldSize;
+     int childno = 0, oldPos;
+     xsltTemplatePtr template;
+@@ -1968,54 +1968,13 @@ xsltDefaultProcessOneNode(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
+            return;
+     }
+     /*
+-     * Handling of Elements: first pass, cleanup and counting
++     * Handling of Elements: first pass, counting
+      */
+     cur = node->children;
+     while (cur != NULL) {
+-       switch (cur->type) {
+-           case XML_TEXT_NODE:
+-           case XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
+-           case XML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
+-           case XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
+-           case XML_ELEMENT_NODE:
+-           case XML_PI_NODE:
+-           case XML_COMMENT_NODE:
+-               nbchild++;
+-               break;
+-            case XML_DTD_NODE:
+-               /* Unlink the DTD, it's still reachable using doc->intSubset */
+-               if (cur->next != NULL)
+-                   cur->next->prev = cur->prev;
+-               if (cur->prev != NULL)
+-                   cur->prev->next = cur->next;
+-               break;
+-           default:
+-#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
+-               XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
+-                "xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: skipping node type %d\n",
+-                                cur->type));
+-#endif
+-               delete = cur;
+-       }
++       if (IS_XSLT_REAL_NODE(cur))
++           nbchild++;
+        cur = cur->next;
+-       if (delete != NULL) {
+-#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
+-           XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
+-                "xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: removing ignorable blank node\n"));
+-#endif
+-           xmlUnlinkNode(delete);
+-           xmlFreeNode(delete);
+-           delete = NULL;
+-       }
+-    }
+-    if (delete != NULL) {
+-#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
+-       XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
+-            "xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: removing ignorable blank node\n"));
+-#endif
+-       xmlUnlinkNode(delete);
+-       xmlFreeNode(delete);
+-       delete = NULL;
+     }
+ 
+     /*
+@@ -4864,7 +4823,7 @@ xsltApplyTemplates(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
+     xsltStylePreCompPtr comp = (xsltStylePreCompPtr) castedComp;
+ #endif
+     int i;
+-    xmlNodePtr cur, delNode = NULL, oldContextNode;
++    xmlNodePtr cur, oldContextNode;
+     xmlNodeSetPtr list = NULL, oldList;
+     xsltStackElemPtr withParams = NULL;
+     int oldXPProximityPosition, oldXPContextSize;
+@@ -4998,73 +4957,9 @@ xsltApplyTemplates(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
+        else
+            cur = NULL;
+        while (cur != NULL) {
+-           switch (cur->type) {
+-               case XML_TEXT_NODE:
+-                   if ((IS_BLANK_NODE(cur)) &&
+-                       (cur->parent != NULL) &&
+-                       (cur->parent->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
+-                       (ctxt->style->stripSpaces != NULL)) {
+-                       const xmlChar *val;
+-
+-                       if (cur->parent->ns != NULL) {
+-                           val = (const xmlChar *)
+-                                 xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->style->stripSpaces,
+-                                                cur->parent->name,
+-                                                cur->parent->ns->href);
+-                           if (val == NULL) {
+-                               val = (const xmlChar *)
+-                                 xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->style->stripSpaces,
+-                                                BAD_CAST "*",
+-                                                cur->parent->ns->href);
+-                           }
+-                       } else {
+-                           val = (const xmlChar *)
+-                                 xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->style->stripSpaces,
+-                                                cur->parent->name, NULL);
+-                       }
+-                       if ((val != NULL) &&
+-                           (xmlStrEqual(val, (xmlChar *) "strip"))) {
+-                           delNode = cur;
+-                           break;
+-                       }
+-                   }
+-                   /* Intentional fall-through */
+-               case XML_ELEMENT_NODE:
+-               case XML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
+-               case XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
+-               case XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
+-               case XML_PI_NODE:
+-               case XML_COMMENT_NODE:
+-                   xmlXPathNodeSetAddUnique(list, cur);
+-                   break;
+-               case XML_DTD_NODE:
+-                   /* Unlink the DTD, it's still reachable
+-                    * using doc->intSubset */
+-                   if (cur->next != NULL)
+-                       cur->next->prev = cur->prev;
+-                   if (cur->prev != NULL)
+-                       cur->prev->next = cur->next;
+-                   break;
+-               case XML_NAMESPACE_DECL:
+-                   break;
+-               default:
+-#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
+-                   XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_APPLY_TEMPLATES,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
+-                    "xsltApplyTemplates: skipping cur type %d\n",
+-                                    cur->type));
+-#endif
+-                   delNode = cur;
+-           }
++            if (IS_XSLT_REAL_NODE(cur))
++               xmlXPathNodeSetAddUnique(list, cur);
+            cur = cur->next;
+-           if (delNode != NULL) {
+-#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
+-               XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_APPLY_TEMPLATES,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
+-                    "xsltApplyTemplates: removing ignorable blank cur\n"));
+-#endif
+-               xmlUnlinkNode(delNode);
+-               xmlFreeNode(delNode);
+-               delNode = NULL;
+-           }
+        }
+     }
+ 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libxslt/libxslt_1.1.34.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libxslt/libxslt_1.1.34.bb
index 1961bb5b31..4755677bec 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libxslt/libxslt_1.1.34.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libxslt/libxslt_1.1.34.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
 SUMMARY = "GNOME XSLT library"
+DESCRIPTION = "libxslt is the XSLT C parser and toolkit developed for the Gnome project. \
+XSLT itself is a an XML language to define transformation for XML. Libxslt is based on \
+libxml2 the XML C library developed for the GNOME project. It also implements most of \
+the EXSLT set of processor-portable extensions functions and some of Saxon's evaluate \
+and expressions extensions."
 HOMEPAGE = "http://xmlsoft.org/XSLT/"
 BUGTRACKER = "https://bugzilla.gnome.org/"
 
@@ -9,6 +14,7 @@ SECTION = "libs"
 DEPENDS = "libxml2"
 
 SRC_URI = "http://xmlsoft.org/sources/libxslt-${PV}.tar.gz \
+           file://CVE-2021-30560.patch \
           "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "db8765c8d076f1b6caafd9f2542a304a"
@@ -16,6 +22,10 @@ SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "98b1bd46d6792925ad2dfe9a87452ea2adebf69dcb9919ffd55bf926a7
 
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "libxslt-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
 
+# We have libxml2 2.9.10 and we don't link statically with it anyway
+# so this isn't an issue.
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2022-29824"
+
 S = "${WORKDIR}/libxslt-${PV}"
 
 BINCONFIG = "${bindir}/xslt-config"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/lz4/files/CVE-2021-3520.patch b/meta/recipes-support/lz4/files/CVE-2021-3520.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5ac8f6691f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/lz4/files/CVE-2021-3520.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 8301a21773ef61656225e264f4f06ae14462bca7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jasper Lievisse Adriaanse <j@jasper.la>
+Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2021 15:21:20 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix potential memory corruption with negative memmove() size
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://github.com/lz4/lz4/commit/8301a21773ef61656225e264f4f06ae14462bca7#diff-7055e9cf14c488aea9837aaf9f528b58ee3c22988d7d0d81d172ec62d94a88a7
+CVE: CVE-2021-3520
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ lib/lz4.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+Index: git/lib/lz4.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/lib/lz4.c
++++ git/lib/lz4.c
+@@ -1665,7 +1665,7 @@ LZ4_decompress_generic(
+                  const size_t dictSize         /* note : = 0 if noDict */
+                  )
+ {
+-    if (src == NULL) { return -1; }
++    if ((src == NULL) || (outputSize < 0)) { return -1; }
+ 
+     {   const BYTE* ip = (const BYTE*) src;
+         const BYTE* const iend = ip + srcSize;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/lz4/lz4_1.9.2.bb b/meta/recipes-support/lz4/lz4_1.9.2.bb
index 455d2a5141..bc11a57eb5 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/lz4/lz4_1.9.2.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/lz4/lz4_1.9.2.bb
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 SUMMARY = "Extremely Fast Compression algorithm"
 DESCRIPTION = "LZ4 is a very fast lossless compression algorithm, providing compression speed at 400 MB/s per core, scalable with multi-cores CPU. It also features an extremely fast decoder, with speed in multiple GB/s per core, typically reaching RAM speed limits on multi-core systems."
+HOMEPAGE = "https://github.com/lz4/lz4"
 
 LICENSE = "BSD | BSD-2-Clause | GPL-2.0"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://lib/LICENSE;md5=ebc2ea4814a64de7708f1571904b32cc \
@@ -11,8 +12,13 @@ PE = "1"
 
 SRCREV = "fdf2ef5809ca875c454510610764d9125ef2ebbd"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://github.com/lz4/lz4.git;branch=dev \
+# remove at next version upgrade or when output changes
+PR = "r1"
+HASHEQUIV_HASH_VERSION .= ".1"
+
+SRC_URI = "git://github.com/lz4/lz4.git;branch=dev;protocol=https \
            file://run-ptest \
+           file://CVE-2021-3520.patch \
            "
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "v(?P<pver>.*)"
 
@@ -21,7 +27,7 @@ S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 # Fixed in r118, which is larger than the current version.
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2014-4715"
 
-EXTRA_OEMAKE = "PREFIX=${prefix} CC='${CC}' DESTDIR=${D} LIBDIR=${libdir} INCLUDEDIR=${includedir} BUILD_STATIC=no"
+EXTRA_OEMAKE = "PREFIX=${prefix} CC='${CC}' CFLAGS='${CFLAGS}' DESTDIR=${D} LIBDIR=${libdir} INCLUDEDIR=${includedir} BUILD_STATIC=no"
 
 do_install() {
         oe_runmake install
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/lzo/lzo_2.10.bb b/meta/recipes-support/lzo/lzo_2.10.bb
index 8eefec3cc9..f0c8631aea 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/lzo/lzo_2.10.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/lzo/lzo_2.10.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 SUMMARY = "Lossless data compression library"
+DESCRIPTION = "A portable lossless data compression library written in \
+ANSI C that offers pretty fast compression and *extremely* fast decompression. "
 HOMEPAGE = "http://www.oberhumer.com/opensource/lzo/"
 SECTION = "libs"
 LICENSE = "GPLv2+"
@@ -16,6 +18,8 @@ SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c0f892943208266f9b6543b3ae308fab6284c5c90e627931446fb49b42
 
 inherit autotools ptest
 
+CVE_PRODUCT = "lzo oberhumer:lzo2"
+
 EXTRA_OECONF = "--enable-shared"
 
 do_install_ptest() {
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/lzop/lzop_1.04.bb b/meta/recipes-support/lzop/lzop_1.04.bb
index b50c230437..59c2003b74 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/lzop/lzop_1.04.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/lzop/lzop_1.04.bb
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ gzip are much higher compression and decompression speed at the cost of some \n\
 compression ratio. The lzop compression utility was designed with the goals \n\
 of reliability, speed, portability and with reasonable drop-in compatibility \n\
 to gzip."
+HOMEPAGE = "http://www.lzop.org/"
 DEPENDS += "lzo"
 
