wpa-supplicant: update to 2.7

CVE patches is already applied in v2.7

(From OE-Core rev: 2c3a905061b501b1c79e191a1f275fdb9768a2d6)

Signed-off-by: Changhyeok Bae <changhyeok.bae@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

10 files changed, 5 insertions, 1202 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple1.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d4d49e7fca..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,191 +0,0 @@
-The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can
-result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network.
-
-Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this.
-
-CVE: CVE-2017-13077
-CVE: CVE-2017-13078
-CVE: CVE-2017-13079
-CVE: CVE-2017-13080
-CVE: CVE-2017-13081
-CVE: CVE-2017-13082
-CVE: CVE-2017-13086
-CVE: CVE-2017-13087
-CVE: CVE-2017-13088
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
-
-From cf4cab804c7afd5c45505528a8d16e46163243a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
-Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
-
-Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
-processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
-issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
-same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
-also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
-frames on RX side.
-
-This issue was introduced by the commit
-0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
-authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
-times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
-needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
-failed.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
----
- src/ap/ieee802_11.c  | 16 +++++++++++++---
- src/ap/wpa_auth.c    | 11 +++++++++++
- src/ap/wpa_auth.h    |  3 ++-
- src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++
- src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h  |  1 +
- 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
-index 4e04169..333035f 100644
---- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
-+++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
-@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
- {
-        struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap;
-        struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap;
-+       int set = 1;
- 
-        /*
-         * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and
-@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
-         * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but
-         * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that
-         * does not support full AP client state.
-+        *
-+        * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the
-+        * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for
-+        * the same key.
-         */
--       if (!sta->added_unassoc)
-+       if (!sta->added_unassoc &&
-+           (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) ||
-+            !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) {
-                hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
-+               wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED);
-+               set = 0;
-+       }
- 
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N
-        if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT)
-@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
-                            sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL,
-                            sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo,
-                            sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0,
--                           sta->added_unassoc)) {
-+                           set)) {
-                hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr,
-                               HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE,
-                               "Could not %s STA to kernel driver",
--                              sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add");
-+                              set ? "set" : "add");
- 
-                if (sta->added_unassoc) {
-                        hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-index 3587086..707971d 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event)
- #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
-                break;
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
-+       case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
-+               sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
-+               return 0;
-        }
- 
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
-@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
- }
- 
- 
-+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
-+{
-+       if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
-+               return 0;
-+       return sm->tk_already_set;
-+}
-+
-+
- int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
-                             struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
- {
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
-index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
-@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
-                 u8 *data, size_t data_len);
- enum wpa_event {
-        WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
--       WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
-+       WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
- };
- void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
-@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
-+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
-                             struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
- struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
-index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
-@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
-                return;
-        }
- 
-+       if (sm->tk_already_set) {
-+               /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
-+                * PN in the driver */
-+               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+                          "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
-+               return;
-+       }
-+
-        /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
-         * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
-         * after association has been completed. This function will be called
-@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
- 
-        /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
-        sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
-+       sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
- }
- 
- 
-@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
- 
-        sm->pairwise = pairwise;
-        sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
-+       sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
-        wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
- 
-        buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
-index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
-@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
-        struct wpa_ptk PTK;
-        Boolean PTK_valid;
-        Boolean pairwise_set;
-+       Boolean tk_already_set;
-        int keycount;
-        Boolean Pair;
-        struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
--- 
-2.7.4
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple2.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 501bb4b56b..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,267 +0,0 @@
-The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can
-result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network.
-
-Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this.
