samba: upgrade to 3.6.24

Upgrade samba to latest 3.6.x version.

* remove PR
* remove backport CVE patches
* update 4 patches: documentation.patch, documentation2.patch, undefined-symbols.patch
  and bug_387266_upstream_4104_mention-kerberos-in-smbspool-manpage.patch

Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <kai.kang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Jansa <Martin.Jansa@gmail.com>

29 files changed, 19 insertions, 1297 deletions

diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/bug_221618_precise-64bit-prototype.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/bug_221618_precise-64bit-prototype.patch
index 31108f2e8..31108f2e8 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/bug_221618_precise-64bit-prototype.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/bug_221618_precise-64bit-prototype.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/bug_387266_upstream_4104_mention-kerberos-in-smbspool-manpage.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/bug_387266_upstream_4104_mention-kerberos-in-smbspool-manpage.patch
index ea499a6eb..d9cc633d4 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/bug_387266_upstream_4104_mention-kerberos-in-smbspool-manpage.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/bug_387266_upstream_4104_mention-kerberos-in-smbspool-manpage.patch
@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ Index: samba/docs/manpages/smbspool.8
  .sp -1
  .IP \(bu 2.3
  .\}
--The user argument (argv[2]) contains the print user\'s name and is presently not used by smbspool\&.
-+The user argument (argv[2]) contains the print user\'s name and is presently not used by smbspool except in Kerberos environments to access the user\'s ticket cache\&.
+-The user argument (argv[2]) contains the print user\*(Aqs name and is presently not used by smbspool\&.
++The user argument (argv[2]) contains the print user\*(Aqs name and is presently not used by smbspool except in Kerberos environments to access the user\'s ticket cache\&.
  .RE
  .sp
  .RS 4
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/bug_598313_upstream_7499-nss_wins-dont-clobber-daemons-logs.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/bug_598313_upstream_7499-nss_wins-dont-clobber-daemons-logs.patch
index dcd94e425..dcd94e425 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/bug_598313_upstream_7499-nss_wins-dont-clobber-daemons-logs.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/bug_598313_upstream_7499-nss_wins-dont-clobber-daemons-logs.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/bug_601406_fix-perl-path-in-example.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/bug_601406_fix-perl-path-in-example.patch
index ba8b1f425..ba8b1f425 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/bug_601406_fix-perl-path-in-example.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/bug_601406_fix-perl-path-in-example.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/bug_604768_upstream_7826_drop-using-samba-link.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/bug_604768_upstream_7826_drop-using-samba-link.patch
index 0c54b6b0b..0c54b6b0b 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/bug_604768_upstream_7826_drop-using-samba-link.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/bug_604768_upstream_7826_drop-using-samba-link.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/bug_604768_upstream_7826_fix-WHATSNEW-link.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/bug_604768_upstream_7826_fix-WHATSNEW-link.patch
index c7dd043fb..c7dd043fb 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/bug_604768_upstream_7826_fix-WHATSNEW-link.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/bug_604768_upstream_7826_fix-WHATSNEW-link.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/configure-disable-core_pattern-cross-check.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/configure-disable-core_pattern-cross-check.patch
index 2d9618973..2d9618973 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/configure-disable-core_pattern-cross-check.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/configure-disable-core_pattern-cross-check.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/configure-disable-getaddrinfo-cross.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/configure-disable-getaddrinfo-cross.patch
index 84ecd498f..84ecd498f 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/configure-disable-getaddrinfo-cross.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/configure-disable-getaddrinfo-cross.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/configure-libunwind.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/configure-libunwind.patch
index 9a2cb00eb..9a2cb00eb 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/configure-libunwind.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/configure-libunwind.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/documentation.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/documentation.patch
index 46ace234e..73111fed7 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/documentation.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/documentation.patch
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Index: experimental/docs/manpages/swat.8
 ===================================================================
 --- experimental.orig/docs/manpages/swat.8
 +++ experimental/docs/manpages/swat.8
-@@ -111,86 +111,6 @@
+@@ -120,86 +120,6 @@
  .RS 4
  Print a summary of command line options\&.
  .RE
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Index: experimental/docs/manpages/swat.8
 -/etc/services
 -file\&.
 -.PP
--the choice of port number isn\'t really important except that it should be less than 1024 and not currently used (using a number above 1024 presents an obscure security hole depending on the implementation details of your
+-the choice of port number isn\*(Aqt really important except that it should be less than 1024 and not currently used (using a number above 1024 presents an obscure security hole depending on the implementation details of your
 -inetd
 -daemon)\&.
 -.PP
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ Index: experimental/docs/manpages/swat.8
  .SH "LAUNCHING"
  .PP
  To launch SWAT just run your favorite web browser and point it at "http://localhost:901/"\&.
-@@ -208,14 +128,11 @@
+@@ -217,14 +137,11 @@
  This file must contain a mapping of service name (e\&.g\&., swat) to service port (e\&.g\&., 901) and protocol type (e\&.g\&., tcp)\&.
  .RE
  .PP
@@ -260,20 +260,20 @@ Index: experimental/docs/manpages/winbindd.8
 ===================================================================
 --- experimental.orig/docs/manpages/winbindd.8
 +++ experimental/docs/manpages/winbindd.8
-@@ -550,16 +550,16 @@
+@@ -539,16 +539,16 @@
  file are owned by root\&.
  .RE
  .PP
 -$LOCKDIR/winbindd_privileged/pipe
 +/var/run/samba/winbindd_privileged/pipe
  .RS 4
- The UNIX pipe over which \'privileged\' clients communicate with the
+ The UNIX pipe over which \*(Aqprivileged\*(Aq clients communicate with the
  winbindd
  program\&. For security reasons, access to some winbindd functions \- like those needed by the
  ntlm_auth
--utility \- is restricted\&. By default, only users in the \'root\' group will get this access, however the administrator may change the group permissions on $LOCKDIR/winbindd_privileged to allow programs like \'squid\' to use ntlm_auth\&. Note that the winbind client will only attempt to connect to the winbindd daemon if both the
+-utility \- is restricted\&. By default, only users in the \*(Aqroot\*(Aq group will get this access, however the administrator may change the group permissions on $LOCKDIR/winbindd_privileged to allow programs like \*(Aqsquid\*(Aq to use ntlm_auth\&. Note that the winbind client will only attempt to connect to the winbindd daemon if both the
 -$LOCKDIR/winbindd_privileged
-+utility \- is restricted\&. By default, only users in the \'root\' group will get this access, however the administrator may change the group permissions on /var/run/samba/winbindd_privileged to allow programs like \'squid\' to use ntlm_auth\&. Note that the winbind client will only attempt to connect to the winbindd daemon if both the
++utility \- is restricted\&. By default, only users in the \'root\' group will get this access, however the administrator may change the group permissions on /var/run/samba/winbindd_privileged to allow programs like \'squid\' to use ntlm_auth\&. Note that the winbind client will only attempt to connect to the winbindd daemon if both the                   
 +/var/run/samba/winbindd_privileged
  directory and
 -$LOCKDIR/winbindd_privileged/pipe
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ Index: experimental/docs/manpages/winbindd.8
  file are owned by root\&.
