summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu')
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-10756.patch40
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-14364.patch93
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-15863.patch64
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-16092.patch49
4 files changed, 246 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-10756.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-10756.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..306aef061b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-10756.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
1From c7ede54cbd2e2b25385325600958ba0124e31cc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Ralf Haferkamp <rhafer@suse.com>
3Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2020 14:51:16 +0200
4Subject: [PATCH] Drop bogus IPv6 messages
5
6Drop IPv6 message shorter than what's mentioned in the payload
7length header (+ the size of the IPv6 header). They're invalid an could
8lead to data leakage in icmp6_send_echoreply().
9
10CVE: CVE-2020-10756
11Upstream-Status: Backport
12https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/slirp/libslirp/-/commit/c7ede54cbd2e2b25385325600958ba0124e31cc0
13
14[SG: Based on libslirp commit c7ede54cbd2e2b25385325600958ba0124e31cc0 and adjusted context]
15Signed-off-by: Stefan Ghinea <stefan.ghinea@windriver.com>
16---
17 slirp/src/ip6_input.c | 7 +++++++
18 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
19
20diff --git a/slirp/src/ip6_input.c b/slirp/src/ip6_input.c
21index d9d2b7e9..0f2b1785 100644
22--- a/slirp/src/ip6_input.c
23+++ b/slirp/src/ip6_input.c
24@@ -49,6 +49,13 @@ void ip6_input(struct mbuf *m)
25 goto bad;
26 }
27
28+ // Check if the message size is big enough to hold what's
29+ // set in the payload length header. If not this is an invalid
30+ // packet
31+ if (m->m_len < ntohs(ip6->ip_pl) + sizeof(struct ip6)) {
32+ goto bad;
33+ }
34+
35 /* check ip_ttl for a correct ICMP reply */
36 if (ip6->ip_hl == 0) {
37 icmp6_send_error(m, ICMP6_TIMXCEED, ICMP6_TIMXCEED_INTRANS);
38--
392.17.1
40
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-14364.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-14364.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a109ac08d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-14364.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
1From b946434f2659a182afc17e155be6791ebfb302eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
3Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2020 07:36:36 +0200
4Subject: [PATCH] usb: fix setup_len init (CVE-2020-14364)
5
6Store calculated setup_len in a local variable, verify it, and only
7write it to the struct (USBDevice->setup_len) in case it passed the
8sanity checks.
9
10This prevents other code (do_token_{in,out} functions specifically)
11from working with invalid USBDevice->setup_len values and overrunning
12the USBDevice->setup_buf[] buffer.
13
14Fixes: CVE-2020-14364
15Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
16Tested-by: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
17Reviewed-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
18Message-id: 20200825053636.29648-1-kraxel@redhat.com
19
20Upstream-Status: Backport
21CVE: CVE-2020-14364
22[https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=patch;h=b946434f2659a182afc17e155be6791ebfb302eb]
23Signed-off-by: Li Wang <li.wang@windriver.com>
24---
25 hw/usb/core.c | 16 ++++++++++------
26 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
27
28diff --git a/hw/usb/core.c b/hw/usb/core.c
29index 5abd128..5234dcc 100644
30--- a/hw/usb/core.c
31+++ b/hw/usb/core.c
32@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ void usb_wakeup(USBEndpoint *ep, unsigned int stream)
33 static void do_token_setup(USBDevice *s, USBPacket *p)
34 {
35 int request, value, index;
36+ unsigned int setup_len;
37
38 if (p->iov.size != 8) {
39 p->status = USB_RET_STALL;
40@@ -138,14 +139,15 @@ static void do_token_setup(USBDevice *s, USBPacket *p)
41 usb_packet_copy(p, s->setup_buf, p->iov.size);
42 s->setup_index = 0;
43 p->actual_length = 0;
44- s->setup_len = (s->setup_buf[7] << 8) | s->setup_buf[6];
45- if (s->setup_len > sizeof(s->data_buf)) {
46+ setup_len = (s->setup_buf[7] << 8) | s->setup_buf[6];
47+ if (setup_len > sizeof(s->data_buf)) {
48 fprintf(stderr,
49 "usb_generic_handle_packet: ctrl buffer too small (%d > %zu)\n",
50- s->setup_len, sizeof(s->data_buf));
51+ setup_len, sizeof(s->data_buf));
52 p->status = USB_RET_STALL;
53 return;
54 }
55+ s->setup_len = setup_len;
56
57 request = (s->setup_buf[0] << 8) | s->setup_buf[1];
58 value = (s->setup_buf[3] << 8) | s->setup_buf[2];
59@@ -259,26 +261,28 @@ static void do_token_out(USBDevice *s, USBPacket *p)
60 static void do_parameter(USBDevice *s, USBPacket *p)
61 {
62 int i, request, value, index;
63+ unsigned int setup_len;
64
65 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
66 s->setup_buf[i] = p->parameter >> (i*8);
67 }
68
69 s->setup_state = SETUP_STATE_PARAM;
70- s->setup_len = (s->setup_buf[7] << 8) | s->setup_buf[6];
71 s->setup_index = 0;
72
73 request = (s->setup_buf[0] << 8) | s->setup_buf[1];
74 value = (s->setup_buf[3] << 8) | s->setup_buf[2];
75 index = (s->setup_buf[5] << 8) | s->setup_buf[4];
76
77- if (s->setup_len > sizeof(s->data_buf)) {
78+ setup_len = (s->setup_buf[7] << 8) | s->setup_buf[6];
79+ if (setup_len > sizeof(s->data_buf)) {
80 fprintf(stderr,
81 "usb_generic_handle_packet: ctrl buffer too small (%d > %zu)\n",
82- s->setup_len, sizeof(s->data_buf));
83+ setup_len, sizeof(s->data_buf));
84 p->status = USB_RET_STALL;
85 return;
86 }
87+ s->setup_len = setup_len;
88
89 if (p->pid == USB_TOKEN_OUT) {
90 usb_packet_copy(p, s->data_buf, s->setup_len);
91--
922.17.1
93
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-15863.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-15863.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9927584d11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-15863.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
1From 5519724a13664b43e225ca05351c60b4468e4555 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
3Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2020 11:19:41 +0200
4Subject: [PATCH] hw/net/xgmac: Fix buffer overflow in xgmac_enet_send()
5
6A buffer overflow issue was reported by Mr. Ziming Zhang, CC'd here. It
7occurs while sending an Ethernet frame due to missing break statements
8and improper checking of the buffer size.
