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-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-29406-1.patch212
1 files changed, 212 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-29406-1.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-29406-1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..080def4682
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+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-29406-1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
1From 5fa6923b1ea891400153d04ddf1545e23b40041b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
3Date: Wed, 28 Jun 2023 13:20:08 -0700
4Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.19] net/http: validate Host header before
5 sending
6
7Verify that the Host header we send is valid.
8Avoids surprising behavior such as a Host of "go.dev\r\nX-Evil:oops"
9adding an X-Evil header to HTTP/1 requests.
10
11Add a test, skip the test for HTTP/2. HTTP/2 is not vulnerable to
12header injection in the way HTTP/1 is, but x/net/http2 doesn't validate
13the header and will go into a retry loop when the server rejects it.
14CL 506995 adds the necessary validation to x/net/http2.
15
16Updates #60374
17Fixes #61075
18For CVE-2023-29406
19
20Change-Id: I05cb6866a9bead043101954dfded199258c6dd04
21Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/506996
22Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
23TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
24Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
25(cherry picked from commit 499458f7ca04087958987a33c2703c3ef03e27e2)
26Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/507358
27Run-TryBot: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
28Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
29
30Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/5fa6923b1ea891400153d04ddf1545e23b40041b]
31CVE: CVE-2023-29406
32Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumbhar@mvista.com>
33---
34 src/net/http/http_test.go | 29 ---------------------
35 src/net/http/request.go | 47 ++++++++--------------------------
36 src/net/http/request_test.go | 11 ++------
37 src/net/http/transport_test.go | 18 +++++++++++++
38 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)
39
40diff --git a/src/net/http/http_test.go b/src/net/http/http_test.go
41index f4ea52d..ea38cb4 100644
42--- a/src/net/http/http_test.go
43+++ b/src/net/http/http_test.go
44@@ -49,35 +49,6 @@ func TestForeachHeaderElement(t *testing.T) {
45 }
46 }
47
48-func TestCleanHost(t *testing.T) {
49- tests := []struct {
50- in, want string
51- }{
52- {"www.google.com", "www.google.com"},
53- {"www.google.com foo", "www.google.com"},
54- {"www.google.com/foo", "www.google.com"},
55- {" first character is a space", ""},
56- {"[1::6]:8080", "[1::6]:8080"},
57-
58- // Punycode:
59- {"гофер.рф/foo", "xn--c1ae0ajs.xn--p1ai"},
60- {"bücher.de", "xn--bcher-kva.de"},
61- {"bücher.de:8080", "xn--bcher-kva.de:8080"},
62- // Verify we convert to lowercase before punycode:
63- {"BÜCHER.de", "xn--bcher-kva.de"},
64- {"BÜCHER.de:8080", "xn--bcher-kva.de:8080"},
65- // Verify we normalize to NFC before punycode:
66- {"gophér.nfc", "xn--gophr-esa.nfc"}, // NFC input; no work needed
67- {"goph\u0065\u0301r.nfd", "xn--gophr-esa.nfd"}, // NFD input
68- }
69- for _, tt := range tests {
70- got := cleanHost(tt.in)
71- if tt.want != got {
72- t.Errorf("cleanHost(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.in, got, tt.want)
73- }
74- }
75-}
76-
77 // Test that cmd/go doesn't link in the HTTP server.
78 //
79 // This catches accidental dependencies between the HTTP transport and
80diff --git a/src/net/http/request.go b/src/net/http/request.go
81index cb2edd2..2706300 100644
82--- a/src/net/http/request.go
83+++ b/src/net/http/request.go
84@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ import (
85 "io/ioutil"
86 "mime"
87 "mime/multipart"
88- "net"
89 "net/http/httptrace"
90 "net/textproto"
91 "net/url"
92@@ -26,7 +25,8 @@ import (
93 "strconv"
94 "strings"
95 "sync"
96-
97+
98+ "golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
99 "golang.org/x/net/idna"
100 )
101
102@@ -557,12 +557,19 @@ func (r *Request) write(w io.Writer, usingProxy bool, extraHeaders Header, waitF
103 // is not given, use the host from the request URL.