  .RE
  .PP
-@@ -568,15 +568,12 @@
+@@ -557,15 +557,12 @@
  Implementation of name service switch library\&.
  .RE
  .PP
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/documentation2.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/documentation2.patch
index 902e8e230..af8da32d5 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/documentation2.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/documentation2.patch
@@ -212,8 +212,8 @@ Index: samba/docs/manpages/nmbd.8
  \fBsmb.conf\fR(5),
  \fBsmbclient\fR(1),
 -\fBtestparm\fR(1),
--\fBtestprns\fR(1), and the Internet RFC\'s
-+\fBtestparm\fR(1), and the Internet RFC\'s
+-\fBtestprns\fR(1), and the Internet RFC\*(Aqs
++\fBtestparm\fR(1), and the Internet RFC\*(Aqs
  rfc1001\&.txt,
  rfc1002\&.txt\&. In addition the CIFS (formerly SMB) specification is available as a link from the Web page
  http://samba\&.org/cifs/\&.
@@ -269,8 +269,8 @@ Index: samba/docs/manpages/smbd.8
  \fBsmb.conf\fR(5),
  \fBsmbclient\fR(1),
 -\fBtestparm\fR(1),
--\fBtestprns\fR(1), and the Internet RFC\'s
-+\fBtestparm\fR(1), and the Internet RFC\'s
+-\fBtestprns\fR(1), and the Internet RFC\*(Aqs
++\fBtestparm\fR(1), and the Internet RFC\*(Aqs
  rfc1001\&.txt,
  rfc1002\&.txt\&. In addition the CIFS (formerly SMB) specification is available as a link from the Web page
  http://samba\&.org/cifs/\&.
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/dont-build-VFS-examples.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/dont-build-VFS-examples.patch
index beff7db67..beff7db67 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/dont-build-VFS-examples.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/dont-build-VFS-examples.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/fhs-filespaths.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/fhs-filespaths.patch
index e7c6b9995..e7c6b9995 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/fhs-filespaths.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/fhs-filespaths.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/installswat.sh.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/installswat.sh.patch
index 3f08e493a..3f08e493a 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/installswat.sh.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/installswat.sh.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/libutil_drop_AI_ADDRCONFIG.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/libutil_drop_AI_ADDRCONFIG.patch
index d3473ea40..d3473ea40 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/libutil_drop_AI_ADDRCONFIG.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/libutil_drop_AI_ADDRCONFIG.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/only_export_public_symbols.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/only_export_public_symbols.patch
index f4fbd56a1..f4fbd56a1 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/only_export_public_symbols.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/only_export_public_symbols.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/pam-examples.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/pam-examples.patch
index 9b36e14e3..9b36e14e3 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/pam-examples.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/pam-examples.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/shadow_copy2_backport.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/shadow_copy2_backport.patch
index dbd10489f..dbd10489f 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/shadow_copy2_backport.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/shadow_copy2_backport.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/smbclient-pager.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/smbclient-pager.patch
index 429f2cec4..429f2cec4 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/smbclient-pager.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/smbclient-pager.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/smbtar-bashism.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/smbtar-bashism.patch
index 27a47cb51..27a47cb51 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/smbtar-bashism.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/smbtar-bashism.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/smbtorture-manpage.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/smbtorture-manpage.patch
index 59930b5e5..59930b5e5 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/smbtorture-manpage.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/smbtorture-manpage.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/undefined-symbols.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/undefined-symbols.patch
index 3ab0027ee..5babc1e38 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/undefined-symbols.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/undefined-symbols.patch
@@ -13,12 +13,12 @@ Index: experimental/source3/Makefile.in
 ===================================================================
 --- experimental.orig/source3/Makefile.in
 +++ experimental/source3/Makefile.in
-@@ -2281,7 +2281,7 @@
+@@ -2594,7 +2594,7 @@
  
- $(LIBSMBCLIENT_SHARED_TARGET_SONAME): $(BINARY_PREREQS) $(LIBSMBCLIENT_OBJ) $(LIBSMBCLIENT_THREAD_OBJ) $(LIBSMBCLIENT_SYMS) $(LIBTALLOC) $(LIBTDB) $(LIBWBCLIENT)
+ $(LIBSMBCLIENT_SHARED_TARGET_SONAME): $(BINARY_PREREQS) $(LIBSMBCLIENT_OBJ) $(LIBSMBCLIENT_THREAD_OBJ) $(LIBSMBCLIENT_SYMS) $(LIBTALLOC) $(LIBTEVENT) $(LIBTDB) $(LIBWBCLIENT)
         @echo Linking shared library $@
 -       @$(SHLD_DSO) $(LIBSMBCLIENT_OBJ) $(LIBSMBCLIENT_THREAD_OBJ) \
 +       @$(SHLD_DSO) -Wl,-z,defs $(LIBSMBCLIENT_OBJ) $(LIBSMBCLIENT_THREAD_OBJ) \
-                $(LIBTALLOC_LIBS) $(LIBTDB_LIBS) $(LIBWBCLIENT_LIBS) $(LIBS) \
+                $(LIBTALLOC_LIBS) $(LIBTEVENT_LIBS) $(LIBTDB_LIBS) $(LIBWBCLIENT_LIBS) $(LIBS) \
                 $(KRB5LIBS) $(LDAP_LIBS) $(NSCD_LIBS) $(ZLIB_LIBS) $(PTHREAD_LDFLAGS) \
                 @SONAMEFLAG@`basename $@`
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/usershare.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/usershare.patch
index 3673db751..3673db751 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/usershare.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/usershare.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/waf-as-source.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/waf-as-source.patch
index 985ed5af1..985ed5af1 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.8/waf-as-source.patch
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba-3.6.24/waf-as-source.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.11-CVE-2013-0213-CVE-2013-0214.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.11-CVE-2013-0213-CVE-2013-0214.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index cccb34127..000000000
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.11-CVE-2013-0213-CVE-2013-0214.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,160 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-From 71225948a249f079120282740fcc39fd6faa880e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
-Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2013 23:11:07 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] swat: Use X-Frame-Options header to avoid clickjacking
-
-Jann Horn reported a potential clickjacking vulnerability in SWAT where
-the SWAT page could be embedded into an attacker's page using a frame or
-iframe and then used to trick the user to change Samba settings.
-
-Avoid this by telling the browser to refuse the frame embedding via the
-X-Frame-Options: DENY header.
-
-Signed-off-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
-
-Fix bug #9576 - CVE-2013-0213: Clickjacking issue in SWAT.
