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-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch33
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch356
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch121
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb3
4 files changed, 513 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d485a1bd6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
1From 080d52c3c9416c731f637f9c6e003961ef43f079 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>
3Date: Mon, 27 May 2019 08:20:32 -0700
4Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Fix bug in undefer_input() that misplaced the input
5 state.
6
7CVE: CVE-2019-13232
8Upstream-Status: Backport
9[https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/41beb477c5744bc396fa1162ee0c14218ec12213]
10
11Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
12---
13 fileio.c | 4 +++-
14 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
15
16diff --git a/fileio.c b/fileio.c
17index 7605a29..14460f3 100644
18--- a/fileio.c
19+++ b/fileio.c
20@@ -532,8 +532,10 @@ void undefer_input(__G)
21 * This condition was checked when G.incnt_leftover was set > 0 in
22 * defer_leftover_input(), and it is NOT allowed to touch G.csize
23 * before calling undefer_input() when (G.incnt_leftover > 0)
24- * (single exception: see read_byte()'s "G.csize <= 0" handling) !!
25+ * (single exception: see readbyte()'s "G.csize <= 0" handling) !!
26 */
27+ if (G.csize < 0L)
28+ G.csize = 0L;
29 G.incnt = G.incnt_leftover + (int)G.csize;
30 G.inptr = G.inptr_leftover - (int)G.csize;
31 G.incnt_leftover = 0;
32--
332.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..41037a8e24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
1From 1aae47fa8935654a84403768f32c03ecbb1be470 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>
3Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 22:01:18 -0700
4Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Detect and reject a zip bomb using overlapped entries.
5
6This detects an invalid zip file that has at least one entry that
7overlaps with another entry or with the central directory to the
8end of the file. A Fifield zip bomb uses overlapped local entries
9to vastly increase the potential inflation ratio. Such an invalid
10zip file is rejected.
11
12See https://www.bamsoftware.com/hacks/zipbomb/ for David Fifield's
13analysis, construction, and examples of such zip bombs.
14
15The detection maintains a list of covered spans of the zip files
16so far, where the central directory to the end of the file and any
17bytes preceding the first entry at zip file offset zero are
18considered covered initially. Then as each entry is decompressed
19or tested, it is considered covered. When a new entry is about to
20be processed, its initial offset is checked to see if it is
21contained by a covered span. If so, the zip file is rejected as
22invalid.
23
24This commit depends on a preceding commit: "Fix bug in
25undefer_input() that misplaced the input state."
26
27CVE: CVE-2019-13232
28Upstream-Status: Backport
29[https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/47b3ceae397d21bf822bc2ac73052a4b1daf8e1c]
30
31Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
32---
33 extract.c | 190 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
34 globals.c | 1 +
35 globals.h | 3 +
36 process.c | 10 +++
37 unzip.h | 1 +
38 5 files changed, 204 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
39
40diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
41index 24db2a8..2bb72ba 100644
42--- a/extract.c
43+++ b/extract.c
44@@ -321,6 +321,125 @@ static ZCONST char Far UnsupportedExtraField[] =
45 "\nerror: unsupported extra-field compression type (%u)--skipping\n";
46 static ZCONST char Far BadExtraFieldCRC[] =
47 "error [%s]: bad extra-field CRC %08lx (should be %08lx)\n";
48+static ZCONST char Far NotEnoughMemCover[] =
49+ "error: not enough memory for bomb detection\n";
50+static ZCONST char Far OverlappedComponents[] =
51+ "error: invalid zip file with overlapped components (possible zip bomb)\n";
52+
53+
54+
55+
56+
57+/* A growable list of spans. */
58+typedef zoff_t bound_t;
59+typedef struct {
60+ bound_t beg; /* start of the span */
61+ bound_t end; /* one past the end of the span */
62+} span_t;
63+typedef struct {
64+ span_t *span; /* allocated, distinct, and sorted list of spans */
65+ size_t num; /* number of spans in the list */
66+ size_t max; /* allocated number of spans (num <= max) */
67+} cover_t;
68+
69+/*
70+ * Return the index of the first span in cover whose beg is greater than val.
