1 files changed, 0 insertions, 40 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0c43919427..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-commit 208d54db20d58c9a5e45e856a0650caadd7d9612
-Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
-Date:   Tue May 13 18:48:31 2014 +0100
-
-    Fix for CVE-2014-0195
-    
-    A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
-    to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
-    run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.
-    
-    Fixed by adding consistency check for DTLS fragments.
-    
-    Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue.
-
-Patch borrowed from Fedora
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
-
-diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
-index 2e8cf68..07f67f8 100644
---- a/ssl/d1_both.c
-+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
-@@ -627,7 +627,16 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
-                frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
-                }
-        else
-+               {
-                frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
-+               if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
-+                       {
-+                       item = NULL;
-+                       frag = NULL;
-+                       goto err;
-+                       }
-+               }
-+
- 
-        /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
-         * retransmit and can be dropped.
-