----
- source3/web/swat.c |    3 ++-
- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/source3/web/swat.c b/source3/web/swat.c
-index 1f6eb6c..ed80c38 100644
---- a/source3/web/swat.c
-+++ b/source3/web/swat.c
-@@ -266,7 +266,8 @@ static void print_header(void)
-        if (!cgi_waspost()) {
-                printf("Expires: 0\r\n");
-        }
--       printf("Content-type: text/html\r\n\r\n");
-+       printf("Content-type: text/html\r\n");
-+       printf("X-Frame-Options: DENY\r\n\r\n");
- 
-        if (!include_html("include/header.html")) {
-                printf("<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC \"-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN\">\n");
--- 
-1.7.7
-
-
-From 91f4275873ebeda8f57684f09df67162ae80515a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
-Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2013 21:41:07 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] swat: Use additional nonce on XSRF protection
-
-If the user had a weak password on the root account of a machine running
-SWAT, there still was a chance of being targetted by an XSRF on a
-malicious web site targetting the SWAT setup.
-
-Use a random nonce stored in secrets.tdb to close this possible attack
-window. Thanks to Jann Horn for reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
-
-Fix bug #9577: CVE-2013-0214: Potential XSRF in SWAT.
----
- source3/web/cgi.c        |   40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
- source3/web/swat.c       |    2 ++
- source3/web/swat_proto.h |    1 +
- 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/source3/web/cgi.c b/source3/web/cgi.c
-index ef1b856..861bc84 100644
---- a/source3/web/cgi.c
-+++ b/source3/web/cgi.c
-@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ static const char *baseurl;
- static char *pathinfo;
- static char *C_user;
- static char *C_pass;
-+static char *C_nonce;
- static bool inetd_server;
- static bool got_request;
- 
-@@ -329,20 +330,7 @@ static void cgi_web_auth(void)
-        C_user = SMB_STRDUP(user);
- 
-        if (!setuid(0)) {
--               C_pass = secrets_fetch_generic("root", "SWAT");
--               if (C_pass == NULL) {
--                       char *tmp_pass = NULL;
--                       tmp_pass = generate_random_password(talloc_tos(),
--                                                           16, 16);
--                       if (tmp_pass == NULL) {
--                               printf("%sFailed to create random nonce for "
--                                      "SWAT session\n<br>%s\n", head, tail);
--                               exit(0);
--                       }
--                       secrets_store_generic("root", "SWAT", tmp_pass);
--                       C_pass = SMB_STRDUP(tmp_pass);
--                       TALLOC_FREE(tmp_pass);
--               }
-+               C_pass = SMB_STRDUP(cgi_nonce());
-        }
-        setuid(pwd->pw_uid);
-        if (geteuid() != pwd->pw_uid || getuid() != pwd->pw_uid) {
-@@ -459,6 +447,30 @@ char *cgi_user_pass(void)
- }
- 
- /***************************************************************************
-+return a ptr to the nonce
-+  ***************************************************************************/
-+char *cgi_nonce(void)
-+{
-+       const char *head = "Content-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n<HTML><BODY><H1>SWAT installation Error</H1>\n";
-+       const char *tail = "</BODY></HTML>\r\n";
-+       C_nonce = secrets_fetch_generic("root", "SWAT");
-+       if (C_nonce == NULL) {
-+               char *tmp_pass = NULL;
-+               tmp_pass = generate_random_password(talloc_tos(),
-+                                                   16, 16);
-+               if (tmp_pass == NULL) {
-+                       printf("%sFailed to create random nonce for "
-+                              "SWAT session\n<br>%s\n", head, tail);
-+                       exit(0);
-+               }
-+               secrets_store_generic("root", "SWAT", tmp_pass);
-+               C_nonce = SMB_STRDUP(tmp_pass);
-+               TALLOC_FREE(tmp_pass);
-+       }
-+        return(C_nonce);
-+}
-+
-+/***************************************************************************
- handle a file download
-   ***************************************************************************/
- static void cgi_download(char *file)
-diff --git a/source3/web/swat.c b/source3/web/swat.c
-index ed80c38..f8933d2 100644
---- a/source3/web/swat.c
-+++ b/source3/web/swat.c
-@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ void get_xsrf_token(const char *username, const char *pass,
-        MD5_CTX md5_ctx;
-        uint8_t token[16];
-        int i;
-+       char *nonce = cgi_nonce();
- 
-        token_str[0] = '\0';
-        ZERO_STRUCT(md5_ctx);
-@@ -167,6 +168,7 @@ void get_xsrf_token(const char *username, const char *pass,
-        if (pass != NULL) {
-                MD5Update(&md5_ctx, (uint8_t *)pass, strlen(pass));
-        }
-+       MD5Update(&md5_ctx, (uint8_t *)nonce, strlen(nonce));
- 
-        MD5Final(token, &md5_ctx);
- 
-diff --git a/source3/web/swat_proto.h b/source3/web/swat_proto.h
-index 424a3af..fe51b1f 100644
---- a/source3/web/swat_proto.h
-+++ b/source3/web/swat_proto.h
-@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ const char *cgi_variable_nonull(const char *name);
- bool am_root(void);
- char *cgi_user_name(void);
- char *cgi_user_pass(void);
-+char *cgi_nonce(void);
- void cgi_setup(const char *rootdir, int auth_required);
- const char *cgi_baseurl(void);
- const char *cgi_pathinfo(void);
--- 
-1.7.7
-
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.16-CVE-2013-4124.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.16-CVE-2013-4124.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 54b8edfbe..000000000
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.16-CVE-2013-4124.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-From efdbcabbe97a594572d71d714d258a5854c5d8ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
-Date: Wed, 10 Jul 2013 17:10:17 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #10010 - Missing integer wrap protection in EA list
- reading can cause server to loop with DOS.
-
-Ensure we never wrap whilst adding client provided input.
-CVE-2013-4124
-
-Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
----
- source3/smbd/nttrans.c |   12 ++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/source3/smbd/nttrans.c b/source3/smbd/nttrans.c
-index ea9d417..5fc3a09 100644
---- a/source3/smbd/nttrans.c
-+++ b/source3/smbd/nttrans.c
-@@ -989,7 +989,19 @@ struct ea_list *read_nttrans_ea_list(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, const char *pdata, size_t
-                if (next_offset == 0) {
-                        break;
-                }
-+
-+               /* Integer wrap protection for the increment. */
-+               if (offset + next_offset < offset) {
-+                       break;
-+               }
-+
-                offset += next_offset;
-+
-+               /* Integer wrap protection for while loop. */
-+               if (offset + 4 < offset) {
-+                       break;
-+               }
-+
-        }
- 
-        return ea_list_head;
--- 
-1.7.10.4
-
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.19-CVE-2013-4475.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.19-CVE-2013-4475.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a435c08b5..000000000
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.19-CVE-2013-4475.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-From 928910f01f951657ea4629a6d573ac00646d16f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
-Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2013 13:48:42 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #10229 - No access check verification on stream
- files.
