nss-3.15.1: fix CVE-2013-1739

Mozilla Network Security Services (NSS) before 3.15.2 does
not ensure that data structures are initialized before
read operations, which allows remote attackers to cause a
denial of service or possibly have unspecified other
impact via vectors that trigger a decryption failure.

http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-1739
(From OE-Core rev: 9b43af77d112e75fa9827a9080b7e94f41f9a116)

Signed-off-by: yzhu1 <yanjun.zhu@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Jackie Huang <jackie.huang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

2 files changed, 82 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1739.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1739.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1a159c3934
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1739.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: yzhu1 <yanjun.zhu@windriver.com>
+
+--- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
++++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
+@@ -10509,7 +10509,7 @@ ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(sslBuffer *pla
+     /* SSLv3 padding bytes are random and cannot be checked. */
+     t = plaintext->len;
+     t -= paddingLength+overhead;
+-    /* If len >= padding_length+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */
++    /* If len >= paddingLength+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */
+     good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
+     /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
+     t = blockSize - (paddingLength+1);
+@@ -10742,7 +10742,7 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
+        }
+     }
+ 
+-    good = (unsigned)-1;
++    good = ~0U;
+     minLength = crSpec->mac_size;
+     if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
+        /* CBC records have a padding length byte at the end. */
+@@ -10756,14 +10756,7 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
+     /* We can perform this test in variable time because the record's total
+      * length and the ciphersuite are both public knowledge. */
+     if (cText->buf->len < minLength) {
+-       SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, record too small.",
+-                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+-       /* must not hold spec lock when calling SSL3_SendAlert. */
+-       ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+-       SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_record_mac);
+-       /* always log mac error, in case attacker can read server logs. */
+-       PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
+-       return SECFailure;
++       goto decrypt_loser;
+     }
+ 
+     if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
+@@ -10831,11 +10824,18 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
+        return SECFailure;
+     }
+ 
++    if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
++       ((cText->buf->len - ivLen) % cipher_def->block_size) != 0) {
++       goto decrypt_loser;
++    }
++
+     /* decrypt from cText buf to plaintext. */
+     rv = crSpec->decode(
+        crSpec->decodeContext, plaintext->buf, (int *)&plaintext->len,
+        plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf + ivLen, cText->buf->len - ivLen);
+-    good &= SECStatusToMask(rv);
++    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
++       goto decrypt_loser;
++    }
+ 
+     PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "cleartext:", plaintext->buf, plaintext->len));
+ 
+@@ -10843,7 +10843,7 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
+ 
+     /* If it's a block cipher, check and strip the padding. */
+     if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
+-       const unsigned int blockSize = cipher_def->iv_size;
++       const unsigned int blockSize = cipher_def->block_size;
+        const unsigned int macSize = crSpec->mac_size;
+ 
+        if (crSpec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
+@@ -10899,10 +10899,11 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
+     }
+ 
+     if (good == 0) {
++decrypt_loser:
+        /* must not hold spec lock when calling SSL3_SendAlert. */
+        ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+ 
+-       SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: mac check failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
++       SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: decryption failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ 
+        if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+            SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_record_mac);
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc b/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc
index 5afd63914b..cc9e7b9cd2 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ SRC_URI = "\
     file://nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-5605.patch \
     file://nss-CVE-2014-1492.patch \
     file://nss-CVE-2013-1740.patch \
+    file://nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1739.patch \
 "
 SRC_URI_append_class-target = "\
     file://nss.pc.in \