 LICENSE = "GPLv2+"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/mpfr/mpfr_4.0.2.bb b/meta/recipes-support/mpfr/mpfr_4.0.2.bb
index 00c2dc2fe9..0ac73f031f 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/mpfr/mpfr_4.0.2.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/mpfr/mpfr_4.0.2.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 SUMMARY = "C library for multiple-precision floating-point computations with exact rounding"
+DESCRIPTION = "The GNU Multiple Precision Floating-Point Reliable Library (GNU MPFR) is a GNU portable C library for arbitrary-precision binary floating-point computation with correct rounding, based on GNU Multi-Precision Library. MPFR's computation is both efficient and has a well-defined semantics: the functions are completely specified on all the possible operands and the results do not depend on the platform."
 HOMEPAGE = "https://www.mpfr.org/"
 LICENSE = "LGPLv3+"
 SECTION = "devel"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-20305-1.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-20305-1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cfc0f382fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-20305-1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+Backport of:
+
+From a63893791280d441c713293491da97c79c0950fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2021 19:37:41 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] New functions ecc_mod_mul_canonical and
+ ecc_mod_sqr_canonical.
+
+* ecc-mod-arith.c (ecc_mod_mul_canonical, ecc_mod_sqr_canonical):
+New functions.
+* ecc-internal.h: Declare and document new functions.
+* curve448-eh-to-x.c (curve448_eh_to_x): Use ecc_mod_sqr_canonical.
+* curve25519-eh-to-x.c (curve25519_eh_to_x): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical.
+* ecc-eh-to-a.c (ecc_eh_to_a): Likewise.
+* ecc-j-to-a.c (ecc_j_to_a): Likewise.
+* ecc-mul-m.c (ecc_mul_m): Likewise.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 2bf497ba4d6acc6f352bca015837fad33008565c)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://sources.debian.org/data/main/n/nettle/3.4.1-1%2Bdeb10u1/debian/patches/CVE-2021-20305-1.patch
+CVE: CVE-2021-20305 dep1
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ ChangeLog            | 11 +++++++++++
+ curve25519-eh-to-x.c |  6 +-----
+ curve448-eh-to-x.c   |  5 +----
+ ecc-eh-to-a.c        | 12 ++----------
+ ecc-internal.h       | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ ecc-j-to-a.c         | 15 +++------------
+ ecc-mod-arith.c      | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ ecc-mul-m.c          |  6 ++----
+ 8 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
+
+#diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+#index fd138d82..5cc5c188 100644
+#--- a/ChangeLog
+#+++ b/ChangeLog
+#@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@
+#+2021-03-11  Niels Möller  <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+#+
+#+      * ecc-mod-arith.c (ecc_mod_mul_canonical, ecc_mod_sqr_canonical):
+#+      New functions.
+#+      * ecc-internal.h: Declare and document new functions.
+#+      * curve448-eh-to-x.c (curve448_eh_to_x): Use ecc_mod_sqr_canonical.
+#+      * curve25519-eh-to-x.c (curve25519_eh_to_x): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical.
+#+      * ecc-eh-to-a.c (ecc_eh_to_a): Likewise.
+#+      * ecc-j-to-a.c (ecc_j_to_a): Likewise.
+#+      * ecc-mul-m.c (ecc_mul_m): Likewise.
+#+
+# 2021-02-17  Niels Möller  <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+# 
+#       * Released Nettle-3.7.1.
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/curve25519-eh-to-x.c
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/curve25519-eh-to-x.c
++++ nettle-3.5.1/curve25519-eh-to-x.c
+@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ curve25519_eh_to_x (mp_limb_t *xp, const
+ #define t2 (scratch + 2*ecc->p.size)
+ 
+   const struct ecc_curve *ecc = &_nettle_curve25519;
+-  mp_limb_t cy;
+ 
+   /* If u = U/W and v = V/W are the coordiantes of the point on the
+      Edwards curve we get the curve25519 x coordinate as
+@@ -69,10 +68,7 @@ curve25519_eh_to_x (mp_limb_t *xp, const
+   ecc->p.invert (&ecc->p, t1, t0, t2 + ecc->p.size);
+   
+   ecc_modp_add (ecc, t0, wp, vp);
+-  ecc_modp_mul (ecc, t2, t0, t1);
+-
+-  cy = mpn_sub_n (xp, t2, ecc->p.m, ecc->p.size);
+-  cnd_copy (cy, xp, t2, ecc->p.size);
++  ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->p, xp, t0, t1, t2);
+ #undef vp
+ #undef wp
+ #undef t0
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/ecc-eh-to-a.c
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/ecc-eh-to-a.c
++++ nettle-3.5.1/ecc-eh-to-a.c
+@@ -59,9 +59,7 @@ ecc_eh_to_a (const struct ecc_curve *ecc
+   /* Needs 2*size + scratch for the invert call. */
+   ecc->p.invert (&ecc->p, izp, zp, tp + ecc->p.size);
+ 
+-  ecc_modp_mul (ecc, tp, xp, izp);
+-  cy = mpn_sub_n (r, tp, ecc->p.m, ecc->p.size);
+-  cnd_copy (cy, r, tp, ecc->p.size);
++  ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->p, r, xp, izp, tp);
+ 
+   if (op)
+     {
+@@ -81,7 +79,5 @@ ecc_eh_to_a (const struct ecc_curve *ecc
+        }
+       return;
+     }
+-  ecc_modp_mul (ecc, tp, yp, izp);
+-  cy = mpn_sub_n (r + ecc->p.size, tp, ecc->p.m, ecc->p.size);
+-  cnd_copy (cy, r + ecc->p.size, tp, ecc->p.size);
++  ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->p, r + ecc->p.size, yp, izp, tp);
+ }
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/ecc-internal.h
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/ecc-internal.h
++++ nettle-3.5.1/ecc-internal.h
+@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@
+ #define ecc_mod_submul_1 _nettle_ecc_mod_submul_1
+ #define ecc_mod_mul _nettle_ecc_mod_mul
+ #define ecc_mod_sqr _nettle_ecc_mod_sqr
++#define ecc_mod_mul_canonical _nettle_ecc_mod_mul_canonical
++#define ecc_mod_sqr_canonical _nettle_ecc_mod_sqr_canonical
+ #define ecc_mod_random _nettle_ecc_mod_random
+ #define ecc_mod _nettle_ecc_mod
+ #define ecc_mod_inv _nettle_ecc_mod_inv
+@@ -263,6 +265,19 @@ ecc_mod_sqr (const struct ecc_modulo *m,
+ #define ecc_modq_mul(ecc, r, a, b) \
+   ecc_mod_mul (&(ecc)->q, (r), (a), (b))
+ 
++/* These mul and sqr functions produce a canonical result, 0 <= R < M.
++   Requirements on input and output areas are similar to the above
++   functions, except that it is *not* allowed to pass rp = rp +
++   m->size.
++ */
++void
++ecc_mod_mul_canonical (const struct ecc_modulo *m, mp_limb_t *rp,
++                      const mp_limb_t *ap, const mp_limb_t *bp, mp_limb_t *tp);
++
++void
++ecc_mod_sqr_canonical (const struct ecc_modulo *m, mp_limb_t *rp,
++                      const mp_limb_t *ap, mp_limb_t *tp);
++
+ /* mod q operations. */
+ void
+ ecc_mod_random (const struct ecc_modulo *m, mp_limb_t *xp,
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/ecc-j-to-a.c
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/ecc-j-to-a.c
++++ nettle-3.5.1/ecc-j-to-a.c
+@@ -51,8 +51,6 @@ ecc_j_to_a (const struct ecc_curve *ecc,
+ #define izBp (scratch + 3*ecc->p.size)
+ #define tp    scratch
+ 
+-  mp_limb_t cy;
+-
+   if (ecc->use_redc)
+     {
+       /* Set v = (r_z / B^2)^-1,
+@@ -86,17 +84,14 @@ ecc_j_to_a (const struct ecc_curve *ecc,
+       ecc_modp_sqr (ecc, iz2p, izp);
+     }
+ 
+-  ecc_modp_mul (ecc, iz3p, iz2p, p);
+-  /* ecc_modp (and ecc_modp_mul) may return a value up to 2p - 1, so
+-     do a conditional subtraction. */
+-  cy = mpn_sub_n (r, iz3p, ecc->p.m, ecc->p.size);
+-  cnd_copy (cy, r, iz3p, ecc->p.size);
++  ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->p, r, iz2p, p, iz3p);
+ 
+   if (op)
+     {
+       /* Skip y coordinate */
+       if (op > 1)
+        {
++         mp_limb_t cy;
+          /* Also reduce the x coordinate mod ecc->q. It should
+             already be < 2*ecc->q, so one subtraction should
+             suffice. */
+@@ -106,10 +101,7 @@ ecc_j_to_a (const struct ecc_curve *ecc,
+       return;
+     }
+   ecc_modp_mul (ecc, iz3p, iz2p, izp);
+-  ecc_modp_mul (ecc, tp, iz3p, p + ecc->p.size);
+-  /* And a similar subtraction. */
+-  cy = mpn_sub_n (r + ecc->p.size, tp, ecc->p.m, ecc->p.size);
+-  cnd_copy (cy, r + ecc->p.size, tp, ecc->p.size);
++  ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->p, r + ecc->p.size, iz3p, p + ecc->p.size, iz3p);
+ 
+ #undef izp
+ #undef up
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/ecc-mod-arith.c
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/ecc-mod-arith.c
++++ nettle-3.5.1/ecc-mod-arith.c
+@@ -119,6 +119,30 @@ ecc_mod_mul (const struct ecc_modulo *m,
+ }
+ 
+ void
++ecc_mod_mul_canonical (const struct ecc_modulo *m, mp_limb_t *rp,
++                      const mp_limb_t *ap, const mp_limb_t *bp, mp_limb_t *tp)
++{
++  mp_limb_t cy;
++  mpn_mul_n (tp + m->size, ap, bp, m->size);
++  m->reduce (m, tp + m->size);
++
++  cy = mpn_sub_n (rp, tp + m->size, m->m, m->size);
++  cnd_copy (cy, rp, tp + m->size, m->size);
++}
++
++void
++ecc_mod_sqr_canonical (const struct ecc_modulo *m, mp_limb_t *rp,
++                      const mp_limb_t *ap, mp_limb_t *tp)
++{
++  mp_limb_t cy;
++  mpn_sqr (tp + m->size, ap, m->size);
++  m->reduce (m, tp + m->size);
++
++  cy = mpn_sub_n (rp, tp + m->size, m->m, m->size);
++  cnd_copy (cy, rp, tp + m->size, m->size);
++}
++
++void
+ ecc_mod_sqr (const struct ecc_modulo *m, mp_limb_t *rp,
+             const mp_limb_t *ap)
+ {
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-20305-2.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-20305-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bb56b14c8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-20305-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+Backport of:
+
+From 971bed6ab4b27014eb23085e8176917e1a096fd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 17:26:37 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical for point comparison.
+
+* eddsa-verify.c (equal_h): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 5b7608fde3a6d2ab82bffb35db1e4e330927c906)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://sources.debian.org/data/main/n/nettle/3.4.1-1%2Bdeb10u1/debian/patches/CVE-2021-20305-2.patch
+CVE: CVE-2021-20305 dep2
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ ChangeLog      | 4 ++++
+ eddsa-verify.c | 9 ++-------
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+#diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+#index 5cc5c188..2a9217a6 100644
+#--- a/ChangeLog
+#+++ b/ChangeLog
+#@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+#+2021-03-13  Niels Möller  <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+#+
+#+      * eddsa-verify.c (equal_h): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical.
+#+
+# 2021-03-11  Niels Möller  <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+# 
+#       * ecc-mod-arith.c (ecc_mod_mul_canonical, ecc_mod_sqr_canonical):
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/eddsa-verify.c
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/eddsa-verify.c
++++ nettle-3.5.1/eddsa-verify.c
+@@ -53,13 +53,8 @@ equal_h (const struct ecc_modulo *p,
+ #define t0 scratch
+ #define t1 (scratch + p->size)
+ 
+-  ecc_mod_mul (p, t0, x1, z2);
+-  if (mpn_cmp (t0, p->m, p->size) >= 0)
+-    mpn_sub_n (t0, t0, p->m, p->size);
+-
+-  ecc_mod_mul (p, t1, x2, z1);
+-  if (mpn_cmp (t1, p->m, p->size) >= 0)
+-    mpn_sub_n (t1, t1, p->m, p->size);
++  ecc_mod_mul_canonical (p, t0, x1, z2, t0);
++  ecc_mod_mul_canonical (p, t1, x2, z1, t1);
+ 
+   return mpn_cmp (t0, t1, p->size) == 0;
+ 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-20305-3.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-20305-3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..15a892ecdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-20305-3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+Backport of:
+
+From 74ee0e82b6891e090f20723750faeb19064e31b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 15:19:19 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug in ecc_ecdsa_verify.
+
+* ecc-ecdsa-verify.c (ecc_ecdsa_verify): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical
+to compute the scalars used for ecc multiplication.
+* testsuite/ecdsa-verify-test.c (test_main): Add test case that
+triggers an assert on 64-bit platforms, without above fix.
+* testsuite/ecdsa-sign-test.c (test_main): Test case generating
+the same signature.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 2397757b3f95fcae1e2d3011bf99ca5b5438378f)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://sources.debian.org/data/main/n/nettle/3.4.1-1%2Bdeb10u1/debian/patches/CVE-2021-20305-3.patch
+CVE: CVE-2021-20305 dep3
+[Minor fixup on _nettle_secp_224r1]
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ ChangeLog                     | 10 +++++++++-
+ ecc-ecdsa-verify.c            |  4 ++--
+ testsuite/ecdsa-sign-test.c   | 13 +++++++++++++
+ testsuite/ecdsa-verify-test.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+#diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+#index 2a9217a6..63848f53 100644
+#--- a/ChangeLog
+#+++ b/ChangeLog
+#@@ -1,7 +1,15 @@
+# 2021-03-13  Niels Möller  <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+# 
+#-      * eddsa-verify.c (equal_h): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical.
+#+      * ecc-ecdsa-verify.c (ecc_ecdsa_verify): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical
+#+      to compute the scalars used for ecc multiplication.
+#+      * testsuite/ecdsa-verify-test.c (test_main): Add test case that
+#+      triggers an assert on 64-bit platforms, without above fix.
+#+      * testsuite/ecdsa-sign-test.c (test_main): Test case generating
+#+      the same signature.
+#+
+#+2021-03-13  Niels Möller  <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+# 
+#+      * eddsa-verify.c (equal_h): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical.
+# 2021-03-11  Niels Möller  <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+# 
+#       * ecc-mod-arith.c (ecc_mod_mul_canonical, ecc_mod_sqr_canonical):
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/ecc-ecdsa-verify.c
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/ecc-ecdsa-verify.c
++++ nettle-3.5.1/ecc-ecdsa-verify.c
+@@ -112,10 +112,10 @@ ecc_ecdsa_verify (const struct ecc_curve
+ 
+   /* u1 = h / s, P1 = u1 * G */
+   ecc_hash (&ecc->q, hp, length, digest);
+-  ecc_modq_mul (ecc, u1, hp, sinv);
++  ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->q, u1, hp, sinv, u1);
+ 
+   /* u2 = r / s, P2 = u2 * Y */
+-  ecc_modq_mul (ecc, u2, rp, sinv);
++  ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->q, u2, rp, sinv, u2);
+ 
+    /* Total storage: 5*ecc->p.size + ecc->mul_itch */
+   ecc->mul (ecc, P2, u2, pp, u2 + ecc->p.size);
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/testsuite/ecdsa-sign-test.c
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/testsuite/ecdsa-sign-test.c
++++ nettle-3.5.1/testsuite/ecdsa-sign-test.c
+@@ -58,6 +58,19 @@ test_ecdsa (const struct ecc_curve *ecc,
+ void
+ test_main (void)
+ {
++  /* Producing the signature for corresponding test in
++     ecdsa-verify-test.c, with special u1 and u2. */
++  test_ecdsa (&_nettle_secp_224r1,
++             "99b5b787484def12894ca507058b3bf5"
++             "43d72d82fa7721d2e805e5e6",
++             "2",
++             SHEX("cdb887ac805a3b42e22d224c85482053"
++                  "16c755d4a736bb2032c92553"),
++             "706a46dc76dcb76798e60e6d89474788"
++             "d16dc18032d268fd1a704fa6", /* r */
++             "3a41e1423b1853e8aa89747b1f987364"
++             "44705d6d6d8371ea1f578f2e"); /* s */
++
+   /* Test cases for the smaller groups, verified with a
+      proof-of-concept implementation done for Yubico AB. */
+   test_ecdsa (&_nettle_secp_192r1,
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/testsuite/ecdsa-verify-test.c
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/testsuite/ecdsa-verify-test.c
++++ nettle-3.5.1/testsuite/ecdsa-verify-test.c
+@@ -81,6 +81,26 @@ test_ecdsa (const struct ecc_curve *ecc,
+ void
+ test_main (void)
+ {
++  /* Corresponds to nonce k = 2 and private key z =
++     0x99b5b787484def12894ca507058b3bf543d72d82fa7721d2e805e5e6. z and
++     hash are chosen so that intermediate scalars in the verify
++     equations are u1 = 0x6b245680e700, u2 =
++     259da6542d4ba7d21ad916c3bd57f811. These values require canonical
++     reduction of the scalars. Bug caused by missing canonical
++     reduction reported by Guido Vranken. */
++  test_ecdsa (&_nettle_secp_224r1,
++             "9e7e6cc6b1bdfa8ee039b66ad85e5490"
++             "7be706a900a3cba1c8fdd014", /* x */
++             "74855db3f7c1b4097ae095745fc915e3"
++             "8a79d2a1de28f282eafb22ba", /* y */
++
++             SHEX("cdb887ac805a3b42e22d224c85482053"
++                  "16c755d4a736bb2032c92553"),
++             "706a46dc76dcb76798e60e6d89474788"
++             "d16dc18032d268fd1a704fa6", /* r */
++             "3a41e1423b1853e8aa89747b1f987364"
++             "44705d6d6d8371ea1f578f2e"); /* s */
++
+   /* From RFC 4754 */
+   test_ecdsa (&_nettle_secp_256r1,
+              "2442A5CC 0ECD015F A3CA31DC 8E2BBC70"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-20305-4.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-20305-4.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..54b4fa584c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-20305-4.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+Backport of:
+
+From 51f643eee00e2caa65c8a2f5857f49acdf3ef1ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 16:27:50 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Ensure ecdsa_sign output is canonically reduced.
+
+* ecc-ecdsa-sign.c (ecc_ecdsa_sign): Ensure s output is reduced to
+canonical range.
+
+(cherry picked from commit c24b36160dc5303f7541dd9da1429c4046f27398)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://sources.debian.org/data/main/n/nettle/3.4.1-1%2Bdeb10u1/debian/patches/CVE-2021-20305-4.patch
+CVE: CVE-2021-20305 dep4
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ ChangeLog        | 3 +++
+ ecc-ecdsa-sign.c | 3 +--
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+#diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+#index 63848f53..fb2d7f66 100644
+#--- a/ChangeLog
+#+++ b/ChangeLog
+#@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
+# 2021-03-13  Niels Möller  <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+# 
+#+      * ecc-ecdsa-sign.c (ecc_ecdsa_sign): Ensure s output is reduced to
+#+      canonical range.
+#+
+#       * ecc-ecdsa-verify.c (ecc_ecdsa_verify): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical
+#       to compute the scalars used for ecc multiplication.
+#       * testsuite/ecdsa-verify-test.c (test_main): Add test case that
+--- a/ecc-ecdsa-sign.c
++++ b/ecc-ecdsa-sign.c
+@@ -90,9 +90,8 @@ ecc_ecdsa_sign (const struct ecc_curve *
+ 
+   ecc_modq_mul (ecc, tp, zp, rp);
+   ecc_modq_add (ecc, hp, hp, tp);
+-  ecc_modq_mul (ecc, tp, hp, kinv);
++  ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->q, sp, hp, kinv, tp);
+ 
+-  mpn_copyi (sp, tp, ecc->p.size);
+ #undef P
+ #undef hp
+ #undef kinv
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-20305-5.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-20305-5.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..468ff66266
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-20305-5.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+Backport of:
+
+From ae3801a0e5cce276c270973214385c86048d5f7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 16:42:21 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Similar fix for eddsa.
+
+* eddsa-hash.c (_eddsa_hash): Ensure result is canonically
+reduced. Two of the three call sites need that.
+
+(cherry picked from commit d9b564e4b3b3a5691afb9328c7342b3f7ca64288)
+
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://sources.debian.org/data/main/n/nettle/3.4.1-1%2Bdeb10u1/debian/patches/CVE-2021-20305-6.patch
+CVE: CVE-2021-20305 
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ ChangeLog    |  3 +++
+ eddsa-hash.c | 10 +++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+#diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+#index 5f8a22c2..ce330831 100644
+#--- a/ChangeLog
+#+++ b/ChangeLog
+#@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
+# 2021-03-13  Niels Möller  <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+# 
+#+      * eddsa-hash.c (_eddsa_hash): Ensure result is canonically
+#+      reduced. Two of the three call sites need that.
+#+
+#       * ecc-gostdsa-verify.c (ecc_gostdsa_verify): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical
+#       to compute the scalars used for ecc multiplication.
+# 
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/eddsa-hash.c
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/eddsa-hash.c
++++ nettle-3.5.1/eddsa-hash.c
+@@ -46,7 +46,12 @@ void
+ _eddsa_hash (const struct ecc_modulo *m,
