1 files changed, 172 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0006-CVE-2014-8275.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0006-CVE-2014-8275.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6a6b829505
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0006-CVE-2014-8275.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+From a8565530e27718760220df469f0a071c85b9e731 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
+Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 15:09:50 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
+certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
+Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
+this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
+certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
+
+1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
+
+If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
+the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
+
+2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
+
+Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
+certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
+errors for some broken certificates.
+
+3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
+
+Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
+signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
+
+This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
+(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
+program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
+(negative or with leading zeroes).
+
+CVE-2014-8275
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
+
+(cherry picked from commit 684400ce192dac51df3d3e92b61830a6ef90be3e)
+
+Conflicts:
+Changes in the "CHANGES" file have been removed from this pacth since
+it fails to apply. These cahnges have been added manually in another patch.
+
+Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>
+---
+ CHANGES                | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ crypto/asn1/a_verify.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c  | 14 +++++++++++++-
+ crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
+ crypto/x509/x_all.c    |  2 ++
+ 5 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+index fc84cd3..a571009 100644
+--- a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
++++ b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+@@ -90,6 +90,12 @@ int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
+                ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
+                goto err;
+                }
++
++       if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
++               {
++               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
++               goto err;
++               }
+        
+        inl=i2d(data,NULL);
+        buf_in=OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)inl);
+@@ -146,6 +152,12 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
+                return -1;
+                }
+ 
++       if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
++               {
++               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
++               return -1;
++               }
++
+        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ 
+        /* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
+diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
+index 6058534..473af87 100644
+--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
++++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
+@@ -176,13 +176,25 @@ int DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+             const unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa)
+        {
+        DSA_SIG *s;
++       const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
++       unsigned char *der = NULL;
++       int derlen = -1;
+        int ret=-1;
+ 
+        s = DSA_SIG_new();
+        if (s == NULL) return(ret);
+-       if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s,&sigbuf,siglen) == NULL) goto err;
++       if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s,&p,siglen) == NULL) goto err;
++       /* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
++       derlen = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &der);
++       if (derlen != siglen || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen))
++               goto err;
+        ret=DSA_do_verify(dgst,dgst_len,s,dsa);
+ err:
++       if (derlen > 0)
++               {
++               OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
++               OPENSSL_free(der);
++               }
+        DSA_SIG_free(s);
+        return(ret);
+        }
+diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c
+index ef9acf7..2836efe 100644
+--- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c
++++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c
+@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
+  */
+ 
+ #include "ecs_locl.h"
++#include "cryptlib.h"
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ #include <openssl/engine.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -84,13 +85,25 @@ int ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+                const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey)
+        {
+        ECDSA_SIG *s;
++       const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
++       unsigned char *der = NULL;
++       int derlen = -1;
+        int ret=-1;
+ 
+        s = ECDSA_SIG_new();
+        if (s == NULL) return(ret);
+-       if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &sigbuf, sig_len) == NULL) goto err;
++       if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &p, sig_len) == NULL) goto err;
++       /* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
++       derlen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &der);
++       if (derlen != sig_len || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen))
++               goto err;
+        ret=ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, s, eckey);
+ err:
++       if (derlen > 0)
++               {
++               OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
++               OPENSSL_free(der);
++               }
+        ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
+        return(ret);
+        }
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_all.c b/crypto/x509/x_all.c
+index e06602d..fef55f8 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/x_all.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/x_all.c
+@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
+ 
+ int X509_verify(X509 *a, EVP_PKEY *r)
+        {
++       if (X509_ALGOR_cmp(a->sig_alg, a->cert_info->signature))
++               return 0;
+        return(ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF),a->sig_alg,
+                a->signature,a->cert_info,r));
+        }
+-- 
+1.9.1
+