-
-https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10229
-
-We need to check if the requested access mask
-could be used to open the underlying file (if
-it existed), as we're passing in zero for the
-access mask to the base filename.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
----
- source3/smbd/open.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/source3/smbd/open.c b/source3/smbd/open.c
-index 447de80..441b8cd 100644
---- a/source3/smbd/open.c
-+++ b/source3/smbd/open.c
-@@ -152,6 +152,48 @@ NTSTATUS smbd_check_open_rights(struct connection_struct *conn,
- }
- 
- /****************************************************************************
-+ Ensure when opening a base file for a stream open that we have permissions
-+ to do so given the access mask on the base file.
-+****************************************************************************/
-+
-+static NTSTATUS check_base_file_access(struct connection_struct *conn,
-+                               struct smb_filename *smb_fname,
-+                               uint32_t access_mask)
-+{
-+       uint32_t access_granted = 0;
-+       NTSTATUS status;
-+
-+       status = smbd_calculate_access_mask(conn, smb_fname,
-+                                       false,
-+                                       access_mask,
-+                                       &access_mask);
-+       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
-+               DEBUG(10, ("smbd_calculate_access_mask "
-+                       "on file %s returned %s\n",
-+                       smb_fname_str_dbg(smb_fname),
-+                       nt_errstr(status)));
-+               return status;
-+       }
-+
-+       if (access_mask & (FILE_WRITE_DATA|FILE_APPEND_DATA)) {
-+               uint32_t dosattrs;
-+               if (!CAN_WRITE(conn)) {
-+                       return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
-+               }
-+               dosattrs = dos_mode(conn, smb_fname);
-+               if (IS_DOS_READONLY(dosattrs)) {
-+                       return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
-+               }
-+       }
-+
-+
-+       return smbd_check_open_rights(conn,
-+                               smb_fname,
-+                               access_mask,
-+                               &access_granted);
-+}
-+
-+/****************************************************************************
-  fd support routines - attempt to do a dos_open.
- ****************************************************************************/
- 
-@@ -3227,6 +3269,25 @@ static NTSTATUS create_file_unixpath(connection_struct *conn,
-                if (SMB_VFS_STAT(conn, smb_fname_base) == -1) {
-                        DEBUG(10, ("Unable to stat stream: %s\n",
-                                   smb_fname_str_dbg(smb_fname_base)));
-+               } else {
-+                       /*
-+                        * https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10229
-+                        * We need to check if the requested access mask
-+                        * could be used to open the underlying file (if
-+                        * it existed), as we're passing in zero for the
-+                        * access mask to the base filename.
-+                        */
-+                       status = check_base_file_access(conn,
-+                                                       smb_fname_base,
-+                                                       access_mask);
-+
-+                       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
-+                               DEBUG(10, ("Permission check "
-+                                       "for base %s failed: "
-+                                       "%s\n", smb_fname->base_name,
-+                                       nt_errstr(status)));
-+                               goto fail;
-+                       }
-                }
- 
-                /* Open the base file. */
--- 
-1.8.4.1
-
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.22-CVE-2013-4496.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.22-CVE-2013-4496.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c190a6c50..000000000
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.22-CVE-2013-4496.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,966 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-From 25066eb31d6608075b5993b0d19b3e0843cdadeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
-Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2013 14:55:44 +1300
-Subject: [PATCH 1/3] CVE-2013-4496:s3-samr: Block attempts to crack passwords
- via repeated password changes
-
-Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10245
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
-Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
-Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
-Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
-Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
----
- source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c |   55 ++++++++++++++++
- source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c        |   90 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
- 2 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c
-index 0b4b25b..59905be 100644
---- a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c
-+++ b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c
-@@ -1106,6 +1106,8 @@ NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user, const char *rhost,
-        struct samu *sampass = NULL;
-        NTSTATUS nt_status;
-        bool ret = false;
-+       bool updated_badpw = false;
-+       NTSTATUS update_login_attempts_status;
- 
-        if (!(sampass = samu_new(NULL))) {
-                return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
-@@ -1121,6 +1123,13 @@ NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user, const char *rhost,
-                return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
-        }
- 
-+       /* Quit if the account was locked out. */
-+       if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) {
-+               DEBUG(3,("check_sam_security: Account for user %s was locked out.\n", user));
-+               TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
-+               return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT;
-+       }
-+
-        nt_status = check_oem_password(user,
-                                       password_encrypted_with_lm_hash,
-                                       old_lm_hash_encrypted,
-@@ -1129,6 +1138,52 @@ NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user, const char *rhost,
-                                       sampass,
-                                       &new_passwd);
- 
-+       /*
-+        * Notify passdb backend of login success/failure. If not
-+        * NT_STATUS_OK the backend doesn't like the login
-+        */
-+       update_login_attempts_status = pdb_update_login_attempts(sampass,
-+                                               NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status));
-+
-+       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
-+               bool increment_bad_pw_count = false;
-+
-+               if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) &&
-+                   (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
-+                   NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_login_attempts_status))
-+               {
-+                       increment_bad_pw_count = true;
-+               }
-+
-+               if (increment_bad_pw_count) {
-+                       pdb_increment_bad_password_count(sampass);
-+                       updated_badpw = true;
-+               } else {
-+                       pdb_update_bad_password_count(sampass,
-+                                                     &updated_badpw);
-+               }
-+       } else {
-+
-+               if ((pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
-+                   (pdb_get_bad_password_count(sampass) > 0)){
-+                       pdb_set_bad_password_count(sampass, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
-+                       pdb_set_bad_password_time(sampass, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
-+                       updated_badpw = true;
-+               }
-+       }
-+
-+       if (updated_badpw) {
-+               NTSTATUS update_status;
-+               become_root();
-+               update_status = pdb_update_sam_account(sampass);
-+               unbecome_root();
-+
-+               if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_status)) {
-+                       DEBUG(1, ("Failed to modify entry: %s\n",
-+                                 nt_errstr(update_status)));
-+               }
-+       }
-+
-        if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
-                TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
-                return nt_status;
-diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
-index 78ef1ba..3241b97 100644
---- a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
-+++ b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
-@@ -1715,9 +1715,11 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
-        NTSTATUS status;
-        bool ret = false;
-        struct samr_user_info *uinfo;
--       struct samu *pwd;
-+       struct samu *pwd = NULL;
-        struct samr_Password new_lmPwdHash, new_ntPwdHash, checkHash;
-        struct samr_Password lm_pwd, nt_pwd;
-+       bool updated_badpw = false;
-+       NTSTATUS update_login_attempts_status;
- 
-        uinfo = policy_handle_find(p, r->in.user_handle,
-                                   SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_PASSWORD, NULL,
-@@ -1729,6 +1731,15 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
-        DEBUG(5,("_samr_ChangePasswordUser: sid:%s\n",
-                  sid_string_dbg(&uinfo->sid)));
- 