71+ * If there is no such span, then cover->num is returned.
72+ */
73+static size_t cover_find(cover, val)
74+ cover_t *cover;
75+ bound_t val;
76+{
77+ size_t lo = 0, hi = cover->num;
78+ while (lo < hi) {
79+ size_t mid = (lo + hi) >> 1;
80+ if (val < cover->span[mid].beg)
81+ hi = mid;
82+ else
83+ lo = mid + 1;
84+ }
85+ return hi;
86+}
87+
88+/* Return true if val lies within any one of the spans in cover. */
89+static int cover_within(cover, val)
90+ cover_t *cover;
91+ bound_t val;
92+{
93+ size_t pos = cover_find(cover, val);
94+ return pos > 0 && val < cover->span[pos - 1].end;
95+}
96+
97+/*
98+ * Add a new span to the list, but only if the new span does not overlap any
99+ * spans already in the list. The new span covers the values beg..end-1. beg
100+ * must be less than end.
101+ *
102+ * Keep the list sorted and merge adjacent spans. Grow the allocated space for
103+ * the list as needed. On success, 0 is returned. If the new span overlaps any
104+ * existing spans, then 1 is returned and the new span is not added to the
105+ * list. If the new span is invalid because beg is greater than or equal to
106+ * end, then -1 is returned. If the list needs to be grown but the memory
107+ * allocation fails, then -2 is returned.
108+ */
109+static int cover_add(cover, beg, end)
110+ cover_t *cover;
111+ bound_t beg;
112+ bound_t end;
113+{
114+ size_t pos;
115+ int prec, foll;
116+
117+ if (beg >= end)
118+ /* The new span is invalid. */
119+ return -1;
120+
121+ /* Find where the new span should go, and make sure that it does not
122+ overlap with any existing spans. */
123+ pos = cover_find(cover, beg);
124+ if ((pos > 0 && beg < cover->span[pos - 1].end) ||
125+ (pos < cover->num && end > cover->span[pos].beg))
126+ return 1;
127+
128+ /* Check for adjacencies. */
129+ prec = pos > 0 && beg == cover->span[pos - 1].end;
130+ foll = pos < cover->num && end == cover->span[pos].beg;
131+ if (prec && foll) {
132+ /* The new span connects the preceding and following spans. Merge the
133+ following span into the preceding span, and delete the following
134+ span. */
135+ cover->span[pos - 1].end = cover->span[pos].end;
136+ cover->num--;
137+ memmove(cover->span + pos, cover->span + pos + 1,
138+ (cover->num - pos) * sizeof(span_t));
139+ }
140+ else if (prec)
141+ /* The new span is adjacent only to the preceding span. Extend the end
142+ of the preceding span. */
143+ cover->span[pos - 1].end = end;
144+ else if (foll)
145+ /* The new span is adjacent only to the following span. Extend the
146+ beginning of the following span. */
147+ cover->span[pos].beg = beg;
148+ else {
149+ /* The new span has gaps between both the preceding and the following
150+ spans. Assure that there is room and insert the span. */
151+ if (cover->num == cover->max) {
152+ size_t max = cover->max == 0 ? 16 : cover->max << 1;
153+ span_t *span = realloc(cover->span, max * sizeof(span_t));
154+ if (span == NULL)
155+ return -2;
156+ cover->span = span;
157+ cover->max = max;
158+ }
159+ memmove(cover->span + pos + 1, cover->span + pos,
160+ (cover->num - pos) * sizeof(span_t));
161+ cover->num++;
162+ cover->span[pos].beg = beg;
163+ cover->span[pos].end = end;
164+ }
165+ return 0;
166+}
167
168
169
170@@ -376,6 +495,29 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
171 }
172 #endif /* !SFX || SFX_EXDIR */
173
174+ /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection. Start with a
175+ span that covers the central directory though the end of the file. */
176+ if (G.cover == NULL) {
177+ G.cover = malloc(sizeof(cover_t));
178+ if (G.cover == NULL) {
179+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
