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From 4794b5dd34688158fb51a2943032569d3780c4b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
Date: Sat, 21 Oct 2017 23:47:52 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix heap overflows when parsing malicious files.
 (CVE-2017-16612)

It is possible to trigger heap overflows due to an integer overflow
while parsing images and a signedness issue while parsing comments.

The integer overflow occurs because the chosen limit 0x10000 for
dimensions is too large for 32 bit systems, because each pixel takes
4 bytes. Properly chosen values allow an overflow which in turn will
lead to less allocated memory than needed for subsequent reads.

The signedness bug is triggered by reading the length of a comment
as unsigned int, but casting it to int when calling the function
XcursorCommentCreate. Turning length into a negative value allows the
check against XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN to pass, and the following
addition of sizeof (XcursorComment) + 1 makes it possible to allocate
less memory than needed for subsequent reads.

CVE: CVE-2017-16612
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXcursor/commit/?id=4794b5dd34688158fb51a2943032569d3780c4b8]

Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Wellving <andreas.wellving@enea.com>
---
 src/file.c | 12 ++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/file.c b/src/file.c
index 43163c2..da16277 100644
--- a/src/file.c
+++ b/src/file.c
@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ XcursorImageCreate (int width, int height)
 {
     XcursorImage    *image;
 
+    if (width < 0 || height < 0)
+       return NULL;
+    if (width > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE || height > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE)
+       return NULL;
+
     image = malloc (sizeof (XcursorImage) +
 		    width * height * sizeof (XcursorPixel));
     if (!image)
@@ -101,7 +106,7 @@ XcursorCommentCreate (XcursorUInt comment_type, int length)
 {
     XcursorComment  *comment;
 
-    if (length > XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN)
+    if (length < 0 || length > XCURSOR_COMMENT_MAX_LEN)
 	return NULL;
 
     comment = malloc (sizeof (XcursorComment) + length + 1);
@@ -448,7 +453,8 @@ _XcursorReadImage (XcursorFile		*file,
     if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &head.delay))
 	return NULL;
     /* sanity check data */
-    if (head.width >= 0x10000 || head.height > 0x10000)
+    if (head.width > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE  ||
+	head.height > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE)
 	return NULL;
     if (head.width == 0 || head.height == 0)
 	return NULL;
@@ -457,6 +463,8 @@ _XcursorReadImage (XcursorFile		*file,
 
     /* Create the image and initialize it */
     image = XcursorImageCreate (head.width, head.height);
+    if (image == NULL)
+	return NULL;
     if (chunkHeader.version < image->version)
 	image->version = chunkHeader.version;
     image->size = chunkHeader.subtype;
-- 
2.7.4