-
-CVE: CVE-2017-13077
-CVE: CVE-2017-13078
-CVE: CVE-2017-13079
-CVE: CVE-2017-13080
-CVE: CVE-2017-13081
-CVE: CVE-2017-13082
-CVE: CVE-2017-13086
-CVE: CVE-2017-13087
-CVE: CVE-2017-13088
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
-
-From 927f891007c402fefd1ff384645b3f07597c3ede Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
-Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
-
-Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
-(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
-not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
-attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
-sequence counter associated to the group key.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
----
- src/common/wpa_common.h |  11 +++++
- src/rsn_supp/wpa.c      | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h    |   4 ++
- 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
-index af1d0f0..d200285 100644
---- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
-+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
-@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
-        size_t tk_len;
- };
- 
-+struct wpa_gtk {
-+       u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
-+       size_t gtk_len;
-+};
-+
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+struct wpa_igtk {
-+       u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
-+       size_t igtk_len;
-+};
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- 
- /* WPA IE version 1
-  * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-        const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
-        u8 gtk_buf[32];
- 
-+       /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
-+       if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
-+           os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
-+               wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
-+                       "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
-+                       gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
-+               return 0;
-+       }
-+
-        wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len);
-        wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
-                "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
-@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-        }
-        os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
- 
-+       sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
-+       os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
-+
-        return 0;
- }
- 
-@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- }
- 
- 
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-+                                      const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
-+{
-+       size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
-+       u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
-+
-+       /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
-+       if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
-+           os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
-+               wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
-+                       "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
-+                       keyidx);
-+               return  0;
-+       }
-+
-+       wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
-+               "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
-+               keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
-+       wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len);
-+       if (keyidx > 4095) {
-+               wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
-+                       "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
-+               return -1;
-+       }
-+       if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
-+                          broadcast_ether_addr,
-+                          keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
-+                          igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
-+               wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
-+                       "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
-+               return -1;
-+       }
-+
-+       sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
-+       os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
-+
-+       return 0;
-+}
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
-+
-+
- static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-                               struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie)
- {
-@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-        if (ie->igtk) {
-                size_t len;
-                const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
--               u16 keyidx;
-+
-                len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
-                if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len)
-                        return -1;
-+
-                igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
--               keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
--               wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d "
--                       "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
--                       keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
--               wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK",
--                               igtk->igtk, len);
--               if (keyidx > 4095) {
--                       wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
--                               "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
--                       return -1;
--               }
--               if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
--                                  broadcast_ether_addr,
--                                  keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
--                                  igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
--                       wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
--                               "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
-+               if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
-                        return -1;
--               }
-        }
- 
-        return 0;
-@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm)
-  */
- void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
- {
--       int clear_ptk = 1;
-+       int clear_keys = 1;
- 
-        if (sm == NULL)
-                return;
-@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
-                /* Prepare for the next transition */
-                wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL);
- 
--               clear_ptk = 0;
-+               clear_keys = 0;
-        }
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
- 
--       if (clear_ptk) {
-+       if (clear_keys) {
-                /*
-                 * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if
-                 * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition.
-@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
-                os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
-                sm->tptk_set = 0;
-                os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
-+               os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+               os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
-        }
- 
- #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
-@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
-        os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk));
-        os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
-        os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
-+       os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+       os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
-        os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
-        os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0));
-@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
-                os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-        } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) {
--               struct wpa_igtk_kde igd;
--               u16 keyidx;
--
--               os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
--               keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
--               os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2);
--               os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6);
--
--               keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid);
--               os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen);
--
--               wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)",
--                               igd.igtk, keylen);
--               if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
--                                  broadcast_ether_addr,
--                                  keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn),
--                                  igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) {
--                       wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in "
--                                  "WNM mode");
--                       os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
-+               const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
-+
-+               igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
-+               if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
-                        return -1;
--               }
--               os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
-        } else {
-                wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id");
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-index f653ba6..afc9e37 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
-        u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
-        int rx_replay_counter_set;
-        u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
-+       struct wpa_gtk gtk;
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+       struct wpa_igtk igtk;
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- 
-        struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
- 
--- 
-2.7.4
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple3.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple3.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2e22655851..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple3.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
-The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can
-result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network.
-
-Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this.
