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author | Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com> | 2018-07-30 15:32:36 +0530 |
---|---|---|
committer | Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> | 2018-08-15 10:22:46 +0100 |
commit | 4a59df45f8e10f4fcf33583602d5c622697caf21 (patch) | |
tree | 25ebb124ce9fb346d3a578a4bac2093e42f5e9d5 /meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor | |
parent | 3259b70497355a009a2ce8159e4f851278e704a1 (diff) | |
download | poky-4a59df45f8e10f4fcf33583602d5c622697caf21.tar.gz |
libxcursor: CVE-2017-16612
affects: <= 1.1.14
CVE-2017-16612: Fix heap overflows when parsing malicious files
It is possible to trigger heap overflows due to an integer overflow
while parsing images and a signedness issue while parsing comments.
The integer overflow occurs because the chosen limit 0x10000 for
dimensions is too large for 32 bit systems, because each pixel takes 4 bytes.
Properly chosen values allow an overflow which in turn will lead to less
allocated memory than needed for subsequent reads.
The signedness bug is triggered by reading the length of a comment
as unsigned int, but casting it to int when calling the function
XcursorCommentCreate. Turning length into a negative value allows the
check against XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN to pass, and the following
addition of sizeof (XcursorComment) + 1 makes it possible to allocate
less memory than needed for subsequent reads.
(From OE-Core rev: bdf13518e79ab949c4320226a399ee4a3913ee30)
Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor')
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor/CVE-2017-16612.patch | 75 |
1 files changed, 75 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor/CVE-2017-16612.patch b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor/CVE-2017-16612.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9a1b12e4f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxcursor/CVE-2017-16612.patch | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ | |||
1 | From 4794b5dd34688158fb51a2943032569d3780c4b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | ||
2 | From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org> | ||
3 | Date: Sat, 21 Oct 2017 23:47:52 +0200 | ||
4 | Subject: Fix heap overflows when parsing malicious files. (CVE-2017-16612) | ||
5 | |||
6 | It is possible to trigger heap overflows due to an integer overflow | ||
7 | while parsing images and a signedness issue while parsing comments. | ||
8 | |||
9 | The integer overflow occurs because the chosen limit 0x10000 for | ||
10 | dimensions is too large for 32 bit systems, because each pixel takes | ||
11 | 4 bytes. Properly chosen values allow an overflow which in turn will | ||
12 | lead to less allocated memory than needed for subsequent reads. | ||
13 | |||
14 | The signedness bug is triggered by reading the length of a comment | ||
15 | as unsigned int, but casting it to int when calling the function | ||
16 | XcursorCommentCreate. Turning length into a negative value allows the | ||
17 | check against XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN to pass, and the following | ||
18 | addition of sizeof (XcursorComment) + 1 makes it possible to allocate | ||
19 | less memory than needed for subsequent reads. | ||
20 | |||
21 | Upstream-Status: Backport from v1.1.15 | ||
22 | CVE: CVE-2017-16612 | ||
23 | |||
24 | Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com> | ||
25 | --- | ||
26 | src/file.c | 12 ++++++++++-- | ||
27 | 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) | ||
28 | |||
29 | diff --git a/src/file.c b/src/file.c | ||
30 | index 43163c2..da16277 100644 | ||
31 | --- a/src/file.c | ||
32 | +++ b/src/file.c | ||
33 | @@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ XcursorImageCreate (int width, int height) | ||
34 | { | ||
35 | XcursorImage *image; | ||
36 | |||
37 | + if (width < 0 || height < 0) | ||
38 | + return NULL; | ||
39 | + if (width > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE || height > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE) | ||
40 | + return NULL; | ||
41 | + | ||
42 | image = malloc (sizeof (XcursorImage) + | ||
43 | width * height * sizeof (XcursorPixel)); | ||
44 | if (!image) | ||
45 | @@ -101,7 +106,7 @@ XcursorCommentCreate (XcursorUInt comment_type, int length) | ||
46 | { | ||
47 | XcursorComment *comment; | ||
48 | |||
49 | - if (length > XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN) | ||
50 | + if (length < 0 || length > XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN) | ||
51 | return NULL; | ||
52 | |||
53 | comment = malloc (sizeof (XcursorComment) + length + 1); | ||
54 | @@ -448,7 +453,8 @@ _XcursorReadImage (XcursorFile *file, | ||
55 | if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay)) | ||
56 | return NULL; | ||
57 | /* sanity check data */ | ||
58 | - if (head.width >= 0x10000 || head.height > 0x10000) | ||
59 | + if (head.width > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE || | ||
60 | + head.height > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE) | ||
61 | return NULL; | ||
62 | if (head.width == 0 || head.height == 0) | ||
63 | return NULL; | ||
64 | @@ -457,6 +463,8 @@ _XcursorReadImage (XcursorFile *file, | ||
65 | |||
66 | /* Create the image and initialize it */ | ||
67 | image = XcursorImageCreate (head.width, head.height); | ||
68 | + if (image == NULL) | ||
69 | + return NULL; | ||
70 | if (chunkHeader.version < image->version) | ||
71 | image->version = chunkHeader.version; | ||
72 | image->size = chunkHeader.subtype; | ||
73 | -- | ||
74 | cgit v1.1 | ||
75 | |||