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author | Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> | 2014-06-09 16:53:43 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> | 2014-06-10 17:12:23 +0100 |
commit | c5d81c3386b945293580ed87fcecc0c80851ef0e (patch) | |
tree | e7af70521a8c03d0d9c2325defb6e2045aaad752 /meta/recipes-connectivity | |
parent | ad2c79b0fd8c9cf5d68c158ebe83e5a0b09656c7 (diff) | |
download | poky-c5d81c3386b945293580ed87fcecc0c80851ef0e.tar.gz |
openssl: fix CVE-2014-0195
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt
DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability (CVE-2014-0195)
A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.
Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client or server affected.
(Patch borrowed from Fedora.)
(From OE-Core rev: c707b3ea9e1fbff2c6a82670e4b1af2b4f53d5e2)
Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity')
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch | 40 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb | 1 |
2 files changed, 41 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0c43919427 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ | |||
1 | commit 208d54db20d58c9a5e45e856a0650caadd7d9612 | ||
2 | Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | ||
3 | Date: Tue May 13 18:48:31 2014 +0100 | ||
4 | |||
5 | Fix for CVE-2014-0195 | ||
6 | |||
7 | A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments | ||
8 | to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to | ||
9 | run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server. | ||
10 | |||
11 | Fixed by adding consistency check for DTLS fragments. | ||
12 | |||
13 | Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. | ||
14 | |||
15 | Patch borrowed from Fedora | ||
16 | Upstream-Status: Backport | ||
17 | Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> | ||
18 | |||
19 | diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c | ||
20 | index 2e8cf68..07f67f8 100644 | ||
21 | --- a/ssl/d1_both.c | ||
22 | +++ b/ssl/d1_both.c | ||
23 | @@ -627,7 +627,16 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) | ||
24 | frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0; | ||
25 | } | ||
26 | else | ||
27 | + { | ||
28 | frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data; | ||
29 | + if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) | ||
30 | + { | ||
31 | + item = NULL; | ||
32 | + frag = NULL; | ||
33 | + goto err; | ||
34 | + } | ||
35 | + } | ||
36 | + | ||
37 | |||
38 | /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a | ||
39 | * retransmit and can be dropped. | ||
40 | |||
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb index 842a903332..7783206a4b 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb | |||
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \ | |||
39 | file://0001-Use-version-in-SSL_METHOD-not-SSL-structure.patch \ | 39 | file://0001-Use-version-in-SSL_METHOD-not-SSL-structure.patch \ |
40 | file://CVE-2014-0160.patch \ | 40 | file://CVE-2014-0160.patch \ |
41 | file://openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch \ | 41 | file://openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch \ |
42 | file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch \ | ||
42 | " | 43 | " |
43 | 44 | ||
44 | SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c" | 45 | SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c" |