-
-CVE: CVE-2017-13077
-CVE: CVE-2017-13078
-CVE: CVE-2017-13079
-CVE: CVE-2017-13080
-CVE: CVE-2017-13081
-CVE: CVE-2017-13082
-CVE: CVE-2017-13086
-CVE: CVE-2017-13087
-CVE: CVE-2017-13088
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
-
-From 8280294e74846ea342389a0cd17215050fa5afe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
- Mode cases
-
-This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
-separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
-corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
-GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
-detect a possible key reconfiguration.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/rsn_supp/wpa.c   | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h |  2 ++
- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-index 95bd7be..7a2c68d 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-@@ -709,14 +709,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data {
- 
- static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-                                      const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd,
--                                     const u8 *key_rsc)
-+                                     const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep)
- {
-        const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
-        u8 gtk_buf[32];
- 
-        /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
--       if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
--           os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
-+       if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
-+            os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) ||
-+           (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
-+            os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
-+                      sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) {
-                wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
-                        "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
-                        gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
-@@ -757,8 +760,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-        }
-        os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
- 
--       sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
--       os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
-+       if (wnm_sleep) {
-+               sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
-+               os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
-+                         sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len);
-+       } else {
-+               sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
-+               os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
-+       }
- 
-        return 0;
- }
-@@ -852,7 +861,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-            (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher,
-                                               gtk_len, gtk_len,
-                                               &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) ||
--            wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) {
-+            wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) {
-                wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
-                        "RSN: Failed to install GTK");
-                os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
-@@ -868,14 +877,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- 
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
- static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
--                                      const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
-+                                      const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk,
-+                                      int wnm_sleep)
- {
-        size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
-        u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
- 
-        /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
--       if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
--           os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
-+       if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
-+            os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) ||
-+           (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len &&
-+            os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
-+                      sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) {
-                wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
-                        "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
-                        keyidx);
-@@ -900,8 +913,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-                return -1;
-        }
- 
--       sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
--       os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
-+       if (wnm_sleep) {
-+               sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len;
-+               os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
-+                         sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len);
-+       } else {
-+               sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
-+               os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
-+       }
- 
-        return 0;
- }
-@@ -924,7 +943,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-                        return -1;
- 
-                igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
--               if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
-+               if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0)
-                        return -1;
-        }
- 
-@@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-        if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc))
-                key_rsc = null_rsc;
- 
--       if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) ||
-+       if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) ||
-            wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0)
-                goto failed;
-        os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
-@@ -2386,8 +2405,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
-                sm->tptk_set = 0;
-                os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
-                os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
-+               os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-                os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
-+               os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
-        }
- 
-@@ -2920,8 +2941,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
-        os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
-        os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
-        os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
-+       os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-        os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
-+       os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
-        os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
-@@ -2986,7 +3009,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
- 
-                wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)",
-                                gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len);
--               if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) {
-+               if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) {
-                        os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
-                        wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in "
-                                   "WNM mode");
-@@ -2998,7 +3021,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
-                const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
- 
-                igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
--               if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
-+               if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0)
-                        return -1;
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
-        } else {
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-index afc9e37..9a54631 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
-        int rx_replay_counter_set;
-        u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
-        struct wpa_gtk gtk;
-+       struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep;
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-        struct wpa_igtk igtk;
-+       struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep;
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- 
-        struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
--- 
-2.7.4
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple4.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple4.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 6c1948696e..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple4.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can
-result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network.
-
-Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this.
-
-CVE: CVE-2017-13077
-CVE: CVE-2017-13078
-CVE: CVE-2017-13079
-CVE: CVE-2017-13080
-CVE: CVE-2017-13081
-CVE: CVE-2017-13082
-CVE: CVE-2017-13086
-CVE: CVE-2017-13087
-CVE: CVE-2017-13088
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
-
-From 8f82bc94e8697a9d47fa8774dfdaaede1084912c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
-Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
-
-Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
-and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
-trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
-
-This fixes the earlier fix in commit
-ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the
-driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account
-possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of
-message 3/4.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
----
- src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 +
- src/rsn_supp/wpa.c      | 5 ++---
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h    | 1 -
- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
-index d200285..1021ccb 100644
---- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
-+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
-@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
-        size_t kck_len;
-        size_t kek_len;
-        size_t tk_len;
-+       int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
- };
- 
- struct wpa_gtk {
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-index 7a2c68d..0550a41 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_4(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-                os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
-        }
-        sm->tptk_set = 1;
--       sm->tk_to_set = 1;
- 
-        kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie;
-        kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len;
-@@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-        enum wpa_alg alg;
-        const u8 *key_rsc;
- 
--       if (!sm->tk_to_set) {
-+       if (sm->ptk.installed) {
-                wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
-                        "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
-                return 0;
-@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- 
-        /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
-        os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
--       sm->tk_to_set = 0;
-+       sm->ptk.installed = 1;
- 
-        if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
-                eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL);
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-index 9a54631..41f371f 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm {
-        struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk;
-        int ptk_set, tptk_set;
-        unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1;
--       unsigned int tk_to_set:1;
-        u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN];
-        u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */
-        int renew_snonce;
--- 
-2.7.4
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple5.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple5.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b262dcac55..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple5.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can
-result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network.
-
-Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this.
