1 files changed, 45 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-ti33x-psp-3.2/3.2.24/0098-eCryptfs-Properly-check-for-O_RDONLY-flag-before-doi.patch b/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-ti33x-psp-3.2/3.2.24/0098-eCryptfs-Properly-check-for-O_RDONLY-flag-before-doi.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2758ec07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-ti33x-psp-3.2/3.2.24/0098-eCryptfs-Properly-check-for-O_RDONLY-flag-before-doi.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 590d0b9de4bb4ef7a84bb0a8a13d85353556e7ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2012 11:17:01 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 098/109] eCryptfs: Properly check for O_RDONLY flag before
+ doing privileged open
+
+commit 9fe79d7600497ed8a95c3981cbe5b73ab98222f0 upstream.
+
+If the first attempt at opening the lower file read/write fails,
+eCryptfs will retry using a privileged kthread. However, the privileged
+retry should not happen if the lower file's inode is read-only because a
+read/write open will still be unsuccessful.
+
+The check for determining if the open should be retried was intended to
+be based on the access mode of the lower file's open flags being
+O_RDONLY, but the check was incorrectly performed. This would cause the
+open to be retried by the privileged kthread, resulting in a second
+failed open of the lower file. This patch corrects the check to
+determine if the open request should be handled by the privileged
+kthread.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
+Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+---
+ fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c |    2 +-
+ 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c b/fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c
+index 69f994a..0dbe58a 100644
+--- a/fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c
++++ b/fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c
+@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int ecryptfs_privileged_open(struct file **lower_file,
+        (*lower_file) = dentry_open(lower_dentry, lower_mnt, flags, cred);
+        if (!IS_ERR(*lower_file))
+                goto out;
+-       if (flags & O_RDONLY) {
++       if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) {
+                rc = PTR_ERR((*lower_file));
+                goto out;
+        }
+-- 
+1.7.7.6
+