180+ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
181+ return PK_MEM;
182+ }
183+ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->span = NULL;
184+ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->max = 0;
185+ }
186+ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->num = 0;
187+ if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 &&
188+ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) ||
189+ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover,
190+ G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory,
191+ G.ziplen) != 0) {
192+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
193+ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
194+ return PK_MEM;
195+ }
196+
197 /*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
198 The basic idea of this function is as follows. Since the central di-
199 rectory lies at the end of the zipfile and the member files lie at the
200@@ -593,7 +735,8 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
201 if (error > error_in_archive)
202 error_in_archive = error;
203 /* ...and keep going (unless disk full or user break) */
204- if (G.disk_full > 1 || error_in_archive == IZ_CTRLC) {
205+ if (G.disk_full > 1 || error_in_archive == IZ_CTRLC ||
206+ error == PK_BOMB) {
207 /* clear reached_end to signal premature stop ... */
208 reached_end = FALSE;
209 /* ... and cancel scanning the central directory */
210@@ -1062,6 +1205,11 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk,
211
212 /* seek_zipf(__G__ pInfo->offset); */
213 request = G.pInfo->offset + G.extra_bytes;
214+ if (cover_within((cover_t *)G.cover, request)) {
215+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
216+ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
217+ return PK_BOMB;
218+ }
219 inbuf_offset = request % INBUFSIZ;
220 bufstart = request - inbuf_offset;
221
222@@ -1593,6 +1741,18 @@ reprompt:
223 return IZ_CTRLC; /* cancel operation by user request */
224 }
225 #endif
226+ error = cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, request,
227+ G.cur_zipfile_bufstart + (G.inptr - G.inbuf));
228+ if (error < 0) {
229+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
230+ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
231+ return PK_MEM;
232+ }
233+ if (error != 0) {
234+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
235+ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
236+ return PK_BOMB;
237+ }
238 #ifdef MACOS /* MacOS is no preemptive OS, thus call event-handling by hand */
239 UserStop();
240 #endif
241@@ -1994,6 +2154,34 @@ static int extract_or_test_member(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
242 }
243
244 undefer_input(__G);
245+
246+ if ((G.lrec.general_purpose_bit_flag & 8) != 0) {
247+ /* skip over data descriptor (harder than it sounds, due to signature
248+ * ambiguity)
249+ */
250+# define SIG 0x08074b50
251+# define LOW 0xffffffff
252+ uch buf[12];
253+ unsigned shy = 12 - readbuf((char *)buf, 12);
254+ ulg crc = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf);
255+ ulg clen = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf + 4);
256+ ulg ulen = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf + 8); /* or high clen if ZIP64 */
257+ if (crc == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */
258+ (G.lrec.crc32 != SIG || /* if not SIG, have signature */
259+ (clen == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */
260+ ((G.lrec.csize & LOW) != SIG || /* if not SIG, have signature */
261+ (ulen == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */
262+ (G.zip64 ? G.lrec.csize >> 32 : G.lrec.ucsize) != SIG
263+ /* if not SIG, have signature */
264+ )))))
