1 files changed, 37 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2016-6301.patch b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2016-6301.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..851bc20f79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2016-6301.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+busybox1.24.1: Fix CVE-2016-6301
+
+[No upstream tracking] -- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1363710
+
+ntpd: NTP server denial of service flaw
+
+The busybox NTP implementation doesn't check the NTP mode of packets
+received on the server port and responds to any packet with the right
+size. This includes responses from another NTP server. An attacker can
+send a packet with a spoofed source address in order to create an
+infinite loop of responses between two busybox NTP servers. Adding
+more packets to the loop increases the traffic between the servers
+until one of them has a fully loaded CPU and/or network.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=150dc7a2b483b8338a3e185c478b4b23ee884e71]
+CVE: CVE-2016-6301
+Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com>
+Signed-off-by: Pascal Bach <pascal.bach@siemens.com>
+
+diff --git a/networking/ntpd.c b/networking/ntpd.c
+index 9732c9b..0f6a55f 100644
+--- a/networking/ntpd.c
++++ b/networking/ntpd.c
+@@ -1985,6 +1985,13 @@ recv_and_process_client_pkt(void /*int fd*/)
+                goto bail;
+        }
+ 
++       /* Respond only to client and symmetric active packets */
++       if ((msg.m_status & MODE_MASK) != MODE_CLIENT
++        && (msg.m_status & MODE_MASK) != MODE_SYM_ACT
++       ) {
++               goto bail;
++       }
++
+        query_status = msg.m_status;
+        query_xmttime = msg.m_xmttime;
+