104 //
105 // Clean the host, in case it arrives with unexpected stuff in it.
106- host := cleanHost(r.Host)
107+ host := r.Host
108 if host == "" {
109 if r.URL == nil {
110 return errMissingHost
111 }
112- host = cleanHost(r.URL.Host)
113+ host = r.URL.Host
114+ }
115+ host, err = httpguts.PunycodeHostPort(host)
116+ if err != nil {
117+ return err
118+ }
119+ if !httpguts.ValidHostHeader(host) {
120+ return errors.New("http: invalid Host header")
121 }
122
123 // According to RFC 6874, an HTTP client, proxy, or other
124@@ -717,38 +724,6 @@ func idnaASCII(v string) (string, error) {
125 return idna.Lookup.ToASCII(v)
126 }
127
128-// cleanHost cleans up the host sent in request's Host header.
129-//
130-// It both strips anything after '/' or ' ', and puts the value
131-// into Punycode form, if necessary.
132-//
133-// Ideally we'd clean the Host header according to the spec:
134-// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-5.4 (Host = uri-host [ ":" port ]")
135-// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-2.7 (uri-host -> rfc3986's host)
136-// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.2.2 (definition of host)
137-// But practically, what we are trying to avoid is the situation in
138-// issue 11206, where a malformed Host header used in the proxy context
139-// would create a bad request. So it is enough to just truncate at the
140-// first offending character.
141-func cleanHost(in string) string {
142- if i := strings.IndexAny(in, " /"); i != -1 {
143- in = in[:i]
144- }
145- host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(in)
146- if err != nil { // input was just a host
147- a, err := idnaASCII(in)
148- if err != nil {
149- return in // garbage in, garbage out
150- }
151- return a
152- }
153- a, err := idnaASCII(host)
154- if err != nil {
155- return in // garbage in, garbage out
156- }
157- return net.JoinHostPort(a, port)
158-}
159-
160 // removeZone removes IPv6 zone identifier from host.
161 // E.g., "[fe80::1%en0]:8080" to "[fe80::1]:8080"
162 func removeZone(host string) string {
163diff --git a/src/net/http/request_test.go b/src/net/http/request_test.go
164index 461d66e..0d417ff 100644
165--- a/src/net/http/request_test.go
166+++ b/src/net/http/request_test.go
167@@ -676,15 +676,8 @@ func TestRequestBadHost(t *testing.T) {
168 }
169 req.Host = "foo.com with spaces"
170 req.URL.Host = "foo.com with spaces"
171- req.Write(logWrites{t, &got})
172- want := []string{
173- "GET /after HTTP/1.1\r\n",
174- "Host: foo.com\r\n",
175- "User-Agent: " + DefaultUserAgent + "\r\n",
176- "\r\n",
177- }
178- if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
179- t.Errorf("Writes = %q\n Want = %q", got, want)
180+ if err := req.Write(logWrites{t, &got}); err == nil {
181+ t.Errorf("Writing request with invalid Host: succeded, want error")
182 }
183 }
184
185diff --git a/src/net/http/transport_test.go b/src/net/http/transport_test.go
186index fa0c370..0afb6b9 100644
187--- a/src/net/http/transport_test.go
188+++ b/src/net/http/transport_test.go
189@@ -6249,3 +6249,21 @@ func TestIssue32441(t *testing.T) {
190 t.Error(err)
191 }
192 }
193+
194+func TestRequestSanitization(t *testing.T) {
195+ setParallel(t)
196+ defer afterTest(t)
197+
198+ ts := newClientServerTest(t, h1Mode, HandlerFunc(func(rw ResponseWriter, req *Request) {
199+ if h, ok := req.Header["X-Evil"]; ok {
200+ t.Errorf("request has X-Evil header: %q", h)
201+ }
202+ })).ts
203+ defer ts.Close()
204+ req, _ := NewRequest("GET", ts.URL, nil)
205+ req.Host = "go.dev\r\nX-Evil:evil"
206+ resp, _ := ts.Client().Do(req)
207+ if resp != nil {
208+ resp.Body.Close()
209+ }
210+}
211--
2122.25.1