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authorPaul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>2014-06-09 11:26:53 +0100
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2014-06-10 17:36:44 +0100
commitd3bc30f75be8dc4d0e503701de106e25fc15da13 (patch)
tree0e8b89b9c940b34294205f33236fd02b614eefa4 /meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch
parent889f731acc7be2503fe092a6ba527cd8893e6948 (diff)
downloadpoky-d3bc30f75be8dc4d0e503701de106e25fc15da13.tar.gz
openssl: fix CVE-2014-0221
From the OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014] http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt DTLS recursion flaw (CVE-2014-0221) By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack. Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client are affected. (Patch borrowed from Fedora.) (From OE-Core rev: 2a9e46a319d32e99266fd44e1ea1ca2b5e7c9a6a) Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch')
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch38
1 files changed, 38 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bf730a8124
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
1commit d30e582446b027868cdabd0994681643682045a4
2Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
3Date: Fri May 16 13:00:45 2014 +0100
4
5 Fix CVE-2014-0221
6
7 Unnecessary recursion when receiving a DTLS hello request can be used to
8 crash a DTLS client. Fixed by handling DTLS hello request without recursion.
9
10 Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
11
12Patch borrowed from Fedora
13Upstream-Status: Backport
14Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
15
16diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
17index 07f67f8..4c2fd03 100644
18--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
19+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
20@@ -793,6 +793,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
21 int i,al;
22 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
23
24+ redo:
25 /* see if we have the required fragment already */
26 if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
27 {
28@@ -851,8 +852,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
29 s->msg_callback_arg);
30
31 s->init_num = 0;
32- return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn,
33- max, ok);
34+ goto redo;
35 }
36 else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
37 {
38