openssl: fix CVE-2014-0195

From the OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014]
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt

DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability (CVE-2014-0195)

A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.

Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client or server affected.

(Patch borrowed from Fedora.)

(From OE-Core rev: 5bcb997663a6bd7a4d7395dcdb5e027d7f2bab81)

Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

2 files changed, 41 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0c43919427
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+commit 208d54db20d58c9a5e45e856a0650caadd7d9612
+Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+Date:   Tue May 13 18:48:31 2014 +0100
+
+    Fix for CVE-2014-0195
+    
+    A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
+    to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
+    run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.
+    
+    Fixed by adding consistency check for DTLS fragments.
+    
+    Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue.
+
+Patch borrowed from Fedora
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index 2e8cf68..07f67f8 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -627,7 +627,16 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+                frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
+                }
+        else
++               {
+                frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
++               if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
++                       {
++                       item = NULL;
++                       frag = NULL;
++                       goto err;
++                       }
++               }
++
+ 
+        /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
+         * retransmit and can be dropped.
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1g.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1g.bb
index 579cf0376e..d4fc91d851 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1g.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1g.bb
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
             file://find.pl \
             file://openssl-fix-des.pod-error.patch \
             file://openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch \
+            file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch \
             file://openssl-CVE-2010-5298.patch \
            "