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authorHongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>2017-09-25 04:07:19 -0400
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2017-09-26 11:05:01 +0100
commitb7485a088033356785407ce21e8f53ab6b8df21c (patch)
treec6e1633fffb9d3099aca668b4b11b34d3fc74aa2 /meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt
parent5c67faff20c6bb75ab005690b65da5c2787fc426 (diff)
downloadpoky-b7485a088033356785407ce21e8f53ab6b8df21c.tar.gz
libgcrypt: fix CVE-2017-0379
Backport the fix from https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git; a=commit;h=bf76acbf0da6b0f245e491bec12c0f0a1b5be7c9 (From OE-Core rev: 3b827eff306c484d78d61b259cd5d4eef8df381c) Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt')
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/0005-ecc-Add-input-validation-for-X25519.patch158
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.0.bb1
2 files changed, 159 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/0005-ecc-Add-input-validation-for-X25519.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/0005-ecc-Add-input-validation-for-X25519.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..66fdd740b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/0005-ecc-Add-input-validation-for-X25519.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
1From ef570e3d2773c12126e7d3fcdc4db9ef80a5e214 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
3Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2017 18:13:28 +0900
4Subject: [PATCH] ecc: Add input validation for X25519.
5
6* cipher/ecc.c (ecc_decrypt_raw): Add input validation.
7* mpi/ec.c (ec_p_init): Use scratch buffer for bad points.
8(_gcry_mpi_ec_bad_point): New.
9
10--
11
12Following is the paper describing the attack:
13
14 May the Fourth Be With You: A Microarchitectural Side Channel Attack
15 on Real-World Applications of Curve25519
16 by Daniel Genkin, Luke Valenta, and Yuval Yarom
17
18In the current implementation, we do output checking and it results an
19error for those bad points. However, when attacked, the computation
20will done with leak of private key, even it will results errors. To
21mitigate leak, we added input validation.
22
23Note that we only list bad points with MSB=0. By X25519, MSB is
24always cleared.
25
26In future, we should implement constant-time field computation. Then,
27this input validation could be removed, if performance is important
28and we are sure for no leak.
29
30CVE-id: CVE-2017-0379
31Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
32
33Upstream-Status: Backport
34CVE: CVE-2017-0379
35Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
36---
37 cipher/ecc.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
38 mpi/ec.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
39 src/mpi.h | 1 +
40 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
41
42diff --git a/cipher/ecc.c b/cipher/ecc.c
43index e25bf09..4e3e5b1 100644
44--- a/cipher/ecc.c
45+++ b/cipher/ecc.c
46@@ -1628,9 +1628,22 @@ ecc_decrypt_raw (gcry_sexp_t *r_plain, gcry_sexp_t s_data, gcry_sexp_t keyparms)
47 if (DBG_CIPHER)
48 log_printpnt ("ecc_decrypt kG", &kG, NULL);
49
50- if (!(flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK)
51+ if ((flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK))
52+ {
53 /* For X25519, by its definition, validation should not be done. */
54- && !_gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (&kG, ec))
55+ /* (Instead, we do output check.)
56+ *
57+ * However, to mitigate secret key leak from our implementation,
58+ * we also do input validation here. For constant-time
59+ * implementation, we can remove this input validation.
