1 files changed, 117 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-kernel/systemtap/systemtap/0001-sysroot-handle-symbolic-links-with-absolute-name-rel.patch b/meta/recipes-kernel/systemtap/systemtap/0001-sysroot-handle-symbolic-links-with-absolute-name-rel.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8a3d39a5b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-kernel/systemtap/systemtap/0001-sysroot-handle-symbolic-links-with-absolute-name-rel.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+From 2041085d1a700201dc088991ca8136e7935bf42f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com>
+Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2018 11:35:26 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] sysroot: handle symbolic links with absolute name relative to
+ sysroot
+
+In case of symbolic link found under sysroot point to absolute path,
+instead of trying to look for such absolute path in host system,
+apply sysroot prefix first.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com>
+---
+ util.cxx | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 76 insertions(+)
+
+Index: git/util.cxx
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/util.cxx
++++ git/util.cxx
+@@ -441,6 +441,64 @@ split_lines(const char *buf, size_t n)
+   return lines;
+ }
+ 
++static string
++follow_link(const string& name, const string& sysroot)
++{
++  char *linkname;
++  ssize_t r;
++  string retpath;
++  struct stat st;
++
++  const char *f = name.c_str();
++
++  lstat(f, &st);
++
++  linkname = (char *) malloc(st.st_size + 1);
++
++  if (linkname)
++    {
++      r = readlink(f, linkname, st.st_size + 1);
++      linkname[st.st_size] = '\0';
++      /*
++       * If we have non-empty sysroot and we got link that
++       * points to absolute path name, we need to look at
++       * this path relative to sysroot itself. access and
++       * stat will follow symbolic links correctly only in
++       * case with empty sysroot.
++       */
++      while (r != -1 && linkname && linkname[0] == '/')
++       {
++         string fname1 = sysroot + linkname;
++         const char *f1 = fname1.c_str();
++         if (access(f1, X_OK) == 0
++             && stat(f1, &st) == 0
++             && S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
++           {
++             retpath = fname1;
++             break;
++           }
++         else if (lstat(f1, &st) == 0
++                  && S_ISLNK(st.st_mode))
++           {
++             free(linkname);
++             linkname = (char *) malloc(st.st_size + 1);
++             if (linkname)
++               {
++                 r = readlink(f1, linkname, st.st_size + 1);
++                 linkname[st.st_size] = '\0';
++               }
++           }
++         else
++           {
++             break;
++           }
++       }
++    }
++  free(linkname);
++
++  return retpath;
++}
++
+ // Resolve an executable name to a canonical full path name, with the
+ // same policy as execvp().  A program name not containing a slash
+ // will be searched along the $PATH.
+@@ -465,6 +523,14 @@ string find_executable(const string& nam
+   if (name.find('/') != string::npos) // slash in the path already?
+     {
+       retpath = sysroot + name;
++
++      const char *f = retpath.c_str();
++      if (sysroot != ""
++         && lstat(f, &st) == 0
++         && S_ISLNK(st.st_mode))
++       {
++         retpath = follow_link(f, sysroot);
++       }
+     }
+   else // Nope, search $PATH.
+     {
+@@ -493,6 +559,16 @@ string find_executable(const string& nam
+                   retpath = fname;
+                   break;
+                 }
++              else if (sysroot != ""
++                       && lstat(f, &st) == 0
++                       && S_ISLNK(st.st_mode))
++               {
++                 retpath = follow_link(f, sysroot);
++                 if (retpath != "")
++                   {
++                     break;
++                   }
++               }
+             }
+         }
+     }