1 files changed, 35 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0007-Follow-on-fix-for-CVE-2014-3571.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0007-Follow-on-fix-for-CVE-2014-3571.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5eef0f362c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0007-Follow-on-fix-for-CVE-2014-3571.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 45fe66b8ba026186aa5d8ef1e0e6010ea74d5c0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Sat, 3 Jan 2015 00:54:35 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Follow on from CVE-2014-3571. This fixes the code that was
+ the original source of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents
+ this situation from occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking
+ at the code for dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more
+ sane.
+
+Reviewed-by: Dr Steve Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>
+---
+ ssl/d1_pkt.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+index d717260..73ce488 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+@@ -676,7 +676,8 @@ again:
+                 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
+                 */
+                if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
+-                   *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
++                   s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
++                   s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+                    !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
+                        {
+                        rr->length = 0;
+-- 
+1.9.1
+