-+       /* basic sanity checking on parameters.  Do this before any database ops */
-+       if (!r->in.lm_present || !r->in.nt_present ||
-+           !r->in.old_lm_crypted || !r->in.new_lm_crypted ||
-+           !r->in.old_nt_crypted || !r->in.new_nt_crypted) {
-+               /* we should really handle a change with lm not
-+                  present */
-+               return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
-+       }
-+
-        if (!(pwd = samu_new(NULL))) {
-                return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
-        }
-@@ -1742,6 +1753,14 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
-                return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
-        }
- 
-+       /* Quit if the account was locked out. */
-+       if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) {
-+               DEBUG(3, ("Account for user %s was locked out.\n",
-+                         pdb_get_username(pwd)));
-+               status = NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT;
-+               goto out;
-+       }
-+
-        {
-                const uint8_t *lm_pass, *nt_pass;
- 
-@@ -1750,29 +1769,19 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
- 
-                if (!lm_pass || !nt_pass) {
-                        status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
--                       goto out;
-+                       goto update_login;
-                }
- 
-                memcpy(&lm_pwd.hash, lm_pass, sizeof(lm_pwd.hash));
-                memcpy(&nt_pwd.hash, nt_pass, sizeof(nt_pwd.hash));
-        }
- 
--       /* basic sanity checking on parameters.  Do this before any database ops */
--       if (!r->in.lm_present || !r->in.nt_present ||
--           !r->in.old_lm_crypted || !r->in.new_lm_crypted ||
--           !r->in.old_nt_crypted || !r->in.new_nt_crypted) {
--               /* we should really handle a change with lm not
--                  present */
--               status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
--               goto out;
--       }
--
-        /* decrypt and check the new lm hash */
-        D_P16(lm_pwd.hash, r->in.new_lm_crypted->hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash);
-        D_P16(new_lmPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_lm_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
-        if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, lm_pwd.hash, 16) != 0) {
-                status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
--               goto out;
-+               goto update_login;
-        }
- 
-        /* decrypt and check the new nt hash */
-@@ -1780,7 +1789,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
-        D_P16(new_ntPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_nt_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
-        if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, nt_pwd.hash, 16) != 0) {
-                status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
--               goto out;
-+               goto update_login;
-        }
- 
-        /* The NT Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present
-@@ -1789,7 +1798,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
-                D_P16(lm_pwd.hash, r->in.nt_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
-                if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
-                        status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
--                       goto out;
-+                       goto update_login;
-                }
-        }
- 
-@@ -1799,7 +1808,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
-                D_P16(nt_pwd.hash, r->in.lm_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
-                if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
-                        status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
--                       goto out;
-+                       goto update_login;
-                }
-        }
- 
-@@ -1810,6 +1819,55 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
-        }
- 
-        status = pdb_update_sam_account(pwd);
-+
-+update_login:
-+
-+       /*
-+        * Notify passdb backend of login success/failure. If not
-+        * NT_STATUS_OK the backend doesn't like the login
-+        */
-+       update_login_attempts_status = pdb_update_login_attempts(pwd,
-+                                               NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status));
-+
-+       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
-+               bool increment_bad_pw_count = false;
-+
-+               if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) &&
-+                   (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
-+                   NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_login_attempts_status))
-+               {
-+                       increment_bad_pw_count = true;
-+               }
-+
-+               if (increment_bad_pw_count) {
-+                       pdb_increment_bad_password_count(pwd);
-+                       updated_badpw = true;
-+               } else {
-+                       pdb_update_bad_password_count(pwd,
-+                                                     &updated_badpw);
-+               }
-+       } else {
-+
-+               if ((pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
-+                   (pdb_get_bad_password_count(pwd) > 0)){
-+                       pdb_set_bad_password_count(pwd, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
-+                       pdb_set_bad_password_time(pwd, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
-+                       updated_badpw = true;
-+               }
-+       }
-+
-+       if (updated_badpw) {
-+               NTSTATUS update_status;
-+               become_root();
-+               update_status = pdb_update_sam_account(pwd);
-+               unbecome_root();
-+
-+               if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_status)) {
-+                       DEBUG(1, ("Failed to modify entry: %s\n",
-+                                 nt_errstr(update_status)));
-+               }
-+       }
-+
-  out:
-        TALLOC_FREE(pwd);
- 
--- 
-1.7.9.5
-
-
-From 059da248cf69a3b0ef29836f49367b938fb1cbda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
-Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2013 14:04:20 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/3] CVE-2013-4496:s3:auth: fix memory leak in the
- ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT case.
-
-Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10245
-
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
-Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
-Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
----
- source3/auth/check_samsec.c |    1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/source3/auth/check_samsec.c b/source3/auth/check_samsec.c
-index f918dc0..e2c42d6 100644
---- a/source3/auth/check_samsec.c
-+++ b/source3/auth/check_samsec.c
-@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ NTSTATUS check_sam_security(const DATA_BLOB *challenge,
-        /* Quit if the account was locked out. */
-        if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) {
-                DEBUG(3,("check_sam_security: Account for user %s was locked out.\n", username));
-+               TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
-                return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT;
-        }
- 
--- 
-1.7.9.5
-
-
-From 27f982ef33a1238ae48d7a38d608dd23ebde61ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
-Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2013 16:16:46 +1300
-Subject: [PATCH 3/3] CVE-2013-4496:samr: Remove ChangePasswordUser
-
-This old password change mechanism does not provide the plaintext to
-validate against password complexity, and it is not used by modern
-clients.
-
-The missing features in both implementations (by design) were:
-
- - the password complexity checks (no plaintext)
- - the minimum password length (no plaintext)
-
-Additionally, the source3 version did not check:
-
- - the minimum password age
- - pdb_get_pass_can_change() which checks the security
-   descriptor for the 'user cannot change password' setting.
- - the password history
- - the output of the 'passwd program' if 'unix passwd sync = yes'.
-
-Finally, the mechanism was almost useless, as it was incorrectly
-only made available to administrative users with permission
-to reset the password.  It is removed here so that it is not
-mistakenly reinstated in the future.
-
-Andrew Bartlett
-
-Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10245
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
-Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
-Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
----
- source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c   |  169 +-------------------
- source3/smbd/lanman.c                   |  254 -------------------------------
- source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c |  126 +--------------
- source4/torture/rpc/samr.c              |   12 +-
- 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 537 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
-index 3241b97..2519a3f 100644
---- a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
-+++ b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
-@@ -1706,172 +1706,19 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_LookupNames(struct pipes_struct *p,
- }
- 
- /****************************************************************
-- _samr_ChangePasswordUser
-+ _samr_ChangePasswordUser.
-+
-+ So old it is just not worth implementing
-+ because it does not supply a plaintext and so we can't do password
-+ complexity checking and cannot update other services that use a
-+ plaintext password via passwd chat/pam password change/ldap password
-+ sync.