265+ /* skip four more bytes to account for signature */
266+ shy += 4 - readbuf((char *)buf, 4);
267+ if (G.zip64)
268+ shy += 8 - readbuf((char *)buf, 8); /* skip eight more for ZIP64 */
269+ if (shy)
270+ error = PK_ERR;
271+ }
272+
273 return error;
274
275 } /* end function extract_or_test_member() */
276diff --git a/globals.c b/globals.c
277index fa8cca5..1e0f608 100644
278--- a/globals.c
279+++ b/globals.c
280@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ Uz_Globs *globalsCtor()
281 # if (!defined(NO_TIMESTAMPS))
282 uO.D_flag=1; /* default to '-D', no restoration of dir timestamps */
283 # endif
284+ G.cover = NULL; /* not allocated yet */
285 #endif
286
287 uO.lflag=(-1);
288diff --git a/globals.h b/globals.h
289index 11b7215..2bdcdeb 100644
290--- a/globals.h
291+++ b/globals.h
292@@ -260,12 +260,15 @@ typedef struct Globals {
293 ecdir_rec ecrec; /* used in unzip.c, extract.c */
294 z_stat statbuf; /* used by main, mapname, check_for_newer */
295
296+ int zip64; /* true if Zip64 info in extra field */
297+
298 int mem_mode;
299 uch *outbufptr; /* extract.c static */
300 ulg outsize; /* extract.c static */
301 int reported_backslash; /* extract.c static */
302 int disk_full;
303 int newfile;
304+ void **cover; /* used in extract.c for bomb detection */
305
306 int didCRlast; /* fileio static */
307 ulg numlines; /* fileio static: number of lines printed */
308diff --git a/process.c b/process.c
309index a3c1a4d..208619c 100644
310--- a/process.c
311+++ b/process.c
312@@ -637,6 +637,13 @@ void free_G_buffers(__G) /* releases all memory allocated in global vars */
313 }
314 #endif
315
316+ /* Free the cover span list and the cover structure. */
317+ if (G.cover != NULL) {
318+ free(*(G.cover));
319+ free(G.cover);
320+ G.cover = NULL;
321+ }
322+
323 } /* end function free_G_buffers() */
324
325
326@@ -1905,6 +1912,7 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len)
327
328 #define Z64FLGS 0xffff
329 #define Z64FLGL 0xffffffff
330+ G.zip64 = FALSE;
331
332 if (ef_len == 0 || ef_buf == NULL)
333 return PK_COOL;
334@@ -1964,6 +1972,8 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len)
335 G.crec.disk_number_start = (zuvl_t)makelong(offset + ef_buf);
336 offset += 4;
337 }
338+
339+ G.zip64 = TRUE;
340 #if 0
341 break; /* Expect only one EF_PKSZ64 block. */
342 #endif /* 0 */
343diff --git a/unzip.h b/unzip.h
344index 5b2a326..ed24a5b 100644
345--- a/unzip.h
346+++ b/unzip.h
347@@ -645,6 +645,7 @@ typedef struct _Uzp_cdir_Rec {
348 #define PK_NOZIP 9 /* zipfile not found */
349 #define PK_PARAM 10 /* bad or illegal parameters specified */
350 #define PK_FIND 11 /* no files found */
351+#define PK_BOMB 12 /* likely zip bomb */
352 #define PK_DISK 50 /* disk full */
353 #define PK_EOF 51 /* unexpected EOF */
354
355--
3562.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fd26fdd833
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
1From be88aa4811af47ca06d8b7dcda294f899eba70ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>
3Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2019 20:43:17 -0700
4Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Do not raise a zip bomb alert for a misplaced central
5 directory.
6
7There is a zip-like file in the Firefox distribution, omni.ja,
8which is a zip container with the central directory placed at the
9start of the file instead of after the local entries as required
10by the zip standard. This commit marks the actual location of the
11central directory, as well as the end of central directory records,
12as disallowed locations. This now permits such containers to not
13raise a zip bomb alert, where in fact there are no overlaps.