+             mp_limb_t *rp, const uint8_t *digest)
+ {
++  mp_limb_t cy;
+   size_t nbytes = 1 + m->bit_size / 8;
+   mpn_set_base256_le (rp, 2*m->size, digest, 2*nbytes);
+   m->mod (m, rp);
++  mpn_copyi (rp + m->size, rp, m->size);
++  /* Ensure canonical reduction. */
++  cy = mpn_sub_n (rp, rp + m->size, m->m, m->size);
++  cnd_copy (cy, rp, rp + m->size, m->size);
+ }
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-3580_1.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-3580_1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ac3a638e72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-3580_1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+From cd6059aebdd3059fbcf674dddb850b821c13b6c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 21:31:39 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Change _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr to take a fix input size.
+
+Improves consistency with _rsa_sec_compute_root, and fixes zero-input bug.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 485b5e2820a057e873b1ba812fdb39cae4adf98c)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2021-3580 dep#1
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ ChangeLog                    | 17 +++++++++-
+ rsa-decrypt-tr.c             |  7 ++---
+ rsa-internal.h               |  4 +--
+ rsa-sec-decrypt.c            |  9 ++++--
+ rsa-sign-tr.c                | 61 +++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c | 14 ++++++++-
+ 6 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
+
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
++++ nettle-3.5.1/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
+@@ -52,14 +52,13 @@ rsa_decrypt_tr(const struct rsa_public_k
+   mp_size_t key_limb_size;
+   int res;
+ 
+-  key_limb_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
++  key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n);
+ 
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, key_limb_size);
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size);
++  mpz_limbs_copy(m, gibberish, key_limb_size);
+ 
+-  res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m,
+-                                 mpz_limbs_read(gibberish),
+-                                 mpz_size(gibberish));
++  res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, m);
+ 
+   mpn_get_base256 (em, key->size, m, key_limb_size);
+ 
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/rsa-internal.h
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/rsa-internal.h
++++ nettle-3.5.1/rsa-internal.h
+@@ -78,11 +78,11 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root(const struct rsa_p
+                       mp_limb_t *scratch);
+ 
+ /* Safe side-channel silent variant, using RSA blinding, and checking the
+- * result after CRT. */
++ * result after CRT. In-place calls, with x == m, is allowed. */
+ int
+ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+                         const struct rsa_private_key *key,
+                         void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
+-                        mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn);
++                        mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m);
+ 
+ #endif /* NETTLE_RSA_INTERNAL_H_INCLUDED */
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
++++ nettle-3.5.1/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
+@@ -58,9 +58,12 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, mpz_size(pub->n));
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size);
+ 
+-  res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m,
+-                                 mpz_limbs_read(gibberish),
+-                                 mpz_size(gibberish));
++  /* We need a copy because m can be shorter than key_size,
++   * but _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr expect all inputs to be
++   * normalized to a key_size long buffer length */
++  mpz_limbs_copy(m, gibberish, mpz_size(pub->n));
++
++  res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, m);
+ 
+   mpn_get_base256 (em, key->size, m, mpz_size(pub->n));
+ 
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/rsa-sign-tr.c
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/rsa-sign-tr.c
++++ nettle-3.5.1/rsa-sign-tr.c
+@@ -131,35 +131,34 @@ int
+ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+                         const struct rsa_private_key *key,
+                         void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
+-                        mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn)
++                        mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m)
+ {
++  mp_size_t nn;
+   mpz_t mz;
+   mpz_t xz;
+   int res;
+ 
+-  mpz_init(mz);
+   mpz_init(xz);
+ 
+-  mpn_copyi(mpz_limbs_write(mz, mn), m, mn);
+-  mpz_limbs_finish(mz, mn);
++  nn = mpz_size (pub->n);
+ 
+-  res = rsa_compute_root_tr(pub, key, random_ctx, random, xz, mz);
++  res = rsa_compute_root_tr(pub, key, random_ctx, random, xz,
++                           mpz_roinit_n(mz, m, nn));
+ 
+   if (res)
+-    mpz_limbs_copy(x, xz, mpz_size(pub->n));
++    mpz_limbs_copy(x, xz, nn);
+ 
+-  mpz_clear(mz);
+   mpz_clear(xz);
+   return res;
+ }
+ #else
+ /* Blinds m, by computing c = m r^e (mod n), for a random r. Also
+-   returns the inverse (ri), for use by rsa_unblind. */
++   returns the inverse (ri), for use by rsa_unblind. Must have c != m,
++   no in-place operation.*/
+ static void
+ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+                void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
+-               mp_limb_t *c, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *m,
+-               mp_size_t mn)
++               mp_limb_t *c, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *m)
+ {
+   const mp_limb_t *ep = mpz_limbs_read (pub->e);
+   const mp_limb_t *np = mpz_limbs_read (pub->n);
+@@ -177,15 +176,15 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_k
+ 
+   /* c = m*(r^e) mod n */
+   itch = mpn_sec_powm_itch(nn, ebn, nn);
+-  i2 = mpn_sec_mul_itch(nn, mn);
++  i2 = mpn_sec_mul_itch(nn, nn);
+   itch = MAX(itch, i2);
+-  i2 = mpn_sec_div_r_itch(nn + mn, nn);
++  i2 = mpn_sec_div_r_itch(2*nn, nn);
+   itch = MAX(itch, i2);
+   i2 = mpn_sec_invert_itch(nn);
+   itch = MAX(itch, i2);
+ 
+-  TMP_GMP_ALLOC (tp, nn + mn + itch);
+-  scratch = tp + nn + mn;
++  TMP_GMP_ALLOC (tp, 2*nn  + itch);
++  scratch = tp + 2*nn;
+ 
+   /* ri = r^(-1) */
+   do
+@@ -198,9 +197,8 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_k
+   while (!mpn_sec_invert (ri, tp, np, nn, 2 * nn * GMP_NUMB_BITS, scratch));
+ 
+   mpn_sec_powm (c, rp, nn, ep, ebn, np, nn, scratch);
+-  /* normally mn == nn, but m can be smaller in some cases */
+-  mpn_sec_mul (tp, c, nn, m, mn, scratch);
+-  mpn_sec_div_r (tp, nn + mn, np, nn, scratch);
++  mpn_sec_mul (tp, c, nn, m, nn, scratch);
++  mpn_sec_div_r (tp, 2*nn, np, nn, scratch);
+   mpn_copyi(c, tp, nn);
+ 
+   TMP_GMP_FREE (r);
+@@ -208,7 +206,7 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_k
+   TMP_GMP_FREE (tp);
+ }
+ 
+-/* m = c ri mod n */
++/* m = c ri mod n. Allows x == c. */
+ static void
+ rsa_sec_unblind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+                  mp_limb_t *x, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *c)
+@@ -299,7 +297,7 @@ int
+ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+                         const struct rsa_private_key *key,
+                         void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
+-                        mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn)
++                        mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m)
+ {
+   TMP_GMP_DECL (c, mp_limb_t);
+   TMP_GMP_DECL (ri, mp_limb_t);
+@@ -307,7 +305,7 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rs
+   size_t key_limb_size;
+   int ret;
+ 
+-  key_limb_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
++  key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n);
+ 
+   /* mpz_powm_sec handles only odd moduli. If p, q or n is even, the
+      key is invalid and rejected by rsa_private_key_prepare. However,
+@@ -321,19 +319,18 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rs
+     }
+ 
+   assert(mpz_size(pub->n) == key_limb_size);
+-  assert(mn <= key_limb_size);
+ 
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (c, key_limb_size);
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (ri, key_limb_size);
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (scratch, _rsa_sec_compute_root_itch(key));
+ 
+-  rsa_sec_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, x, ri, m, mn);
++  rsa_sec_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, c, ri, m);
+ 
+-  _rsa_sec_compute_root(key, c, x, scratch);
++  _rsa_sec_compute_root(key, x, c, scratch);
+ 
+-  ret = rsa_sec_check_root(pub, c, x);
++  ret = rsa_sec_check_root(pub, x, c);
+ 
+-  rsa_sec_unblind(pub, x, ri, c);
++  rsa_sec_unblind(pub, x, ri, x);
+ 
+   cnd_mpn_zero(1 - ret, x, key_limb_size);
+ 
+@@ -357,17 +354,17 @@ rsa_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_pub
+                    mpz_t x, const mpz_t m)
+ {
+   TMP_GMP_DECL (l, mp_limb_t);
++  mp_size_t nn = mpz_size(pub->n);
+   int res;
+ 
+-  mp_size_t l_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
+-  TMP_GMP_ALLOC (l, l_size);
++  TMP_GMP_ALLOC (l, nn);
++  mpz_limbs_copy(l, m, nn);
+ 
+-  res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, l,
+-                                 mpz_limbs_read(m), mpz_size(m));
++  res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, l, l);
+   if (res) {
+-    mp_limb_t *xp = mpz_limbs_write (x, l_size);
+-    mpn_copyi (xp, l, l_size);
+-    mpz_limbs_finish (x, l_size);
++    mp_limb_t *xp = mpz_limbs_write (x, nn);
++    mpn_copyi (xp, l, nn);
++    mpz_limbs_finish (x, nn);
+   }
+ 
+   TMP_GMP_FREE (l);
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
++++ nettle-3.5.1/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
+@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ test_main(void)
+   uint8_t after;
+ 
+   mpz_t gibberish;
++  mpz_t zero;
+ 
+   rsa_private_key_init(&key);
+   rsa_public_key_init(&pub);
+@@ -101,6 +102,17 @@ test_main(void)
+   ASSERT(decrypted[decrypted_length] == after);
+   ASSERT(decrypted[0] == 'A');
+ 
++  /* Test zero input. */
++  mpz_init_set_ui (zero, 0);
++  decrypted_length = msg_length;
++  ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
++  ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
++                        &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
++                        &decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
++  ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
++                         &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
++                         decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
++  ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
+ 
+   /* Test invalid key. */
+   mpz_add_ui (key.q, key.q, 2);
+@@ -112,6 +124,6 @@ test_main(void)
+   rsa_private_key_clear(&key);
+   rsa_public_key_clear(&pub);
+   mpz_clear(gibberish);
++  mpz_clear(zero);
+   free(decrypted);
+ }
+-  
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-3580_2.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-3580_2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..18e952ddf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle-3.5.1/CVE-2021-3580_2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+From c80961c646b0962ab152619ac0a7c6a21850a380 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 21:32:38 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Add input check to rsa_decrypt family of functions.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 0ad0b5df315665250dfdaa4a1e087f4799edaefe)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2021-3580
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ ChangeLog                    | 10 +++++++++-
+ rsa-decrypt-tr.c             |  4 ++++
+ rsa-decrypt.c                | 10 ++++++++++
+ rsa-sec-decrypt.c            |  4 ++++
+ rsa.h                        |  5 +++--
+ testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 6 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
++++ nettle-3.5.1/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
+@@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ rsa_decrypt_tr(const struct rsa_public_k
+   mp_size_t key_limb_size;
+   int res;
+ 
++  /* First check that input is in range. */
++  if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, pub->n) >= 0)
++    return 0;
++
+   key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n);
+ 
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, key_limb_size);
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/rsa-decrypt.c
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/rsa-decrypt.c
++++ nettle-3.5.1/rsa-decrypt.c
+@@ -48,6 +48,16 @@ rsa_decrypt(const struct rsa_private_key
+   int res;
+ 
+   mpz_init(m);
++
++  /* First check that input is in range. Since we don't have the
++     public key available here, we need to reconstruct n. */
++  mpz_mul (m, key->p, key->q);
++  if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, m) >= 0)
++    {
++      mpz_clear (m);
++      return 0;
++    }
++
+   rsa_compute_root(key, m, gibberish);
+ 
+   res = pkcs1_decrypt (key->size, m, length, message);
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
++++ nettle-3.5.1/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
+@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_
+   TMP_GMP_DECL (em, uint8_t);
+   int res;
+ 
++  /* First check that input is in range. */
++  if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, pub->n) >= 0)
++    return 0;
++
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, mpz_size(pub->n));
+   TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size);
+ 
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/rsa.h
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/rsa.h
++++ nettle-3.5.1/rsa.h
+@@ -428,13 +428,14 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_
+                size_t length, uint8_t *message,
+                const mpz_t gibberish);
+ 
+-/* Compute x, the e:th root of m. Calling it with x == m is allowed. */
++/* Compute x, the e:th root of m. Calling it with x == m is allowed.
++   It is required that 0 <= m < n. */
+ void
+ rsa_compute_root(const struct rsa_private_key *key,
+                 mpz_t x, const mpz_t m);
+ 
+ /* Safer variant, using RSA blinding, and checking the result after
+-   CRT. */
++   CRT. It is required that 0 <= m < n. */
+ int
+ rsa_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+                    const struct rsa_private_key *key,
+Index: nettle-3.5.1/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
+===================================================================
+--- nettle-3.5.1.orig/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
++++ nettle-3.5.1/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
+@@ -19,11 +19,12 @@ test_main(void)
+   uint8_t after;
+ 
+   mpz_t gibberish;
+-  mpz_t zero;
++  mpz_t bad_input;
+ 
+   rsa_private_key_init(&key);
+   rsa_public_key_init(&pub);
+   mpz_init(gibberish);
++  mpz_init(bad_input);
+ 
+   knuth_lfib_init(&lfib, 17);
+   
+@@ -103,15 +104,40 @@ test_main(void)
+   ASSERT(decrypted[0] == 'A');
+ 
+   /* Test zero input. */
+-  mpz_init_set_ui (zero, 0);
++  mpz_set_ui (bad_input, 0);
+   decrypted_length = msg_length;
+-  ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
++  ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+   ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
+                         &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+-                        &decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
++                        &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+   ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
+                          &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+-                         decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
++                         decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
++  ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
++
++  /* Test input that is slightly larger than n */
++  mpz_add(bad_input, gibberish, pub.n);
++  decrypted_length = msg_length;
++  ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
++  ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
++                        &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
++                        &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
++  ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
++                         &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
++                         decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
++  ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
++
++  /* Test input that is considerably larger than n */
++  mpz_mul_2exp (bad_input, pub.n, 100);
++  mpz_add (bad_input, bad_input, gibberish);
++  decrypted_length = msg_length;
++  ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
++  ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
++                        &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
++                        &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
++  ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
++                         &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
++                         decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+   ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
+ 
+   /* Test invalid key. */
+@@ -124,6 +150,6 @@ test_main(void)
+   rsa_private_key_clear(&key);
+   rsa_public_key_clear(&pub);
+   mpz_clear(gibberish);
+-  mpz_clear(zero);
++  mpz_clear(bad_input);
+   free(decrypted);
+ }
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle_3.5.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle_3.5.1.bb
index a9550ed033..192fd295e9 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle_3.5.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/nettle/nettle_3.5.1.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 SUMMARY = "A low level cryptographic library"
+DESCRIPTION = "Nettle is a cryptographic library that is designed to fit easily in more or less any context: In crypto toolkits for object-oriented languages (C++, Python, Pike, ...), in applications like LSH or GNUPG, or even in kernel space."
 HOMEPAGE = "http://www.lysator.liu.se/~nisse/nettle/"
 DESCRIPTION = "It tries to solve a problem of providing a common set of \
 cryptographic algorithms for higher-level applications by implementing a \
@@ -17,6 +18,13 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://Add-target-to-only-build-tests-not-run-them.patch \
            file://run-ptest \
            file://check-header-files-of-openssl-only-if-enable_.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3580_1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3580_2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-20305-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-20305-2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-20305-3.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-20305-4.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-20305-5.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI_append_class-target = "\
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/npth/npth_1.6.bb b/meta/recipes-support/npth/npth_1.6.bb
index 88484acec3..94a3f00eac 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/npth/npth_1.6.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/npth/npth_1.6.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 SUMMARY = "New GNU Portable Threads library"
+DESCRIPTION = "nPth is a library to provide the GNU Pth API and thus a non-preemptive threads implementation. "
 HOMEPAGE = "https://www.gnu.org/software/pth/"
 SECTION = "libs"
 LICENSE = "LGPLv2+"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/p11-kit/p11-kit_0.23.22.bb b/meta/recipes-support/p11-kit/p11-kit_0.23.22.bb
index c539ecdbc6..5f1b73ee16 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/p11-kit/p11-kit_0.23.22.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/p11-kit/p11-kit_0.23.22.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 SUMMARY = "Provides a way to load and enumerate PKCS#11 modules"
+DESCRIPTION = " Provides a standard configuration setup for installing PKCS#11 modules in such a way that they're discoverable. Also solves problems with coordinating the use of PKCS#11 by different components or libraries living in the same process."
+HOMEPAGE = "https://p11-glue.github.io/p11-glue/p11-kit.html"
 LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=02933887f609807fbb57aa4237d14a50"
 
@@ -8,7 +10,7 @@ DEPENDS = "libtasn1 libtasn1-native libffi"
 
 DEPENDS_append = "${@' glib-2.0' if d.getVar('GTKDOC_ENABLED') == 'True' else ''}"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://github.com/p11-glue/p11-kit;branch=0.23"
+SRC_URI = "git://github.com/p11-glue/p11-kit;branch=0.23;protocol=https"
 SRCREV = "bd97afbfe28d5fbbde95ce36ff7a8834fc0291ee"
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/popt/popt_1.16.bb b/meta/recipes-support/popt/popt_1.16.bb
index 27e49c2ca2..0c0392d036 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/popt/popt_1.16.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/popt/popt_1.16.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 SUMMARY = "Library for parsing command line options"
+DESCRIPTION = "Popt is a C library for parsing command line parameters. Popt was heavily influenced by the getopt() and getopt_long() functions, but it improves on them by allowing more powerful argument expansion. Popt can parse arbitrary argv[] style arrays and automatically set variables based on command line arguments."
 HOMEPAGE = "http://rpm5.org/"
 SECTION = "libs"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/ptest-runner/ptest-runner_2.4.0.bb b/meta/recipes-support/ptest-runner/ptest-runner_2.4.0.bb
index 8b9938f572..3401b7b39e 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/ptest-runner/ptest-runner_2.4.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/ptest-runner/ptest-runner_2.4.0.bb
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=751419260aa954499f7abaabaa882bbe"
 SRCREV = "834670317bd3f6e427e1ac461c07ada6b8936dfd"
 PV .= "+git${SRCPV}"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/ptest-runner2 \
+SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/ptest-runner2;branch=master \
 "
 UPSTREAM_VERSION_UNKNOWN = "1"
 
