curl: Drop CVE patches

curl was upgraded to 7.58.0 on upstream poky rocko branch
and this version already contains all our CVE patches.

Signed-off-by: Martin Borg <martin.borg@enea.com>

5 files changed, 0 insertions, 292 deletions

diff --git a/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2017-1000257.patch b/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2017-1000257.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index de0dc3a..0000000
--- a/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2017-1000257.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From 13c9a9ded3ae744a1e11cbc14e9146d9fa427040 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
-Date: Sat, 7 Oct 2017 00:11:31 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] imap: if a FETCH response has no size, don't call write
- callback
-
-CVE: CVE-2017-1000257
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://curl.haxx.se/CVE-2017-1000257.patch]
-
-Reported-by: Brian Carpenter and 0xd34db347
-Also detected by OSS-Fuzz: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=3586
-Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>
----
- lib/imap.c | 5 +++++
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/lib/imap.c b/lib/imap.c
-index 954d18f37..baa31a2f8 100644
---- a/lib/imap.c
-+++ b/lib/imap.c
-@@ -1124,10 +1124,15 @@ static CURLcode imap_state_fetch_resp(struct connectdata *conn, int imapcode,
- 
-       if(chunk > (size_t)size)
-         /* The conversion from curl_off_t to size_t is always fine here */
-         chunk = (size_t)size;
- 
-+      if(!chunk) {
-+        /* no size, we're done with the data */
-+        state(conn, IMAP_STOP);
-+        return CURLE_OK;
-+      }
-       result = Curl_client_write(conn, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, pp->cache, chunk);
-       if(result)
-         return result;
- 
-       data->req.bytecount += chunk;
--- 
-2.15.0.rc1
-
diff --git a/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2017-8816.patch b/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2017-8816.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9b957ce..0000000
--- a/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2017-8816.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-From 7947c50bcd09cf471c95511739bc66d2cb506ee2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
-Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2017 23:51:52 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] ntlm: avoid integer overflow for malloc size
-
-Reported-by: Alex Nichols
-Assisted-by: Kamil Dudka and Max Dymond
-
-CVE: CVE-2017-8816
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://curl.haxx.se/CVE-2017-8816.patch]
-
-Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2017-11e7.html
-Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>
----
- lib/curl_ntlm_core.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c b/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c
-index 1309bf0d9..e8962769c 100644
---- a/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c
-+++ b/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c
-@@ -644,23 +644,42 @@ CURLcode Curl_hmac_md5(const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen,
-   Curl_HMAC_final(ctxt, output);
- 
-   return CURLE_OK;
- }
- 
-+#ifndef SIZE_T_MAX
-+/* some limits.h headers have this defined, some don't */
-+#if defined(SIZEOF_SIZE_T) && (SIZEOF_SIZE_T > 4)
-+#define SIZE_T_MAX 18446744073709551615U
-+#else
-+#define SIZE_T_MAX 4294967295U
-+#endif
-+#endif
-+
- /* This creates the NTLMv2 hash by using NTLM hash as the key and Unicode
-  * (uppercase UserName + Domain) as the data
-  */
- CURLcode Curl_ntlm_core_mk_ntlmv2_hash(const char *user, size_t userlen,
-                                        const char *domain, size_t domlen,
-                                        unsigned char *ntlmhash,
-                                        unsigned char *ntlmv2hash)
- {
-   /* Unicode representation */
--  size_t identity_len = (userlen + domlen) * 2;
--  unsigned char *identity = malloc(identity_len);
-+  size_t identity_len;
-+  unsigned char *identity;
-   CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
- 
-+  /* we do the length checks below separately to avoid integer overflow risk
-+     on extreme data lengths */
-+  if((userlen > SIZE_T_MAX/2) ||
-+     (domlen > SIZE_T_MAX/2) ||
-+     ((userlen + domlen) > SIZE_T_MAX/2))
-+    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
-+
-+  identity_len = (userlen + domlen) * 2;
-+  identity = malloc(identity_len);
-+
-   if(!identity)
-     return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
- 
-   ascii_uppercase_to_unicode_le(identity, user, userlen);
-   ascii_to_unicode_le(identity + (userlen << 1), domain, domlen);
--- 
-2.15.0
-
diff --git a/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2017-8817.patch b/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2017-8817.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e8429b2..0000000
--- a/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2017-8817.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-From 438a9ebfe9c4dc850ca2ed858bf5b8c31ce15ef5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>
-Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2018 08:48:05 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] curl: fix for CVE-2017-8817
-
-wildcardmatch: fix heap buffer overflow in setcharset
-
-The code would previous read beyond the end of the pattern string if the
-match pattern ends with an open bracket when the default pattern
-matching function is used.
-