60+ */
61+ if (_gcry_mpi_ec_bad_point (&kG, ec))
62+ {
63+ rc = GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
64+ goto leave;
65+ }
66+ }
67+ else if (!_gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (&kG, ec))
68 {
69 rc = GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
70 goto leave;
71diff --git a/mpi/ec.c b/mpi/ec.c
72index a0f7357..4c16603 100644
73--- a/mpi/ec.c
74+++ b/mpi/ec.c
75@@ -396,6 +396,29 @@ ec_get_two_inv_p (mpi_ec_t ec)
76 }
77
78
79+static const char *curve25519_bad_points[] = {
80+ "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
81+ "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
82+ "0x00b8495f16056286fdb1329ceb8d09da6ac49ff1fae35616aeb8413b7c7aebe0",
83+ "0x57119fd0dd4e22d8868e1c58c45c44045bef839c55b1d0b1248c50a3bc959c5f",
84+ "0x7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffec",
85+ "0x7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffed",
86+ "0x7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffee",
87+ NULL
88+};
89+
90+static gcry_mpi_t
91+scanval (const char *string)
92+{
93+ gpg_err_code_t rc;
94+ gcry_mpi_t val;
95+
96+ rc = _gcry_mpi_scan (&val, GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, string, 0, NULL);
97+ if (rc)
98+ log_fatal ("scanning ECC parameter failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
99+ return val;
100+}
101+
102
103 /* This function initialized a context for elliptic curve based on the
104 field GF(p). P is the prime specifying this field, A is the first
105@@ -434,9 +457,17 @@ ec_p_init (mpi_ec_t ctx, enum gcry_mpi_ec_models model,
106
107 _gcry_mpi_ec_get_reset (ctx);
108
109- /* Allocate scratch variables. */
110- for (i=0; i< DIM(ctx->t.scratch); i++)
111- ctx->t.scratch[i] = mpi_alloc_like (ctx->p);
112+ if (model == MPI_EC_MONTGOMERY)
113+ {
114+ for (i=0; i< DIM(ctx->t.scratch) && curve25519_bad_points[i]; i++)
115+ ctx->t.scratch[i] = scanval (curve25519_bad_points[i]);
116+ }
117+ else
118+ {
119+ /* Allocate scratch variables. */
120+ for (i=0; i< DIM(ctx->t.scratch); i++)
121+ ctx->t.scratch[i] = mpi_alloc_like (ctx->p);
122+ }
123
124 /* Prepare for fast reduction. */
125 /* FIXME: need a test for NIST values. However it does not gain us
126@@ -1572,3 +1603,17 @@ _gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ctx)
127
128 return res;
129 }
130+
131+
132+int
133+_gcry_mpi_ec_bad_point (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ctx)
134+{
135+ int i;
136+ gcry_mpi_t x_bad;
137+
138+ for (i = 0; (x_bad = ctx->t.scratch[i]); i++)
139+ if (!mpi_cmp (point->x, x_bad))
140+ return 1;
141+
142+ return 0;
143+}
144diff --git a/src/mpi.h b/src/mpi.h
145index b5385b5..aeba7f8 100644
146--- a/src/mpi.h
147+++ b/src/mpi.h
148@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ void _gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point (mpi_point_t result,
149 gcry_mpi_t scalar, mpi_point_t point,
150 mpi_ec_t ctx);
151 int _gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ctx);
152+int _gcry_mpi_ec_bad_point (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ctx);
153
154 gcry_mpi_t _gcry_mpi_ec_ec2os (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ectx);
155
156--
1571.8.3.1
158
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.0.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.0.bb
index 1797d9584d..fb004d9ceb 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.0.bb
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNUPG_MIRROR}/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-${PV}.tar.gz \
20 file://0003-tests-bench-slope.c-workaround-ICE-failure-on-mips-w.patch \ 20 file://0003-tests-bench-slope.c-workaround-ICE-failure-on-mips-w.patch \
21 file://0002-libgcrypt-fix-building-error-with-O2-in-sysroot-path.patch \ 21 file://0002-libgcrypt-fix-building-error-with-O2-in-sysroot-path.patch \
22 file://0004-tests-Makefile.am-fix-undefined-reference-to-pthread.patch \ 22 file://0004-tests-Makefile.am-fix-undefined-reference-to-pthread.patch \
23 file://0005-ecc-Add-input-validation-for-X25519.patch \
23" 24"
24SRC_URI[md5sum] = "110ce4352f9ea6f560bdc6c5644ae93c" 25SRC_URI[md5sum] = "110ce4352f9ea6f560bdc6c5644ae93c"
25SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f6e470b7f2d3a703e8747f05a8c19d9e10e26ebf2d5f3d71ff75a40f504e12ee" 26SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f6e470b7f2d3a703e8747f05a8c19d9e10e26ebf2d5f3d71ff75a40f504e12ee"