@@ -27,3 +27,5 @@ do_compile () {
 do_install () {
         install -D -m 0755 ${S}/ptest-runner ${D}${bindir}/ptest-runner
 }
+
+RDEPENDS_${PN}_append_libc-glibc = " libgcc"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-1.patch b/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b7dcaefad3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
+From fd634998f813340768c333cdad638498602856e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ulya Trofimovich <skvadrik@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2020 21:28:32 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Rewrite recursion into iteration (Tarjan's SCC algorithm and
+ YYFILL states).
+
+This is to avoid stack overflow on large RE (especially on instrumented
+builds that have larger stack frames, like AddressSanitizer).
+
+Stack overflow reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
+Related to #219 "overflow-1.re test fails on system with small stack".
+
+Upstram-Status: Backport:
+https://github.com/skvadrik/re2c/commit/fd634998f813340768c333cdad638498602856e5
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-21232
+
+Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal <davide.gardenal@huawei.com>
+---
+diff --git a/src/dfa/fillpoints.cc b/src/dfa/fillpoints.cc
+--- a/src/dfa/fillpoints.cc     (revision e58939b34bb4c37cd990f82dc286f21cb405743e)
++++ b/src/dfa/fillpoints.cc     (date 1646929180243)
+@@ -5,151 +5,186 @@
+ 
+ #include "src/dfa/dfa.h"
+ 
+-namespace re2c
+-{
++
++/*
++ * note [finding strongly connected components of DFA]
++ *
++ * A slight modification of Tarjan's algorithm.
++ *
++ * The algorithm traverses the DFA in depth-first order. It maintains a stack
++ * of states that have already been visited but haven't been assigned to an SCC
++ * yet. For each state the algorithm calculates 'lowlink': index of the highest
++ * ancestor state reachable in one step from a descendant of this state.
++ * Lowlink is used to determine when a set of states should be popped off stack
++ * into a new SCC.
++ *
++ * We use lowlink to hold different kinds of information:
++ *   - values in range [0 .. stack size] mean that the state is on stack (a
++ *     link to a state with the smallest index reachable from this one)
++ *   - SCC_UND means that this state has not been visited yet
++ *   - SCC_INF means that this state has already been popped off stack
++ *
++ * We use stack size (rather than topological sort index) as a unique index of
++ * the state on stack. This is safe because the indices of states on stack are
++ * unique and less than the indices of states that have been popped off stack
++ * (SCC_INF).
++ */
++
++namespace re2c {
++    namespace {
+ 
+-static const size_t SCC_INF = std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max();
+-static const size_t SCC_UND = SCC_INF - 1;
++        static const size_t SCC_INF = std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max();
++        static const size_t SCC_UND = SCC_INF - 1;
+ 
+-static bool loopback(size_t node, size_t narcs, const size_t *arcs)
+-{
+-       for (size_t i = 0; i < narcs; ++i)
+-       {
+-               if (arcs[i] == node)
+-               {
+-                       return true;
+-               }
+-       }
+-       return false;
+-}
++        static bool loopback(size_t state, size_t narcs, const size_t *arcs)
++        {
++            for (size_t i = 0; i < narcs; ++i) {
++                if (arcs[i] == state) return true;
++            }
++            return false;
++        }
+ 
+-/*
+- * node [finding strongly connected components of DFA]
+- *
+- * A slight modification of Tarjan's algorithm.
+- *
+- * The algorithm walks graph in deep-first order. It maintains a stack
+- * of nodes that have already been visited but haven't been assigned to
+- * SCC yet. For each node the algorithm calculates 'lowlink': index of
+- * the highest ancestor node reachable in one step from a descendant of
+- * the node. Lowlink is used to determine when a set of nodes should be
+- * popped off the stack into a new SCC.
+- *
+- * We use lowlink to hold different kinds of information:
+- *   - values in range [0 .. stack size] mean that this node is on stack
+- *     (link to a node with the smallest index reachable from this one)
+- *   - SCC_UND means that this node has not been visited yet
+- *   - SCC_INF means that this node has already been popped off stack
+- *
+- * We use stack size (rather than topological sort index) as unique index
+- * of a node on stack. This is safe because indices of nodes on stack are
+- * still unique and less than indices of nodes that have been popped off
+- * stack (SCC_INF).
+- *
+- */
+-static void scc(
+-       const dfa_t &dfa,
+-       std::stack<size_t> &stack,
+-       std::vector<size_t> &lowlink,
+-       std::vector<bool> &trivial,
+-       size_t i)
+-{
+-       const size_t link = stack.size();
+-       lowlink[i] = link;
+-       stack.push(i);
++        struct StackItem {
++            size_t state;  // current state
++            size_t symbol; // next arc to be visited in this state
++            size_t link;   // Tarjan's "lowlink"
++        };
++
++// Tarjan's algorithm
++        static void scc(const dfa_t &dfa, std::vector<bool> &trivial,
++                        std::vector<StackItem> &stack_dfs)
++        {
++            std::vector<size_t> lowlink(dfa.states.size(), SCC_UND);
++            std::stack<size_t> stack;
++
++            StackItem x0 = {0, 0, 0};
++            stack_dfs.push_back(x0);
++
++            while (!stack_dfs.empty()) {
++                const size_t i = stack_dfs.back().state;
++                size_t c = stack_dfs.back().symbol;
++                size_t link = stack_dfs.back().link;
++                stack_dfs.pop_back();
++
++                const size_t *arcs = dfa.states[i]->arcs;
++
++                if (c == 0) {
++                    // DFS recursive enter
++                    //DASSERT(lowlink[i] == SCC_UND);
++                    link = lowlink[i] = stack.size();
++                    stack.push(i);
++                }
++                else {
++                    // DFS recursive return (from one of successor states)
++                    const size_t j = arcs[c - 1];
++                    //DASSERT(lowlink[j] != SCC_UND);
++                    lowlink[i] = std::min(lowlink[i], lowlink[j]);
++                }
+ 
+-       const size_t *arcs = dfa.states[i]->arcs;
+-       for (size_t c = 0; c < dfa.nchars; ++c)
+-       {
+-               const size_t j = arcs[c];
+-               if (j != dfa_t::NIL)
+-               {
+-                       if (lowlink[j] == SCC_UND)
+-                       {
+-                               scc(dfa, stack, lowlink, trivial, j);
+-                       }
+-                       if (lowlink[j] < lowlink[i])
+-                       {
+-                               lowlink[i] = lowlink[j];
+-                       }
+-               }
+-       }
++                // find the next successor state that hasn't been visited yet
++                for (; c < dfa.nchars; ++c) {
++                    const size_t j = arcs[c];
++                    if (j != dfa_t::NIL) {
++                        if (lowlink[j] == SCC_UND) {
++                            break;
++                        }
++                        lowlink[i] = std::min(lowlink[i], lowlink[j]);
++                    }
++                }
+ 
+-       if (lowlink[i] == link)
+-       {
+-               // SCC is non-trivial (has loops) iff it either:
+-               //   - consists of multiple nodes (they all must be interconnected)
+-               //   - consists of single node which loops back to itself
+-               trivial[i] = i == stack.top()
+-                       && !loopback(i, dfa.nchars, arcs);
++                if (c < dfa.nchars) {
++                    // recurse into the next successor state
++                    StackItem x1 = {i, c + 1, link};
++                    stack_dfs.push_back(x1);
++                    StackItem x2 = {arcs[c], 0, SCC_UND};
++                    stack_dfs.push_back(x2);
++                }
++                else if (lowlink[i] == link) {
++                    // all successors have been visited
++                    // SCC is non-trivial (has loops) if either:
++                    //   - it contains multiple interconnected states
++                    //   - it contains a single self-looping state
++                    trivial[i] = i == stack.top() && !loopback(i, dfa.nchars, arcs);
+ 
+-               size_t j;
+-               do
+-               {
+-                       j = stack.top();
+-                       stack.pop();
+-                       lowlink[j] = SCC_INF;
+-               }
+-               while (j != i);
+-       }
+-}
++                    for (;;) {
++                        const size_t j = stack.top();
++                        stack.pop();
++                        lowlink[j] = SCC_INF;
++                        if (i == j) break;
++                    }
++                }
++            }
++        }
+ 
+-static void calc_fill(
+-       const dfa_t &dfa,
+-       const std::vector<bool> &trivial,
+-       std::vector<size_t> &fill,
+-       size_t i)
+-{
+-       if (fill[i] == SCC_UND)
+-       {
+-               fill[i] = 0;
+-               const size_t *arcs = dfa.states[i]->arcs;
+-               for (size_t c = 0; c < dfa.nchars; ++c)
+-               {
+-                       const size_t j = arcs[c];
+-                       if (j != dfa_t::NIL)
+-                       {
+-                               calc_fill(dfa, trivial, fill, j);
+-                               size_t max = 1;
+-                               if (trivial[j])
+-                               {
+-                                       max += fill[j];
+-                               }
+-                               if (max > fill[i])
+-                               {
+-                                       fill[i] = max;
+-                               }
+-                       }
+-               }
+-       }
+-}
+-
+-void fillpoints(const dfa_t &dfa, std::vector<size_t> &fill)
+-{
+-       const size_t size = dfa.states.size();
+-
+-       // find DFA states that belong to non-trivial SCC
+-       std::stack<size_t> stack;
+-       std::vector<size_t> lowlink(size, SCC_UND);
+-       std::vector<bool> trivial(size, false);
+-       scc(dfa, stack, lowlink, trivial, 0);
+-
+-       // for each DFA state, calculate YYFILL argument:
+-       // maximal path length to the next YYFILL state
+-       fill.resize(size, SCC_UND);
+-       calc_fill(dfa, trivial, fill, 0);
++        static void calc_fill(const dfa_t &dfa, const std::vector<bool> &trivial,
++                              std::vector<StackItem> &stack_dfs, std::vector<size_t> &fill)
++        {
++            const size_t nstates = dfa.states.size();
++            fill.resize(nstates, SCC_UND);
++
++            StackItem x0 = {0, 0, SCC_INF};
++            stack_dfs.push_back(x0);
++
++            while (!stack_dfs.empty()) {
++                const size_t i = stack_dfs.back().state;
++                size_t c = stack_dfs.back().symbol;
++                stack_dfs.pop_back();
++
++                const size_t *arcs = dfa.states[i]->arcs;
++
++                if (c == 0) {
++                    // DFS recursive enter
++                    if (fill[i] != SCC_UND) continue;
++                    fill[i] = 0;
++                }
++                else {
++                    // DFS recursive return (from one of successor states)
++                    const size_t j = arcs[c - 1];
++                    //DASSERT(fill[i] != SCC_UND && fill[j] != SCC_UND);
++                    fill[i] = std::max(fill[i], 1 + (trivial[j] ? fill[j] : 0));
++                }
++
++                // find the next successor state that hasn't been visited yet
++                for (; c < dfa.nchars; ++c) {
++                    const size_t j = arcs[c];
++                    if (j != dfa_t::NIL) break;
++                }
++
++                if (c < dfa.nchars) {
++                    // recurse into the next successor state
++                    StackItem x1 = {i, c + 1, SCC_INF};
++                    stack_dfs.push_back(x1);
++                    StackItem x2 = {arcs[c], 0, SCC_INF};
++                    stack_dfs.push_back(x2);
++                }
++            }
+ 
+-       // The following states must trigger YYFILL:
+-       //   - inital state
+-       //   - all states in non-trivial SCCs
+-       // for other states, reset YYFILL argument to zero
+-       for (size_t i = 1; i < size; ++i)
+-       {
+-               if (trivial[i])
+-               {
+-                       fill[i] = 0;
+-               }
+-       }
+-}
++            // The following states must trigger YYFILL:
++            //   - inital state
++            //   - all states in non-trivial SCCs
++            // for other states, reset YYFILL argument to zero
++            for (size_t i = 1; i < nstates; ++i) {
++                if (trivial[i]) {
++                    fill[i] = 0;
++                }
++            }
++        }
+ 
++    } // anonymous namespace
++
++    void fillpoints(const dfa_t &dfa, std::vector<size_t> &fill)
++    {
++        const size_t nstates = dfa.states.size();
++        std::vector<bool> trivial(nstates, false);
++        std::vector<StackItem> stack_dfs;
++        stack_dfs.reserve(nstates);
++
++        // find DFA states that belong to non-trivial SCC
++        scc(dfa, trivial, stack_dfs);
++
++        // for each DFA state, calculate YYFILL argument:
++        // maximal path length to the next YYFILL state
++        calc_fill(dfa, trivial, stack_dfs, fill);
++    }
++
+ } // namespace re2c
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-2.patch b/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..820a6decbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+From 7b5643476bd99c994c4f51b8143f942982d85521 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ulya Trofimovich <skvadrik@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2020 22:37:24 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Rewrite recursion into iteration (fixed tags computation).
+
+This is to avoid stack overflow on large RE (especially on instrumented
+builds that have larger stack frames, like AddressSanitizer).
+
+Partial fix for #219 "overflow-1.re test fails on system with small stack".
+
+Upstream-Stauts: Backport:
+https://github.com/skvadrik/re2c/commit/7b5643476bd99c994c4f51b8143f942982d85521
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-21232
+
+Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal <davide.gardenal@huawei.com>
+---
+diff --git a/src/re/tag.cc b/src/re/tag.cc
+--- a/src/re/tag.cc     (revision e58939b34bb4c37cd990f82dc286f21cb405743e)
++++ b/src/re/tag.cc     (date 1646986908580)
+@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
+ {
+ 
+ const size_t Tag::RIGHTMOST = std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max();
+-const size_t Tag::VARDIST = std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max();
++const uint32_t Tag::VARDIST = std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max();
+ const size_t Tag::FICTIVE = Tag::RIGHTMOST - 1;
+ 
+ } // namespace re2c
+
+
+diff --git a/src/re/tag.h b/src/re/tag.h
+--- a/src/re/tag.h      (revision e58939b34bb4c37cd990f82dc286f21cb405743e)
++++ b/src/re/tag.h      (date 1646986922376)
+@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
+ struct Tag
+ {
+        static const size_t RIGHTMOST;
+-       static const size_t VARDIST;
++    static const uint32_t VARDIST;
+        static const size_t FICTIVE;
+ 
+        const std::string *name;
+
+
+diff --git a/src/re/fixed_tags.cc b/src/re/fixed_tags.cc
+--- a/src/re/fixed_tags.cc      (revision e58939b34bb4c37cd990f82dc286f21cb405743e)
++++ b/src/re/fixed_tags.cc      (date 1646991137317)
+@@ -7,78 +7,131 @@
+ #include "src/re/tag.h"
+ 
+ namespace re2c {
++namespace {
+ 
+ /* note [fixed and variable tags]
+  *
+- * If distance between two tags is constant (equal for all strings that
+- * match the given regexp), then lexer only needs to track one of them:
+- * the second tag equals the first tag plus static offset.
++ * If distance between two tags is constant (equal for all strings that match
++ * the given regexp), then lexer only needs to track one of them: the second
++ * tag equals the first tag plus static offset.
+  *
+- * However, this optimization is applied only to tags in top-level
+- * concatenation, because other tags may be uninitialized and we don't
+- * want to mess with conditional calculation of fixed tags.
+- *
++ * This optimization is applied only to tags in top-level concatenation,
++ * because in other cases the base tag may be NULL, and the calculation of
++ * the fixed tag value is not as simple as substracting a fixed offset.
+  * Furthermore, fixed tags are fobidden with generic API because it cannot
+- * express fixed offsets.
+- *
+- * Tags with history also cannot be fixed.
++ * express fixed offsets. M-tags (with history) also cannot be fixed.
+  *
+  * Another special case is fictive tags (those that exist only to impose
+- * hierarchical laws of POSIX disambiguation). We treat them as fixed
+- * in order to suppress code generation.
++ * hierarchical laws of POSIX disambiguation). We treat them as fixed in order
++ * to suppress code generation.
+  */
+ 
+-static void find_fixed_tags(RE *re, std::vector<Tag> &tags,
+-       size_t &dist, size_t &base, bool toplevel)
++struct StackItem {
++    RE       *re;       // current sub-RE
++    uint32_t  dist;     // distance backup for alternative, unused for other RE
++    uint8_t   succ;     // index of the next successor to be visited
++    bool      toplevel; // if this sub-RE is in top-level concatenation
++};
++
++static void find_fixed_tags(RESpec &spec, std::vector<StackItem> &stack, RE *re0)
+ {
+-       switch (re->type) {
+-               case RE::NIL: break;
+-               case RE::SYM:
+-                       if (dist != Tag::VARDIST) ++dist;
+-                       break;
+-               case RE::ALT: {
+-                       size_t d1 = dist, d2 = dist;
+-                       find_fixed_tags(re->alt.re1, tags, d1, base, false);
+-                       find_fixed_tags(re->alt.re2, tags, d2, base, false);
+-                       dist = (d1 == d2) ? d1 : Tag::VARDIST;
+-                       break;
+-               }
+-               case RE::CAT:
+-                       find_fixed_tags(re->cat.re2, tags, dist, base, toplevel);
+-                       find_fixed_tags(re->cat.re1, tags, dist, base, toplevel);
+-                       break;
+-               case RE::ITER:
+-                       find_fixed_tags(re->iter.re, tags, dist, base, false);
+-                       dist = Tag::VARDIST;
+-                       break;