- ****************************************************************/
- 
- NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
-                                  struct samr_ChangePasswordUser *r)
- {
--       NTSTATUS status;
--       bool ret = false;
--       struct samr_user_info *uinfo;
--       struct samu *pwd = NULL;
--       struct samr_Password new_lmPwdHash, new_ntPwdHash, checkHash;
--       struct samr_Password lm_pwd, nt_pwd;
--       bool updated_badpw = false;
--       NTSTATUS update_login_attempts_status;
--
--       uinfo = policy_handle_find(p, r->in.user_handle,
--                                  SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_PASSWORD, NULL,
--                                  struct samr_user_info, &status);
--       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
--               return status;
--       }
--
--       DEBUG(5,("_samr_ChangePasswordUser: sid:%s\n",
--                 sid_string_dbg(&uinfo->sid)));
--
--       /* basic sanity checking on parameters.  Do this before any database ops */
--       if (!r->in.lm_present || !r->in.nt_present ||
--           !r->in.old_lm_crypted || !r->in.new_lm_crypted ||
--           !r->in.old_nt_crypted || !r->in.new_nt_crypted) {
--               /* we should really handle a change with lm not
--                  present */
--               return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
--       }
--
--       if (!(pwd = samu_new(NULL))) {
--               return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
--       }
--
--       become_root();
--       ret = pdb_getsampwsid(pwd, &uinfo->sid);
--       unbecome_root();
--
--       if (!ret) {
--               TALLOC_FREE(pwd);
--               return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
--       }
--
--       /* Quit if the account was locked out. */
--       if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) {
--               DEBUG(3, ("Account for user %s was locked out.\n",
--                         pdb_get_username(pwd)));
--               status = NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT;
--               goto out;
--       }
--
--       {
--               const uint8_t *lm_pass, *nt_pass;
--
--               lm_pass = pdb_get_lanman_passwd(pwd);
--               nt_pass = pdb_get_nt_passwd(pwd);
--
--               if (!lm_pass || !nt_pass) {
--                       status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
--                       goto update_login;
--               }
--
--               memcpy(&lm_pwd.hash, lm_pass, sizeof(lm_pwd.hash));
--               memcpy(&nt_pwd.hash, nt_pass, sizeof(nt_pwd.hash));
--       }
--
--       /* decrypt and check the new lm hash */
--       D_P16(lm_pwd.hash, r->in.new_lm_crypted->hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash);
--       D_P16(new_lmPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_lm_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
--       if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, lm_pwd.hash, 16) != 0) {
--               status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
--               goto update_login;
--       }
--
--       /* decrypt and check the new nt hash */
--       D_P16(nt_pwd.hash, r->in.new_nt_crypted->hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash);
--       D_P16(new_ntPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_nt_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
--       if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, nt_pwd.hash, 16) != 0) {
--               status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
--               goto update_login;
--       }
--
--       /* The NT Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present
--          check the nt cross hash */
--       if (r->in.cross1_present && r->in.nt_cross) {
--               D_P16(lm_pwd.hash, r->in.nt_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
--               if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
--                       status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
--                       goto update_login;
--               }
--       }
--
--       /* The LM Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present
--          check the lm cross hash */
--       if (r->in.cross2_present && r->in.lm_cross) {
--               D_P16(nt_pwd.hash, r->in.lm_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
--               if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
--                       status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
--                       goto update_login;
--               }
--       }
--
--       if (!pdb_set_nt_passwd(pwd, new_ntPwdHash.hash, PDB_CHANGED) ||
--           !pdb_set_lanman_passwd(pwd, new_lmPwdHash.hash, PDB_CHANGED)) {
--               status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
--               goto out;
--       }
--
--       status = pdb_update_sam_account(pwd);
--
--update_login:
--
--       /*
--        * Notify passdb backend of login success/failure. If not
--        * NT_STATUS_OK the backend doesn't like the login
--        */
--       update_login_attempts_status = pdb_update_login_attempts(pwd,
--                                               NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status));
--
--       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
--               bool increment_bad_pw_count = false;
--
--               if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) &&
--                   (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
--                   NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_login_attempts_status))
--               {
--                       increment_bad_pw_count = true;
--               }
--
--               if (increment_bad_pw_count) {
--                       pdb_increment_bad_password_count(pwd);
--                       updated_badpw = true;
--               } else {
--                       pdb_update_bad_password_count(pwd,
--                                                     &updated_badpw);
--               }
--       } else {
--
--               if ((pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
--                   (pdb_get_bad_password_count(pwd) > 0)){
--                       pdb_set_bad_password_count(pwd, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
--                       pdb_set_bad_password_time(pwd, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
--                       updated_badpw = true;
--               }
--       }
--
--       if (updated_badpw) {
--               NTSTATUS update_status;
--               become_root();
--               update_status = pdb_update_sam_account(pwd);
--               unbecome_root();
--
--               if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_status)) {
--                       DEBUG(1, ("Failed to modify entry: %s\n",
--                                 nt_errstr(update_status)));
--               }
--       }
--
-- out:
--       TALLOC_FREE(pwd);
--
--       return status;
-+       return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
- }
- 
- /*******************************************************************
-diff --git a/source3/smbd/lanman.c b/source3/smbd/lanman.c
-index aef12df..3b4ec65 100644
---- a/source3/smbd/lanman.c
-+++ b/source3/smbd/lanman.c
-@@ -2947,259 +2947,6 @@ static bool api_NetRemoteTOD(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
- }
- 
- /****************************************************************************
-- Set the user password.
--*****************************************************************************/
--
--static bool api_SetUserPassword(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
--                               connection_struct *conn,uint16 vuid,
--                               char *param, int tpscnt,
--                               char *data, int tdscnt,
--                               int mdrcnt,int mprcnt,
--                               char **rdata,char **rparam,
--                               int *rdata_len,int *rparam_len)
--{
--       char *np = get_safe_str_ptr(param,tpscnt,param,2);
--       char *p = NULL;
--       fstring user;
--       fstring pass1,pass2;
--       TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_tos();
--       NTSTATUS status, result;
--       struct rpc_pipe_client *cli = NULL;
--       struct policy_handle connect_handle, domain_handle, user_handle;
--       struct lsa_String domain_name;
--       struct dom_sid2 *domain_sid;
--       struct lsa_String names;
--       struct samr_Ids rids;
--       struct samr_Ids types;
--       struct samr_Password old_lm_hash;
--       struct samr_Password new_lm_hash;
--       int errcode = NERR_badpass;
--       uint32_t rid;
--       int encrypted;
--       int min_pwd_length;
--       struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = NULL;
--
--       /* Skip 2 strings. */
--       p = skip_string(param,tpscnt,np);
--       p = skip_string(param,tpscnt,p);
--
--       if (!np || !p) {
--               return False;
--       }
--
--       /* Do we have a string ? */
--       if (skip_string(param,tpscnt,p) == NULL) {
--               return False;
--       }
--       pull_ascii_fstring(user,p);
--
--       p = skip_string(param,tpscnt,p);
--       if (!p) {
--               return False;
--       }
--
--       memset(pass1,'\0',sizeof(pass1));
--       memset(pass2,'\0',sizeof(pass2));
--       /*
--        * We use 31 here not 32 as we're checking
--        * the last byte we want to access is safe.
