From 2c81f47508fa6bce9df84e3b43dfb16dffb742a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Raphael Geissert Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2024 15:51:05 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] Avoid directory traversal when extracting archives Description of the vulnerability from the NIST CVE tracker [1]: Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in the (1) tar_extract_glob and (2) tar_extract_all functions in libtar 1.2.20 and earlier allow remote attackers to overwrite arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in a crafted tar file. Imported from the Debian libtar package 1.2.20-8 [2]. Original Debian description: Author: Raphael Geissert Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/731860 Description: Avoid directory traversal when extracting archives by skipping over leading slashes and any prefix containing ".." components. Forwarded: yes meta-openembedded uses Debian's release tarball [3]. Debian uses repo.or.cz/libtar.git as their upstream [4]. repo.or.cz/libtar.git has been inactive since 2013 [5]. CVE: CVE-2013-4420 Upstream-Status: Inactive-Upstream [lastrelease: 2013 lastcommit: 2013] Comments: Added the commit message [1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4420 [2] https://sources.debian.org/patches/libtar/1.2.20-8/CVE-2013-4420.patch/ [3] https://git.openembedded.org/meta-openembedded/tree/meta-oe/recipes-support/libtar/libtar_1.2.20.bb?h=master#n8 [4] http://svn.kibibyte.se/libtar/trunk/debian/control (rev 51; not tagged) [5] https://repo.or.cz/libtar.git/shortlog/refs/heads/master Signed-off-by: Katariina Lounento --- lib/decode.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- lib/extract.c | 8 ++++---- lib/internal.h | 1 + lib/output.c | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/decode.c b/lib/decode.c index 35312be..edd5f2e 100644 --- a/lib/decode.c +++ b/lib/decode.c @@ -22,13 +22,42 @@ # include #endif +char * +safer_name_suffix (char const *file_name) +{ + char const *p, *t; + p = t = file_name; + while (*p == '/') t = ++p; + while (*p) + { + while (p[0] == '.' && p[0] == p[1] && p[2] == '/') + { + p += 3; + t = p; + } + /* advance pointer past the next slash */ + while (*p && (p++)[0] != '/'); + } + + if (!*t) + { + t = "."; + } + + if (t != file_name) + { + /* TODO: warn somehow that the path was modified */ + } + return (char*)t; +} + /* determine full path name */ char * th_get_pathname(TAR *t) { if (t->th_buf.gnu_longname) - return t->th_buf.gnu_longname; + return safer_name_suffix(t->th_buf.gnu_longname); /* allocate the th_pathname buffer if not already */ if (t->th_pathname == NULL) @@ -50,7 +79,7 @@ th_get_pathname(TAR *t) } /* will be deallocated in tar_close() */ - return t->th_pathname; + return safer_name_suffix(t->th_pathname); } diff --git a/lib/extract.c b/lib/extract.c index 9fc6ad5..4ff1a95 100644 --- a/lib/extract.c +++ b/lib/extract.c @@ -302,14 +302,14 @@ tar_extract_hardlink(TAR * t, char *realname) if (mkdirhier(dirname(filename)) == -1) return -1; libtar_hashptr_reset(&hp); - if (libtar_hash_getkey(t->h, &hp, th_get_linkname(t), + if (libtar_hash_getkey(t->h, &hp, safer_name_suffix(th_get_linkname(t)), (libtar_matchfunc_t)libtar_str_match) != 0) { lnp = (char *)libtar_hashptr_data(&hp); linktgt = &lnp[strlen(lnp) + 1]; } else - linktgt = th_get_linkname(t); + linktgt = safer_name_suffix(th_get_linkname(t)); #ifdef DEBUG printf(" ==> extracting: %s (link to %s)\n", filename, linktgt); @@ -347,9 +347,9 @@ tar_extract_symlink(TAR *t, char *realname) #ifdef DEBUG printf(" ==> extracting: %s (symlink to %s)\n", - filename, th_get_linkname(t)); + filename, safer_name_suffix(th_get_linkname(t))); #endif - if (symlink(th_get_linkname(t), filename) == -1) + if (symlink(safer_name_suffix(th_get_linkname(t)), filename) == -1) { #ifdef DEBUG perror("symlink()"); diff --git a/lib/internal.h b/lib/internal.h index da7be7f..f05ca4f 100644 --- a/lib/internal.h +++ b/lib/internal.h @@ -21,3 +21,4 @@ #define TLS_THREAD #endif +char* safer_name_suffix(char const*); diff --git a/lib/output.c b/lib/output.c index a5262ee..af754f1 100644 --- a/lib/output.c +++ b/lib/output.c @@ -124,9 +124,9 @@ th_print_long_ls(TAR *t) else printf(" link to "); if ((t->options & TAR_GNU) && t->th_buf.gnu_longlink != NULL) - printf("%s", t->th_buf.gnu_longlink); + printf("%s", safer_name_suffix(t->th_buf.gnu_longlink)); else - printf("%.100s", t->th_buf.linkname); + printf("%.100s", safer_name_suffix(t->th_buf.linkname)); } putchar('\n');