1 files changed, 38 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/pango/pango/CVE-2019-1010238.patch b/meta/recipes-graphics/pango/pango/CVE-2019-1010238.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5b0c342f49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/pango/pango/CVE-2019-1010238.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 490f8979a260c16b1df055eab386345da18a2d54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matthias Clasen <mclasen@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 10 Jul 2019 20:26:23 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] bidi: Be safer against bad input
+
+Don't run off the end of an array that we
+allocated to certain length.
+
+Closes: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/pango/issues/342
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/pango/commit/490f8979a260c16b1df055eab386345da18a2d54]
+CVE: CVE-2019-1010238
+Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
+---
+ pango/pango-bidi-type.c | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/pango/pango-bidi-type.c b/pango/pango-bidi-type.c
+index 3e46b66c..5c02dbbb 100644
+--- a/pango/pango-bidi-type.c
++++ b/pango/pango-bidi-type.c
+@@ -181,8 +181,11 @@ pango_log2vis_get_embedding_levels (const gchar    *text,
+   for (i = 0, p = text; p < text + length; p = g_utf8_next_char(p), i++)
+     {
+       gunichar ch = g_utf8_get_char (p);
+-      FriBidiCharType char_type;
+-      char_type = fribidi_get_bidi_type (ch);
++      FriBidiCharType char_type = fribidi_get_bidi_type (ch);
++
++      if (i == n_chars)
++        break;
++
+       bidi_types[i] = char_type;
+       ored_types |= char_type;
+       if (FRIBIDI_IS_STRONG (char_type))
+-- 
+2.21.0
+