--        */
--       if (!is_offset_safe(param,tpscnt,p,31)) {
--               return False;
--       }
--       memcpy(pass1,p,16);
--       memcpy(pass2,p+16,16);
--
--       encrypted = get_safe_SVAL(param,tpscnt,p+32,0,-1);
--       if (encrypted == -1) {
--               errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_INVALID_PARAM);
--               goto out;
--       }
--
--       min_pwd_length = get_safe_SVAL(param,tpscnt,p+34,0,-1);
--       if (min_pwd_length == -1) {
--               errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_INVALID_PARAM);
--               goto out;
--       }
--
--       *rparam_len = 4;
--       *rparam = smb_realloc_limit(*rparam,*rparam_len);
--       if (!*rparam) {
--               return False;
--       }
--
--       *rdata_len = 0;
--
--       DEBUG(3,("Set password for <%s> (encrypted: %d, min_pwd_length: %d)\n",
--               user, encrypted, min_pwd_length));
--
--       ZERO_STRUCT(connect_handle);
--       ZERO_STRUCT(domain_handle);
--       ZERO_STRUCT(user_handle);
--
--       status = rpc_pipe_open_interface(mem_ctx, &ndr_table_samr.syntax_id,
--                                       conn->session_info,
--                                       &conn->sconn->client_id,
--                                       conn->sconn->msg_ctx,
--                                       &cli);
--       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
--               DEBUG(0,("api_SetUserPassword: could not connect to samr: %s\n",
--                         nt_errstr(status)));
--               errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
--               goto out;
--       }
--
--       b = cli->binding_handle;
--
--       status = dcerpc_samr_Connect2(b, mem_ctx,
--                                     global_myname(),
--                                     SAMR_ACCESS_CONNECT_TO_SERVER |
--                                     SAMR_ACCESS_ENUM_DOMAINS |
--                                     SAMR_ACCESS_LOOKUP_DOMAIN,
--                                     &connect_handle,
--                                     &result);
--       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
--               errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
--               goto out;
--       }
--       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
--               errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
--               goto out;
--       }
--
--       init_lsa_String(&domain_name, get_global_sam_name());
--
--       status = dcerpc_samr_LookupDomain(b, mem_ctx,
--                                         &connect_handle,
--                                         &domain_name,
--                                         &domain_sid,
--                                         &result);
--       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
--               errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
--               goto out;
--       }
--       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
--               errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
--               goto out;
--       }
--
--       status = dcerpc_samr_OpenDomain(b, mem_ctx,
--                                       &connect_handle,
--                                       SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_OPEN_ACCOUNT,
--                                       domain_sid,
--                                       &domain_handle,
--                                       &result);
--       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
--               errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
--               goto out;
--       }
--       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
--               errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
--               goto out;
--       }
--
--       init_lsa_String(&names, user);
--
--       status = dcerpc_samr_LookupNames(b, mem_ctx,
--                                        &domain_handle,
--                                        1,
--                                        &names,
--                                        &rids,
--                                        &types,
--                                        &result);
--       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
--               errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
--               goto out;
--       }
--       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
--               errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
--               goto out;
--       }
--
--       if (rids.count != 1) {
--               errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_NO_SUCH_USER);
--               goto out;
--       }
--       if (rids.count != types.count) {
--               errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_INVALID_PARAM);
--               goto out;
--       }
--       if (types.ids[0] != SID_NAME_USER) {
--               errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_INVALID_PARAM);
--               goto out;
--       }
--
--       rid = rids.ids[0];
--
--       status = dcerpc_samr_OpenUser(b, mem_ctx,
--                                     &domain_handle,
--                                     SAMR_USER_ACCESS_CHANGE_PASSWORD,
--                                     rid,
--                                     &user_handle,
--                                     &result);
--       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
--               errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
--               goto out;
--       }
--       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
--               errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
--               goto out;
--       }
--
--       if (encrypted == 0) {
--               E_deshash(pass1, old_lm_hash.hash);
--               E_deshash(pass2, new_lm_hash.hash);
--       } else {
--               ZERO_STRUCT(old_lm_hash);
--               ZERO_STRUCT(new_lm_hash);
--               memcpy(old_lm_hash.hash, pass1, MIN(strlen(pass1), 16));
--               memcpy(new_lm_hash.hash, pass1, MIN(strlen(pass2), 16));
--       }
--
--       status = dcerpc_samr_ChangePasswordUser(b, mem_ctx,
--                                               &user_handle,
--                                               true, /* lm_present */
--                                               &old_lm_hash,
--                                               &new_lm_hash,
--                                               false, /* nt_present */
--                                               NULL, /* old_nt_crypted */
--                                               NULL, /* new_nt_crypted */
--                                               false, /* cross1_present */
--                                               NULL, /* nt_cross */
--                                               false, /* cross2_present */
--                                               NULL, /* lm_cross */
--                                               &result);
--       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
--               errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
--               goto out;
--       }
--       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
--               errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
--               goto out;
--       }
--
--       errcode = NERR_Success;
-- out:
--
--       if (b && is_valid_policy_hnd(&user_handle)) {
--               dcerpc_samr_Close(b, mem_ctx, &user_handle, &result);
--       }
--       if (b && is_valid_policy_hnd(&domain_handle)) {
--               dcerpc_samr_Close(b, mem_ctx, &domain_handle, &result);
--       }
--       if (b && is_valid_policy_hnd(&connect_handle)) {
--               dcerpc_samr_Close(b, mem_ctx, &connect_handle, &result);
--       }
--
--       memset((char *)pass1,'\0',sizeof(fstring));
--       memset((char *)pass2,'\0',sizeof(fstring));
--
--       SSVAL(*rparam,0,errcode);
--       SSVAL(*rparam,2,0);             /* converter word */
--       return(True);
--}
--
--/****************************************************************************
-   Set the user password (SamOEM version - gets plaintext).
- ****************************************************************************/
- 
-@@ -5790,7 +5537,6 @@ static const struct {
-        {"NetServerEnum2",      RAP_NetServerEnum2,     api_RNetServerEnum2}, /* anon OK */
-        {"NetServerEnum3",      RAP_NetServerEnum3,     api_RNetServerEnum3}, /* anon OK */
-        {"WAccessGetUserPerms",RAP_WAccessGetUserPerms,api_WAccessGetUserPerms},
--       {"SetUserPassword",     RAP_WUserPasswordSet2,  api_SetUserPassword},
-        {"WWkstaUserLogon",     RAP_WWkstaUserLogon,    api_WWkstaUserLogon},
-        {"PrintJobInfo",        RAP_WPrintJobSetInfo,   api_PrintJobInfo},
-        {"WPrintDriverEnum",    RAP_WPrintDriverEnum,   api_WPrintDriverEnum},
-diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c b/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c
-index ee13a11..e618740 100644
---- a/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c
-+++ b/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c
-@@ -32,131 +32,17 @@
- 
- /*
-   samr_ChangePasswordUser
-+
-+  So old it is just not worth implementing
-+  because it does not supply a plaintext and so we can't do password
-+  complexity checking and cannot update all the other password hashes.