9
10Reported-by: Ziming Zhang <ezrakiez@gmail.com>
11Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
12Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
13Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
14
15CVE: CVE-2020-15863
16Upstream-Status: Backport
17[https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=5519724a13664b43e225ca05351c60b4468e4555]
18Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
19Signed-off-by: Li Wang <li.wang@windriver.com>
20---
21 hw/net/xgmac.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
22 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
23
24diff --git a/hw/net/xgmac.c b/hw/net/xgmac.c
25index f49df95..f496f7e 100644
26--- a/hw/net/xgmac.c
27+++ b/hw/net/xgmac.c
28@@ -217,21 +217,31 @@ static void xgmac_enet_send(XgmacState *s)
29 }
30 len = (bd.buffer1_size & 0xfff) + (bd.buffer2_size & 0xfff);
31
32+ /*
33+ * FIXME: these cases of malformed tx descriptors (bad sizes)
34+ * should probably be reported back to the guest somehow
35+ * rather than simply silently stopping processing, but we
36+ * don't know what the hardware does in this situation.
37+ * This will only happen for buggy guests anyway.
38+ */
39 if ((bd.buffer1_size & 0xfff) > 2048) {
40 DEBUGF_BRK("qemu:%s:ERROR...ERROR...ERROR... -- "
41 "xgmac buffer 1 len on send > 2048 (0x%x)\n",
42 __func__, bd.buffer1_size & 0xfff);
43+ break;
44 }
45 if ((bd.buffer2_size & 0xfff) != 0) {
46 DEBUGF_BRK("qemu:%s:ERROR...ERROR...ERROR... -- "
47 "xgmac buffer 2 len on send != 0 (0x%x)\n",
48 __func__, bd.buffer2_size & 0xfff);
49+ break;
50 }
51- if (len >= sizeof(frame)) {
52+ if (frame_size + len >= sizeof(frame)) {
53 DEBUGF_BRK("qemu:%s: buffer overflow %d read into %zu "
54- "buffer\n" , __func__, len, sizeof(frame));
55+ "buffer\n" , __func__, frame_size + len, sizeof(frame));
56 DEBUGF_BRK("qemu:%s: buffer1.size=%d; buffer2.size=%d\n",
57 __func__, bd.buffer1_size, bd.buffer2_size);
58+ break;
59 }
60
61 cpu_physical_memory_read(bd.buffer1_addr, ptr, len);
62--
631.9.1
64
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-16092.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-16092.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8ce01e26ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-16092.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
1From 035e69b063835a5fd23cacabd63690a3d84532a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
3Date: Sat, 1 Aug 2020 18:42:38 +0200
4Subject: [PATCH] hw/net/net_tx_pkt: fix assertion failure in
5 net_tx_pkt_add_raw_fragment()
6
7An assertion failure issue was found in the code that processes network
8packets
9while adding data fragments into the packet context. It could be abused
10by a
11malicious guest to abort the QEMU process on the host. This patch
12replaces the
13affected assert() with a conditional statement, returning false if the
14current
15data fragment exceeds max_raw_frags.
16
17Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
18Reported-by: Ziming Zhang <ezrakiez@gmail.com>
19Reviewed-by: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry.fleytman@gmail.com>
20Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
21Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
22
23Upstream-Status: Backport
24CVE: CVE-2020-16092
25[https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=035e69b063835a5fd23cacabd63690a3d84532a8]
26Signed-off-by: Li Wang <li.wang@windriver.com>
27---
28 hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c | 5 ++++-
29 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
30
31diff --git a/hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c b/hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c
32index 162f802..54d4c3b 100644
33--- a/hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c
34+++ b/hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c
35@@ -379,7 +379,10 @@ bool net_tx_pkt_add_raw_fragment(struct NetTxPkt *pkt, hwaddr pa,
36 hwaddr mapped_len = 0;
37 struct iovec *ventry;
38 assert(pkt);
39- assert(pkt->max_raw_frags > pkt->raw_frags);
40+
41+ if (pkt->raw_frags >= pkt->max_raw_frags) {
42+ return false;
43+ }
44
45 if (!len) {
46 return true;
47--
482.17.1
49
generated by cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf (git 2.39.0) at 2024-05-09 23:41:00 +0000