-Detected by OSS-Fuzz:
-https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=4161
-
-CVE: CVE-2017-8817
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://curl.haxx.se/CVE-2017-8817.patch]
-
-Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2017-ae72.html
-
-Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>
----
- lib/curl_fnmatch.c      |  9 +++------
- tests/data/Makefile.inc |  2 +-
- tests/data/test1163     | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 tests/data/test1163
-
-diff --git a/lib/curl_fnmatch.c b/lib/curl_fnmatch.c
-index 46d3ada..5dd5323 100644
---- a/lib/curl_fnmatch.c
-+++ b/lib/curl_fnmatch.c
-@@ -133,6 +133,9 @@ static int setcharset(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *charset)
-   unsigned char c;
-   for(;;) {
-     c = **p;
-+    if(!c)
-+      return SETCHARSET_FAIL;
-+
-     switch(state) {
-     case CURLFNM_SCHS_DEFAULT:
-       if(ISALNUM(c)) { /* ASCII value */
-@@ -196,9 +199,6 @@ static int setcharset(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *charset)
-         else
-           return SETCHARSET_FAIL;
-       }
--      else if(c == '\0') {
--        return SETCHARSET_FAIL;
--      }
-       else {
-         charset[c] = 1;
-         (*p)++;
-@@ -277,9 +277,6 @@ static int setcharset(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *charset)
-       else if(c == ']') {
-         return SETCHARSET_OK;
-       }
--      else if(c == '\0') {
--        return SETCHARSET_FAIL;
--      }
-       else if(ISPRINT(c)) {
-         charset[c] = 1;
-         (*p)++;
-diff --git a/tests/data/Makefile.inc b/tests/data/Makefile.inc
-index 5284654..942f9ee 100644
---- a/tests/data/Makefile.inc
-+++ b/tests/data/Makefile.inc
-@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ test1128 test1129 test1130 test1131 test1132 test1133 test1134 test1135 \
- test1136 test1137 test1138 test1139 test1140 test1141 test1142 test1143 \
- test1144 test1145 test1146 \
- test1152 \
--\
-+test1163 \
- test1200 test1201 test1202 test1203 test1204 test1205 test1206 test1207 \
- test1208 test1209 test1210 test1211 test1212 test1213 test1214 test1215 \
- test1216 test1217 test1218 test1219 \
-diff --git a/tests/data/test1163 b/tests/data/test1163
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3266fa8
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/tests/data/test1163
-@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
-+<testcase>
-+<info>
-+<keywords>
-+FTP
-+RETR
-+LIST
-+wildcardmatch
-+ftplistparser
-+flaky
-+</keywords>
-+</info>
-+
-+#
-+# Server-side
-+<reply>
-+<data>
-+</data>
-+</reply>
-+
-+# Client-side
-+<client>
-+<server>
-+ftp
-+</server>
-+<tool>
-+lib576
-+</tool>
-+<name>
-+FTP wildcard with pattern ending with an open-bracket
-+</name>
-+<command>
-+"ftp://%HOSTIP:%FTPPORT/fully_simulated/DOS/*[]["
-+</command>
-+</client>
-+<verify>
-+<protocol>
-+USER anonymous
-+PASS ftp@example.com
-+PWD
-+CWD fully_simulated
-+CWD DOS
-+EPSV
-+TYPE A
-+LIST
-+QUIT
-+</protocol>
-+# 78 == CURLE_REMOTE_FILE_NOT_FOUND
-+<errorcode>
-+78
-+</errorcode>
-+</verify>
-+</testcase>
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2018-1000005.patch b/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2018-1000005.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 200ef16..0000000
--- a/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2018-1000005.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From fa3dbb9a147488a2943bda809c66fc497efe06cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zhouyihai Ding <ddyihai@ddyihai.svl.corp.google.com>
-Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 10:12:18 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH] http2: fix incorrect trailer buffer size
-
-Prior to this change the stored byte count of each trailer was
-miscalculated and 1 less than required. It appears any trailer
-after the first that was passed to Curl_client_write would be truncated
-or corrupted as well as the size. Potentially the size of some
-subsequent trailer could be erroneously extracted from the contents of
-that trailer, and since that size is used by client write an
-out-of-bounds read could occur and cause a crash or be otherwise
-processed by client write.
-
-The bug appears to have been born in 0761a51 (precedes 7.49.0).
-
-Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/2231
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2018-1000005
-
-Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>
----
- lib/http2.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/http2.c b/lib/http2.c
-index 8e2fc71996..699287940e 100644
---- a/lib/http2.c
-+++ b/lib/http2.c
-@@ -925,8 +925,8 @@ static int on_header(nghttp2_session *session, const nghttp2_frame *frame,
- 
-   if(stream->bodystarted) {
-     /* This is trailer fields. */
--    /* 3 is for ":" and "\r\n". */
--    uint32_t n = (uint32_t)(namelen + valuelen + 3);
-+    /* 4 is for ": " and "\r\n". */
-+    uint32_t n = (uint32_t)(namelen + valuelen + 4);
- 
-     DEBUGF(infof(data_s, "h2 trailer: %.*s: %.*s\n", namelen, name, valuelen,
-                  value));
diff --git a/recipes-support/curl/curl_%.bbappend b/recipes-support/curl/curl_%.bbappend
deleted file mode 100644
index d30e613..0000000
--- a/recipes-support/curl/curl_%.bbappend
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# look for files in the layer first
-FILESEXTRAPATHS_prepend := "${THISDIR}/${PN}:"
-
-SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2017-1000257.patch \
-            file://CVE-2017-8816.patch \
-            file://CVE-2017-8817.patch \
-            file://CVE-2018-1000005.patch \
-           "