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author | Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> | 2014-06-09 11:26:53 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> | 2014-06-10 17:36:44 +0100 |
commit | d3bc30f75be8dc4d0e503701de106e25fc15da13 (patch) | |
tree | 0e8b89b9c940b34294205f33236fd02b614eefa4 | |
parent | 889f731acc7be2503fe092a6ba527cd8893e6948 (diff) | |
download | poky-d3bc30f75be8dc4d0e503701de106e25fc15da13.tar.gz |
openssl: fix CVE-2014-0221
From the OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014]
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt
DTLS recursion flaw (CVE-2014-0221)
By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code
can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack.
Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client are affected.
(Patch borrowed from Fedora.)
(From OE-Core rev: 2a9e46a319d32e99266fd44e1ea1ca2b5e7c9a6a)
Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch | 38 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb | 1 |
2 files changed, 39 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bf730a8124 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ | |||
1 | commit d30e582446b027868cdabd0994681643682045a4 | ||
2 | Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | ||
3 | Date: Fri May 16 13:00:45 2014 +0100 | ||
4 | |||
5 | Fix CVE-2014-0221 | ||
6 | |||
7 | Unnecessary recursion when receiving a DTLS hello request can be used to | ||
8 | crash a DTLS client. Fixed by handling DTLS hello request without recursion. | ||
9 | |||
10 | Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue. | ||
11 | |||
12 | Patch borrowed from Fedora | ||
13 | Upstream-Status: Backport | ||
14 | Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> | ||
15 | |||
16 | diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c | ||
17 | index 07f67f8..4c2fd03 100644 | ||
18 | --- a/ssl/d1_both.c | ||
19 | +++ b/ssl/d1_both.c | ||
20 | @@ -793,6 +793,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) | ||
21 | int i,al; | ||
22 | struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; | ||
23 | |||
24 | + redo: | ||
25 | /* see if we have the required fragment already */ | ||
26 | if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok) | ||
27 | { | ||
28 | @@ -851,8 +852,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) | ||
29 | s->msg_callback_arg); | ||
30 | |||
31 | s->init_num = 0; | ||
32 | - return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, | ||
33 | - max, ok); | ||
34 | + goto redo; | ||
35 | } | ||
36 | else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */ | ||
37 | { | ||
38 | |||
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb index 25dc1856c6..738f085059 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb | |||
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \ | |||
38 | file://CVE-2014-0160.patch \ | 38 | file://CVE-2014-0160.patch \ |
39 | file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch \ | 39 | file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch \ |
40 | file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch \ | 40 | file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch \ |
41 | file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch \ | ||
41 | " | 42 | " |
42 | 43 | ||
43 | SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c" | 44 | SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c" |