curl: Upgrade 7.47.1 -> 7.53.1

Security vulnerabilities fixed between 7.47.1 and 7.53.1 versions:
=================================================================
TLS session resumption client cert bypass (again): CVE-2017-XXXX
--write-out out of buffer read: CVE-2017-7407
SSL_VERIFYSTATUS ignored: CVE-2017-2629
uninitialized random: CVE-2016-9594
printf floating point buffer overflow: CVE-2016-9586
Win CE schannel cert wildcard matches too much: CVE-2016-9952
Win CE schannel cert name out of buffer read: CVE-2016-9953
cookie injection for other servers: CVE-2016-8615
case insensitive password comparison: CVE-2016-8616
OOB write via unchecked multiplication: CVE-2016-8617
double-free in curl_maprintf: CVE-2016-8618
double-free in krb5 code: CVE-2016-8619
glob parser write/read out of bounds: CVE-2016-8620
curl_getdate read out of bounds: CVE-2016-8621
URL unescape heap overflow via integer truncation: CVE-2016-8622
Use-after-free via shared cookies: CVE-2016-8623
invalid URL parsing with '#': CVE-2016-8624
IDNA 2003 makes curl use wrong host: CVE-2016-8625
curl escape and unescape integer overflows: CVE-2016-7167
Incorrect reuse of client certificates: CVE-2016-7141
TLS session resumption client cert bypass: CVE-2016-5419
Re-using connections with wrong client cert: CVE-2016-5420
use of connection struct after free: CVE-2016-5421
Windows DLL hijacking: CVE-2016-4802
TLS certificate check bypass with mbedTLS/PolarSSL: CVE-2016-3739

Reference:
https://curl.haxx.se/docs/security.html
https://curl.haxx.se/changes.html

Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Dudau <adrian.dudau@enea.com>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 51 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2016-8624.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2016-8624.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 009f7d0601..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2016-8624.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From 3bb273db7e40ebc284cff45f3ce3f0475c8339c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2016 00:48:35 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] urlparse: accept '#' as end of host name
-
-'http://example.com#@127.0.0.1/x.txt' equals a request to example.com
-for the '/' document with the rest of the URL being a fragment.
-
-CVE: CVE-2016-8624
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20161102J.html
-Reported-by: Fernando Muñoz
-
-Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>
-
-diff -ruN a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c
---- a/lib/url.c 2016-11-07 08:50:23.030126833 +0100
-+++ b/lib/url.c 2016-11-07 10:16:13.562089428 +0100
-@@ -4086,7 +4086,7 @@
-     path[0]=0;
- 
-     if(2 > sscanf(data->change.url,
--                   "%15[^\n:]://%[^\n/?]%[^\n]",
-+                   "%15[^\n:]://%[^\n/?#]%[^\n]",
-                    protobuf,
-                    conn->host.name, path)) {
- 
-@@ -4094,7 +4094,7 @@
-        * The URL was badly formatted, let's try the browser-style _without_
-        * protocol specified like 'http://'.
-        */
--      rc = sscanf(data->change.url, "%[^\n/?]%[^\n]", conn->host.name, path);
-+      rc = sscanf(data->change.url, "%[^\n/?#]%[^\n]", conn->host.name, path);
-       if(1 > rc) {
-         /*
-          * We couldn't even get this format.
-@@ -4184,10 +4184,10 @@
-   }
- 
-   /* If the URL is malformatted (missing a '/' after hostname before path) we
--   * insert a slash here. The only letter except '/' we accept to start a path
--   * is '?'.
-+   * insert a slash here. The only letters except '/' that can start a path is
-+   * '?' and '#' - as controlled by the two sscanf() patterns above.
-    */
--  if(path[0] == '?') {
-+  if(path[0] != '/') {
-     /* We need this function to deal with overlapping memory areas. We know
-        that the memory area 'path' points to is 'urllen' bytes big and that
-        is bigger than the path. Use +1 to move the zero byte too. */