diff options
author | Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> | 2019-03-14 20:34:04 +0000 |
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committer | Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> | 2019-03-18 23:47:43 +0000 |
commit | ffa0ee8b53df8bb1e4fcd7453bfea9e3a27f55ae (patch) | |
tree | 6a175146afc5f207e4846f17c0848247b51de138 /meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl | |
parent | ed9971d58dce21e6ac41ae6e93a12fe4baa79430 (diff) | |
download | poky-ffa0ee8b53df8bb1e4fcd7453bfea9e3a27f55ae.tar.gz |
openssl: fix CVE-2019-1543
(From OE-Core rev: 0f65b1192067a101d9a035f0ef26bae0ea13afeb)
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl')
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch | 69 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1a.bb | 1 |
2 files changed, 70 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..59a92f06e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ | |||
1 | Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f426625b6ae9a7831010750490a5f0ad689c5ba3] | ||
2 | Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> | ||
3 | |||
4 | From f426625b6ae9a7831010750490a5f0ad689c5ba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | ||
5 | From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | ||
6 | Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 14:39:15 +0000 | ||
7 | Subject: [PATCH] Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305 | ||
8 | |||
9 | ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for | ||
10 | every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) | ||
11 | should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and | ||
12 | front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it | ||
13 | also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case | ||
14 | only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are | ||
15 | ignored. | ||
16 | |||
17 | It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique. | ||
18 | Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious | ||
19 | confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the | ||
20 | default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to | ||
21 | the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique | ||
22 | nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a | ||
23 | reused nonce. | ||
24 | |||
25 | Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the | ||
26 | integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the | ||
27 | integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further | ||
28 | affected. | ||
29 | |||
30 | Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe | ||
31 | because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user | ||
32 | applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce | ||
33 | length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable. | ||
34 | |||
35 | CVE-2019-1543 | ||
36 | |||
37 | Fixes #8345 | ||
38 | |||
39 | Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> | ||
40 | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | ||
41 | (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406) | ||
42 | |||
43 | (cherry picked from commit 2a3d0ee9d59156c48973592331404471aca886d6) | ||
44 | --- | ||
45 | crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c | 4 +++- | ||
46 | 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) | ||
47 | |||
48 | diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c b/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c | ||
49 | index c1917bb86a6..d3e2c622a1b 100644 | ||
50 | --- a/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c | ||
51 | +++ b/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c | ||
52 | @@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ typedef struct { | ||
53 | |||
54 | #define data(ctx) ((EVP_CHACHA_KEY *)(ctx)->cipher_data) | ||
55 | |||
56 | +#define CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN 12 | ||
57 | + | ||
58 | static int chacha_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, | ||
59 | const unsigned char user_key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE], | ||
60 | const unsigned char iv[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE], int enc) | ||
61 | @@ -533,7 +535,7 @@ static int chacha20_poly1305_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, | ||
62 | return 1; | ||
63 | |||
64 | case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: | ||
65 | - if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA_CTR_SIZE) | ||
66 | + if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN) | ||
67 | return 0; | ||
68 | actx->nonce_len = arg; | ||
69 | return 1; | ||
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1a.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1a.bb index 4a626a4fcd..5c5e291c1b 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1a.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1a.bb | |||
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz \ | |||
17 | file://0001-skip-test_symbol_presence.patch \ | 17 | file://0001-skip-test_symbol_presence.patch \ |
18 | file://0001-buildinfo-strip-sysroot-and-debug-prefix-map-from-co.patch \ | 18 | file://0001-buildinfo-strip-sysroot-and-debug-prefix-map-from-co.patch \ |
19 | file://afalg.patch \ | 19 | file://afalg.patch \ |
20 | file://CVE-2019-1543.patch \ | ||
20 | " | 21 | " |
21 | 22 | ||
22 | SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \ | 23 | SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \ |