diff options
author | Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com> | 2023-08-10 19:46:12 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> | 2023-08-16 03:55:13 -1000 |
commit | 5e47346311d9f14a0ca4c71d59963f25c0f2898d (patch) | |
tree | 5ebaff9421f5e202d4396e6398c208ae6ac5805f | |
parent | d76406934a99352fd715b4152e25294ca0f38016 (diff) | |
download | poky-5e47346311d9f14a0ca4c71d59963f25c0f2898d.tar.gz |
openssl: Upgrade 1.1.1t -> 1.1.1v
https://www.openssl.org/news/openssl-1.1.1-notes.html
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1u and OpenSSL 1.1.1v [1 Aug 2023]
* Fix excessive time spent checking DH q parameter value (CVE-2023-3817)
* Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus (CVE-2023-3446)
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1t and OpenSSL 1.1.1u [30 May 2023]
* Mitigate for very slow `OBJ_obj2txt()` performance with gigantic OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identities. (CVE-2023-2650)
* Fixed documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() (CVE-2023-0466)
* Fixed handling of invalid certificate policies in leaf certificates (CVE-2023-0465)
* Limited the number of nodes created in a policy tree ([CVE-2023-0464])
All CVEs for upgrade to 1.1.1u were already patched, so effectively
this will apply patches for CVE-2023-3446 and CVE-2023-3817 plus
several non-CVE fixes.
Because of mips build changes were backported to openssl 1.1.1 branch,
backport of a patch from kirkstone is necessary.
(From OE-Core rev: be5d49d86553769deaf4754969d2cf6931d6ac34)
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch | 37 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch | 226 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch | 60 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch | 82 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-2650.patch | 122 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1v.bb (renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1t.bb) | 7 |
6 files changed, 39 insertions, 495 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b3f6a942d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ | |||
1 | From 326909baf81a638d51fa8be1d8227518784f5cc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | ||
2 | From: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de> | ||
3 | Date: Tue, 14 Sep 2021 12:18:25 +0200 | ||
4 | Subject: [PATCH] Configure: do not tweak mips cflags | ||
5 | |||
6 | This conflicts with mips machine definitons from yocto, | ||
7 | e.g. | ||
8 | | Error: -mips3 conflicts with the other architecture options, which imply -mips64r2 | ||
9 | |||
10 | Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [oe-core specific] | ||
11 | Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de> | ||
12 | Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com> | ||
13 | --- | ||
14 | Configure | 10 ---------- | ||
15 | 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-) | ||
16 | |||
17 | Index: openssl-3.0.4/Configure | ||
18 | =================================================================== | ||
19 | --- openssl-3.0.4.orig/Configure | ||
20 | +++ openssl-3.0.4/Configure | ||
21 | @@ -1243,16 +1243,6 @@ if ($target =~ /^mingw/ && `$config{CC} --target-help 2>&1` =~ m/-mno-cygwin/m) | ||
22 | push @{$config{shared_ldflag}}, "-mno-cygwin"; | ||
23 | } | ||
24 | |||
25 | -if ($target =~ /linux.*-mips/ && !$disabled{asm} | ||
26 | - && !grep { $_ =~ /-m(ips|arch=)/ } (@{$config{CFLAGS}})) { | ||
27 | - # minimally required architecture flags for assembly modules | ||
28 | - my $value; | ||
29 | - $value = '-mips2' if ($target =~ /mips32/); | ||
30 | - $value = '-mips3' if ($target =~ /mips64/); | ||
31 | - unshift @{$config{cflags}}, $value; | ||
32 | - unshift @{$config{cxxflags}}, $value if $config{CXX}; | ||
33 | -} | ||
34 | - | ||
35 | # If threads aren't disabled, check how possible they are | ||
36 | unless ($disabled{threads}) { | ||
37 | if ($auto_threads) { | ||
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch deleted file mode 100644 index cce5bad9f0..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch +++ /dev/null | |||
@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@ | |||
1 | From 879f7080d7e141f415c79eaa3a8ac4a3dad0348b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | ||
2 | From: Pauli <pauli@openssl.org> | ||
3 | Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2023 15:28:20 +1100 | ||
4 | Subject: [PATCH] x509: excessive resource use verifying policy constraints | ||
5 | |||
6 | A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions | ||
7 | of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains | ||
8 | that include policy constraints. Attackers may be able to exploit this | ||
9 | vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers | ||
10 | exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service | ||
11 | (DoS) attack on affected systems. | ||
12 | |||
13 | Fixes CVE-2023-0464 | ||
14 | |||
15 | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> | ||
16 | Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> | ||
17 | (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20569) | ||
18 | |||
19 | CVE: CVE-2023-0464 | ||
20 | Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=patch;h=879f7080d7e141f415c79eaa3a8ac4a3dad0348b] | ||
21 | Signed-off-by: Nikhil R <nikhil.r@kpit.com> | ||
22 | |||
23 | --- | ||
24 | crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h | 8 +++++++- | ||
25 | crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c | 12 +++++++++--- | ||
26 | crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- | ||
27 | 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) | ||
28 | |||
29 | diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h | ||
30 | index 5daf78de45..344aa06765 100644 | ||
31 | --- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h | ||
32 | +++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h | ||
33 | @@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st { | ||
34 | }; | ||
35 | |||
36 | struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st { | ||
37 | + /* The number of nodes in the tree */ | ||
38 | + size_t node_count; | ||
39 | + /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */ | ||
40 | + size_t node_maximum; | ||
41 | + | ||
42 | /* This is the tree 'level' data */ | ||
43 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels; | ||
44 | int nlevel; | ||
45 | @@ -159,7 +164,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk, | ||
46 | X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, | ||
47 | X509_POLICY_DATA *data, | ||
48 | X509_POLICY_NODE *parent, | ||
49 | - X509_POLICY_TREE *tree); | ||
50 | + X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, | ||
51 | + int extra_data); | ||
52 | void policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node); | ||
53 | int policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl, | ||
54 | const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid); | ||
55 | diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c | ||
56 | index e2d7b15322..d574fb9d66 100644 | ||
57 | --- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c | ||
58 | +++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c | ||
59 | @@ -59,10 +59,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, | ||
60 | X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, | ||
61 | X509_POLICY_DATA *data, | ||
62 | X509_POLICY_NODE *parent, | ||
63 | - X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) | ||
64 | + X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, | ||
65 | + int extra_data) | ||
66 | { | ||
67 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node; | ||
68 | |||
69 | + /* Verify that the tree isn't too large. This mitigates CVE-2023-0464 */ | ||
70 | + if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum) | ||
71 | + return NULL; | ||
72 | + | ||
73 | node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node)); | ||
74 | if (node == NULL) { | ||
75 | X509V3err(X509V3_F_LEVEL_ADD_NODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
76 | @@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, | ||
77 | } | ||
78 | node->data = data; | ||
79 | node->parent = parent; | ||
80 | - if (level) { | ||
81 | + if (level != NULL) { | ||
82 | if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) { | ||
83 | if (level->anyPolicy) | ||
84 | goto node_error; | ||
85 | @@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, | ||
86 | } | ||
87 | } | ||
88 | |||
89 | - if (tree) { | ||
90 | + if (extra_data) { | ||
91 | if (tree->extra_data == NULL) | ||
92 | tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null(); | ||
93 | if (tree->extra_data == NULL){ | ||
94 | @@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, | ||
95 | } | ||
96 | } | ||
97 | |||
98 | + tree->node_count++; | ||
99 | if (parent) | ||
100 | parent->nchild++; | ||
101 | |||
102 | diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c | ||
103 | index 6e8322cbc5..6c7fd35405 100644 | ||
104 | --- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c | ||
105 | +++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c | ||
106 | @@ -13,6 +13,18 @@ | ||
107 | |||
108 | #include "pcy_local.h" | ||
109 | |||
110 | +/* | ||
111 | + * If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it to | ||
112 | + * a generous default of 1000 nodes. | ||
113 | + * | ||
114 | + * Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens the | ||
115 | + * door on CVE-2023-0464. | ||
116 | + */ | ||
117 | + | ||
118 | +#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX | ||
119 | +# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000 | ||
120 | +#endif | ||
121 | + | ||
122 | /* | ||
123 | * Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during | ||
124 | * evaluation. | ||
125 | @@ -168,6 +180,9 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, | ||
126 | return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; | ||
127 | } | ||
128 | |||
129 | + /* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */ | ||
130 | + tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX; | ||
131 | + | ||
132 | /* | ||
133 | * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3. | ||
134 | * | ||
135 | @@ -184,7 +199,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, | ||
136 | level = tree->levels; | ||
137 | if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL) | ||
138 | goto bad_tree; | ||
139 | - if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) { | ||
140 | + if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) { | ||
141 | policy_data_free(data); | ||
142 | goto bad_tree; | ||
143 | } | ||
144 | @@ -243,7 +258,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, | ||
145 | * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise | ||
146 | */ | ||
147 | static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, | ||
148 | - X509_POLICY_DATA *data) | ||
149 | + X509_POLICY_DATA *data, | ||
150 | + X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) | ||
151 | { | ||
152 | X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; | ||
153 | int i, matched = 0; | ||
154 | @@ -253,13 +269,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, | ||
155 | X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); | ||
156 | |||
157 | if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) { | ||
158 | - if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL) | ||
159 | + if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL) | ||
160 | return 0; | ||
161 | matched = 1; | ||
162 | } | ||
163 | } | ||
164 | if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) { | ||
165 | - if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) | ||
166 | + if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL) | ||
167 | return 0; | ||
168 | } | ||
169 | return 1; | ||
170 | @@ -272,7 +288,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, | ||
171 | * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. | ||
172 | */ | ||
173 | static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, | ||
174 | - const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache) | ||
175 | + const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, | ||
176 | + X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) | ||
177 | { | ||
178 | int i; | ||
179 | |||
180 | @@ -280,7 +297,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, | ||
181 | X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i); | ||
182 | |||
183 | /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */ | ||
184 | - if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data)) | ||
185 | + if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree)) | ||
186 | return 0; | ||
187 | } | ||
188 | return 1; | ||
189 | @@ -311,7 +328,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, | ||
190 | /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ | ||
191 | data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; | ||
192 | data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; | ||
193 | - if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) { | ||
194 | + if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) { | ||
195 | policy_data_free(data); | ||
196 | return 0; | ||
197 | } | ||
198 | @@ -373,7 +390,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, | ||
199 | } | ||
200 | /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */ | ||
201 | if (last->anyPolicy && | ||
202 | - level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) | ||
203 | + level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL) | ||
204 | return 0; | ||
205 | return 1; | ||
206 | } | ||
207 | @@ -555,7 +572,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, | ||
208 | extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set; | ||
209 | extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS | ||
210 | | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE; | ||
211 | - node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree); | ||
212 | + node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree, 1); | ||
213 | } | ||
214 | if (!tree->user_policies) { | ||
215 | tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null(); | ||
216 | @@ -582,7 +599,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) | ||
217 | |||
218 | for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { | ||
219 | cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert); | ||
220 | - if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache)) | ||
221 | + if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree)) | ||
222 | return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; | ||
223 | |||
224 | if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) | ||
225 | -- | ||
226 | 2.34.1 | ||
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch deleted file mode 100644 index be5068074e..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch +++ /dev/null | |||
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ | |||
1 | From b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | ||
2 | From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | ||
3 | Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 16:52:55 +0000 | ||
4 | Subject: [PATCH] Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY is checked even in leaf | ||
5 | certs | ||
6 | |||
7 | Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we | ||
8 | later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf | ||
9 | cert was bad. | ||
10 | |||
11 | Fixes: CVE-2023-0465 | ||
12 | |||
13 | Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> | ||
14 | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> | ||
15 | (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20588) | ||
16 | |||
17 | CVE: CVE-2023-0465 | ||
18 | Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95] | ||
19 | Comment: Refreshed first hunk | ||
20 | Signed-off-by: Omkar Patil <omkar.patil@kpit.com> | ||
21 | |||
22 | --- | ||
23 | crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 11 +++++++++-- | ||
24 | 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) | ||
25 | |||
26 | diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | ||
27 | index 925fbb5412..1dfe4f9f31 100644 | ||
28 | --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | ||
29 | +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | ||
30 | @@ -1649,18 +1649,25 @@ | ||
31 | } | ||
32 | /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ | ||
33 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) { | ||
34 | - int i; | ||
35 | + int i, cbcalled = 0; | ||
36 | |||
37 | /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */ | ||
38 | - for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { | ||
39 | + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { | ||
40 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | ||
41 | |||
42 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) | ||
43 | continue; | ||
44 | + cbcalled = 1; | ||
45 | if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, | ||
46 | X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION)) | ||
47 | return 0; | ||
48 | } | ||
49 | + if (!cbcalled) { | ||
50 | + /* Should not be able to get here */ | ||
51 | + X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | ||
52 | + return 0; | ||
53 | + } | ||
54 | + /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */ | ||
55 | return 1; | ||
56 | } | ||
57 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) { | ||
58 | -- | ||
59 | 2.34.1 | ||
60 | |||
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f042aa5da1..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch +++ /dev/null | |||
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ | |||
1 | From 0d16b7e99aafc0b4a6d729eec65a411a7e025f0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | ||
2 | From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> | ||
3 | Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2023 16:15:47 +0100 | ||
4 | Subject: [PATCH] Fix documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() | ||
5 | |||
6 | The function was incorrectly documented as enabling policy checking. | ||
7 | |||
8 | Fixes: CVE-2023-0466 | ||
9 | |||
10 | Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | ||
11 | Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> | ||
12 | (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20564) | ||
13 | |||
14 | CVE: CVE-2023-0466 | ||
15 | Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=0d16b7e99aafc0b4a6d729eec65a411a7e025f0a] | ||
16 | Comment: Refreshed first hunk from CHANGE and NEWS | ||
17 | Signed-off-by: Omkar Patil <omkar.patil@kpit.com> | ||
18 | |||
19 | --- | ||
20 | CHANGES | 5 +++++ | ||
21 | NEWS | 1 + | ||
22 | doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod | 9 +++++++-- | ||
23 | 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) | ||
24 | |||
25 | diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES | ||
26 | index efccf7838e..b19f1429bb 100644 | ||
27 | --- a/CHANGES | ||
28 | +++ b/CHANGES | ||
29 | @@ -9,6 +9,11 @@ | ||
30 | |||
31 | Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023] | ||
32 | |||
33 | + *) Corrected documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() to mention | ||
34 | + that it does not enable policy checking. Thanks to | ||
35 | + David Benjamin for discovering this issue. (CVE-2023-0466) | ||
36 | + [Tomas Mraz] | ||
37 | + | ||
38 | *) Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName. | ||
39 | |||
40 | There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address processing | ||
41 | diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS | ||
42 | index 36a9bb6890..62615693fa 100644 | ||
43 | --- a/NEWS | ||
44 | +++ b/NEWS | ||
45 | @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ | ||
46 | |||
47 | Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1s and OpenSSL 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023] | ||