-
-CVE: CVE-2017-13077
-CVE: CVE-2017-13078
-CVE: CVE-2017-13079
-CVE: CVE-2017-13080
-CVE: CVE-2017-13081
-CVE: CVE-2017-13082
-CVE: CVE-2017-13086
-CVE: CVE-2017-13087
-CVE: CVE-2017-13088
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
-
-From 12fac09b437a1dc8a0f253e265934a8aaf4d2f8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
-
-The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
-the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
-directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
-determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
-new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
-
-Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
-for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
- }
- 
- 
-+static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
-+{
-+       if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
-+               wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
-+                          "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
-+               sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
-+               return -1;
-+       }
-+       wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
-+                   WPA_NONCE_LEN);
-+       sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
-+       return 0;
-+}
-+
-+
- SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
- {
-        u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
-@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
-                SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
-        else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
-                SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
--       else if (sm->PTKRequest)
--               SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
--       else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
-+       else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
-+               if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
-+                       SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
-+               else
-+                       SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
-+       } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
-        case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
-                break;
-        case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
--- 
-2.7.4
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple6.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple6.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 15183f40c1..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple6.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
-The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can
-result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network.
-
-Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this.
-
-CVE: CVE-2017-13077
-CVE: CVE-2017-13078
-CVE: CVE-2017-13079
-CVE: CVE-2017-13080
-CVE: CVE-2017-13081
-CVE: CVE-2017-13082
-CVE: CVE-2017-13086
-CVE: CVE-2017-13087
-CVE: CVE-2017-13088
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
-
-From 6c4bed4f47d1960ec04981a9d50e5076aea5223d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 6/8] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
-
-Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
-been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
-related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
-for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
-that behavior does not get modified.
-
-For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
-followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
-the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
-ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
-and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
-
-As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
-the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
-index e424168..9eb9738 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
-@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
-                u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
-        } tpk;
-        int tpk_set;
-+       int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
-        int tpk_success;
-        int tpk_in_progress;
- 
-@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
-        u8 rsc[6];
-        enum wpa_alg alg;
- 
-+       if (peer->tk_set) {
-+               /*
-+                * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
-+                * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
-+                * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
-+                * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
-+                * not allow that to happen.
-+                */
-+               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
-+                          " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
-+                          MAC2STR(peer->addr));
-+               return -1;
-+       }
-+
-        os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
- 
-        switch (peer->cipher) {
-@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
-                return -1;
-        }
- 
-+       wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
-+                  MAC2STR(peer->addr));
-        if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
-                           rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
-                wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
-                           "driver");
-                return -1;
-        }
-+       peer->tk_set = 1;
-        return 0;
- }
- 
-@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
-        peer->cipher = 0;
-        peer->qos_info = 0;
-        peer->wmm_capable = 0;
--       peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
-+       peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
-        peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
-        os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
-        os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
-@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
-                wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
-                return -1;
-        }
-+       peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
-        wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
-                    peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
-        os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
-@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer,
- }
- 
- 
-+static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
-+{
-+       int i;
-+
-+       for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
-+               if (nonce[i])
-+                       return 1;
-+       }
-+
-+       return 0;
-+}
-+
-+
- static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
-                                   const u8 *buf, size_t len)
- {
-@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn:
-        peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
-        peer->cipher = cipher;
- 
--       if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
-+       if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
-+           !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
-                /*
-                 * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
-                 * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
-@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn:
-                                "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce");
-                        goto error;
-                }
-+               peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
-        }
- 
- #if 0
--- 
-2.7.4
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple7.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple7.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2e12bc7555..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple7.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can
-result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network.
-
-Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this.
-
-CVE: CVE-2017-13077
-CVE: CVE-2017-13078
-CVE: CVE-2017-13079
-CVE: CVE-2017-13080
-CVE: CVE-2017-13081
-CVE: CVE-2017-13082
-CVE: CVE-2017-13086
-CVE: CVE-2017-13087
-CVE: CVE-2017-13088
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
-
-From 53c5eb58e95004f86e65ee9fbfccbc291b139057 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:25:02 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 7/8] WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending
- request
-
-Commit 03ed0a52393710be6bdae657d1b36efa146520e5 ('WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep
-Mode Response if WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used') started ignoring the
-response when no WNM-Sleep Mode Request had been used during the
-association. This can be made tighter by clearing the used flag when
-successfully processing a response. This adds an additional layer of
-protection against unexpected retransmissions of the response frame.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
-index 1b3409c..67a07ff 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
-@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
- 
-        if (!wpa_s->wnmsleep_used) {
-                wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
--                          "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used in this association");
-+                          "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode operation has not been requested");
-                return;
-        }
- 
-@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
-                return;
-        }
- 
-+       wpa_s->wnmsleep_used = 0;
-+
-        if (wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_ACCEPT ||
-            wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_EXIT_ACCEPT_GTK_UPDATE) {
-                wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Successfully recv WNM-Sleep Response "
--- 
-2.7.4
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple8.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple8.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7f5390c312..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple8.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
-The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can
-result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network.