-+
- */
- NTSTATUS dcesrv_samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call,
-                                        TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
-                                        struct samr_ChangePasswordUser *r)
- {
--       struct dcesrv_handle *h;
--       struct samr_account_state *a_state;
--       struct ldb_context *sam_ctx;
--       struct ldb_message **res;
--       int ret;
--       struct samr_Password new_lmPwdHash, new_ntPwdHash, checkHash;
--       struct samr_Password *lm_pwd, *nt_pwd;
--       NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
--       const char * const attrs[] = { "dBCSPwd", "unicodePwd" , NULL };
--
--       DCESRV_PULL_HANDLE(h, r->in.user_handle, SAMR_HANDLE_USER);
--
--       a_state = h->data;
--
--       /* basic sanity checking on parameters.  Do this before any database ops */
--       if (!r->in.lm_present || !r->in.nt_present ||
--           !r->in.old_lm_crypted || !r->in.new_lm_crypted ||
--           !r->in.old_nt_crypted || !r->in.new_nt_crypted) {
--               /* we should really handle a change with lm not
--                  present */
--               return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
--       }
--
--       /* Connect to a SAMDB with system privileges for fetching the old pw
--        * hashes. */
--       sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, dce_call->event_ctx,
--                               dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
--                               system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx), 0);
--       if (sam_ctx == NULL) {
--               return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE;
--       }
--
--       /* fetch the old hashes */
--       ret = gendb_search_dn(sam_ctx, mem_ctx,
--                             a_state->account_dn, &res, attrs);
--       if (ret != 1) {
--               return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
--       }
--
--       status = samdb_result_passwords(mem_ctx,
--                                       dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
--                                       res[0], &lm_pwd, &nt_pwd);
--       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) || !nt_pwd) {
--               return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
--       }
--
--       /* decrypt and check the new lm hash */
--       if (lm_pwd) {
--               D_P16(lm_pwd->hash, r->in.new_lm_crypted->hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash);
--               D_P16(new_lmPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_lm_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
--               if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, lm_pwd, 16) != 0) {
--                       return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
--               }
--       }
--
--       /* decrypt and check the new nt hash */
--       D_P16(nt_pwd->hash, r->in.new_nt_crypted->hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash);
--       D_P16(new_ntPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_nt_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
--       if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, nt_pwd, 16) != 0) {
--               return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
--       }
--
--       /* The NT Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present
--          check the nt cross hash */
--       if (r->in.cross1_present && r->in.nt_cross && lm_pwd) {
--               D_P16(lm_pwd->hash, r->in.nt_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
--               if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
--                       return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
--               }
--       }
--
--       /* The LM Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present
--          check the lm cross hash */
--       if (r->in.cross2_present && r->in.lm_cross && lm_pwd) {
--               D_P16(nt_pwd->hash, r->in.lm_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
--               if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
--                       return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
--               }
--       }
--
--       /* Start a SAM with user privileges for the password change */
--       sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, dce_call->event_ctx,
--                               dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
--                               dce_call->conn->auth_state.session_info, 0);
--       if (sam_ctx == NULL) {
--               return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE;
--       }
--
--       /* Start transaction */
--       ret = ldb_transaction_start(sam_ctx);
--       if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
--               DEBUG(1, ("Failed to start transaction: %s\n", ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
--               return NT_STATUS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED;
--       }
--
--       /* Performs the password modification. We pass the old hashes read out
--        * from the database since they were already checked against the user-
--        * provided ones. */
--       status = samdb_set_password(sam_ctx, mem_ctx,
--                                   a_state->account_dn,
--                                   a_state->domain_state->domain_dn,
--                                   NULL, &new_lmPwdHash, &new_ntPwdHash,
--                                   lm_pwd, nt_pwd, /* this is a user password change */
--                                   NULL,
--                                   NULL);
--       if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
--               ldb_transaction_cancel(sam_ctx);
--               return status;
--       }
--
--       /* And this confirms it in a transaction commit */
--       ret = ldb_transaction_commit(sam_ctx);
--       if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
--               DEBUG(1,("Failed to commit transaction to change password on %s: %s\n",
--                        ldb_dn_get_linearized(a_state->account_dn),
--                        ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
--               return NT_STATUS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED;
--       }
--
--       return NT_STATUS_OK;
-+       return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
- }
- 
- /*
-diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/samr.c b/source4/torture/rpc/samr.c
-index 7d9a1e2..adfc5d4 100644
---- a/source4/torture/rpc/samr.c
-+++ b/source4/torture/rpc/samr.c
-@@ -1728,8 +1728,16 @@ static bool test_ChangePasswordUser(struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b,
- 
-        torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_samr_ChangePasswordUser_r(b, tctx, &r),
-                "ChangePasswordUser failed");
--       torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, r.out.result, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD,
--               "ChangePasswordUser failed: expected NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD because we broke the LM hash");
-+
-+       /* Do not proceed if this call has been removed */
-+       if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(r.out.result, NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED)) {
-+               return true;
-+       }
-+
-+       if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(r.out.result, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION)) {
-+               torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, r.out.result, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD,
-+                       "ChangePasswordUser failed: expected NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD because we broke the LM hash");
-+       }
- 
-        /* Unbreak the LM hash */
-        hash1.hash[0]--;
--- 
-1.7.9.5
-
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba_3.6.8.bb b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba_3.6.24.bb
index cf13a0f58..8860da088 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba_3.6.8.bb
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba_3.6.24.bb
@@ -3,8 +3,6 @@ require samba-basic.inc
 LICENSE = "GPLv3"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://../COPYING;md5=d32239bcb673463ab874e80d47fae504"
 
-PR = "r8"
-
 SRC_URI += "\
     file://config-h.patch \
     file://documentation.patch;patchdir=.. \
@@ -30,14 +28,9 @@ SRC_URI += "\
     file://configure-disable-getaddrinfo-cross.patch;patchdir=.. \
     file://configure-disable-core_pattern-cross-check.patch;patchdir=.. \
     file://configure-libunwind.patch;patchdir=.. \
-    file://samba-3.6.22-CVE-2013-4496.patch;patchdir=.. \
-    file://0001-PIDL-fix-parsing-linemarkers-in-preprocessor-output.patch;patchdir=.. \
-    file://samba-3.6.11-CVE-2013-0213-CVE-2013-0214.patch;patchdir=.. \
-    file://samba-3.6.16-CVE-2013-4124.patch;patchdir=.. \
-    file://samba-3.6.19-CVE-2013-4475.patch;patchdir=.. \
 "
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "fbb245863eeef2fffe172df779a217be"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4f5a171a8d902c6b4f822ed875c51eb8339196d9ccf0ecd7f6521c966b3514de"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "d98425c0c2b73e08f048d31ffc727fb0"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "11d0bd04b734731970259efc6692b8e749ff671a9b56d8cc5fa98c192ab234a7"
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/samba-${PV}/source3"