48 | |||
49 | + o Fixed documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() (CVE-2023-0466) | ||
50 | o Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName (CVE-2023-0286) | ||
51 | o Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF (CVE-2023-0215) | ||
52 | o Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex (CVE-2022-4450) | ||
53 | diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod | ||
54 | index f6f304bf7b..aa292f9336 100644 | ||
55 | --- a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod | ||
56 | +++ b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod | ||
57 | @@ -92,8 +92,9 @@ B<trust>. | ||
58 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B<param> to | ||
59 | B<t>. Normally the current time is used. | ||
60 | |||
61 | -X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled | ||
62 | -by default) and adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set. | ||
63 | +X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set. | ||
64 | +Contrary to preexisting documentation of this function it does not enable | ||
65 | +policy checking. | ||
66 | |||
67 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled | ||
68 | by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B<policies>. Any existing | ||
69 | @@ -377,6 +378,10 @@ and has no effect. | ||
70 | |||
71 | The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i. | ||
72 | |||
73 | +The function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() was historically documented as | ||
74 | +enabling policy checking however the implementation has never done this. | ||
75 | +The documentation was changed to align with the implementation. | ||
76 | + | ||
77 | =head1 COPYRIGHT | ||
78 | |||
79 | Copyright 2009-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | ||
80 | -- | ||
81 | 2.34.1 | ||
82 | |||
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-2650.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-2650.patch deleted file mode 100644 index ef344dda7f..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-2650.patch +++ /dev/null | |||
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@ | |||
1 | From 9e209944b35cf82368071f160a744b6178f9b098 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | ||
2 | From: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | ||
3 | Date: Fri, 12 May 2023 10:00:13 +0200 | ||
4 | Subject: [PATCH] Restrict the size of OBJECT IDENTIFIERs that OBJ_obj2txt will | ||
5 | translate | ||
6 | |||
7 | OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical | ||
8 | numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very | ||
9 | long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that | ||
10 | sub-identifier. | ||
11 | |||
12 | To mitigate this, a restriction on the size that OBJ_obj2txt() will | ||
13 | translate to canonical numeric text form is added, based on RFC 2578 | ||
14 | (STD 58), which says this: | ||
15 | |||
16 | > 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values | ||
17 | > | ||
18 | > An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative numbers. | ||
19 | > For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a sub-identifier, | ||
20 | > there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value, and each sub-identifier | ||
21 | > has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal). | ||
22 | |||
23 | Fixes otc/security#96 | ||
24 | Fixes CVE-2023-2650 | ||
25 | |||
26 | Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | ||
27 | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> | ||
28 | |||
29 | Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9e209944b35cf82368071f160a744b6178f9b098] | ||
30 | CVE: CVE-2023-2650 | ||
31 | Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> | ||
32 | --- | ||
33 | CHANGES | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- | ||
34 | NEWS | 2 ++ | ||
35 | crypto/objects/obj_dat.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ | ||
36 | 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) | ||
37 | |||
38 | diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES | ||
39 | index 1eaaf4e..f2cf38f 100644 | ||
40 | --- a/CHANGES | ||
41 | +++ b/CHANGES | ||
42 | @@ -7,7 +7,33 @@ | ||
43 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate | ||
44 | release branch. | ||
45 | |||
46 | - Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023] | ||
47 | + Changes between 1.1.1t and 1.1.1u [xx XXX xxxx] | ||
48 | + | ||
49 | + *) Mitigate for the time it takes for `OBJ_obj2txt` to translate gigantic | ||
50 | + OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identifiers to canonical numeric text form. | ||
51 | + | ||
52 | + OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical | ||
53 | + numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very | ||
54 | + long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that | ||
55 | + sub-identifier. (CVE-2023-2650) | ||
56 | + | ||
