1 files changed, 45 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/recipes-security/selinux/policycoreutils/policycoreutils-make-O_CLOEXEC-optional.patch b/recipes-security/selinux/policycoreutils/policycoreutils-make-O_CLOEXEC-optional.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aaaa1e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-security/selinux/policycoreutils/policycoreutils-make-O_CLOEXEC-optional.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From dca6a89058d818827d6f1c80c9b6abb46002b855 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Joe MacDonald <joe.macdonald@windriver.com>
+Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2013 09:55:43 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] policycoreutils: make O_CLOEXEC optional
+
+Various commits in the selinux tree in the current release added O_CLOEXEC
+to open() calls in an attempt to address file descriptor leaks as
+described:
+
+   http://danwalsh.livejournal.com/53603.html
+
+However O_CLOEXEC isn't available on all platforms, so make it a
+compile-time option and generate a warning when it is not available.  The
+actual impact of leaking these file descriptors is minimal, though it does
+produce curious AVC Denied messages.
+
+Uptream-Status: Inappropriate [O_CLOEXEC has been in Linux since 2007 and POSIX since 2008]
+
+Signed-off-by: Joe MacDonald <joe.macdonald@windriver.com>
+---
+ restorecond/user.c |    8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/restorecond/user.c b/restorecond/user.c
+index 00a646f..50f3ab6 100644
+--- a/restorecond/user.c
++++ b/restorecond/user.c
+@@ -201,7 +201,13 @@ static int local_server() {
+                        perror("asprintf");
+                return -1;
+        }
+-       int fd = open(ptr, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
++       int fd = open(ptr, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_NOFOLLOW 
++#ifdef O_CLOEXEC
++                 | O_CLOEXEC
++#else
++#warning O_CLOEXEC undefined on this platform, this may leak file descriptors
++#endif
++                 , S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+        if (debug_mode)
+                g_warning ("Lock file: %s", ptr);
+ 
+-- 
+1.7.10.4
+