+-               case RE::TAG: {
+-                       // see note [fixed and variable tags]
+-                       Tag &tag = tags[re->tag.idx];
+-                       if (fictive(tag)) {
+-                               tag.base = tag.dist = 0;
+-                       } else if (toplevel && dist != Tag::VARDIST && !history(tag)) {
+-                               tag.base = base;
+-                               tag.dist = dist;
+-                       } else if (toplevel) {
+-                               base = re->tag.idx;
+-                               dist = 0;
+-                       }
+-                       if (trailing(tag)) dist = 0;
+-                       break;
+-               }
+-       }
++    static const uint32_t VARDIST = Tag::VARDIST;
++    bool toplevel = spec.opts->input_api != INPUT_CUSTOM;
++
++    // base tag, intially the fake "rightmost tag" (the end of RE)
++    size_t base = Tag::RIGHTMOST;
++
++    // the distance to the nearest top-level tag to the right (base tag)
++    uint32_t dist = 0;
++
++    const StackItem i0 = {re0, VARDIST, 0, toplevel};
++    stack.push_back(i0);
++
++    while (!stack.empty()) {
++        const StackItem i = stack.back();
++        stack.pop_back();
++        RE *re = i.re;
++
++        if (re->type == RE::SYM) {
++            if (dist != VARDIST) ++dist;
++        }
++        else if (re->type == RE::ALT) {
++            if (i.succ == 0) {
++                // save the current distance on stack (from the alternative end
++                // to base) and recurse into the left sub-RE
++                StackItem k = {re, dist, 1, i.toplevel};
++                stack.push_back(k);
++                StackItem j = {re->alt.re1, VARDIST, 0, false};
++                stack.push_back(j);
++            }
++            else if (i.succ == 1) {
++                // save the current distance on stack (from the left sub-RE to
++                // base), reset distance to the distance popped from stack (from
++                // the alternative end to base), recurse into the right sub-RE
++                StackItem k = {re, dist, 2, i.toplevel};
++                stack.push_back(k);
++                StackItem j = {re->alt.re2, VARDIST, 0, false};
++                stack.push_back(j);
++                dist = i.dist;
++            }
++            else {
++                // both sub-RE visited, compare the distance on stack (from the
++                // left sub-RE to base) to the current distance (from the right
++                // sub-RE to base), if not equal set variable distance
++                dist = (i.dist == dist) ? i.dist : VARDIST;
++            }
++        }
++        else if (re->type == RE::ITER) {
++            if (i.succ == 0) {
++                // recurse into the sub-RE
++                StackItem k = {re, VARDIST, 1, i.toplevel};
++                stack.push_back(k);
++                StackItem j = {re->iter.re, VARDIST, 0, false};
++                stack.push_back(j);
++            }
++            else {
++                // sub-RE visited, assume unknown number of iterations
++                // TODO: find precise distance for fixed repetition counter
++                dist = VARDIST;
++            }
++        }
++        else if (re->type == RE::CAT) {
++            // the right sub-RE is pushed on stack after the left sub-RE and
++            // visited earlier (because distance is computed from right to left)
++            StackItem j1 = {re->cat.re1, VARDIST, 0, i.toplevel};
++            stack.push_back(j1);
++            StackItem j2 = {re->cat.re2, VARDIST, 0, i.toplevel};
++            stack.push_back(j2);
++        }
++        else if (re->type == RE::TAG) {
++            // see note [fixed and variable tags]
++            Tag &tag = spec.tags[re->tag.idx];
++            if (fictive(tag)) {
++                tag.base = tag.dist = 0;
++            }
++            else if (i.toplevel && dist != VARDIST && !history(tag)) {
++                tag.base = base;
++                tag.dist = dist;
++            }
++            else if (i.toplevel) {
++                base = re->tag.idx;
++                dist = 0;
++            }
++            if (trailing(tag)) {
++                dist = 0;
++            }
++        }
++    }
+ }
++
++} // anonymous namespace
+ 
+-void find_fixed_tags(RESpec &spec)
+-{
+-       const bool generic = spec.opts->input_api == INPUT_CUSTOM;
+-       std::vector<RE*>::iterator
+-               i = spec.res.begin(),
+-               e = spec.res.end();
+-       for (; i != e; ++i) {
+-               size_t base = Tag::RIGHTMOST, dist = 0;
+-               find_fixed_tags(*i, spec.tags, dist, base, !generic);
+-       }
+-}
++    void find_fixed_tags(RESpec &spec)
++    {
++        std::vector<StackItem> stack;
++        for (std::vector<RE*>::iterator i = spec.res.begin(); i != spec.res.end(); ++i) {
++            find_fixed_tags(spec, stack, *i);
++        }
++    }
+ 
+-} // namespace re2c
++} // namespace re2c
+\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-3.patch b/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f942e21cba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+From 4d9c809355b574f2a58eac119f5e076c48e4d1e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ulya Trofimovich <skvadrik@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2020 22:16:51 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Rewrite recursion into iteration (nullable RE).
+
+This is to avoid stack overflow on large RE (especially on instrumented
+builds that have larger stack frames, like AddressSanitizer).
+
+Partial fix for #219 "overflow-1.re test fails on system with small stack".
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport:
+https://github.com/skvadrik/re2c/commit/4d9c809355b574f2a58eac119f5e076c48e4d1e2
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-21232
+
+Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal <davide.gardenal@huawei.com>
+---
+diff --git a/src/re/nullable.cc b/src/re/nullable.cc
+--- a/src/re/nullable.cc        (revision e58939b34bb4c37cd990f82dc286f21cb405743e)
++++ b/src/re/nullable.cc        (date 1647253886226)
+@@ -9,43 +9,100 @@
+ #include "src/re/tag.h"
+ 
+ namespace re2c {
++    namespace {
++
++        struct StackItem {
++            const RE *re;   // current sub-RE
++            uint8_t   succ; // index of the next sucessor to be visited
++        };
+ 
+-static bool nullable(const RESpec &spec, const RE *re, bool &trail)
+-{
+-       if (trail) return true;
++        static bool nullable(const RESpec &spec, std::vector<StackItem> &stack, const RE *re0)
++        {
++            // the "nullable" status of the last sub-RE visited by DFS
++            bool null = false;
+ 
+-       switch (re->type) {
+-               case RE::NIL: return true;
+-               case RE::SYM: return false;
+-               case RE::ITER:
+-                       return nullable(spec, re->iter.re, trail);
+-               case RE::TAG:
+-                       trail |= trailing(spec.tags[re->tag.idx]);
+-                       return true;
+-               case RE::ALT:
+-                       return nullable(spec, re->alt.re1, trail)
+-                               || nullable(spec, re->alt.re2, trail);
+-               case RE::CAT:
+-                       return nullable(spec, re->cat.re1, trail)
+-                               && nullable(spec, re->cat.re2, trail);
+-       }
+-       return false; /* unreachable */
+-}
++            const StackItem i0 = {re0, 0};
++            stack.push_back(i0);
++
++            while (!stack.empty()) {
++                const StackItem i = stack.back();
++                stack.pop_back();
++
++                const RE *re = i.re;
++                if (re->type == RE::NIL) {
++                    null = true;
++                }
++                else if (re->type == RE::SYM) {
++                    null = false;
++                }
++                else if (re->type == RE::TAG) {
++                    null = true;
+ 
+-/*
+- * warn about rules that match empty string
+- * (including rules with nonempty trailing context)
+- * false positives on partially self-shadowed rules like [^]?
+- */
+-void warn_nullable(const RESpec &spec, const std::string &cond)
+-{
+-       const size_t nre = spec.res.size();
+-       for (size_t i = 0; i < nre; ++i) {
+-               bool trail = false;
+-               if (nullable(spec, spec.res[i], trail)) {
+-                       spec.warn.match_empty_string(spec.rules[i].code->fline, cond);
+-               }
+-       }
+-}
++                    // Trailing context is always in top-level concatenation, and sub-RE
++                    // are visited from left to right. Since we are here, sub-RE to the
++                    // left of the trailing context is nullable (otherwise we would not
++                    // recurse into the right sub-RE), therefore the whole RE is nullable.
++                    if (trailing(spec.tags[re->tag.idx])) {
++                        //DASSERT(stack.size() == 1 && stack.back().re->type == RE::CAT);
++                        stack.pop_back();
++                        break;
++                    }
++                }
++                else if (re->type == RE::ALT) {
++                    if (i.succ == 0) {
++                        // recurse into the left sub-RE
++                        StackItem k = {re, 1};
++                        stack.push_back(k);
++                        StackItem j = {re->alt.re1, 0};
++                        stack.push_back(j);
++                    }
++                    else if (!null) {
++                        // if the left sub-RE is nullable, so is alternative, so stop
++                        // recursion; otherwise recurse into the right sub-RE
++                        StackItem j = {re->alt.re2, 0};
++                        stack.push_back(j);
++                    }
++                }
++                else if (re->type == RE::CAT) {
++                    if (i.succ == 0) {
++                        // recurse into the left sub-RE
++                        StackItem k = {re, 1};
++                        stack.push_back(k);
++                        StackItem j = {re->cat.re1, 0};
++                        stack.push_back(j);
++                    }
++                    else if (null) {
++                        // if the left sub-RE is not nullable, neither is concatenation,
++                        // so stop recursion; otherwise recurse into the right sub-RE
++                        StackItem j = {re->cat.re2, 0};
++                        stack.push_back(j);
++                    }
++                }
++                else if (re->type == RE::ITER) {
++                    // iteration is nullable if the sub-RE is nullable
++                    // (zero repetitions is represented with alternative)
++                    StackItem j = {re->iter.re, 0};
++                    stack.push_back(j);
++                }
++            }
++
++            //DASSERT(stack.empty());
++            return null;
++        }
++
++    } // anonymous namespace
++
++// Warn about rules that match empty string (including rules with nonempty
++// trailing context). False positives on partially self-shadowed rules like [^]?
++    void warn_nullable(const RESpec &spec, const std::string &cond)
++    {
++        std::vector<StackItem> stack;
++        const size_t nre = spec.res.size();
++        for (size_t i = 0; i < nre; ++i) {
++            if (nullable(spec, stack, spec.res[i])) {
++                spec.warn.match_empty_string(spec.rules[i].code->fline, cond);
++            }
++        }
++    }
+ 
+ } // namespace re2c
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-4.patch b/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-4.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ee8d84b1bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-4.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+From 89be91f3df00657261870adbc590209fdb2bc405 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ulya Trofimovich <skvadrik@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2020 23:02:21 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Rewrite recursion into iteration (estimation of NFA size for
+ RE).
+
+This is to avoid stack overflow on large RE (especially on instrumented
+builds that have larger stack frames, like AddressSanitizer).
+
+Partial fix for #219 "overflow-1.re test fails on system with small stack".
+
+Upstram-Status: Backport:
+https://github.com/skvadrik/re2c/commit/89be91f3df00657261870adbc590209fdb2bc405
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-21232
+
+Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal <davide.gardenal@huawei.com>
+---
+diff --git a/src/nfa/estimate_size.cc b/src/nfa/estimate_size.cc
+--- a/src/nfa/estimate_size.cc  (revision e58939b34bb4c37cd990f82dc286f21cb405743e)
++++ b/src/nfa/estimate_size.cc  (date 1647005399735)
+@@ -6,41 +6,113 @@
+ #include "src/re/re.h"
+ 
+ namespace re2c {
++namespace {
++
++struct StackItem {
++    const RE *re;   // current sub-RE
++    uint32_t  size; // size of the sub-RE (only for alternative and concatenation)
++    uint8_t   succ; // index of the next sucessor to be visited
++};
+ 
+-static size_t estimate(const RE *re)
++static uint32_t estimate_re_size(const RE *re0, std::vector<StackItem> &stack)
+ {
+-       switch (re->type) {
+-               case RE::NIL: return 0;
+-               case RE::SYM: return 1;
+-               case RE::TAG: return 1;
+-               case RE::ALT:
+-                       return estimate(re->alt.re1)
+-                               + estimate(re->alt.re2)
+-                               + 1;
+-               case RE::CAT:
+-                       return estimate(re->cat.re1)
+-                               + estimate(re->cat.re2);
+-               case RE::ITER: {
+-                       const size_t
+-                               iter = estimate(re->iter.re),
+-                               min = re->iter.min,
+-                               max = re->iter.max;
+-                       return max == AST::MANY
+-                               ? iter * min + 1
+-                               : iter * max + (max - min);
+-               }
+-       }
+-       return 0; /* unreachable */
+-}
++    // the estimated size of the last sub-RE visited by DFS
++    uint32_t size = 0;
++
++    const StackItem i0 = {re0, 0, 0};
++    stack.push_back(i0);
++
++    while (!stack.empty()) {
++        const StackItem i = stack.back();
++        stack.pop_back();
++
++        const RE *re = i.re;
++        if (re->type == RE::NIL) {
++            size = 0;
++        }
++        else if (re->type == RE::SYM || re->type == RE::TAG) {
++            size = 1;
++        }
++        else if (re->type == RE::ALT) {
++            if (i.succ == 0) {
++                // recurse into the left sub-RE
++                StackItem k = {re, 0, 1};
++                stack.push_back(k);
++                StackItem j = {re->alt.re1, 0, 0};
++                stack.push_back(j);
++            }
++            else if (i.succ == 1) {
++                // recurse into the right sub-RE
++                StackItem k = {re, size, 2};
++                stack.push_back(k);
++                StackItem j = {re->alt.re2, 0, 0};
++                stack.push_back(j);
++            }
++            else {
++                // both sub-RE visited, recursive return
++                size = i.size // left sub-RE (saved on stack)
++                       + size    // right sub-RE (just visited by DFS)
++                       + 1;      // additional state for alternative
++            }
++        }
++        else if (re->type == RE::CAT) {
++            if (i.succ == 0) {
++                // recurse into the left sub-RE
++                StackItem k = {re, 0, 1};
++                stack.push_back(k);
++                StackItem j = {re->cat.re1, 0, 0};
++                stack.push_back(j);
++            }
++            else if (i.succ == 1) {
++                // recurse into the right sub-RE
++                StackItem k = {re, size, 2};
++                stack.push_back(k);
++                StackItem j = {re->cat.re2, 0, 0};
++                stack.push_back(j);
++            }
++            else {
++                // both sub-RE visited, recursive return
++                size = i.size // left sub-RE (saved on stack)
++                       + size;   // right sub-RE (just visited by DFS)
++            }
++        }
++        else if (re->type == RE::ITER) {
++            if (i.succ == 0) {
++                // recurse into the sub-RE
++                StackItem k = {re, 0, 1};
++                stack.push_back(k);
++                StackItem j = {re->iter.re, 0, 0};
++                stack.push_back(j);
++            }
++            else {
++                // sub-RE visited, recursive return
++                const uint32_t min = re->iter.min, max = re->iter.max;
++                size = max == AST::MANY
++                       ? size * min + 1
++                       : size * max + (max - min);
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    //DASSERT(stack.empty());
++    return size;
++}
++
++} // anonymous namespace
+ 
+ size_t estimate_size(const std::vector<RE*> &res)
+ {
+-       const size_t nre = res.size();
+-       size_t size = nre - 1;
+-       for (size_t i = 0; i < nre; ++i) {
+-               size += estimate(res[i]) + 1;
+-       }
+-       return size;
++    std::vector<StackItem> stack;
++
++    const size_t nre = res.size();
++    //DASSERT(nre > 0);
++    size_t size = nre - 1;
++
++    for (size_t i = 0; i < nre; ++i) {
++        size += estimate_re_size(res[i], stack) + 1;
++    }
++
++    return size;
+ }
+ 
+ } // namespace re2c
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c_1.0.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c_1.0.1.bb
index 35200ecde8..ca5c33f151 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c_1.0.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c_1.0.1.bb
@@ -1,11 +1,17 @@
 SUMMARY = "Tool for writing very fast and very flexible scanners"
-HOMEPAGE = "http://re2c.sourceforge.net/"
+DESCRIPTION = "A free and open-source lexer generator for C, C++ and Go. It compiles regular expressions to determinisitic finite automata and encodes the automata in the form of a program in the target language. Unlike any other such tool, re2c focuses on generating high efficient code for regular expression matching. As a result this allows a much broader range of use than any traditional lexer."
+HOMEPAGE = "http://re2c.org/"
+BUGTRACKER = "https://github.com/skvadrik/re2c/issues"
 AUTHOR = "Marcus Börger <helly@users.sourceforge.net>"
 SECTION = "devel"
 LICENSE = "PD"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://README;beginline=146;md5=881056c9add17f8019ccd8c382ba963a"
 