14
15CVE: CVE-2019-13232
16Upstream-Status: Backport
17[https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/6d351831be705cc26d897db44f878a978f4138fc]
18
19Signed-off-by: Dan Tran <dantran@microsoft.com>
20---
21 extract.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
22 process.c | 6 ++++++
23 unzpriv.h | 10 ++++++++++
24 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
25
26diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
27index 2bb72ba..a9dcca8 100644
28--- a/extract.c
29+++ b/extract.c
30@@ -495,8 +495,11 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
31 }
32 #endif /* !SFX || SFX_EXDIR */
33
34- /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection. Start with a
35- span that covers the central directory though the end of the file. */
36+ /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection. Start with
37+ spans that cover any extra bytes at the start, the central directory,
38+ the end of central directory record (including the Zip64 end of central
39+ directory locator, if present), and the Zip64 end of central directory
40+ record, if present. */
41 if (G.cover == NULL) {
42 G.cover = malloc(sizeof(cover_t));
43 if (G.cover == NULL) {
44@@ -508,15 +511,25 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
45 ((cover_t *)G.cover)->max = 0;
46 }
47 ((cover_t *)G.cover)->num = 0;
48- if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 &&
49- cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) ||
50- cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover,
51+ if (cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover,
52 G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory,
53- G.ziplen) != 0) {
54+ G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory +
55+ G.ecrec.size_central_directory) != 0) {
56 Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
57 LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
58 return PK_MEM;
59 }
60+ if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 &&
61+ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) ||
62+ (G.ecrec.have_ecr64 &&
63+ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec64_start,
64+ G.ecrec.ec64_end) != 0) ||
65+ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec_start,
66+ G.ecrec.ec_end) != 0) {
67+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
68+ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
69+ return PK_BOMB;
70+ }
71
72 /*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
73 The basic idea of this function is as follows. Since the central di-
74diff --git a/process.c b/process.c
75index 208619c..5f8f6c6 100644
76--- a/process.c
77+++ b/process.c
78@@ -1408,6 +1408,10 @@ static int find_ecrec64(__G__ searchlen) /* return PK-class error */
79
80 /* Now, we are (almost) sure that we have a Zip64 archive. */
81 G.ecrec.have_ecr64 = 1;
82+ G.ecrec.ec_start -= ECLOC64_SIZE+4;
83+ G.ecrec.ec64_start = ecrec64_start_offset;
84+ G.ecrec.ec64_end = ecrec64_start_offset +
85+ 12 + makeint64(&byterec[ECREC64_LENGTH]);
86
87 /* Update the "end-of-central-dir offset" for later checks. */
88 G.real_ecrec_offset = ecrec64_start_offset;
89@@ -1542,6 +1546,8 @@ static int find_ecrec(__G__ searchlen) /* return PK-class error */
90 makelong(&byterec[OFFSET_START_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY]);
91 G.ecrec.zipfile_comment_length =
92 makeword(&byterec[ZIPFILE_COMMENT_LENGTH]);
93+ G.ecrec.ec_start = G.real_ecrec_offset;
94+ G.ecrec.ec_end = G.ecrec.ec_start + 22 + G.ecrec.zipfile_comment_length;
95
96 /* Now, we have to read the archive comment, BEFORE the file pointer
97 is moved away backwards to seek for a Zip64 ECLOC64 structure.
98diff --git a/unzpriv.h b/unzpriv.h
99index c8d3eab..5e177c7 100644
100--- a/unzpriv.h
101+++ b/unzpriv.h
102@@ -2185,6 +2185,16 @@ typedef struct VMStimbuf {
103 int have_ecr64; /* valid Zip64 ecdir-record exists */
104 int is_zip64_archive; /* Zip64 ecdir-record is mandatory */
105 ush zipfile_comment_length;
106+ zusz_t ec_start, ec_end; /* offsets of start and end of the
107+ end of central directory record,
108+ including if present the Zip64
109+ end of central directory locator,
110+ which immediately precedes the
111+ end of central directory record */
112+ zusz_t ec64_start, ec64_end; /* if have_ecr64 is true, then these
113+ are the offsets of the start and
114+ end of the Zip64 end of central
115+ directory record */
116 } ecdir_rec;
117
118
119--
1202.22.0.vfs.1.1.57.gbaf16c8
121
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb
index daba722722..c1ea0a9a2c 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/infozip/UnZip%206.x%20%28latest%29/UnZip%206.0/
22 file://symlink.patch \ 22 file://symlink.patch \
23 file://0001-unzip-fix-CVE-2018-1000035.patch \ 23 file://0001-unzip-fix-CVE-2018-1000035.patch \
24 file://CVE-2018-18384.patch \ 24 file://CVE-2018-18384.patch \
25 file://CVE-2019-13232_p1.patch \
26 file://CVE-2019-13232_p2.patch \
27 file://CVE-2019-13232_p3.patch \
25" 28"
26UPSTREAM_VERSION_UNKNOWN = "1" 29UPSTREAM_VERSION_UNKNOWN = "1"
27 30