libgcrypt: update from version 1.8.0 to 1.8.1

Update libgcrypt version from 1.8.0 to 1.8.1.

(From OE-Core rev: b26d1dc8767cd0a34da47a8eb3ab001cc86cd8cc)

Signed-off-by: Jussi Laako <jussi.laako@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 158 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/0005-ecc-Add-input-validation-for-X25519.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/0005-ecc-Add-input-validation-for-X25519.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 66fdd740b5..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/0005-ecc-Add-input-validation-for-X25519.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
-From ef570e3d2773c12126e7d3fcdc4db9ef80a5e214 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
-Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2017 18:13:28 +0900
-Subject: [PATCH] ecc: Add input validation for X25519.
-
-* cipher/ecc.c (ecc_decrypt_raw): Add input validation.
-* mpi/ec.c (ec_p_init): Use scratch buffer for bad points.
-(_gcry_mpi_ec_bad_point): New.
-
---
-
-Following is the paper describing the attack:
-
-    May the Fourth Be With You: A Microarchitectural Side Channel Attack
-    on Real-World Applications of Curve25519
-    by Daniel Genkin, Luke Valenta, and Yuval Yarom
-
-In the current implementation, we do output checking and it results an
-error for those bad points.  However, when attacked, the computation
-will done with leak of private key, even it will results errors.  To
-mitigate leak, we added input validation.
-
-Note that we only list bad points with MSB=0.  By X25519, MSB is
-always cleared.
-
-In future, we should implement constant-time field computation.  Then,
-this input validation could be removed, if performance is important
-and we are sure for no leak.
-
-CVE-id: CVE-2017-0379
-Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2017-0379
-Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
----
- cipher/ecc.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
- mpi/ec.c     | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- src/mpi.h    |  1 +
- 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/cipher/ecc.c b/cipher/ecc.c
-index e25bf09..4e3e5b1 100644
---- a/cipher/ecc.c
-+++ b/cipher/ecc.c
-@@ -1628,9 +1628,22 @@ ecc_decrypt_raw (gcry_sexp_t *r_plain, gcry_sexp_t s_data, gcry_sexp_t keyparms)
-   if (DBG_CIPHER)
-     log_printpnt ("ecc_decrypt    kG", &kG, NULL);
- 
--  if (!(flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK)
-+  if ((flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK))
-+    {
-       /* For X25519, by its definition, validation should not be done.  */
--      && !_gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (&kG, ec))
-+      /* (Instead, we do output check.)
-+       *
-+       * However, to mitigate secret key leak from our implementation,
-+       * we also do input validation here.  For constant-time
-+       * implementation, we can remove this input validation.
-+       */
-+      if (_gcry_mpi_ec_bad_point (&kG, ec))
-+        {
-+          rc = GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
-+          goto leave;
-+        }
-+    }
-+  else if (!_gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (&kG, ec))
-     {
-       rc = GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
-       goto leave;
-diff --git a/mpi/ec.c b/mpi/ec.c
-index a0f7357..4c16603 100644
---- a/mpi/ec.c
-+++ b/mpi/ec.c
-@@ -396,6 +396,29 @@ ec_get_two_inv_p (mpi_ec_t ec)
- }
- 
- 
-+static const char *curve25519_bad_points[] = {
-+  "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
-+  "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
-+  "0x00b8495f16056286fdb1329ceb8d09da6ac49ff1fae35616aeb8413b7c7aebe0",
-+  "0x57119fd0dd4e22d8868e1c58c45c44045bef839c55b1d0b1248c50a3bc959c5f",
-+  "0x7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffec",
-+  "0x7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffed",
-+  "0x7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffee",
-+  NULL
-+};
-+
-+static gcry_mpi_t
-+scanval (const char *string)
-+{
-+  gpg_err_code_t rc;
-+  gcry_mpi_t val;
-+
-+  rc = _gcry_mpi_scan (&val, GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, string, 0, NULL);
-+  if (rc)
-+    log_fatal ("scanning ECC parameter failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
-+  return val;
-+}
-+
- 
- /* This function initialized a context for elliptic curve based on the
-    field GF(p).  P is the prime specifying this field, A is the first
-@@ -434,9 +457,17 @@ ec_p_init (mpi_ec_t ctx, enum gcry_mpi_ec_models model,
- 
-   _gcry_mpi_ec_get_reset (ctx);
- 
--  /* Allocate scratch variables.  */
--  for (i=0; i< DIM(ctx->t.scratch); i++)
--    ctx->t.scratch[i] = mpi_alloc_like (ctx->p);
-+  if (model == MPI_EC_MONTGOMERY)
-+    {
-+      for (i=0; i< DIM(ctx->t.scratch) && curve25519_bad_points[i]; i++)
-+        ctx->t.scratch[i] = scanval (curve25519_bad_points[i]);
-+    }
-+  else
-+    {
-+      /* Allocate scratch variables.  */
-+      for (i=0; i< DIM(ctx->t.scratch); i++)
-+        ctx->t.scratch[i] = mpi_alloc_like (ctx->p);
-+    }
- 
-   /* Prepare for fast reduction.  */
-   /* FIXME: need a test for NIST values.  However it does not gain us
-@@ -1572,3 +1603,17 @@ _gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ctx)
- 
-   return res;
- }
-+
-+
-+int
-+_gcry_mpi_ec_bad_point (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ctx)
-+{
-+  int i;
-+  gcry_mpi_t x_bad;
-+
-+  for (i = 0; (x_bad = ctx->t.scratch[i]); i++)
-+    if (!mpi_cmp (point->x, x_bad))
-+      return 1;
-+
-+  return 0;
-+}
-diff --git a/src/mpi.h b/src/mpi.h
-index b5385b5..aeba7f8 100644
---- a/src/mpi.h
-+++ b/src/mpi.h
-@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ void _gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point (mpi_point_t result,
-                              gcry_mpi_t scalar, mpi_point_t point,
-                              mpi_ec_t ctx);
- int  _gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ctx);
-+int _gcry_mpi_ec_bad_point (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ctx);
- 
- gcry_mpi_t _gcry_mpi_ec_ec2os (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ectx);
- 
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-