-SRC_URI = "https://github.com/skvadrik/re2c/releases/download/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz"
+SRC_URI = "https://github.com/skvadrik/re2c/releases/download/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
+file://CVE-2018-21232-1.patch \
+file://CVE-2018-21232-2.patch \
+file://CVE-2018-21232-3.patch \
+file://CVE-2018-21232-4.patch"
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "e2c6cf52fc6a21595f21bc82db5324f8"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "605058d18a00e01bfc32aebf83af35ed5b13180b4e9f279c90843afab2c66c7c"
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/skvadrik/re2c/releases"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/rng-tools/rng-tools/rngd.service b/meta/recipes-support/rng-tools/rng-tools/rngd.service
index aaaaa29074..f296a99e1f 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/rng-tools/rng-tools/rngd.service
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/rng-tools/rng-tools/rngd.service
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ Description=Hardware RNG Entropy Gatherer Daemon
 DefaultDependencies=no
 After=systemd-udev-settle.service
 Before=sysinit.target shutdown.target
+Wants=systemd-udev-settle.service
 Conflicts=shutdown.target
 
 [Service]
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/rng-tools/rng-tools_6.9.bb b/meta/recipes-support/rng-tools/rng-tools_6.9.bb
index b8c6f022f3..58b58fbb3c 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/rng-tools/rng-tools_6.9.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/rng-tools/rng-tools_6.9.bb
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=b234ee4d69f5fce4486a80fdaf4a4263"
 DEPENDS = "sysfsutils"
 
 SRC_URI = "\
-    git://github.com/nhorman/rng-tools.git \
+    git://github.com/nhorman/rng-tools.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
     file://0001-rngd_jitter-fix-O_NONBLOCK-setting-for-entropy-pipe.patch \
     file://0002-rngd_jitter-initialize-AES-key-before-setting-the-en.patch \
     file://0003-rngd_jitter-always-read-from-entropy-pipe-before-set.patch \
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/serf/serf_1.3.9.bb b/meta/recipes-support/serf/serf_1.3.9.bb
index 2fbf96f997..3276d40df6 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/serf/serf_1.3.9.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/serf/serf_1.3.9.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
 SUMMARY = "High-Performance Asynchronous HTTP Client Library"
+DESCRIPTION = "The Apache Serf library is a C-based HTTP client library built upon the Apache \
+Portable Runtime (APR) library. It multiplexes connections, running the \
+read/write communication asynchronously. Memory copies and transformations are \
+kept to a minimum to provide high performance operation."
+HOMEPAGE = "http://serf.apache.org/"
 SRC_URI = "${APACHE_MIRROR}/${BPN}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://norpath.patch \
            file://env.patch \
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/shared-mime-info/shared-mime-info_git.bb b/meta/recipes-support/shared-mime-info/shared-mime-info_git.bb
index 7a060b09ad..05c7d32965 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/shared-mime-info/shared-mime-info_git.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/shared-mime-info/shared-mime-info_git.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 SUMMARY = "Shared MIME type database and specification"
+DESCRIPTION = "The shared-mime-info package contains the core database of common types and the update-mime-database command used to extend it. It requires glib2 to be installed for building the update command. Additionally, it uses intltool for translations, though this is only a dependency for the maintainers."
 HOMEPAGE = "http://freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/shared-mime-info"
 SECTION = "base"
 
@@ -7,7 +8,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=b234ee4d69f5fce4486a80fdaf4a4263"
 
 DEPENDS = "libxml2 itstool-native glib-2.0 shared-mime-info-native"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xdg/shared-mime-info.git;protocol=https"
+SRC_URI = "git://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xdg/shared-mime-info.git;protocol=https;branch=master"
 SRCREV = "829b26d85e7d89a0caee03046c3bce373f04c80a"
 PV = "1.15"
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2020-35525.patch b/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2020-35525.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..27d81d42d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2020-35525.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+From: drh <drh@noemail.net>
+Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2020 14:08:51 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Early-out on the INTERSECT query processing following an
+ error.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [http://security.debian.org/debian-security/pool/updates/main/s/sqlite3/sqlite3_3.27.2-3+deb10u2.debian.tar.xz]
+CVE: CVE-2020-35525
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+---
+Index: sqlite-autoconf-3310100/sqlite3.c
+===================================================================
+--- sqlite-autoconf-3310100.orig/sqlite3.c
++++ sqlite-autoconf-3310100/sqlite3.c
+@@ -130767,6 +130767,7 @@ static int multiSelect(
+         /* Generate code to take the intersection of the two temporary
+         ** tables.
+         */
++        if( rc ) break;
+         assert( p->pEList );
+         iBreak = sqlite3VdbeMakeLabel(pParse);
+         iCont = sqlite3VdbeMakeLabel(pParse);
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2020-35527.patch b/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2020-35527.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d1dae389b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2020-35527.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+From: dan <dan@noemail.net>
+Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2020 13:24:36 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix a problem with ALTER TABLE for views that have a nested
+ FROM clause. Ticket [f50af3e8a565776b].
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [http://security.debian.org/debian-security/pool/updates/main/s/sqlite3/sqlite3_3.27.2-3+deb10u2.debian.tar.xz]
+CVE: CVE-2020-35527
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com>
+---
+Index: sqlite-autoconf-3310100/sqlite3.c
+===================================================================
+--- sqlite-autoconf-3310100.orig/sqlite3.c
++++ sqlite-autoconf-3310100/sqlite3.c
+@@ -133110,7 +133110,7 @@ static int selectExpander(Walker *pWalke
+             pNew = sqlite3ExprListAppend(pParse, pNew, pExpr);
+             sqlite3TokenInit(&sColname, zColname);
+             sqlite3ExprListSetName(pParse, pNew, &sColname, 0);
+-            if( pNew && (p->selFlags & SF_NestedFrom)!=0 ){
++            if( pNew && (p->selFlags & SF_NestedFrom)!=0 && !IN_RENAME_OBJECT ){
+               struct ExprList_item *pX = &pNew->a[pNew->nExpr-1];
+               sqlite3DbFree(db, pX->zEName);
+               if( pSub ){
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2021-20223.patch b/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2021-20223.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e9d2e04d30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2021-20223.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+From d1d43efa4fb0f2098c0e2c5bf2e807c58d5ec05b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: dan <dan@noemail.net>
+Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2020 13:24:36 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Prevent fts5 tokenizer unicode61 from considering '\0' to be
+ a token characters, even if other characters of class "Cc" are.
+
+FossilOrigin-Name: b7b7bde9b7a03665e3691c6d51118965f216d2dfb1617f138b9f9e60e418ed2f
+
+CVE: CVE-2021-20223
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/sqlite/sqlite/commit/d1d43efa4fb0f2098c0e2c5bf2e807c58d5ec05b.patch]
+Comment: Removed manifest, manifest.uuid and fts5tok1.test as these files are not present in the amalgamated source code
+Signed-Off-by: Sana.Kazi@kpit.com
+---
+--- a/sqlite3.c        2022-09-09 13:54:30.010768197 +0530
++++ b/sqlite3.c        2022-09-09 13:56:25.458769142 +0530
+@@ -227114,6 +227114,7 @@
+     }
+     iTbl++;
+   }
++  aAscii[0] = 0;                  /* 0x00 is never a token character */
+ }
+
+ /*
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2022-35737.patch b/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2022-35737.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..341e002913
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2022-35737.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From 2bbf4c999dbb4b520561a57e0bafc19a15562093 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2022 11:22:29 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-35737
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://www.sqlite.org/src/info/aab790a16e1bdff7]
+CVE: CVE-2022-35737
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ sqlite3.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/sqlite3.c b/sqlite3.c
+index f664217..33dfb78 100644
+--- a/sqlite3.c
++++ b/sqlite3.c
+@@ -28758,7 +28758,8 @@ SQLITE_API void sqlite3_str_vappendf(
+       case etSQLESCAPE:           /* %q: Escape ' characters */
+       case etSQLESCAPE2:          /* %Q: Escape ' and enclose in '...' */
+       case etSQLESCAPE3: {        /* %w: Escape " characters */
+-        int i, j, k, n, isnull;
++        i64  i, j, k, n;
++        int isnull;
+         int needQuote;
+         char ch;
+         char q = ((xtype==etSQLESCAPE3)?'"':'\'');   /* Quote character */
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2023-7104.patch b/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2023-7104.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..01ff29ff5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2023-7104.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From eab426c5fba69d2c77023939f72b4ad446834e3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: dan <Dan Kennedy>
+Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2023 13:53:09 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix a buffer overread in the sessions extension that could occur when processing a corrupt changeset.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sqlite.org/src/info/0e4e7a05c4204b47]
+CVE: CVE-2023-7104
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ sqlite3.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sqlite3.c b/sqlite3.c
+index 972ef18..c645ac8 100644
+--- a/sqlite3.c
++++ b/sqlite3.c
+@@ -203301,15 +203301,19 @@ static int sessionReadRecord(
+         }
+       }
+       if( eType==SQLITE_INTEGER || eType==SQLITE_FLOAT ){
+-        sqlite3_int64 v = sessionGetI64(aVal);
+-        if( eType==SQLITE_INTEGER ){
+-          sqlite3VdbeMemSetInt64(apOut[i], v);
++       if( (pIn->nData-pIn->iNext)<8 ){
++         rc = SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT;
+         }else{
+-          double d;
+-          memcpy(&d, &v, 8);
+-          sqlite3VdbeMemSetDouble(apOut[i], d);
++         sqlite3_int64 v = sessionGetI64(aVal);
++         if( eType==SQLITE_INTEGER ){
++           sqlite3VdbeMemSetInt64(apOut[i], v);
++         }else{
++           double d;
++           memcpy(&d, &v, 8);
++           sqlite3VdbeMemSetDouble(apOut[i], d);
++         }
++         pIn->iNext += 8;
+         }
+-        pIn->iNext += 8;
+       }
+     }
+   }
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3.inc b/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3.inc
index 07614bdb3e..1adc0eba66 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3.inc
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 SUMMARY = "Embeddable SQL database engine"
+DESCRIPTION = "A library that implements a small, fast, self-contained, high-reliability, full-featured, SQL database engine. SQLite is the most used database engine in the world. SQLite is built into all mobile phones and most computers and comes bundled inside countless other applications that people use every day"
 HOMEPAGE = "http://www.sqlite.org"
 SECTION = "libs"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.31.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.31.1.bb
index 877e80f5a3..0e7bcfa5a7 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.31.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.31.1.bb
@@ -13,6 +13,11 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.sqlite.org/2020/sqlite-autoconf-${SQLITE_PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2020-13630.patch \
            file://CVE-2020-13631.patch \
            file://CVE-2020-13632.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-35737.patch \
+           file://CVE-2020-35525.patch \
+           file://CVE-2020-35527.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-20223.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-7104.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2d0a553534c521504e3ac3ad3b90f125"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "62284efebc05a76f909c580ffa5c008a7d22a1287285d68b7825a2b6b51949ae"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/taglib/taglib_1.11.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/taglib/taglib_1.11.1.bb
index f4e288295d..165bccadc1 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/taglib/taglib_1.11.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/taglib/taglib_1.11.1.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 SUMMARY = "Library for reading and editing the meta-data of popular audio formats"
+DESCRIPTION = "Platform-independent library (tested on Windows/Linux) for reading and writing metadata in media files, including video, audio, and photo formats. This is a convenient one-stop-shop to present or tag all your media collection, regardless of which format/container these might use. You can read/write the standard or more common tags/properties of a media, or you can also create and retrieve your own custom tags."
 SECTION = "libs/multimedia"
 HOMEPAGE = "http://taglib.github.io/"
 LICENSE = "LGPLv2.1 | MPL-1.1"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0001-src-Makefile-improve-reproducibility.patch b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0001-src-Makefile-improve-reproducibility.patch
index 63a7b78f12..2fc11dbdc2 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0001-src-Makefile-improve-reproducibility.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0001-src-Makefile-improve-reproducibility.patch
@@ -16,11 +16,11 @@ Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <mingli.yu@windriver.com>
  src/Makefile | 14 ++++----------
  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
 