-
-Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this.
-
-CVE: CVE-2017-13077
-CVE: CVE-2017-13078
-CVE: CVE-2017-13079
-CVE: CVE-2017-13080
-CVE: CVE-2017-13081
-CVE: CVE-2017-13082
-CVE: CVE-2017-13086
-CVE: CVE-2017-13087
-CVE: CVE-2017-13088
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
-
-From b372ab0b7daea719749194dc554b26e6367603f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 8/8] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
-
-The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
-the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
-case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
-pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
-be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
-even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
-Reassociation Response frame.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/rsn_supp/wpa.c    | 3 +++
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h  | 1 +
- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-index 0550a41..2a53c6f 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-@@ -2440,6 +2440,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm)
- #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
-        wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm);
- #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
-+       sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
- 
-        /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */
-        wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
-index 205793e..d45bb45 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
-@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len,
-        u16 capab;
- 
-        sm->ft_completed = 0;
-+       sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
- 
-        buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
-                2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100;
-@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
-                return -1;
-        }
- 
-+       if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) {
-+               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission");
-+               return 0;
-+       }
-+
-        if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) {
-                wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs");
-                return -1;
-@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
-                return -1;
-        }
- 
-+       sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1;
-+
-        if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0)
-                return -1;
- 
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-index 41f371f..56f88dc 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm {
-        size_t r0kh_id_len;
-        u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN];
-        int ft_completed;
-+       int ft_reassoc_completed;
-        int over_the_ds_in_progress;
-        u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */
-        int set_ptk_after_assoc;
--- 
-2.7.4
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e800a410ea..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-wpa_supplicant-2.6: Fix CVE-2018-14526
-
-[No upstream tracking] -- https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/unauthenticated-eapol-key-decryption.txt
-
-wpa: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data
-
-Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant
-processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted
-flag set, but not the MIC flag.
-
-When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but
-not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying
-the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when
-negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that
-unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary
-could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information
-in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key).
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c?id=3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961]
-CVE: CVE-2018-14526
-Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com>
-
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-index 3c47879..6bdf923 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
-
-        if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) &&
-            (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) {
-+               /*
-+                * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity
-+                * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not
-+                * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0
-+                * which is the case in this code branch.
-+                */
-+               if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
-+                       wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
-+                               "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data");
-+                       goto out;
-+               }
-                if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data,
-                                                    &key_data_len))
-                        goto out;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.6.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.7.bb
index c92ed4ab93..6fc5cf5db7 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.6.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.7.bb
@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ HOMEPAGE = "http://w1.fi/wpa_supplicant/"
 BUGTRACKER = "http://w1.fi/security/"
 SECTION = "network"
 LICENSE = "BSD"
-LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=292eece3f2ebbaa25608eed8464018a3 \
-                    file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=3f01d778be8f953962388307ee38ed2b \
-                    file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=4061612fc5715696134e3baf933e8aba"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=a3791c270ad6bb026707d17bf750e5ef \
+                    file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=495cbce6008253de4b4d8f4cdfae9f4f \
+                    file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=a5687903a31b8679e6a06b3afa5c819e"
 DEPENDS = "dbus libnl"
 RRECOMMENDS_${PN} = "wpa-supplicant-passphrase wpa-supplicant-cli"
 
@@ -24,19 +24,10 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz  \
            file://wpa_supplicant.conf \
            file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \
            file://99_wpa_supplicant \
-           file://key-replay-cve-multiple1.patch \
-           file://key-replay-cve-multiple2.patch \
-           file://key-replay-cve-multiple3.patch \
-           file://key-replay-cve-multiple4.patch \
-           file://key-replay-cve-multiple5.patch \
-           file://key-replay-cve-multiple6.patch \
-           file://key-replay-cve-multiple7.patch \
-           file://key-replay-cve-multiple8.patch \
-           file://wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch \
            file://0001-replace-systemd-install-Alias-with-WantedBy.patch \
           "
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "091569eb4440b7d7f2b4276dbfc03c3c"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b4936d34c4e6cdd44954beba74296d964bc2c9668ecaa5255e499636fe2b1450"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "a68538fb62766f40f890125026c42c10"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "76ea6b06b7a2ea8e6d9eb1a9166166f1656e6d48c7508914f592100c95c73074"
 
 CVE_PRODUCT = "wpa_supplicant"