57 | + To mitigitate this, `OBJ_obj2txt()` will only translate an OBJECT | ||
58 | + IDENTIFIER to canonical numeric text form if the size of that OBJECT | ||
59 | + IDENTIFIER is 586 bytes or less, and fail otherwise. | ||
60 | + | ||
61 | + The basis for this restriction is RFC 2578 (STD 58), section 3.5. OBJECT | ||
62 | + IDENTIFIER values, which stipulates that OBJECT IDENTIFIERS may have at | ||
63 | + most 128 sub-identifiers, and that the maximum value that each sub- | ||
64 | + identifier may have is 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal). | ||
65 | + | ||
66 | + For each byte of every sub-identifier, only the 7 lower bits are part of | ||
67 | + the value, so the maximum amount of bytes that an OBJECT IDENTIFIER with | ||
68 | + these restrictions may occupy is 32 * 128 / 7, which is approximately 586 | ||
69 | + bytes. | ||
70 | + | ||
71 | + Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5 | ||
72 | + | ||
73 | +Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023] | ||
74 | |||
75 | *) Corrected documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() to mention | ||
76 | that it does not enable policy checking. Thanks to | ||
77 | diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS | ||
78 | index a86220a..41922c4 100644 | ||
79 | --- a/NEWS | ||
80 | +++ b/NEWS | ||
81 | @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ | ||
82 | |||
83 | Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1s and OpenSSL 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023] | ||
84 | |||
85 | + o Mitigate for very slow `OBJ_obj2txt()` performance with gigantic | ||
86 | + OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identities. (CVE-2023-2650) | ||
87 | o Fixed documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() (CVE-2023-0466) | ||
88 | o Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName (CVE-2023-0286) | ||
89 | o Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF (CVE-2023-0215) | ||
90 | diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c | ||
91 | index 7e8de72..d699915 100644 | ||
92 | --- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c | ||
93 | +++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c | ||
94 | @@ -428,6 +428,25 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name) | ||
95 | first = 1; | ||
96 | bl = NULL; | ||
97 | |||
98 | + /* | ||
99 | + * RFC 2578 (STD 58) says this about OBJECT IDENTIFIERs: | ||
100 | + * | ||
101 | + * > 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values | ||
102 | + * > | ||
103 | + * > An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative | ||
104 | + * > numbers. For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a | ||
105 | + * > sub-identifier, there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value, | ||
106 | + * > and each sub-identifier has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295 | ||
107 | + * > decimal). | ||
108 | + * | ||
109 | + * So a legitimate OID according to this RFC is at most (32 * 128 / 7), | ||
110 | + * i.e. 586 bytes long. | ||
111 | + * | ||
112 | + * Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5 | ||
113 | + */ | ||
114 | + if (len > 586) | ||
115 | + goto err; | ||
116 | + | ||
117 | while (len > 0) { | ||
118 | l = 0; | ||
119 | use_bn = 0; | ||
120 | -- | ||
121 | 2.25.1 | ||
122 | |||
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1t.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1v.bb index eea8ef64af..d1222dc470 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1t.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1v.bb | |||
@@ -19,17 +19,14 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz \ | |||
19 | file://reproducible.patch \ | 19 | file://reproducible.patch \ |
20 | file://reproducibility.patch \ | 20 | file://reproducibility.patch \ |
21 | file://0001-Configure-add-2-missing-key-sorts.patch \ | 21 | file://0001-Configure-add-2-missing-key-sorts.patch \ |
22 | file://CVE-2023-0464.patch \ | 22 | file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \ |
23 | file://CVE-2023-0465.patch \ | ||
24 | file://CVE-2023-0466.patch \ | ||
25 | file://CVE-2023-2650.patch \ | ||
26 | " | 23 | " |
27 | 24 | ||
28 | SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \ | 25 | SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \ |
29 | file://environment.d-openssl.sh \ | 26 | file://environment.d-openssl.sh \ |
30 | " | 27 | " |
31 | 28 | ||
32 | SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "8dee9b24bdb1dcbf0c3d1e9b02fb8f6bf22165e807f45adeb7c9677536859d3b" | 29 | SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "d6697e2871e77238460402e9362d47d18382b15ef9f246aba6c7bd780d38a6b0" |
33 | 30 | ||
34 | inherit lib_package multilib_header multilib_script ptest | 31 | inherit lib_package multilib_header multilib_script ptest |
35 | MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-bin:${bindir}/c_rehash" | 32 | MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-bin:${bindir}/c_rehash" |