1 files changed, 0 insertions, 90 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/03-xen-MSI-X-limit-error-messages-CVE-2015-4105.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/03-xen-MSI-X-limit-error-messages-CVE-2015-4105.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8bb2230333..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/03-xen-MSI-X-limit-error-messages-CVE-2015-4105.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <kai.kang@windriver.com>
-
-From b38ec5ee7a581776bbce0bdaecb397632c3c4791 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:00 +0000
-Subject: xen/MSI-X: limit error messages
-Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/787547
-
-Limit error messages resulting from bad guest behavior to avoid allowing
-the guest to cause the control domain's disk to fill.
-
-The first message in pci_msix_write() can simply be deleted, as this
-is indeed bad guest behavior, but such out of bounds writes don't
-really need to be logged.
-
-The second one is more problematic, as there guest behavior may only
-appear to be wrong: For one, the old logic didn't take the mask-all bit
-into account. And then this shouldn't depend on host device state (i.e.
-the host may have masked the entry without the guest having done so).
-Plus these writes shouldn't be dropped even when an entry is unmasked.
-Instead, if they can't be made take effect right away, they should take
-effect on the next unmasking or enabling operation - the specification
-explicitly describes such caching behavior. Until we can validly drop
-the message (implementing such caching/latching behavior), issue the
-message just once per MSI-X table entry.
-
-Note that the log message in pci_msix_read() similar to the one being
-removed here is not an issue: "addr" being of unsigned type, and the
-maximum size of the MSI-X table being 32k, entry_nr simply can't be
-negative and hence the conditonal guarding issuing of the message will
-never be true.
-
-This is XSA-130.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
----
- hw/xen/xen_pt.h     |  1 +
- hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c | 12 +++++++-----
- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h
-index 52ceb85..8c9b6c2 100644
---- a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h
-+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h
-@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ typedef struct XenPTMSIXEntry {
-     uint32_t data;
-     uint32_t vector_ctrl;
-     bool updated; /* indicate whether MSI ADDR or DATA is updated */
-+    bool warned;  /* avoid issuing (bogus) warning more than once */
- } XenPTMSIXEntry;
- typedef struct XenPTMSIX {
-     uint32_t ctrl_offset;
-diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c
-index 9ed9321..68db623 100644
---- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c
-+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c
-@@ -434,11 +434,10 @@ static void pci_msix_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
-     XenPCIPassthroughState *s = opaque;
-     XenPTMSIX *msix = s->msix;
-     XenPTMSIXEntry *entry;
--    int entry_nr, offset;
-+    unsigned int entry_nr, offset;
- 
-     entry_nr = addr / PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE;
--    if (entry_nr < 0 || entry_nr >= msix->total_entries) {
--        XEN_PT_ERR(&s->dev, "asked MSI-X entry '%i' invalid!\n", entry_nr);
-+    if (entry_nr >= msix->total_entries) {
-         return;
-     }
-     entry = &msix->msix_entry[entry_nr];
-@@ -460,8 +459,11 @@ static void pci_msix_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
-             + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL;
- 
-         if (msix->enabled && !(*vec_ctrl & PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_CTRL_MASKBIT)) {
--            XEN_PT_ERR(&s->dev, "Can't update msix entry %d since MSI-X is"
--                       " already enabled.\n", entry_nr);
-+            if (!entry->warned) {
-+                entry->warned = true;
-+                XEN_PT_ERR(&s->dev, "Can't update msix entry %d since MSI-X is"
-+                           " already enabled.\n", entry_nr);
-+            }
-             return;
-         }
- 
--- 
-2.1.4
-