-diff --git a/src/Makefile b/src/Makefile
-index f2fafa4dc..7148d4bd9 100644
---- a/src/Makefile
-+++ b/src/Makefile
-@@ -2845,16 +2845,10 @@ auto/pathdef.c: Makefile auto/config.mk
+Index: git/src/Makefile
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/Makefile
++++ git/src/Makefile
+@@ -3101,16 +3101,10 @@ auto/pathdef.c: Makefile auto/config.mk
         -@echo '#include "vim.h"' >> $@
         -@echo 'char_u *default_vim_dir = (char_u *)"$(VIMRCLOC)";' | $(QUOTESED) >> $@
         -@echo 'char_u *default_vimruntime_dir = (char_u *)"$(VIMRUNTIMEDIR)";' | $(QUOTESED) >> $@
@@ -41,6 +41,3 @@ index f2fafa4dc..7148d4bd9 100644
         -@sh $(srcdir)/pathdef.sh
  
  GUI_GTK_RES_INPUTS = \
--- 
-2.17.1
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/disable_acl_header_check.patch b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/disable_acl_header_check.patch
index 33089162b4..533138245d 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/disable_acl_header_check.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/disable_acl_header_check.patch
@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
  src/configure.ac | 3 ++-
  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
-diff --git a/src/configure.ac b/src/configure.ac
-index 2d409b3ca06a..dbcaf6140263 100644
---- a/src/configure.ac
-+++ b/src/configure.ac
-@@ -3257,7 +3257,7 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(stdint.h stdlib.h string.h \
+Index: git/src/configure.ac
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/configure.ac
++++ git/src/configure.ac
+@@ -3292,7 +3292,7 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(stdint.h stdlib.h strin
         sys/systeminfo.h locale.h sys/stream.h termios.h \
         libc.h sys/statfs.h poll.h sys/poll.h pwd.h \
         utime.h sys/param.h sys/ptms.h libintl.h libgen.h \
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ index 2d409b3ca06a..dbcaf6140263 100644
         sys/access.h sys/sysinfo.h wchar.h wctype.h)
  
  dnl sys/ptem.h depends on sys/stream.h on Solaris
-@@ -3886,6 +3886,7 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(acl,
+@@ -3974,6 +3974,7 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(acl,
         , [enable_acl="yes"])
  if test "$enable_acl" = "yes"; then
    AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
@@ -34,6 +34,3 @@ index 2d409b3ca06a..dbcaf6140263 100644
    AC_CHECK_LIB(posix1e, acl_get_file, [LIBS="$LIBS -lposix1e"],
         AC_CHECK_LIB(acl, acl_get_file, [LIBS="$LIBS -lacl"
                   AC_CHECK_LIB(attr, fgetxattr, LIBS="$LIBS -lattr",,)],,),)
--- 
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/no-path-adjust.patch b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/no-path-adjust.patch
index 05c2d803f6..9d6da80913 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/no-path-adjust.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/no-path-adjust.patch
@@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ Upstream-Status: Pending
 
 Signed-off-by: Joe Slater <joe.slater@windriver.com>
 
---- a/src/Makefile
-+++ b/src/Makefile
-@@ -2507,11 +2507,14 @@ installtools: $(TOOLS) $(DESTDIR)$(exec_
+Index: git/src/Makefile
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/Makefile
++++ git/src/Makefile
+@@ -2565,11 +2565,14 @@ installtools: $(TOOLS) $(DESTDIR)$(exec_
                  rm -rf $$cvs; \
               fi
         -chmod $(FILEMOD) $(DEST_TOOLS)/*
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/racefix.patch b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/racefix.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 48dca44cad..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/racefix.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-The creation of the LINGUAS file is duplicated for each desktop file
-which can lead the commands to race against each other. Rework
-the makefile to avoid this as the expense of leaving the file on disk.
-
-Upstream-Status: Pending
-RP 2021/2/15
-
-Index: git/src/po/Makefile
-===================================================================
---- git.orig/src/po/Makefile
-+++ git/src/po/Makefile
-@@ -165,17 +165,16 @@ $(PACKAGE).pot: ../*.c ../if_perl.xs ../
-                po/gvim.desktop.in po/vim.desktop.in
-        mv -f ../$(PACKAGE).po $(PACKAGE).pot
- 
--vim.desktop: vim.desktop.in $(POFILES)
-+LINGUAS:
-        echo $(LANGUAGES) | tr " " "\n" |sed -e '/\./d' | sort > LINGUAS
-+
-+vim.desktop: vim.desktop.in $(POFILES) LINGUAS
-        $(MSGFMT) --desktop -d . --template vim.desktop.in -o tmp_vim.desktop
--       rm -f LINGUAS
-        if command -v desktop-file-validate; then desktop-file-validate tmp_vim.desktop; fi
-        mv tmp_vim.desktop vim.desktop
- 
--gvim.desktop: gvim.desktop.in $(POFILES)
--       echo $(LANGUAGES) | tr " " "\n" |sed -e '/\./d' | sort > LINGUAS
-+gvim.desktop: gvim.desktop.in $(POFILES) LINGUAS
-        $(MSGFMT) --desktop -d . --template gvim.desktop.in -o tmp_gvim.desktop
--       rm -f LINGUAS
-        if command -v desktop-file-validate; then desktop-file-validate tmp_gvim.desktop; fi
-        mv tmp_gvim.desktop gvim.desktop
- 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/vim-add-knob-whether-elf.h-are-checked.patch b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/vim-add-knob-whether-elf.h-are-checked.patch
index 37914d4cd9..5284ba45b6 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/vim-add-knob-whether-elf.h-are-checked.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/vim-add-knob-whether-elf.h-are-checked.patch
@@ -14,11 +14,11 @@ Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
  src/configure.ac | 7 +++++++
  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
 
-diff --git a/src/configure.ac b/src/configure.ac
-index 0ee86ad..64736f0 100644
---- a/src/configure.ac
-+++ b/src/configure.ac
-@@ -3192,11 +3192,18 @@ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <stdio.h>], [int x __attribute__((unused));],
+Index: git/src/configure.ac
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/configure.ac
++++ git/src/configure.ac
+@@ -3264,11 +3264,18 @@ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <stdio.h>], [in
         AC_MSG_RESULT(no))
  
  dnl Checks for header files.
@@ -37,6 +37,3 @@ index 0ee86ad..64736f0 100644
  
  AC_HEADER_DIRENT
  
--- 
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim-tiny_8.2.bb b/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim-tiny_9.0.bb
index e4c26d23f6..e4c26d23f6 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim-tiny_8.2.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim-tiny_9.0.bb
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc b/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc
index d57f784da5..6d62bd67af 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc
@@ -1,29 +1,37 @@
 SUMMARY = "Vi IMproved - enhanced vi editor"
+DESCRIPTION = "Vim is a greatly improved version of the good old UNIX editor Vi. Many new features have been added: multi-level undo, syntax highlighting, command line history, on-line help, spell checking, filename completion, block operations, script language, etc. There is also a Graphical User Interface (GUI) available."
 SECTION = "console/utils"
 
+HOMEPAGE = "https://www.vim.org/"
+BUGTRACKER = "https://github.com/vim/vim/issues"
+
 DEPENDS = "ncurses gettext-native"
 # vimdiff doesn't like busybox diff
 RSUGGESTS_${PN} = "diffutils"
+
 LICENSE = "vim"
-LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://runtime/doc/uganda.txt;endline=287;md5=a19edd7ec70d573a005d9e509375a99a"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=d1a651ab770b45d41c0f8cb5a8ca930e"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git \
+SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
            file://disable_acl_header_check.patch \
            file://vim-add-knob-whether-elf.h-are-checked.patch \
            file://0001-src-Makefile-improve-reproducibility.patch \
            file://no-path-adjust.patch \
-           file://racefix.patch \
-"
-SRCREV = "98056533b96b6b5d8849641de93185dd7bcadc44"
+           "
+
+PV .= ".2190"
+SRCREV = "6a950da86d7a6eb09d5ebeab17657986420d07ac"
 
 # Do not consider .z in x.y.z, as that is updated with every commit
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "(?P<pver>\d+\.\d+)\.0"
+# Ignore that the upstream version .z in x.y.z is always newer
+UPSTREAM_VERSION_UNKNOWN = "1"
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 
 VIMDIR = "vim${@d.getVar('PV').split('.')[0]}${@d.getVar('PV').split('.')[1]}"
 
-inherit autotools-brokensep update-alternatives mime-xdg
+inherit autotools-brokensep update-alternatives mime-xdg pkgconfig
 
 CLEANBROKEN = "1"
 
@@ -32,29 +40,24 @@ do_configure () {
     cd src
     rm -f auto/*
     touch auto/config.mk
+    # git timestamps aren't reliable, so touch the shipped .po files so they aren't regenerated
+    touch -c po/cs.cp1250.po po/ja.euc-jp.po po/ja.sjis.po po/ko.po po/pl.UTF-8.po po/pl.cp1250.po po/ru.cp1251.po po/sk.cp1250.po po/uk.cp1251.po po/zh_CN.po po/zh_CN.cp936.po po/zh_TW.po
+    # ru.cp1251.po uses CP1251 rather than cp1251, fix that
+    sed -i -e s/CP1251/cp1251/ po/ru.cp1251.po
     aclocal
     autoconf
     cd ..
     oe_runconf
     touch src/auto/configure
     touch src/auto/config.mk src/auto/config.h
+    # need a native tool, not a target one
+    ${BUILD_CC} src/po/sjiscorr.c -o src/po/sjiscorr
 }
 
-do_compile() {
-    # We do not support fully / correctly the following locales.  Attempting
-    # to use these with msgfmt in order to update the ".desktop" files exposes
-    # this problem and leads to the compile failing.
-    for LOCALE in cs fr ko pl sk zh_CN zh_TW;do
-        echo -n > src/po/${LOCALE}.po
-    done
-    autotools_do_compile
-}
-
-#Available PACKAGECONFIG options are gtkgui, acl, x11, tiny
-PACKAGECONFIG ??= ""
-PACKAGECONFIG += " \
+PACKAGECONFIG ??= "\
     ${@bb.utils.filter('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'acl selinux', d)} \
     ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'x11', 'x11 gtkgui', '', d)} \
+    nls \
 "
 
 PACKAGECONFIG[gtkgui] = "--enable-gui=gtk3,--enable-gui=no,gtk+3"
@@ -63,6 +66,7 @@ PACKAGECONFIG[x11] = "--with-x,--without-x,xt,"
 PACKAGECONFIG[tiny] = "--with-features=tiny,--with-features=big,,"
 PACKAGECONFIG[selinux] = "--enable-selinux,--disable-selinux,libselinux,"
 PACKAGECONFIG[elfutils] = "--enable-elf-check,,elfutils,"
+PACKAGECONFIG[nls] = "--enable-nls,--disable-nls,,"
 
 EXTRA_OECONF = " \
     --disable-gpm \
@@ -71,6 +75,7 @@ EXTRA_OECONF = " \
     --disable-netbeans \
     --disable-desktop-database-update \
     --with-tlib=ncurses \
+    --with-modified-by='${MAINTAINER}' \
     ac_cv_small_wchar_t=no \
     ac_cv_path_GLIB_COMPILE_RESOURCES=no \
     vim_cv_getcwd_broken=no \
@@ -83,6 +88,11 @@ EXTRA_OECONF = " \
     STRIP=/bin/true \
 "
 
+# Some host distros don't have it, disable consistently
+# also disable on dunfell target builds
+EXTRA_OECONF_append_class-native = " vim_cv_timer_create=no"
+EXTRA_OECONF_append_class-target = " vim_cv_timer_create=no"
+
 do_install() {
     autotools_do_install
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim_8.2.bb b/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim_9.0.bb
index 709b6ddb55..709b6ddb55 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim_8.2.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim_9.0.bb
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vte/vte_0.58.3.bb b/meta/recipes-support/vte/vte_0.58.3.bb
index 41dc2e77c9..50724700e8 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/vte/vte_0.58.3.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/vte/vte_0.58.3.bb
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 SUMMARY = "Virtual terminal emulator GTK+ widget library"
+DESCRIPTION = "VTE provides a virtual terminal widget for GTK applications."
+HOMEPAGE = "https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Terminal/VTE"
 BUGTRACKER = "https://bugzilla.gnome.org/buglist.cgi?product=vte"
 LICENSE = "GPLv3 & LGPLv3+ & LGPLv2.1+"
 LICENSE_libvte = "LGPLv3+"